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Dinsdag, 18 Januari 2011 | Bewerkt door Crethi Plethi

WikiLeaks: Intensieve Samenwerking Nederland en de VS in Counter-Terrorisme

Document 1, 2 en 3: Drie ambtsberichten van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over de samenwerking met Nederland in de strijd tegen terrorisme. Twee jongens filmen de ambassades van Israel en VS. Inkijkje in samenwerking met Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisme bestrijding (NCTb).

Document 4: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over de samenwerking met Nederland in de strijd tegen terrorisme. Arrestatie Hofstadgroep op 14/10/2005. Samenwerking NCTb en VS.

Document 5: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over de samenwerking met Nederland in de strijd tegen terrorisme. Juridische verhouding met Nederland nav bezoek Attorney General Gonzales o.a. over discussie rondom beveiliging Hirsi Ali, activiteiten van FBI, Homeland, Secret Service etc.

Document 6: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over de samenwerking met Nederland in de strijd tegen terrorisme. Arrestatie van zes terreurverdachten.

Bron document 1: WikiLeaks/NOS

”
19205,

7/29/2004 5:59,

04THEHAGUE1903,

“Embassy The Hague”,

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,,

“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.”,

“UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001903

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

TERREP

STATE FOR DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/IP/EUR, DS/ICI/PII, DS/ICI/CI,
DS/IP/FPO, EUR/UIB
AMSTERDAM FOR PSO
BRUSSELS FOR LEGAT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC, NL, PTER
SUBJECT: SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. EMBASSY THE HAGUE 07/27/2004

A. (U) POST: The Hague.

B, (U) ACTIVITY DATE/TIME: July 27, 2004 at approximately
1250 hrs.

C. (SBU) SUMMARY: DCM and RSO responded to the office of
the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Public
Safety, at his request, to join with the Israeli Security
Officer, in a briefing on a security incident from the
previous evening. The security incident was a filming of
sensitive locations including Dutch provincial and national
government building and the US and Israeli Embassies, among
others. It was later determined that our source received the
report the previous evening but that the incident was several
hours earlier in the day.

The incident came to light when the Dutch Royal Military
Police Security Detail for the Israeli Defense Attach
noticed an passenger filming the area in front of the Israeli
Embassy from inside a vehicle stopped across the street. The
MPs followed the suspicious vehicle, a black Peugeot 205
(NFI) and when the driver was observed using his cell phone,
not hands free while driving, they stopped him for the
traffic violation. The two occupants were determined to be a
Dutch citizen and a Saudi citizen. The MPs reviewed the
filming done by the subject even though they lacked any clear
legal authority to do so. The review revealed they had filmed
for approximately one kilometer on 3 streets. They began at
the provincial government building around the corner and
continued towards our location filming the Omani Embassy,
Turkish Embassy, The Hague’s only Synagogue, the French
Embassy (immediately adjacent to us) along the way, our
building and continued almost a half kilometer to the Israeli
Embassy and the Dutch Parliament building across the street.
The subject’s line of approach gave him an angled view of our
only pedestrian entrance and our rear gate vehicle entrance.
This line of travel took then along the south side (long
side) of the building and gave them a similarly angled but
fairly complete view of the front of our building. Finding no
reason to hold the subjects the MPs released them after
returning their video camera.

The Coordinator refused our requests for names, DOBs and tag
numbers citing the fact that an active Police investigation
was ongoing and that he did not have authority to release
that information. He did indicate that he anticipated arrests
in the next day or two.

D, (SBU) REPORT SOURCE: Agents of the Dutch Royal Military
Police (Koninklijke Marechausee) Protective Security Branch
(BSB) to Ajgan Jonge Vos, Dutch National Coordinator for
Security and Public Safety.

E. (SBU) DESCRIPTIONS: Two Males, one Saudi National and one
Dutch National. Mr. Jonge Vos is restricted in what
information he can disclose but he did state a) the subjects
drove up the A-12 from Utrecht, b) that one subject was born
in Brawa and c) the investigation was being conducted outside
The Hague. From that we deduce that driver/vehicle owner is a
naturalized citizen from Brawa or Brawa Yare, Somalia and
that the investigation is in the hands of the authorities in
Utrecht. Utrecht, about 60 km East of The Hague is the fourth
largest city in the Netherlands, a city with a significant
Muslim immigrant population and a known radical mosques.

F. PROBABLE TARGET/S: Dutch government, US and Israeli Embassy

G. (SBU) POST INVESTIGATE ACTIONS: RSO will check SDTeam
Database and attempt to determine is our cameras recorded the
passage of the vehicle. The Israeli RSO will also check his
video recordings and has agreed to share his results.

H. (SBU) POST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL ACTIONS: RSO will brief
the SD Team and the MSG Detachment.

I. (SBU) REQUESTS MADE FOR HOST SECURITY ASSISTANCE: DCM and
RSO requested any an all releasable information developed as
the investigation progresses.

