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Zaterdag, 4 December 2010 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6 | Bewerkt door Crethi Plethi

Jeminitische soldaat waakt over Sanaa (Foto: AFP/GETTY)

WikiLeaks: Jemen Gaf VS ‘Vrij Spel’ Voor Militaire Operaties Tegen Al Qaida

De president van Jemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, maakte in het geheim afspraken met de Amerikaanse regering om Amerikaanse troepen onbeperkte toegang tot Jemens grondgebied te geven voor het uitvoeren van militaire operaties tegen terroristische doelen van Al Qaida. Dit blijkt uit de documenten van Amerikaanse ambassades die via de website WikiLeaks naar buiten zijn gekomen.

De documenten onthullen de omvang van geheime Amerikaanse militaire operaties in Arabische landen in het Midden Oosten. Ook geven ze een goed beeld over de hypocrisie van Arabische regeringsleiders die bang zijn voor de binnenlandse publieke (islamitische) opinie, maar zich er ook van bewust zijn dat de strijd tegen Islamistisch terrorisme gevoerd moet worden willen zij overleven. Al Qaida strijdt niet alleen tegen het Westen, maar ook tegen de gematigde Arabische regeringen, zoals Saoedi-Arabië, die pro-Westers zijn.

Ondanks het risico van binnenlandse verontwaardiging over zo’n besluit zei Ali Abdullah Saleh in september 2009 tegen John Brennan, hoofd van het counter-terrorisme beleid van Obama: “Ik heb u vrij spel tegen het terrorisme gegeven, zodat ik niet langer verantwoordelijk ben als Al Qaida weer toeslaat.” De werkelijkheid was echter dat ondanks het aanbod van een “open deur” in de strijd tegen terrorisme Jemen slechts beperkte toegang voor Amerikaanse troepen gaf om te voorkomen dat deze afspraken binnenlandse critici van Saleh in de kaart zou spelen.

Terwijl de Westerse wereld opgeschrikt werd door de terroristische acties van Al Qaida vanuit Jemen zoals de mislukte aanslag met pakketbommen op vrachtvliegtuigen en de Detroit ‘kerstmisbom’, maakte Washington zich al langer grote zorgen over Al Qaida activiteiten op het Arabische Schiereiland. Deze groep, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is vooral actief binnen Saoedi-Arabië en Jemen en zijn onderdeel van het wereldwijde Al Qaida netwerk. Daarnaast ontlenen zij hun naam ook aan het Al Qaida van Osama Bin Laden en hangen ze dezelfde Islamistische ideologie aan. De vader van Osama Bin Laden is overigens geboren in Jemen. De radicale Islamist Anwar al-Awlaki wordt gezien als de drijvende kracht achter AQAP.

Volgens WikiLeaks documenten wezen Israël en de VS in november 2009 in een gezamenlijk onderhoud op het ontstaan van een “Afghanistan-achtig scenario” in Yemen.

Hoewel Saleh’s regering publiekelijk zegt zelf verantwoordelijk te zijn voor binnenlandse counter-terrorisme operaties, onthullen de documenten in detail hoe de president een geheime deal met de VS sloot om aanvallen met kruisraketten uit te voeren op AQAP doelen. De eerste kruisraket aanval was in december vorig jaar waarbij tientallen burgers gedood werden samen met Al Qaida jihadisten. Deze aanval werd publiekelijk door Jemen gepresenteerd als een eigen militaire operatie ondersteund door Amerikaanse inlichtingendiensten.

In een document uit 21 december 2009 lezen we dat VS ambassadeur Stephen Seche zegt dat “Jemen er op aan dringt dat de ‘status quo’ met betrekking tot de officiële ontkenning van betrokkenheid van de VS” bij militaire operaties gehandhaafd moet blijven. Saleh wilde de acties “non-stop voortzetten totdat we deze ziekte uitgeroeid hebben.” Een tweede aanval vond op 24 december plaats.

Een paar dagen later tijdens een ontmoeting met generaal David Petraeus, destijds hoofd van het Centrale Commando van de VS, gaf Saleh toe dat hij tegen zijn bevolking loog over de aanvallen. “We blijven zeggen dat de bommen van ons zijn en niet van jouw,” zei Saleh tegen Petraeus op 2 januari. Hierop zei de vice-premier, Rashad al-Alimi, die ook bij het gesprek aanwezig was dat hij zojuist had “gelogen” in het parlement door te vertellen dat de bommen in Arhab, Abyan en Shebwa (Al Qaida bolwerken) van Amerikaanse makelij waren, maar ingezet waren door het Jemenitische leger.

Petraeus was naar Sanaa gevlogen met een persoonlijk bericht van Barack Obama om Saleh te vertellen dat de Amerikanen bereid waren grondtroepen in te zetten gesteund door “direct-feed intelligence” van satellieten of patrouillevliegtuigen voor counter-terroristische operaties in Jemen. Maar in tegenstelling tot zijn suggestie van een “open deur” in de strijd tegen terrorisme verwierp Saleh het aanbod vanwege zijn bezorgdheid over eventuele Amerikaanse slachtoffers. Dit zou namelijk een probleem kunnen opleveren in het volhouden dat er geen Amerikaanse troepen actief waren op Jemens grondgebied.

In plaats daarvan werd afgesproken dat “Amerikaanse bommenwerpers uit het zicht en buiten Jemenitisch grondgebied zouden rondcirkelen klaar om AQAP doelen aan te vallen mocht bruikbare informatie beschikbaar komen.” VS leger-personeel zou in het Jemenitisch commando centrum moeten verblijven.

Saleh zei dat er “fouten waren gemaakt” in de eerdere aanvallen en betreurde het gebruik van Amerikaanse kruisraketten die “niet zeer nauwkeurig” waren en was ingenomen met het inzetten van vliegtuigen met precisie-geleide bommen.

Uit de documenten blijkt ook dat Petraeus om een verhoging van 150 miljoen dollar gevraagd had voor het beveiligingsbudget voor Jemen in 2010, een aanzienlijke stijging ten opzichte van 2009. Later in 2010 werden er besprekingen gemeld waarmee het budget voor het verhogen van de hulp aan Jemen opliep tot meer dan 1 miljard dollar.

Volgens de documenten prees Saoedi-Arabië de Amerikaanse luchtaanvallen in Jemen. De vice-minister van Binnenlandse Zaken, prins Mohammed bin Nayef, vertelde aan generaal James Jones, de nationale veiligheid adviseur van Obama: “De Saoedi’s luisteren nauwgezet naar de gesprekken van Al Qaida terroristen in Jemen en hoorde vóór de aanval ontspannen 20 minuten gesprekken over mobiele telefoons, terwijl na de aanval de telefoons vrijwel ongebruikt werden. Dit suggereert althans voor nu dat deze militanten meer gericht zijn op hun eigen veiligheid in plaats van het plannen van nieuwe operaties.”

De steun van Bin Nayef voor operaties tegen AQAP is niet zo verrassend. Hijzelf overleefde ternauwernood een moordaanslag in Jeddah in september 2009, toen een Saudische AQAP terrorist genaamd Abdullah Hassan Al Aseery berouw voor zijn jihadistische standpunten veinsde in een ontmoeting met de prins en zichzelf daarna opblies met een bom die hij verborgen had in zijn anus. De prins raakte slechts licht gewond bij deze aanslag. Aseery zou geassisteerd zijn in de voorbereidingen door de Jemenitische terrorist Rayed Abdullah Salem Al Harbi. Na de aanslag zei Bin Nayef dat hij met nog meer vastberadenheid de strijd tegen Al Qaida zou voortzetten.

In de geheime documenten lezen we ook tot in detail hoe Jemen faalt in het opleiden van de luchthaven ambtenaren in anti-terreur training en passeert lading voor vliegtuigen vaak ongecontroleerd de x-ray machines. Daarnaast lezen we hoe Jemen weigerde om mee te werken aan een onderzoek over de Amerikaanse verdenkingen met betrekking tot het reizen van studenten via islamitische instituties. Dit alles had te maken met de gevoeligheden en de publieke opinie in Jemen.

Op 31 januari 2010 waarschuwde de hoogste Amerikaanse ambtenaar van de terrorismebestrijding de Jemenitische president over de noodzaak om strengere beveiliging van de luchthaven toe te staan nadat de Amerikaanse ambassade gemeld had dat Jemen al meer dan 10 jaar dit veiligheidsadvies genegeerd had. Tijdens een directe ontmoeting met Saleh herhaalde Daniel Benjamin “de wens van de Amerikaanse regering om ervoor te zorgen dat er geen internationale terroristische aanslag afkomstig uit Jemen plaats vindt,” aldus een document van de ambassade in Sanaa. Hij drong er bij Saleh op aan om Amerikaanse hulp te aanvaarden om de “screening procedures op alle internationale luchthavens van Jemen te versterken.”

De bijeenkomst vond plaats in de nasleep van de mislukte terroristische aanslag op een vliegtuig van Northwest Airlines over Detroit op eerste kerstdag. De Nigeriaanse “onderbroekterrorist” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, die probeerde de vlucht vanuit Amsterdam op te blazen, was geradicaliseerd in Jemen terwijl hij beweerde er te zijn geweest als een student.

Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri, een Saudische geboren militant actief in Jemen, zou naar verluidt verantwoordelijk zijn geweest voor het maken van die bom en hij wordt ook verdacht van het maken van de “computerprinter” bommen gevonden op vluchten van Sanaa en bestemd voor Joodse instellingen in Chicago. AQAP heeft de verantwoordelijkheid opgeëist voor beide terroristische acties.

Zoals gemeld blijkt uit de Amerikaanse memo’s ook dat Jemen het verzoek van Amerika weigerde om informatie te delen over studenten die Jemen in en uit reizen ondanks de sterke vermoedens dat sommige universiteiten en Madrassa’s (Koranscholen) in Jemen een belangrijke rol spelen in het werven van Al Qaida terroristen.

Benjamin zei tegen Saleh dat de VS “een mechanisme willen voor het delen van informatie over passagiers die via het luchtruim van en naar Jemen reizen als ook van vreemdelingen die naar Jemen gekomen zijn om te gaan studeren aan taal- of religieuze instellingen.” Maar de Jemenitische beveiligingcommissie zei dat het verzoek “te ruim” gedefinieerd was om in te kunnen willigen.

Uit de documenten komt ook naar voren dat op sommige momenten de relatie tussen de VS en de Jemenitische president gespannen leek. Saleh vertelde bijvoorbeeld dat hij tevreden was met Amerika’s strijd tegen het terrorisme tot nu toe, maar “deed ook een beroep voor het versnellen van aanvullende steun, zoals het leveren van helikopters en voertuigen met IED-jamming apparatuur”. Hij beschreef de Amerikanen als “warmbloedig en ongeduldig als u ons nodig hebt”, maar “koelbloedig en Brits als wij jullie nodig hebben.”

In 2009 meldde de Amerikaanse ambassadeur Seche dat de beveiliging van de luchthaven in Jemen slecht was en dat de Amerikaanse anti-terreur opleiding voor het luchthaven-en bewakingspersoneel sinds 1998 nog voldoende geïmplementeerd was. “Er zijn talrijke gevallen van x-ray screeners die niet constant op hun monitoren letten en de controle op de toegangsprocedures is ineffectief geweest,” zei hij. Daar kwam nog bij dat douane-ambtenaren niet effectief waren, “onderbetaald, slecht opgeleidt en ontvankelijk voor corruptie” volgens Seche. Een screening van de luchthaven door een Amerikaans beveiligingsbedrijf in juni 2009 onthulde “meerdere hiaten in de beveiliging van de luchthaven … met betrekking tot personenauto screening, beveiliging van de vracht, en beveiligde identificatiepassen en toegangsprocedures.”

De documenten laten een onthutsend beeld zien hoe de Verenigde Staten de Jemenitische mogelijkheden om al-Qaida te bestrijden als zwak afdeden, ondanks de opkomst van het land als het tweede belangrijkste front in de strijd tegen het Al Qaida terrorisme. Tot januari 2010 was volgens Seche het belangrijkste Counter-Terrorisme Controle Centrum uitgerust met slechts drie computers, werd er door officieren op de grond slechts sporadisch gebruik gemaakt van mobiele telefoons die vaak ook nog niet werkten, en dat de enige beschikbare mappen papieren kaarten waren.

Recente Jemenitische contra-terreur operaties werden “belemmerd door een gebrek aan duidelijke opdrachten, miscommunicatie tussen terrorismebestrijding eenheden met betrekking tot taken, informatie die niet werd gedeeld tot na de operatie, en slechts een gebruik van sporadisch mobiel contact tussen de verschillende eenheden in het veld tijdens de loop van de operatie.” Seche citeerde de Jemenitische commandant van de terrorismebestrijding, Kamal al-Sayani, die toegaf dat “bijna 80% van de relevante informatie die zij leveren aan de tactische contra-terrorisme eenheden in het veld nooit aankomen.”

Amerikaanse functionarissen waren bevreesd dat steun voor Saleh averechts kon werken: “Terwijl de Jemenitische terrorismebestrijding en samenwerking sterk toenamen in de afgelopen maanden,” werd aan Arabische bondgenoten verteld [aan de vooravond van een conferentie in Londen over de steun aan Jemen] dat de Amerikanen “bezorgd zijn dat Saleh’s bereidheid om AQAP te bestrijden zal afnemen wanneer de binnenlandse oppositie Saleh afschildert als een pion van de Verenigde Staten. Publieke Arabische steun aan Jemen voor de terrorismebestrijding tegen Al Qaida kunnen Saleh helpen de interne kritiek in dit opzicht te weerstaan.”