J. (SBU) SECURITY ACTIONS TAKEN BY HOST GOVERNMENT: Host
government has promised a full investigation.

Bron document 2: WikiLeaks/NOS

”
19260,

7/30/2004 6:06,

04THEHAGUE1915,

“Embassy The Hague”,

SECRET//NOFORN,

04THEHAGUE1903,

“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.”,

“S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001915

SIPDIS

NOFORN

TERREP

STATE FOR DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/IP/EUR, DS/ICI/PII, DS/ICI/CI,
DS/IP/FPO, EUR/UBI DESK
BRUSSELS FOR LEGATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/28/2014
TAGS: ASEC, NL, PTER
SUBJECT: SURVEILLANCE OF U.S. EMBASSY THE HAGUE 07/27/2004,
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
REF: THE HAGUE 01903

Classified By: RSO JOHN HUCKE

1. (S/NF) The date of this incident is now in question. ORCA
reports that the liaison service reports the incident as
having taken place on Monday July 26. A very senior member
of The Hague Police told the RSO this afternoon that the
incident occurred on Monday and the Israeli RSO maintains
that the incident occurred on Monday vice Tuesday, per a
member of his staff who cites the Royal Military Police
Detail as their source. The RSO recontacted the National
Coordinator for Security and Public Safety who originally
provided the information to the embassy. In response to the
RSO’s query he replied he was informed at 2100 hours 07/27
and when he received the written report on the morning of
07/28 it had been written 07/27/2004 at 1300. RSO advised him
that two elements of his government were reporting the
incident on the 26th vice the 27th. The Coordinator advised
he was out of the office and would recheck and advise RSO on
Friday morning.

2. (C) (SENSITIVE SOURCE REQUIRING PROTECTION) On 07/28/2004
a member of the Dutch National Police (KLPD) faxed the
Brussels LEGATT the names and bio data of the two individuals
involved in this incident along with 3 Dutch Mobile Phone
Numbers associated with the pair and requested FBI record
checks. Brussels LEGATT shared this information with RSO The
Hague. The LEGATT now believes this fax might be considered
an unauthorized disclosure by Dutch Prosecutors if they did
not specifically direct the Officer to make this query, hence
the request the source be protected along with the method the
information was transmitted. The fax stated that the subjects
were arrested on Tuesday the 27th.,””when making a video of
the Israeli embassy. Examination of the video tape showed
there was also footage of the embassies of the United States
and England””. LEGATT reported no record on subjects or phone
numbers. RSO COMMENT – This is the first, and so far only,
mention of the British embassy. The British embassy is not on
the route provided by the source of the original report and
while close to the US embassy would not be visible from any
portion of the route reported so far. RSO does not believe
these individuals were arrested in the normal U. S. sense of
the word, they were detained in what might be called a field
interview or traffic stop since a traffic violation was cited
as justification for the stop.

3. (SBU) Subject One: XXXXXXXXXXXX, Somalia residing at Alberding Thijinstraat
16, Rotterdam, NL.

4. (SBU) Subject Two: XXXXXXXXXXXX, Saudi Citizen, DBOP
Oct. 13, 1977 Saudi Arabia.

5, (S/NF) This information was provided ORCA for traces.

6. (SBU) AM CON GEN Amsterdam reports no record in Class.

7. (SBU) DHS Attach Rotterdam Container Security Initiative
conducted TECS checks with negative results.

8. (SBU) In reftel RSO reported the deduction the that
Subject One was a resident of Utrecht and the investigation
was centered there. That deduction is now in question as the
bio data indicates the subject is from Rotterdam. The Dutch
National Terrorism Prosecutor is located in Rotterdam and
will supervise the investigation where ever it is centered.

SOBEL

“,
19285,7/30/2004 12:31,04THEHAGUE1916,”Embassy The
Hague”,CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN,04STATE157147,”This record is a partial extract
of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

Bron document 3: WikiLeaks/NOS

”
19309,

7/30/2004 17:29,

04THEHAGUE1923,

“Embassy The Hague”,

CONFIDENTIAL,

04THEHAGUE1903|04THEHAGUE1915,

“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.”,

“C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001923

SIPDIS

TERREP

STATE FOR DS/DSS/IP/EUR, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, DS/IP/FPO,
EUR/UBI DESK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2014
TAGS: ASEC, NL, PTER
SUBJECT: SURVEILLANCE OF THE U.S. EMBASSY THE HAGUE ON
07/26/2004 (CORRECTED DATE)
REF: A. (A) THE HAGUE 01915
B. (B) THE HAGUE 01903

Classified By: RSO JOHN HUCKE, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (SBU) Dutch National Coordinator for Security and Public
Safety contacted the RSO on 07/30 and advised that the
incident had actually occurred on 07/26 and not 07/27 as he
originally told the embassy. As an aside he stated he would
determine why he wasn’t informed until the evening of 07/27.
From other sources we now believe the delay occurred at the
lowest level of law enforcement and that the Coordinator
contacted us shortly after the report actually came to him.