Bron: WikiLeaks

Tuesday, 15 September 2009, 06:12

S E C R E T SANAA 001669
SIPDIS
NOFORN
NSC FOR APDNSA JOHN BRENNAN AND DENISE MORAGA
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD
EO 12958 DECL: 09/08/2019
TAGS PTER, PGOV, PINR, KDRG, PINS, SA, YM
SUBJECT: BRENNAN-SALEH MEETING SEP 6, 2009
REF: SANAA 01549
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b), (c), and (d).

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. In a September 6 meeting with Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan, President Saleh pledged unfettered access to Yemen’s national territory for U.S. counterterrorism operations, suggesting that in the process, the USG assumed responsibility for the success – or failure – of efforts to neutralize AQAP in Yemen. Saleh expressed dissatisfaction with the USG’s current level of aid for CT and security operations and insisted the ROYG began its war against the al-Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen on behalf of the U.S. Saleh stated his preference for Saudi Arabia over Jordan as a potential rehabilitation site for Guantanamo detainees of Yemeni origin, but claimed the ROYG was willing and able to accept them in Yemeni prisons. In a one-on-one that followed, Brennan extended an invitation to Saleh to visit President Obama at the White House on October 6. END SUMMARY.

“OPEN LAND, AIR, AND SEA” FOR U.S. STRIKES AGAINST AQAP

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2. (S/NF) In a September 6 meeting with Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan, President Saleh insisted that Yemen’s national territory is available for unilateral CT operations by the U.S. Dissatisfied with current levels of USG funding and military training provided to the ROYG’s CT forces, Saleh asserted that the USG has produced “only words, but no solutions” to the terrorism issue in Yemen. Saleh repeatedly requested more funds and equipment to fight al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), while at the same time placing responsibility for any future AQAP attacks on the shoulders of the USG now that it enjoys unfettered access to Yemeni airspace, coastal waters and land. (NOTE. The USG has been actively engaged since 2001 in training elements of Yemen’s CT forces, including the Counter-Terrorism Unit (CTU), the Yemen Special Operations Force (YSOF), the Presidential Guard, the Yemeni Border Troops, Yemen Air Force (YAF), and the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG). The USG has expended over $115 million equipping CT forces since FY02. In 2009 alone, U.S. teams have instructed Yemeni CT forces in training valued at $5 million. END NOTE.)

3. (S/NF) While Saleh offered assurances that the ROYG is “determined to continue the war against al-Qaeda because they’re targeting U.S. and Yemeni interests,” he continued to link increased U.S. access to AQAP targets with full responsibility for achieving CT goals. Highlighting the potential for a future AQAP attack on the U.S. Embassy or other Western targets, Saleh said, “I have given you an open door on terrorism, so I am not responsible.” THE SA’ADA WAR: “THE HOUTHIS ARE YOUR ENEMIES TOO”

——————————————— —–

4. (S/NF) President Saleh expressed his frustration with the USG refusal to view the Sa’ada war against the al-Houthis in the north in the same light as the fight against AQAP. Claiming a need for increased aid and support, Saleh asserted that “this war we’re launching is a war on behalf of the U.S….the Houthis are your enemies too,” citing videos of al-Houthi followers chanting, “Death to Israel, death to America.” (NOTE: The Houthis have not attacked U.S. interests or personnel in the six rounds of fighting between the ROYG and the Houthis that began in 2004. END NOTE.) The USG’s failure to view the Houthis as terrorists and equip ROYG forces to fight them in Sa’ada undermines the USG’s claims of friendship and cooperation, according to Saleh. Commenting on the status of ROYG forces in Sa’ada, Saleh said, “we are suffering a lot of casualties and loss of material.” Renewing his requests for armored personnel vehicles, aircraft, and medical evacuation vehicles, Saleh echoed his criticism of U.S. efforts. “We need deeds, not only words,” he said. Brennan responded that the USG is prohibited by law from providing military support to the ROYG to be used against the Houthis since the USG considers the group a domestic insurgency.

5. (S/NF) Restating claims of Iranian support to the Houthi movement, ROYG officials present said they had provided files supporting an Iranian-Houthi connection to USG officials and would provide more if necessary. (NOTE. The Ambassador acknowledged receiving a file that was reviewed here and in Washington; however, no conclusive evidence of an Iranian-Houthi link has been made from these or other records. Brennan said that he would request a fresh scrub of all available intelligence to see if it turned up any evidence of Iranian involvement. END NOTE.) Saleh said, “Iran is trying to settle old scores against the U.S. by ruining relations between Yemen and GCC countries and the U.S.” He also made a tangential reference to Hezbollah, claiming the organization’s influence in the region also rendered the ROYG-Houthi war a fight on behalf of the U.S. Referencing the high poverty rate and illicit arms flows into both Yemen and Somalia, Saleh concluded by saying, “If you don’t help, this country will become worse than Somalia.”

MUDDLED MESSAGES ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

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6. (S/NF) Saleh expressed his preference for the existing Saudi Arabia option as a potential site for rehabilitating Guantanamo detainees of Yemeni origin over a proposed Jordanian option, citing closer familial ties and cultural bonds in Saudi Arabia as mechanisms for more effective treatment. Saleh commented that he thought the Jordanians were &too poor8 to support a rehabilitation program, but did not dismiss Jordan as an option. However, he signaled that rehabilitation is not his concern, but rather “the U.S.’s problem” as he is ready and willing to accept all Yemeni detainees into the Yemeni prison system. (COMMENT. Saleh would, in our judgment, be unable to hold returning detainees in jail for any more than a matter of weeks before public pressure ) or the courts ) forced their release. END COMMENT.) Saleh urged the USG to design and implement a rehabilitation and education program for the detainees and to build a rehabilitation center in Yemen, but reiterated that the U.S. would have to fund these projects, repeatedly asking, “How many dollars is the U.S. going to bring?” However, when Brennan offered $500,000 as an initial investment currently available for the crafting of a rehabilitation program, Saleh dismissed the offer as insufficient. Saleh also assured Brennan that he was committed to “freeing the innocent people after a complete and total rehabilitation,” suggesting a lack of clarity on his own policy and on the status of Guantanamo detainees in the ROYG legal system.

ECONOMIC REFORM AND CORRUPTION

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7. (S/NF) Saleh welcomed the letter from President Obama that Brennan hand-carried, and expressed appreciation for U.S. concern over the stability and economic hardships facing the country. He agreed to move forward with the 10-point plan outlining necessary economic reforms (reftel) but did not provide details regarding dates or implementation goals. Responding to Brennan’s concerns that economic and other assistance might be diverted through corrupt officials to other purposes, Saleh urged the U.S. to donate supplies and hardware rather than liquid funds in order to curb corruption’s reach. Saleh also told US officials that they could have full access to financial records to ensure proper usage of donor funding. (COMMENT. Saleh’s preference for infrastructure and equipment over cash displays a lack of confidence in his own regime’s ability to handle liquid assets and hardly provides a viable solution for stemming the curb of corruption in the long run. END COMMENT.)

VISIT TO WASHINGTON & OTHER ISSUES

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8. (S/NF) Saleh again asked to visit the U.S., arguing that it was necessary to resolve issues regarding the Guantanamo detainees and increased military assistance. “We see this visit as very important to reach mutual understanding and so that you understand our requests and demands.” Brennan undertook to look into Saleh’s claims of “promised” military equipment that has not been delivered. In a one-on-one session that followed the formal meeting, Brennan extended an invitation to Saleh to meet President Obama at the White House on October 6. Saleh also stated that there would be no more delays in the U.S. Embassy’s request to purchase lands for the building of more secure housing facilities and that the Shari’a Council would approve the transfer of the lands from waqf (or publicly held) status to free-hold status.

COMMENT

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9. (S/NF) COMMENT. Saleh was in vintage form during the two hours he spent with DNSA Brennan, at times disdainful and dismissive and at others, conciliatory and congenial. One might easily conclude that his repeated assertion that Yemen’s national territory is open to the US to conduct operations against AQAP reflects his interest in outsourcing the CT effort in Yemen to the USG, especially in view of his somewhat ominous claim that, should AQAP attacks occur in the future, they will be the result of the U.S. having failed to do enough to put the organization out of business. Additionally, a concerted USG anti-terrorism campaign in Yemen will free Saleh to continue to devote his limited security assets to the ongoing war against Houthi rebels in Sa’ada. The net effect, and one we strongly suspect Saleh has calculated, of both the American and ROYG “iron fist” unleashed at the same time in Yemen will be a clear message to the southern movement or any other party interested in generating political unrest in the country that a similar fate awaits them.

10. (S/NF) COMMENT CONTINUED. Not surprisingly, Saleh was far less animated when Brennan attempted to focus his attention on the need for immediate action to relieve Yemen’s deteriorating socio-economic situation, largely limiting his response to a pitch that the USG persuade recalcitrant donors to speed up and increase their assistance to Yemen. After stating petulantly in the group session that he was no longer interested in an invitation to the White House, telling Brennan that “my relationship with you is sufficient,” Saleh’s mood changed noticeably for the better when the invitation was extended, and he had captured the prize he has been chasing after for months. END COMMENT. SECHE

Bron: WikiLeaks

Monday, 21 December 2009, 13:34

S E C R E T SANAA 002251
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE
EO 12958 DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS PTER, MOPS, MASS, PGOV, PREL, YE
SUBJECT: ROYG LOOKS AHEAD FOLLOWING CT OPERATIONS, BUT
PERHAPS NOT FAR ENOUGH
REF: SANAA 02230
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. The ROYG views the December 17 CT operations as a success and a benefit to Yemeni national interests, and appears not overly concerned about unauthorized leaks regarding the U.S. role and negative media attention to civilian deaths. ROYG officials continue to publicly maintain that the operation was conducted entirely by its forces, acknowledging U.S. support strictly in terms of intelligence sharing. Deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi told the Ambassador on December 20 that any evidence of greater U.S. involvement ) such as fragments of U.S. munitions found at the sites – could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S. While the ROYG has touted the operation as a victory in terms of the number of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) members killed or captured, it hasn’t yet decided how, or even if, it should begin to modify its public messaging to address criticism over collateral damage, or the likelihood that the extent of U.S. involvement may become impossible to deny. END SUMMARY.

2. (S/NF) In a December 20 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime Minister for Security and Defense Rashad al-Alimi said that the ROYG, including President Saleh himself, views the December 17 CT operations in Abyan and Arhab as a success, despite negative press reports (septel) and leaks to the U.S. press regarding a U.S. role in the operation. Alimi said he was joined by other ROYG officials in their positive view of the operation against al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and a desire for continued collaboration on CT operations. Referring to an internal ROYG meeting chaired by President Saleh on December 19, Alimi assured the Ambassador that Saleh wants these operations against AQAP to continue “non-stop until we eradicate this disease.”

3. (S/NF) Alimi told the Ambassador that Saleh was undisturbed by press reports citing U.S. officials asserting American involvement in the operations, saying that the ROYG “must maintain the status quo” with regard to the official denial of U.S. involvement in order to ensure additional “positive operations” against AQAP. Alimi seemed more concerned with the political opposition and Southern Movement’s use of the Abyan operation as an example of the government’s heavy-handed response to groups the ROYG deems a threat. The Ambassador cautioned Alimi that the ROYG may need to nuance its position regarding U.S. involvement in the event more evidence surfaces, complicating its ability to adhere to the official line that ROYG forces conducted the operations independently. Alimi appeared confident that any evidence of greater U.S. involvement ) such as U.S. munitions found at the sites – could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S. However, Alimi informed the Ambassador that senior ROYG officials continue to the discuss media strategy and the public posture of the ROYG.

NOT SO INNOCENT

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4. (S/NF) According to Alimi, the ROYG has recruited a number of local political and religious leaders to visit the ares affected by the air strikes in Abyan to explain o the people the need for the operation and the dnger that AQAP poses to all Yemenis. The Governr of Abyan was given YR 20 million (approximatel USD 100,000) to disburse to the families of those killed or wounded in the strikes in Maajala, where the AQAP training camp was located. Alimi said that the civilians who died were largely nomadic, Bedouin families who lived in tents near the AQAP training camp and were assisting AQAP with logistical support. Alimi said they were poor people selling food and supplies to the terrorists, but were nonetheless acting in collusion with the terrorists and benefitting financially from AQAP’s presence in the area. He assured the Ambassador that the Governor of Abyan visited the site after the operation and confirmed that there were no villages, houses, or civilian institutions that were damaged, only the training camp, and the encampments of the non-combatant Bedouin population.

COMMENT

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5. (S/NF) Given that local and international media will continue to look for evidence of a U.S. role in the December

17 strikes against AQAP, the ROYG must think seriously about its public posture and whether its strict adherence to assertions that the strikes were unilateral will undermine public support for legitimate and urgently needed CT operations, should evidence to the contrary surface. Thus far, the ROYG has deployed influential local leaders to the affected area in Abyan to explain the need for the strikes in an effort to quell potential unrest; however, it has not attempted to provide any context for the civilian casualties, which might help to counter overblown claims of ROYG disregard for the local population ) in this particular case, southerners. END COMMENT. SECHE

Bron: WikiLeaks

Monday, 04 January 2010, 13:33

S E C R E T SANAA 000004
NOFORN
DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP
NSC FOR DPNSA BRENNAN
HQ USCENTCOM/CCCC-CIG FOR JSEATON
EO 12958 DECL: 01/04/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, PINS, MOPS, MASS, MCAP, SA,
AE, UK, ER, DJ, QA, YM
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS’ MEETING WITH SALEH ON SECURITY
ASSISTANCE, AQAP STRIKES
REF: 2009 SANAA 1430
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Commander of the U.S. Central Command General David Petraeus congratulated President Saleh on recent successful operations against AQAP, and informed him that U.S. security assistance to the ROYG would increase to USD 150 million in 2010, including USD 45 million to equip and train a CT-focused aviation regiment under the Yemeni Special Operations Forces. Saleh requested that the U.S. provide 12 armed helicopters and train and equip three new Republican Guard brigades. Saleh rejected the General’s proposal to have USG personnel armed with direct-feed intelligence present inside the area of CT operations, but agreed to a have U.S. fixed-wing bombers circle outside Yemeni territory ready to engage AQAP targets should actionable intelligence become available. END SUMMARY.