2. (C) LEGATT Brussels met with the controlling prosecutor
and the Police in Rotterdam this morning and afternoon.
Subsequent to these meetings LEGATT responded to the embassy
and briefed the Security sub committee of the EAC. There has
been a marked improvement in information sharing regarding
this case. The prosecutor instructed the Police to keep the
LEGATT informed. Accordingly there has been a stream of calls
doing so. While the flow is somewhat fragmentary, important
developments are being reported, virtually in real time. The
two subjects have been closely monitored and were arrested
separately, one this morning and the other this afternoon,
both without incident. Two, as yet unidentified, associates
were also arrested. LEGATT reports the Police are searching
two houses and two vehicle as of 1710 hours. One house is
the residence of the subject XXXXXXXXXXXX, the
ownership/occupancy of the other hose is currently unknown.
It is know that the subjects were followed to this location
yesterday. One vehicle is presumably the Black Peugeot 205,
NL Tag TY 73 HK, used in this incident. Police advise that an
Uzi SMG was found at the other residence. The Prosecutor has
authorized continued detention of all of the subjects based
on the recovery of a firearm. LEGATT anticipates additional
calls as further evidence is uncovered.

3. (SBU) RSO had the vehicle description and tag number run
in the RSO’s Amsterdam/The Hague Surveillance Detection Team
database with negative results. Post managment and other
interested embassy elements have been updated on
developements through 1900 hrs.

SOBEL

“,
19310,7/30/2004 17:38,04THEHAGUE1924,”Embassy The
Hague”,SECRET//NOFORN,04THEHAGUE1913|04THEHAGUE1915,
“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.
301738Z Jul 04
“,”S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001924

Bron document 4: WikiLeaks/NOS

“,
22285,

11/1/2004 17:55,

04THEHAGUE2793,

“Embassy The Hague”,

CONFIDENTIAL,,

“This record is a partial extract of the original cable.
The full text of the original cable is not available.”,

“C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002793

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI – PROSPER/RICHARD, EUR – STEPHENS,
EUR/SCE – GAUDIOSI/GREGORIAN/MITCHELL, L/EUR – LAHNE, L/AF
– GTAFT. INR/WCAD – SEIDENSTRICKER/MORIN; USUN FOR
ROSTOW/WILLSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: FIVE YEARS AFTER ICTY CLOSURE
TAGS: BK, HR, KAWC, NL, PHUM, PREL, SR, ICTY
SUBJECT: ICTY – TRIBUNAL OFFICIALS HIGHLIGHT CONCERNS ABOUT
SERB NONCOOPERATION AND BUDGET FREEZE IN MEETINGS WITH
S/WCI AMBASSADOR PROSPER AND EUR STEPHENS

Classified By: Clifton M. Johnson, Legal Counselor, Reason 1.5(b)-(d).

1. (C) Summary. In a series of meetings on September 28 at
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), President Meron, Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte, and
Registrar Holthuis struck consistent themes with
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Pierre Prosper and
EUR DAS for Southeast Europe Kathy Stephens. All ICTY
officials lamented the continued lack of cooperation with
Serbia and Montenegro on fugitives and welcomed the USG,s
renewed tough message to Belgrade. ICTY officials were
similarly receptive to efforts by the USG to coordinate a
similar policy line with the Europeans, linking the EU
accession process with progress on cooperation. While
describing efforts to facilitate the transfer of cases to the
region, ICTY officials underscored their deep concern about
the continuing hiring freeze imposed on the Tribunal by the
UN and noted its significant negative impact on the ICTY,s
ability to meet completion strategy goals. End summary.

——————-
The Prosecution
——————-

2. (C) Ambassador Prosper joined by EUR DAS Stephens,
EUR/SCE officer Jennifer Mitchell and Embassy legal officers,
opened their visit by meeting with Chief Prosecutor Carla Del
Ponte and her senior staff. Prosper and Stephens expressed
deep concern with the lack of cooperation by Belgrade and
stressed the need to reevaluate current policy in the region
in order to increase pressure and incentives on Belgrade to
cooperate with the ICTY. Del Ponte welcomed this objective
but expressed concern that earlier USG remarks about the
possibility of transferring the four generals to Serbia for
trial were premature, being used as a pretext by Belgrade to
cease all efforts to bring about the transfer of fugitives
below the Mladic level, and, more generally, encouraging
Serb officials and fugitives to try to wait out the ICTY,s
completion. Prosper explained that Belgrade had been given
an opportunity to produce results and that the policy of
showing an openness to support transfers back to the region
for domestic trail “”hasn,t worked to date.”” What is needed,
he said, is a stronger message to “”make clear in the region
that noncooperation will result in extending the life of the
Tribunal.”” Del Ponte and her staff supported the idea of a
firmer message but advised that the USG should avoid stating
specific requirements of cooperation because SAM would
respond by only meeting those requirements, and then only to
draw out the process of cooperation on those few things.
Senior political adviser Jean-Daniel Ruch urged that the
message should be, “”you know what to do, start doing it.””

3. (C) Ruch said that he would urge his contacts in Brussels,
on the staff of Javier Solana and Chris Patten, to reinforce
the tough message on Belgrade,s cooperation. He pointed out
that in June 2004, the EU had stated that as long as Mladic,
Karadzic, and Gotovina remained at large, the Tribunal should
not close its doors. Del Ponte welcomed Stephens,s focus on
coordinating a tough message with the EU as “”extremely
important”” and said she supported a unified message of the
sort announced by the EU ministers and endorsed by Ambassador
Prosper. Note. On October 4, Del Ponte met with Solana and
urged him to deliver a stiff message to SAM on the need to
cooperate fully in order for their to be progress on EU
accession issues. End note.

4. (C) Speaking to OTP,s overall frustration with Serb
noncooperation, Del Ponte reported that, according to a
conversation she had with the chairman of the National
Council for Cooperation with the ICTY, Rasim Ljajic,
“”Kostunica believes the United States only wants Mladic and
that is the reason they are not arresting the others.”” Chief
of Investigations Patrick Lopez-Terres cited RS police
sources who complain that the Belgrade police are not helping
them. But he also expressed concern about the “”complete radio
silence”” with respect to search operations conducted by Serb
authorities and the lack of feedback with respect to fugitive
information passed by the ICTY. Increasingly, he said, his
office cannot track Belgrade,s work on fugitives.

————
The Court
————

5. (SBU) President Theodor Meron, joined by chief of staff
Larry Johnson, focused on the ICTY,s budget crisis, which he
called a “”real plague”” on the Tribunal. Meron noted that the
main result of the crisis is the hiring freeze. It has
affected all of the Tribunal,s main activities, from
judicial decisionmaking (although the Chambers received
permission to fill nine vital clerkship positions, new
vacancies have since arisen) to OTP investigations and
prosecutions (OTP is hemorrhaging senior investigators and
prosecutors to places like the Oil For Food investigation and
the International Criminal Court and is unable to fill the
vacancies) to transitioning cases to the region (OTP cannot
staff a new transition team to facilitate the transfer of
cases to the region until it can fill vacancies). Meron
urged the USG to provide its assessed contribution as soon as
possible in order to convince U/SYG Bertini to lift the
freeze. Meron was pleased to learn that the United States
expected to make a 13 million USD contribution by early
October and that another 10 million USD would follow this
autumn. (Note. Post understands that both Russia and Japan,
the other major contributors in arrears have now paid all or
most of their outstanding balances. The US paid $14.3
million in October and expects to pay the remaining balance
of $8.8 million shortly. End note.)

6. (C) Meron expressed concern that the BiH State
Prosecutor’s Special Department for Organized Crime and
Corruption has complicated the process of creating the war
crimes chamber in Sarajevo by issuing a war crimes indictment
before the chamber has been established, thereby sending
mixed signals regarding the readiness of BiH to adjudicate
domestic war crimes cases . Prosper and Meron agreed that
cooperation from local governments is a critical dimension in
the success of the 11bis trials referred to the local courts.
Meron said that the Tribunal must be “”very careful”” about
the transfer of detainees who might be considered
senior-level, not only because of the Security Council
expectation that such persons would be tried in The Hague but
also because of the signals that could send to senior-level
fugitives. Meron also expressed a willingness to work with
the USG in particular on urging Belgrade to develop domestic
capacity to prosecute war crimes, noting that he had good
relations with the local SAM Ambassador and other SAM
officials.

—————
The Registry
—————-

7. (SBU) Registrar Hans Holthuis echoed Meron in focusing on
the hiring freeze, which has forced the Tribunal to maintain
a fifteen (15) percent staff vacancy rate, well above the
normal 3 to 4 percent rate. This includes positions lost to
normal attrition that remain unfilled. Prosper indicated
that he would follow-up with USUN and the UN leadership in an
effort to lift the hiring freeze, at least to fill vacancies
due to normal attrition.

8. (SBU) Holthuis described various initiatives under way to
enhance Tribunal efficiency and further progress towards
completion. He said that the Registry is examining ways in
which to schedule more than the present six trials in its
three courtrooms, noting that it might be possible to
schedule contempt hearings and other short proceedings during
gaps in the major trials. Holthuis also reviewed outreach
and training efforts underway in Croatia, SAM, and BiH to
help build up local trial capacity.