SALEH: HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS

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2. (S/NF) CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, accompanied by the Ambassador, CENTCOM aides, the Embassy DATT, and EconOff note taker, congratulated President Saleh on successful operations against AQAP during a January 2 meeting. The General told Saleh that he had requested USD 150 million in security assistance for 2010, a substantial increase over the 2009 amount of USD 67 million. Also present were Minister of Defense MG Muhammed Nasser Ahmad Ali and Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs Rashad al-Alimi. Raising a topic that he would manage to insert into almost every item of discussion during the hour and half-long meeting, Saleh requested that the U.S. provide the ROYG with 12 armed helicopters. Possessing such helicopters would allow the ROYG to take the lead in future CT operations, “ease” the use of fighter jets and cruise missiles against terrorist targets, and allow Yemeni Special Operations Forces to capture terrorist suspects and identify victims following strikes, according to Saleh. The U.S. could convince Saudi Arabia and the UAE to supply six helicopters each if the American “bureaucracy” prevented quick approval, Saleh suggested. The General responded that he had already considered the ROYG’s request for helicopters and was in discussions with Saudi Arabia on the matter. “We won’t use the helicopters in Sa’ada, I promise. Only against al-Qaeda,” Saleh told General Petraeus.

3. (S/NF) Saleh agreed to General Patraeus’ proposal to dedicate USD 45 million of 2010 security assistance funds to help establish and train a YSOF aviation regiment, allowing YSOF to focus on al-Qaeda targets and leaving Sa’ada air operations to the Yemeni Air Force. Without giving much detail, Saleh also requested that the U.S. equip and train three new Republican Guard brigades, totaling 9,000 soldiers. “Equipping these brigades would reflect upon our true partnership,” Saleh said. The General urged Saleh to focus first on the YSOF aviation regiment.

AQAP STRIKES: CONCERN FOR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

———————————————

4. (S/NF) Saleh praised the December 17 and 24 strikes against AQAP but said that “mistakes were made” in the killing of civilians in Abyan. The General responded that the only civilians killed were the wife and two children of an AQAP operative at the site, prompting Saleh to plunge into a lengthy and confusing aside with Deputy Prime Minister Alimi and Minister of Defense Ali regarding the number of terrorists versus civilians killed in the strike. (Comment: Saleh’s conversation on the civilian casualties suggests he has not been well briefed by his advisors on the strike in Abyan, a site that the ROYG has been unable to access to determine with any certainty the level of collateral damage. End Comment.) AQAP leader Nassr al-Wahishi and extremist cleric Anwar al-Awlaki may still be alive, Saleh said, but the December strikes had already caused al-Qaeda operatives to turn themselves in to authorities and residents in affected areas to deny refuge to al-Qaeda. Saleh raised the issue of the Saudi Government and Jawf governorate tribal sheikh Amin al-Okimi, a subject that is being reported through other channels.

SHIFTING AIRSTRIKE STRATEGIES

—————————–

5. (S/NF) President Obama has approved providing U.S. intelligence in support of ROYG ground operations against AQAP targets, General Petraeus informed Saleh. Saleh reacted coolly, however, to the General’s proposal to place USG personnel inside the area of operations armed with real-time, direct feed intelligence from U.S. ISR platforms overhead. “You cannot enter the operations area and you must stay in the joint operations center,” Saleh responded. Any U.S. casualties in strikes against AQAP would harm future efforts, Saleh asserted. Saleh did not have any objection, however, to General Petraeus’ proposal to move away from the use of cruise missiles and instead have U.S. fixed-wing bombers circle outside Yemeni territory, “out of sight,” and engage AQAP targets when actionable intelligence became available. Saleh lamented the use of cruise missiles that are “not very accurate” and welcomed the use of aircraft-deployed precision-guided bombs instead. “We’ll continue saying the bombs are ours, not yours,” Saleh said, prompting Deputy Prime Minister Alimi to joke that he had just “lied” by telling Parliament that the bombs in Arhab, Abyan, and Shebwa were American-made but deployed by the ROYG.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN MIL-MIL RELATIONS

—————————————–

6. (S/NF) General Petraeus praised cooperation between the Embassy and the NSB, YSOF, Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG), and Counterterrorism Unit (CTU), but singled out relations with the Yemeni Air Force as problematic. Only four out of 50 planned U.S. Special Operations Forces Command training missions with the Yemeni Air Force had actually been executed in the past year, he said. Saleh said he would personally instruct Minister of Defense to improve the situation. The General also urged Saleh to stop Yemeni Customs’ habit of holding up Embassy cargo at the airport, including shipments destined for the ROYG itself, such as equipment for the CTU. Saleh laughed and made a vague pledge to have the customs issue “taken care of.” Saleh complained that the ROYG had not yet received the necessary training to operate 17 Iraqi Light Armored Vehicle (ILAVs) provided by the USG in 2008, saying that YSOF needed the training in order to use the ILAVs for CT operations. The General said he would look into having U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel conduct the training.

7. (S/NF) Pointing to the ROYG’s problems in combating rampant drug and arms smuggling, Saleh told General Petraeus that U.S. maritime security assistance was insufficient to cover Yemen’s nearly 2,000 km of coastline. “Why not have Italy, Germany, Holland, Japan, Saudi, and the UAE each provide two patrol boats?” Saleh suggested. The General told Saleh that two fully-equipped 87-foot patrol boats destined for the Yemeni Coast Guard were under construction and would arrive in Yemen within a year. Saleh singled out smuggling from Djibouti as particularly troublesome, claiming that the ROYG had recently intercepted four containers of Djibouti-origin TNT. “Tell (Djiboutian President) Ismail Guelleh that I don’t care if he smuggles whiskey into Yemen — provided it’s good whiskey ) but not drugs or weapons,” Saleh joked. Saleh said that smugglers of all stripes are bribing both Saudi and Yemeni border officials.

SALEH WELCOMES LONDON CONFERENCE

——————————–

8. (S/NF) Saleh told the General that he welcomed PM Gordon Brown’s announcement of the London conference and said that the cooperation on Yemen between the U.S., EU, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE would be benefitial. Qatar should not be involved, however, because “they work with Iran.” In this regard, Saleh also identified Qatar as one of those nations working “against Yemen,” along with Iran, Libya, and Eritrea.

9. (U) General Petraeus did not have an opportunity to clear on this cable.