9. (C) Comment: The budget crisis is severely testing the
OTP,s capacity to carry out its remaining pre-indictment
investigations and the Tribunal,s capacity overall to
continue with its six-trial maximum schedule. A quick
lifting of the hiring freeze is essential not only to permit
the Tribunal to complete its work on time but also for it
advance the transfer of cases involving mid and lower level
perpetrators back to the region for trial. All ICTY leaders
are focused on the capacity of jurisdictions in the region to
prosecute war crimes cases at a level that meets
international standards. OTP and Chambers are particularly
focused on the capacity of the Sarajevo war crimes chamber to
handle 11bis cases as early as this January, since this
constitutes by far the largest category of cases eligible to
be transferred. OTP has also begun testing Belgrade,s
capacity to conduct effective and fair war crimes trials by
providing the special war crimes court there with complete
investigative files in two cases. If these cases go well,
the Tribunal is prepared to add others in the pipeline. ICTY
and USG officials shared the sense that cooperation with
Belgrade is at a crossroads. The promising start of domestic
war crimes trials points a clear way towards the future, but
that opportunity as well as progress towards European
integration will be squandered if political levels fail to
produce the long overdue results with respect to fugitives.
End comment.

10 (U) This cable has been cleared by S/WCI Prosper and EUR

Stephens.

Bron document 5: WikiLeaks/NOS

“,
82501,

10/19/2006 15:25,

06THEHAGUE2277,

“Embassy The Hague”,

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,,

“VZCZCXRO4671
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTC #2277/01 2921525
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 191525Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7164
INFO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAT/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 1618”,”UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 THE
HAGUE 002277

SIPDIS

JUSTICE FOR OIA-JFRIEDMAN
JUSTICE FOR ANDREW BEACH, THERESA PAGLIOCCA

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, PTER, SNAR, PREL, PGOV, KJUS, PINR, NL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL GONZALES VISIT TO
THE NETHERLANDS, OCTOBER 25-27, 2006
THE HAGUE 00002277 001.2 OF 005

1. (SBU) We warmly welcome your visit to the Netherlands,
the first by an Attorney General since Attorney General
Aschroft visited in September 2004. There are four
important issues where you can advance our law enforcement
agenda: (1) Establish a strong working relationship with
new Minister of Justice Ernst Hirsch Ballin; (2) Launch a
new bilateral dialogue on cyber crime, a major issue for
both us and the Dutch; (3) Review with Eurojust the new
relationship we will have as a result of our recently
negotiated MOU; and (4) Engage in robust press outreach that
emphasizes our common goals and answers our many critics
here. Accordingly, your schedule is built around a working
lunch with Minister Hirsch Ballin, meetings with Interior
Minister Remkes and Eurojust president Kennedy, and your
welcoming address to the cyber crime conference. We have
also scheduled a press conference, a television interview
and a one-on-one interview with the best weekly magazine in
the Netherlands.

Overview
——–

2. (SBU) Dutch Parliamentary elections will be held on
November 22. The race appears to be a dead heat between
Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende’s center-right coalition
and the left-of-center Labor party. Balkenende came to
power in 2001, but his government collapsed in August over a
dispute regarding Dutch Parliamentarian Aayan Hirsi Ali’s
asylum application. The Somali-born politician – a vocal
critic of extreme Islam – is now in the United States with
the American Enterprise Institute. How to provide her
adequate protection in Washington is the subject of
continuing discussions between us and the Dutch, and the
issue may come up during your visit as Hirsch Ballin is the
key Dutch decision maker on this issue.

3. (U) Aside from the elections, the most significant news
here is the Dutch economy, which has come to life in recent
months. Current projections show the economy growing at a
rate of nearly 3 percent with unemployment falling below 5.5
percent. The economy is outperforming Eurozone averages for
the first time in seven years.

4. (SBU) Our relations with the Dutch are excellent, aside
from Guantanamo and negative public opinion of Iraq and
other policies. The Dutch are strong allies in the Global
War on Terrorism, and currently have nearly 2,000 troops
deployed in the heart of southern Afghanistan, where the
Taliban are seeking to make a comeback. A Dutch contingent
also served in the early stages of the Iraq war. Although
they do not approve of our policies at Guantanamo, they are
one of the few European countries engaging in serious
dialogue on the issue with us. Commercial relations are
strong, with heavy U.S. investment in the Netherlands and
heavy Dutch investment in the United States. In your
meetings and public remarks it will be important to
emphasize the breadth of our cooperation and how much we
value the Netherlands as a partner.

5. (SBU) Law enforcement cooperation is good and getting
better. While Dutch and EU data protection (privacy) rules
and bureaucratic restrictions continue to hamper some direct
police-to-police cooperation and information sharing, we
have made significant progress in the last two years to
advance our law enforcement priorities with the Dutch. We
expect interim Justice Minister Hirsch Ballin to continue
former Minister Piet Hein Donner’s pro-cooperation approach
with us.

Law Enforcement Presence
————————

6. (SBU) Our law enforcement presence here has tripled since
9/11 and now constitutes a strong platform for our extensive
law enforcement and counter-terrorism agenda with the Dutch,
and for our nascent relationship with EUROPOL and Eurojust.
Four U.S. law enforcement agencies operate from the Embassy,
and represent 10 percent of the entire mission staff.
— DEA: The six-person office focuses on cocaine and ecstasy
trafficking and works closely with the Dutch and other DEA
offices in Europe and South America. The Dutch are
facilitating information sharing and allowing some
controlled delivery operations for the first time. The DEA
office here is tied with Madrid as the largest in Western

THE HAGUE 00002277 002.2 OF 005

Europe.
— FBI: The bureau is represented by a Special Agent who was
permanently assigned to The Hague in October 2005. Since
his arrival, there has been a dramatic increase in the level
of cooperation between Dutch national police (KLDP) and
intelligence service (AIVD) on information and intelligence
sharing, cooperation on international investigations, and
the initiation of joint investigations. The Dutch have
requested FBI assistance in cases ranging from the Hofstad
Group (a home-grown terrorist cell) to the Natalee Holloway
disappearance in Aruba. The Legatt has direct access to the
KLPD’s counterterrorism unit, allowing him to be involved in
all criminal counter-terrorism investigations. Counterterrorism
and cyber crime are the two largest parts of FBI’s
portfolio here.
— DHS: Homeland Security is the largest U.S. law
enforcement agency in the Netherlands. DHS officers are
stationed at the Port of Rotterdam and Schiphol Airport to
scan cargo and check passengers destined for the United
States. DHS has 14 staff in the Netherlands, with plans to
add at least two more in the coming year. The DHS office
covers Belgium and Luxembourg in addition to the
Netherlands.
— Secret Service: The service has one special agent
stationed at EUROPOL with a primary focus on counterfeit
currency. His relations with EUROPOL colleagues are
excellent. The office was established in 2005.
— The Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Agency is
planning to assign an officer here starting in FY 2007. The
Postal Inspection Service has also expressed interest in
establishing a presence here.

Counter Terrorism
—————–

7. (SBU) The Dutch have strengthened their counter-terrorism
capabilities since 9/11 in three significant ways. First,
they passed tough new legislation that provided new counterterrorism
tools for police and prosecutors, increased
penalties for crimes committed with “”terrorist intent,”” made
conspiracy to commit a terrorist offense a crime, and
criminalized financial support for banned terrorist
organizations on UN and EU asset freeze lists. As of
January 1, 2005, every person over the age of 14 in the
Netherlands is obligated to carry valid identification and
the police can demand that identification at any time. More
recent legislation has given prosecutors the ability to
introduce classified material and sources into court
proceedings, and expanded the ability of law enforcement
agencies to share data. The conviction of nine members of
the Hofstad group in March marked the first successful
prosecution in the Netherlands for membership in a terrorist
organization, under 2004 legislation making such membership
a criminal offence.

8. (SBU) As with us, new terrorism laws have been
accompanied by increased attention to immigration.
Backlash about a growing immigrant population helped bring
Balkenende to power in 2001. New immigration laws are very
strict and include a requirement for immigrant visa
applicants to pass an exam on Dutch history and culture and
to learn Dutch. The exam was so difficult that many Dutch
natives failed the exam. As a result of these strict laws,
immigration is significantly down. The number of foreign
marriage partners and children immigrating to the
Netherlands has fallen by 50 percent over the past two
years.

9. (SBU) Second, the Dutch created a new agency specifically
charged with coordinating counter-terrorism policy: The
Office of the National Counter Terrorism Coordinator (NCTB)
reports jointly to Hirsch Ballin and Remkes. It became
operational in January 2005 and is mandated with
coordinating counter-terrorism efforts, including
facilitating cooperation among the police, intelligence and
prosecution services. Like all new government agencies, the
NCTB suffers from unclear lines of authority. The CT
Coordinator, Tjibbe Joustra, reports to both the Justice
Minister, the designated coordinating minister for
counterterrorism, and the Interior Minister, who oversees
the police and the AIVD domestic intelligence service. The

THE HAGUE 00002277 003.2 OF 005

merger of the Justice and Interior ministries into one
“”super ministry”” for security was proposed in 2005, but
consideration of the idea has been deferred until the new
government takes office. In addition to creating the NCTB
the Dutch have significantly expanded their military and
civilian intelligence bureaus.

10. (SBU) Third, the Dutch have greatly expanded cooperation
with the United States, Britain and others. They have been
strong partners with us on border security initiatives, and
were the first in Europe to host DHS’s Container Security
Initiative (CSI) and the Immigration Advisory Program.
Schiphol Airport was willing to share passenger data with
us, even in the face of EU criticism. The Port of Rotterdam
was also criticized by the EU for being the first to adopt
CSI; other European ports claimed it was an unfair trade
advantage.

11. (SBU) The government’s quarterly terrorist threat
assessment released October 16 maintained the threat level
at “”substantial,”” the second highest of four threat levels.
Substantial is defined as a “”realistic threat of an attack””
in the Netherlands or on Dutch interests abroad. The report
highlights continuing concern about radicalization among the
Dutch Muslim population as a factor in the assessment. The
Muslim community in the Netherlands is the second largest in
Europe as a percentage of the population (5.8 percent), and
is one of the least well integrated in Europe.