SECHE

Bron: WikiLeaks

Tuesday, 19 January 2010, 09:17

S E C R E T RIYADH 000090
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR AJOST
EO 12958 DECL: 01/12/2020
TAGS IR, MARR, MASS, MOPS, SA, YM
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: GENERAL JONES’ JANUARY 12, 2010
MEETING WITH PRINCE MOHAMMED BIN NAIF, ASSISTANT MINISTER OF INTERIOR
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

SUMMARY

——-

1. (S) Summary: During a 30-minute meeting with Prince Mohammed, General Jones reviewed U.S. and Saudi efforts to combat Al-Qaida extremists in the region and discussed Afghanistan/Pakistan, Yemen, and Iran. Prince Mohammed highlighted Saudi Arabia’s continued and growing concerns about Al-Qaida operations originating from Yemen and praised the Yemeni government’s successful December attacks against Al-Qaida operatives. The meeting was followed by a lunch and a briefing on the situation on the Saudi-Yemeni border.

WE MUST KEEP AL-QAIDA ON THE RUN

——————————–

2. (S) General Jones noted that the attempted bombing of a U.S. aircraft on December 25 is another reminder that we are passing through difficult times. He assured Prince Mohammed that while the U.S. recognizes that screening procedures can be improved, the U.S. has confidence that the systems in place are basically sound. The General also noted that terrorism concerns seem to be spreading beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and now are being heard from governments in north Africa, particularly Niger, Mali, Morocco and Algeria.

3. (S) Prince Mohammed responded that we are likely to see many more attempts like the December 25 incident. He also noted that the Saudi experience against Al-Qaida demonstrates that the best response is to “keep them on the run.” Right after the 9/11 attacks, he noted, nearly eighty percent of the mosques in Saudi Arabia voiced support for Bin Laden. That is when the Saudi leadership realized how dire the problem they faced was. Over the last 6 years of combating Al-Qaida inside Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom has foiled many Al-Qaida plots and in the process learned that we must not only to fight Al-Qaida “in the field,” but also to counter their ideology in order to curtail recruitment.

4. (S/NF) In this light, the recent attack against Al-Qaida in Yemen “was very positive.” Prince Mohammed noted that the Saudis have been monitoring conversations of Al-Qaida operatives in Yemen very closely, and whereas before the attack they were hearing relaxed 20-minute phone conversations over cell phones, after the attack the phones went virtually silent. This suggests that at least for now these operatives are more focused on their own security rather than on planning operations.

SAUDI CONCERNS ON YEMEN

———————–

5. (S) Prince Mohammed said that the Saudi government has been watching with great concern Al-Qaida’s growth in Yemen over the last five years. Yemen’s geography makes it a much more convenient place for Al-Qaida operations. Not only does the mountainous terrain help them hide, but the shoreline also gives them an ability to move over the water – extending their potential reach much further abroad.

6. (C) One of Al-Qaida’s objectives in its confrontation with Saudi Arabia, Prince Mohammed explained is “to control Mecca and Medina.” He said that they want to be able to control who makes the Hajj, and if they were able to do so, they would limit the visits of those coming to the Hajj to one week, something that could cause chaos. (Embassy note: Among Al-Qaida’s basic objectives is its call to “liberate” the Islamic holy sites from the corrupt hands of the Al Saud, but this is the first time we have heard a Saudi official point out the more specific goal of limiting how long Muslims can visit the holy places as part of their Hajj. End note.)

7. (C) Prince Mohammed also noted that Saudi Arabia has been making an effort to seal the Saudi-Yemen border, noting that “we have been arresting between one to two thousand people each day.” He also admitted that the Saudis have maintained a common practice of feeding those caught crossing before transporting them back across the border. “We need to change

that,” he went on, since many may be crossing the border only to get a meal. Prince Mohammed pointed out that a key feature of the Saudi approach to undermine Al-Qaida’s growth in Yemen is to bolster the central government, in particular with substantial financial assistance. A Saudi-Yemeni Council meets twice a year to review development projects in Yemen funded by Saudi Arabia. However, up to now, he reported, the Saudis have not been satisfied with the distribution of these development and infrastructure projects because the Yemeni government has been concentrating them in Sanaa and other urban areas. The Saudis now insist on having a say in distributing these infrastructure investments with remote areas receiving priority “to give the tribes in those areas something to lose if they cooperate with terrorists.”

Afghanistan/Pakistan

——————–

8. (C) General Jones noted that the Obama administration’s approach in Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects many of the same lessons that the Saudis have learned. That is why the U.S. is working with a new emphasis on national reunification in Afghanistan. The approach includes reducing the emphasis on military operations while exerting new efforts to encourage reconciliation. In order for this strategy to succeed, Gen. Jones cautioned, it will be essential that Pakistani territory no longer be available as a safehaven to terrorists.

9. (C) Prince Mohammed commented that “Pakistan must let people know that it is fighting a war to keep Pakistan united and its people safe.” But if we want one hundred percent from them, he cautioned, we should make them feel more secure on their border with India. He also noted that King Abdullah “has concerns about the Pakistani government; the biggest problem is the army.” General Kayani (Army Chief of Staff) is a good man; I asked him, Prince Mohammed recounted, whether or not his soldiers, when they visit their villages, wear their uniforms, or if they changed into civilian clothes. He told me that they change to civilian clothes.

10. (C) General Jones assured Prince Mohammed that the U.S. is working to reduce Pakistani-Indian tensions, and emphasized that what is most needed at this moment is for Pakistan to choose which path it wants to take. The first step is to dislodge the terrorists; if Pakistan resolves to do this, they will find that the U.S. will help them for some time to come. The Pakistani ISI also needs to act with greater consistency. Noting Saudi Arabia’s influence with Pakistan, General Jones emphasized that the U.S. is looking for Saudi Arabia’s support.

Next Phase with Iran

——————–

10. (C) General Jones described the administration’s current thinking on Iran, noting that Iran has failed to enter into a serious dialogue with the international community about its nuclear program. With the deadline of the end of the year now passed, it is time to start looking at sanctions. Prince Mohammed said Saudi Arabia remains greatly concerned about Iran’s nuclear program and noted that there is now a big crack in the Iranian government, particularly following the recent attack on Karroubi. (Embassy note: Opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi’s car was fired upon on January 9, an attack that oppositionist attribute to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. End note.)

High Marks for U.S.-Saudi Counterterrorism Cooperation

—————————-

11. (C) General Jones asked Prince Mohammed if there was anything needed from the U.S. to improve our counterterrorism coordination. Prince Mohammed responded that King Abdullah has made very clear that U.S.-Saudi security cooperation must remain independent of political buffeting. He said that our cooperation is very good, and has developed to the point that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are in “simultaneous mode” regarding the sharing of raw data and threat information. Gen. Jones remarked that Prince Mohammed has played an

important role in bringing about this strong security relationship, and conveyed President Obama’s appreciation for this strong partnership.