Counter Narcotics
—————–

12. (SBU) We have made significant strides in counter
narcotics cooperation with the Dutch. DEA has successfully
co-located special agents in two KLDP National Crime Squad
(NR) units, dealing with cocaine and synthetic drug
investigations. Co-location has greatly enhanced effective
cooperation, in particular police-to-police intelligence
sharing, and has helped to link Dutch drug investigations to
major ongoing DEA international operations. Since 2005, DEA
has been able to conduct controlled delivery (CD) operations
without a formal MLAT request.

13. (SBU) Our main concern over the past five years has been
stemming the flood of ecstasy from the Netherlands to the
United States. Through combined efforts by DEA and Dutch
authorities, the number of ecstasy tablets seized in the
United States that could be traced to the Netherlands
dropped from over 5 million a year in the early 2000s to
roughly 200,000 in 2004. Dutch efforts against ecstasy were
commended by President Bush in the 2006 International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). Cooperation
against synthetic drug trafficking will likely remain our
top focus in the foreseeable future.

14. (SBU) Police-to-police sharing goes both ways with the
Dutch. As a result of the October 2004 MOU between the KLDP
and the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), the KLDP can now
run intelligence checks through the EPIC Watch Center 24
hours a day; the KLPD is the only European police agency
with such access. EPIC access has helped foster closer
police-to-police intelligence sharing. For example, the
Dutch have agreed to share names on the “”blacklist”” of drug
couriers arrested at Schiphol airport; as a result, over
6,000 drug couriers have been entered into DEA databases.
Since May 2005, the Dutch have participated in DEA’s
International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) as
observers; they will become a full IDEC member at the next
conference in Madrid in May 2007.

Cyber Crime
———–

15. (U) The bilateral cyber crime conference that you will
open with Hirsch Ballin and the Ambasasdor on October 26
will bring together 40 U.S. and Dutch policy-makers,
prosecutors and police for in-depth discussions on effective
approaches to combating cyber crime. In addition to
detailed discussions of mechanisms for effective cooperation
on cyber crime, the conference will include sessions on
combating use of the Internet for child pornography,
terrorism and radicalization, and scams and frauds. U.S
delegates include DOJ prosecutors, cyber crime and
international affairs experts, and FBI, Secret Service, and
DHS officials.

THE HAGUE 00002277 004.2 OF 005

16. (U) Long the gateway to Europe via sea and air, the
Netherlands is quickly becoming a digital gateway as well.
It now tops the world in broadband internet penetration,
along with South Korea. Because of the high connectivity of
the country, the Dutch allocate substantial energy to
combating child pornography, internet radicalization and online
scams and frauds. The National Prosecutor just
released a four-year strategy that identifies cyber crime as
one of his four priority law enforcement areas. The FBI
Legatt spends nearly half his time working on cyber crime
cases. The national police are forming a new high tech
crime squad to investigate complex cyber crime cases. Dutch
prosecutors uncovered and are in the process of prosecuting
one of the largest hacking cases to date. Cases like these
will be discussed during the conference and help both
countries develop a better understanding of what is required
to combat cyber crime.

Extraditions
————

17. (SBU) We have an active extradition portfolio with the
Dutch that generally runs smoothly, although sometimes
slowly. Extraditions cover a wide array of crimes, many
drug-related. So far this year, 8 suspects have been
extradited. Two high-profile cases merit your attention,
the first involving a terror suspect, the second involving a
well-known Dutch business executive whom we have indicted on
corruption charges.

18. (SBU) The terror case concerns Iraqi-born Dutch citizen
Wesam Al Delaema. Al Delaema is the first individual to be
indicted in a U.S. criminal case for terrorist activities —
conspiracy to kill U.S. citizens and bomb U.S. property —
in Iraq. On October 11, Justice Minister Hirsch Ballin
approved the extradition to the U.S. of Al Delaema. In the
extradition order, the Minister strongly refuted allegations
by the defense and some opposition parliamentarians that, as
a terror suspect, Al Delaema would not get a fair trail in
the U.S. Specifically, the Minister indicated he saw no
reason “”not to trust the U.S.”” to meet its commitments. Al
Delaema’s attorney has filed a request for an injunction
against the extradition order. We expect the Court to
reject the request; resolution of the case will likely take
two to three months, after which Al Delaema can be
extradited.

19. (SBU) The well-connected Dutch business executive,
Frederik Pluimers, was indicted in the U.S. on Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act violations. Although the Dutch
Supreme Court in 2003 cleared the way for his extradition,
the government has not taken any action to complete his
extradition. Pluimers is wanted, in his capacity as the
director of the U.S. subsidiary of Seybolt International, in
connection with bribes paid to Panamanian officials in 1995.
Pluimers is very well regarded in Dutch business and
political circles, however, and former Justice Minister
Donner deferred action on his extradition in light of
opposition from fellow Cabinet ministers. Foreign Minister
Bot wrote former Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick in late
2005 to request that the USG drop its extradition request
for Pluimers; following interagency consultation, Zoellick
responded that we would not drop the request. There has
been no further action on the case.