Comment

——-

12. (S) We note that Prince Mohammed did not raise the matter of recently introduced heightened screening procedures on Saudi citizens. While we have heard that these new measures provoked strong reactions from some in the Saudi leadership, the absence of any expressions of concern or upset on Prince Mohammed part is fully in keeping with his reputation as one who fully understands the difficulty of maneuvering against extremist elements to prevent attacks. The Embassy views this meeting as accomplishing the important objective of reinforcing our strong counterterrorism cooperation. As is evident from his brief responses to Gen. Jones’ briefs on Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan, these issues are ones on which Prince Mohammed carefully defers to the King. SMITH

Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 03 February 2010, 13:41

S E C R E T SANAA 000221
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP ANDREW MACDONALD, S/CT AMBASSADOR DANIEL
BENJAMIN, DS/ATA JOHN NASON, AND OBO ADAM NAMM
NSC FOR DPNSA BRENNAN
HQ USCENTCOM/CCCC-CIG FOR JSEATON
DHS/TSA FOR TOM WARRICK
EO 12958 DECL: 01/02/2020
TAGS PTER, PREL, PGOV, PINR, PINS, MOPS, MASS, MCAP, ASEC,
EAIR, ABLD, SA, UK, YM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BENJAMIN DISCUSSES CT ASSISTANCE,
AIRPORT SECURITY WITH SALEH
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Summary. During a 35-minute meeting on January 31, the Department’s Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, congratulated President Saleh on the success of the London meeting and counter-terrorism (CT) operations the ROYG has undertaken in recent weeks against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) elements, and described USG interest in increasing airport security and sharing information on travelers in and out of Yemen. Saleh agreed to the upcoming Transportation Security Administration/Anti-Terrorism Assistance (TSA/ATA) visit, requesting at the same time additional CT support. When pressed by Ambassador Benjamin about Sa’ada, he indicated that the ROYG had no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire at this time. In a separate meeting, Foreign Minister Dr. Abubakr al-Qirbi agreed on the success of the London meeting, and suggested that the follow-up meeting in Riyadh would be important for determining concrete steps. Senior ROYG security officials expressed support for the Embassy’s struggle to acquire land and a willingness to act on the Embassy’s behalf. End Summary.

SALEH ON CT ASSISTANCE, AIRPORT SECURITY, AND SA’ADA

——————————————— ——-

2. (S/NF) In a January 31 meeting with President Saleh, the Department’s Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, congratulated Saleh on the success of the London meeting and suggested that stability in Yemen can be achieved only through a dual focus on security and development. He commended Saleh on actions the ROYG has taken in recent weeks against AQAP elements in Yemen and assured Saleh that he could count on continued operational support and intelligence sharing from the U.S. President Saleh said he was satisfied with counter-terrorism (CT) assistance to date and with Secretary Clinton’s speech at the London Conference, but said he “would like to be more satisfied in the future” and appealed for the acceleration of additional support, specifically citing helicopters and vehicles with IED-jamming devices. Describing Americans as “hot-blooded and hasty when you need us,” but “cold-blooded and British when we need you,” he asked for a “moderate blood temperature” and measured approach. (Note: Also present were Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Rashad al-Alimi, National Security Bureau Director Ali al-‘Anisi, and Political Security Organization (PSO) Director Ghalib Mutahir al-Gamish, with whom Benjamin met separately after the conversation with the President. End Note.)

3. (S/NF) Ambassador Benjamin reiterated the USG desire to ensure that no international terrorist attack originates again from Yemen. He said the USG wants to help the ROYG strengthen screening procedures at all of Yemen’s international airports, and establish a mechanism for sharing information on passengers traveling via air to and from Yemen as well as foreign nationals who have come to Yemen to study at language or religious institutions. When approached with the upcoming Transportation Security Administration/Anti-Terrorism Assistance (TSA/ATA) visit, Saleh agreed to the idea but deferred to his Supreme Security Committee (Alimi, et al) on the details. In the follow-on meeting, Alimi and ‘Anisi both concurred with the upcoming ATA/TSA visit and expressed support for increasing airport security. ‘Anisi, however, had reservations about sharing information on foreign students in Yemen, and complained that the USG request was too broad. (Comment: According to GRPO reporting, the ROYG is willing to share information with the USG on American students in Yemen and would likewise share information with other embassies about their nationals. While Western governments would presumably share information among themselves, this system would still leave intelligence gaps about non-Western countries such as Nigeria. End Comment.)

4. (S/NF) Citing Saudi Arabia’s decision to suspend its military operations in Sa’ada and Abdul Malik al-Houthi’s public acceptance of the ROYG’s conditions for a ceasefire, Ambassador Benjamin asked Saleh if he saw an end to the fighting. Saleh dismissed these points, arguing that the Saudis gave a ceasefire ultimatum to the Houthis, and will resume fighting in two weeks if the ceasefire is unfulfilled. He called the Houthis “liars” and declared that they would violate the six conditions of the ceasefire. He indicated that the ROYG had no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire at this time.

5. (S/NF) In a visit to Yemen Special Operation Forces (YSOF) Headquarters, Ambassador Benjamin was treated to a display of military equipment and briefed by YSOF Chief of Staff Brigadier General Ahmad Dahan on YSOF activities. Ambassador Benjamin emphasized common security interests and congratulated Yemeni forces for their role in recent operations. Dahan reiterated the request for helicopters and asked for communications systems and additional training courses. He lauded Yemeni operations as having a great effect on AQAP elements, and indicated that the operations were possible only due to the exchange of intelligence.

FM QIRBI LOOKING FORWARD TO RIYADH

———————————-

6. (S/NF) In a separate meeting, Foreign Minister Dr. Abu Bakr al-Qirbi agreed the London Conference was a success and expressed hope that the February follow-up meeting in Riyadh would help determine concrete steps to move forward. Qirbi agreed that a smaller group, focusing on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member countries, rather than a broader donor group, would be more constructive. Qirbi said that the ROYG wanted to focus on the Top Ten Economic Reform Priorities over the course of the next year, but would need donor assistance to accomplish these goals. He expressed support for discussion at the GCC-hosted meeting of funding for an extremist rehabilitation center, indicating that an educational institute with a long-term plan would do much to counter radicalization and address issues of poverty and unemployment, particularly in areas where AQAP has a hold. Qirbi and other ROYG officials expressed support for US intervention with GCC member countries in an attempt to gain financial support for a rehabilitation center as an expression of regional support for Yemen’s stability.

EMBASSY LAND DISPUTE

——————–

7. (C) The Supreme Security Committee was familiar with the Embassy’s struggle to acquire land, and said they were willing to act on the Embassy’s behalf. Foreign Minister Qirbi said that he had been in communication with Minister of Religious Endowments Judge Hamoud Hitar, who indicated the ROYG’s readiness for the purchase and resolution of a dispute over ownership. Alimi said that Deputy Foreign Minister Mohyadeen al-Dhabi was following up and had secured the full cooperation of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Alimi encouraged Ambassador Seche to sign the contract for the land, professing that he would personally guarantee the investment. (Comment: In a follow-on conversation on February 3, Alimi repeated his assurance to the Ambassador that the ROYG is prepared to provide for the security of the proposed housing site both during and after construction. He suggested that the Ambassador meet with ‘Anisi, who President Saleh has charged with overseeing the process, to discuss final details of the deal, including our timeframe for beginning construction. The Ambassador will try to see ‘Anisi next week for this purpose. End Comment.) SECHE

Bron: WikiLeaks

Tuesday, 04 August 2009, 11:58

S E C R E T SANAA 001402
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND PM/WRA SPICO AND
SCOSTNER
EO 12958 DECL: 08/04/2019
TAGS PARM, PREL, PTER, MASS, YM
SUBJECT: (S/NF) PROGRESS ON US-ROYG COOPERATION TO REDUCE
MANPADS THREAT
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. On June 20-22, a PM/WRA delegation visited Yemen to discuss MANPADS threat reduction efforts with ROYG officials. Since 2004, US-ROYG cooperation has dramatically reduced the availability of MANPADS on the black market in Yemen. Although the program has likely recovered the bulk of the illicit MANPADS available on the black market, several more will likely be collected in the coming years. MOD insists that there are no official MANPADS stocks, and that they have already implemented necessary stockpile security and inventory controls, but the intelligence community and the National Security Bureau (NSB) believe that is not the case. The USG will offer the MOD, through NSB interlocutors, payment for destruction of MOD MANPADS and stockpile security upgrades. ROYG officials seem more receptive to a TSA-sponsored MANPADS Assist Visit. END SUMMARY.

BACKGROUND

———-

2. (S/NF) After years of uncontrolled weapons imports and the chaos of the 1994 civil war, MANPADS were widely available on the illicit arms market in Yemen, making these systems a critical proliferation threat. MANPADS that leaked from official Yemeni stocks were used in al-Qaeda (AQ) operations in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in 2001 and 2002. In 2003, the ROYG began collecting MANPADS from weapons souks throughout the country, and in 2004 the USG agreed to compensate the ROYG for the acquisition and destruction of these and other black market MANPADS. In February 2005, US-ROYG cooperation resulted in the destruction of 1,161 MANPADS.

MEETINGS READOUT

—————-

3. (S/NF) On June 20-22, a PM/WRA delegation consisting of XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX; and XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, visited Yemen to discuss US-ROYG cooperation to reduce the threat of MANPADS. The delegation began with a June 20 meeting at the NSB with XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX briefed XXXXXXXXXXXX on the MANPADS threat to civilian aviation. He also offered a MANPADS Assist Visit (MAV), in which experts from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) identify airport vulnerabilities to MANPADS attacks and recommend ways to mitigate them. Following the meeting, the delegation toured the current airport and the site of the new airport. During the tour, several lapses in airport security practices were observed regarding passenger screening, cargo security, and Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge and access procedures. XXXXXXXXXXXX recommended that the TSA Representative (TSAR) in Amman, Jordan be contacted for follow-on discussions with airport officials. NSB officials seemed receptive to the MAV offer.

4. (S/NF) On June 21, the delegation met with NSB Deputy Director Ammar Saleh to discuss ongoing efforts to acquire MANPADS from the black market in Yemen. Since the program’s inception in August 2004, this program had resulted in the destruction of 1,161 black market MANPADS in 2005. XXXXXXXXXXXX thanked the ROYG for its efforts, expressed the USG’s continued interest in supporting the program, and pressed the ROYG to destroy an additional 102 MANPADS they had collected since 2005.

5. (S/NF) Ammar Saleh agreed with USG assessments that the majority of black market MANPADS had been collected in Yemen, and said that a few more might trickle in with the increase in price. (Note: In July 2008, the price for first generation systems was increased from $7,700 to $15,000. End Note.) The small quantity of illicit MANPADS that still exist outside of state control in Yemen are in the hands of tribal leaders or AQAP, neither of which is likely to part with them at any price. He could not estimate how many MANPADS Yemeni tribal leaders possess, but he believes that AQAP has six MANPADS (NFI). Finally, he expressed skepticism that the MOD would accept U.S. assistance to destroy its

official MANPADS stocks (an offer on the table since 2005). He believes MOD would want a more modern air defense system in return, not cash payment or stockpile security upgrades. He offered to attempt to broker a cash-for-destruction deal.

6. (S/NF) Accompanied by NSB official Akram al-Qassmi, the delegation visited a warehouse to view 96 MANPADS collected between 2005 and May 2009 that were awaiting destruction. (Note: These systems had already been verified by U.S. personnel and disabled. End Note.) The delegation verified an additional six SA-7s, four SA-7 gripstocks, and six batteries collected by the NSB since May 2009. The delegation disabled the six MANPADS and expended the six batteries.

7. (S/NF) On their last day, June 22, the delegation accompanied the Ambassador to a meeting with Minister of Defense Mohammed Nasser Ahmed. Ahmed denied that the MOD has any MANPADS in its official stocks, saying that they had already been handed over to NSB and destroyed. (Note: This is in direct contradiction to NSB,s June 21 assertion that the MOD had excess stocks of MANPADS, but would part with them only in exchange for a more modern air defense system. End Note.) The Minister described the MOD’s progress on SA/LW issues since S/E Bloomfield’s July 2008 visit. He noted that more than 250 weapons souks had been closed and more than 140 weapons dealers prosecuted. Furthermore, he remarked that the MOD has established an inventory system for all Armed Forces and MOD weapons, all of which are now marked. He invited U.S. officials to visit the warehouses to see how the system works. Finally, the Minister shared the delegation,s concerns about the airport,s MANPADS vulnerability, and said that as a member of the Supreme Security Committee, he would support a MAV.

NEXT STEPS

———-

8. (S/NF) Post worked with NSB to ensure that all 102 collected MANPADS were destroyed on July 27 (septel). Post has requested a meeting with the MOD Chief of Staff to observe the stockpile security and inventory control system reportedly in place. Post will follow up with NSB to find out whether it will accept a MAV and, if so, identify possible dates for the assessment. (Note: Despite ministerial-level support, the final decision on the MAV will be made by President Saleh. End Note.) Finally, Post will work with the Department to present a specific offer to the Yemeni government for assistance with physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) and destruction and marking of Yemeni SA/LW.

COMMENT

——-

9. (S/NF) It is hard to know what to believe regarding the presence or absence of MOD MANPADS. In a subsequent meeting on June 27, Qassmi told PolOffs that the MOD does indeed have MANPADS, but would never speak of them because they are considered a state secret. While MOD realizes their MANPADS are of little military value, they consider them better than nothing and would turn them over for destruction only if they were able to get a modern air defense system in return, according to Qassmi. PolOffs agreed to continue negotiating the destruction of MOD MANPADS through NSB interlocutors, since the MOD appears unwilling to discuss the issue with USG officials directly. END COMMENT. SECHE