Detainee Issues
—————

20. (SBU) The Dutch in general strongly oppose our detainee
policies and Guantanamo, although we are making progress
convincing them that the issues are far more complex than is
often portrayed in public debates. Foreign Minister Bot has
called for the closure of Guantanamo, insisting detainees
there are in a legal black hole. He has also condemned the
use of secret prisons. In response to parliamentary
demands, he called at the EU Foreign Ministers meeting in
September for a resolution condemning the secret sites. He
has offered Dutch assistance in developing a detainee policy
that satisfies international legal norms as the Dutch see
them. State Department Legal Advisor John Bellinger visited
the Netherlands October 10-12 to discuss detainee policy,
the recently-passed Military Commissions Act, U.S.
interpretations of our obligations under international law,
and the future of secret detention facilities. Justice

THE HAGUE 00002277 005.2 OF 005

Minister Hirsch Ballin met with Bellinger and displayed an
appreciation for the challenges we face, and may raise the
issue during your meeting with him.

Your Meeting with Justice Minister Hirsch Ballin
——————————————— —

21. (U) Ernst Hirsch Ballin took office September 21,
following the resignation of Piet Hein Donner as Justice
Minister over charges that he was negligent in not
preventing a 2005 fire at a Schipol Airport detention center
that killed several illegal immigrants. Hirsch Ballin
served previously as Justice Minister from 1989 to 1994. He
is a distinguished law professor with a background in
international law. Your working lunch with him provides an
opportunity to establish ties with the new Minister and to
express appreciation for improved bilateral law enforcement
cooperation. It would also be useful to thank him for the
strong affirmation of trust in the U.S. justice system he
presented in the Al Delaema extradition order, and to press
him to move expeditiously on it once appeals are exhausted.
You should also thank him for Dutch efforts to combat the
ecstasy trade.

Your Meeting with Interior Minister Remkes
——————————————

22. (U) Interior Minister Remkes is responsible for crisis
management and oversees the police and the domestic
intelligence service. His role in setting law enforcement
and counter terrorism policy is limited. Your meeting
offers an opportunity to express appreciation for the
improved direct police-to-police cooperation in combating
terrorism, narcotics and organized crime.

Your Meeting with Eurojust President Kennedy
——————————————–

23. (U) Your meeting with Eurojust President Michael Kennedy
offers an opportunity to inaugurate a new relationship
between the DOJ and Eurojust. That relationship will be
formally initiated during the November signing of a working
agreement between MOJ and Eurojust. You can use your
meeting to focus on how best to utilize the new relationship
and how to focus on critical enforcement areas. This is
also an opportunity to look forward to cooperation on
implementing the Council of Europe cyber crime convention.

Press
—–

24. (U) We are working to arrange a press roundtable, a
television interview, and a longer human-interest interview
with a journalist from the Netherlands’s most influential
weekly newsmagazine. We are working to arrange a press pool
to cover your and Dutch Minister of Justice’s opening
remarks at the conference. The Dutch media will be
interested to learn about the outcomes of your meetings.
This is a good opportunity to highlight bilateral law
enforcement cooperation and commend progress made thus far.
Journalists will also be interested in hearing about our War
on Terror. The Dutch press is generally fair in its
reporting and your visit should produce some great coverage
that will help spread our messages to a broad audience.

Bron document 6: WikiLeaks/NOS

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84924,

11/8/2006 16:22,

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER, PINR, PINS, KPRP, PGOV, NL
SUBJECT: SIX SUSPECTS ARRESTED FOR JIHAD RECRUITMENT

1. The National Crime Squad (NR) arrested five men and one
woman in Amsterdam and The Hague on November 6 and 7 for
suspicion of recruitment for Jihad, participating in a
terrorist organization, and obtaining false travel
documents. According to the National Prosecutor’s Office,
the arrests are a result of an investigation begun in
November 2005, when the AIVD intelligence service informed
prosecutors that three young Muslims from The Hague were
considering fighting for extremist Islamic ends. The three
were later arrested in Azerbaijan by local authorities and
returned to the Netherlands with help from the Dutch police.

2. The group appears to have been led by Murat , alias
Ibrahim the Turk, alias Abu Jarah, who reportedly is the
main suspect and who was among those arrested. The 36-year
old Turk was previously tried in 2003, together with nine
other suspects, for Jihad recruitment, but was released due
to lack of evidence. The other five suspects arrested this
week were not identified publicly, but the prosecutor’s
office stated that some of them may have been involved in
obtaining false travel documents for Iraq. Dutch press
reported that two of the suspects, a 19 year-old woman and
her Islamic husband, were connected to the “”Hofstad”” terror
network. The main Turkish suspect reportedly has been on
the watch list of international intelligence agencies since
2000, when he was spotted in Australia collecting money for
Jihad in Chechnya. He reportedly was in contact with terror
suspect Mamdouh Habib, who served three years in Guantanamo
Bay on suspicion of having ties with Al Qaeda.

3. The NR said that it is continuing its investigation.