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Fri, Dec 17, 2010 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6 | Edited by Crethi Plethi

WikiLeaks: US Officials Voiced Fears India Could Be Target of Biological Terrorism

Read the related article here.

WikiLeaks: Indian jihadi groups ‘interested in bio-terrorism’

Wednesday, 24 May 2006, 10:28

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 NEW DELHI 003611
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT
TREASURY FOR DAS DANNY GRASER AND ANDY BAUKOL
FINCEN FOR HEATHER MOYE
EO 12958 DECL: 05/24/2016
TAGS PTER, EFIN, TBIO, PREL, PINS, SCUL, KCIP, ASEC, EAIR,
PBTS, PROP, KISL, KSAC, IN, PK, BG”>BG, CE
SUBJECT: EMBASSY AND MEA HOLD PRODUCTIVE, FOCUSED CTJWG
FOLLOW-UP MEETING IN DELHI
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3473 B. NEW DELHI 3057 C. 05 NEW DELHI 6596
Classified By: Charge Robert Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

1. (U) This is an Action Request for SCA and S/CT. Please see Para 17.

2. (C) Summary: The DCM and key Embassy interlocutors on counterterrorism issues (see Paras 21-22) on May 19 reviewed with MEA Additional Secretary (International Organizations) KC Singh action items that emerged from the April 19 US-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) meeting in Washington and subsequent CT-related conversations (Refs A and B). The dialogue paved the way for further discussions on bio-terrorism cooperation, operationalizing countering terrorism finance, aviation security, improving USG delivery of CT training (and a GOI offer to provide CT training to USG personnel), improving the sharing of GOI tactical terrorist threat information, and continuing the discussion on how most effectively to counter extremist ideology in mass media and on the Internet. Ambassador Singh and Joint Secretary (Cabinet Secretariat) Sharad Kumar also shared GOI concerns that India is becoming more central to al-Qai’da’s agenda, and that al-Qa’ida and “al-Qa’ida franchises” share close links with the Pakistan establishment. The Indians again were receptive to the idea of a focused effort to defeat LTTE fund-raising and arms trafficking, but asked that this be couched in generic terms, rather than targeting Sri Lanka alone. End Summary.

India Now an al-Qa’ida Target

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3. (C) Singh opened by noting that India is becoming more prominent on al-Qai’da’s radar, pointing to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s April 29 video message praising “popular jihadist movements against Indians in Kashmir” and calling India “the best candidate for carrying out the Zionist-Crusader scheme to humiliate, weaken, and dismember Pakistan.” He added that al-Zawahiri’s recent reference to the US-India civil nuclear agreement demonstrated that Delhi’s growing cooperation with Washington was drawing al-Qai’da’s attention.

Alleging Direct Links Between al-Qa’ida and Islamabad

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4. (S) Singh asserted that Pakistan’s ISI retains connections to al-Qa’ida and has been privy to Usama bin Ladin’s communications. To the DCM’s question of information on operational links, Joint Secretary (Cabinet Secretariat, i.e. RAW) Sharad Kumar stated that Indian intelligence has transcripts of pre-9/11 meetings between UBL and Mullah Omar during which terrorism in J&K was discussed. He continued that UBL had been “willing to divert $20 million” from Central Asian programming to support Kashmir-oriented

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terrorism, and that UBL was quoted saying the Kashmiri jihadis “would not run short of funds.” Kumar added that when UBL sent his bodyguard contingent to help the Taliban fight the Northern Alliance, the temporary chief of his security force was an unnamed individual who went on to join Jaish-e-Mohammad. Singh ascribed al-Qa’ida’s increasing interest in India to the July 18 civil nuclear agreement. “ISI seeks to heat things up” to interfere with growing US-India convergence, he claimed.

5. (S) RAW’s Kumar observed that today, “al-Qa’ida franchises,” if not al-Qa’ida proper, are and have been very active in India. He defined “al-Qa’ida franchises” as groups that espouse the same extremist ideology and share some logistical and funding infrastructure even while remaining discrete organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Not all these groups or their attacks are linked, he continued; each must be investigated individually to locate their intersections.

Delhi Interest in Bio-Terror Rising

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6. (C) Turning to the subject of counter-bio-terrorism cooperation, Singh reported that Indian intelligence is picking up chatter indicating jihadi groups are interested in bio-terrorism, for example seeking out like-minded PhD’s in biology and bio-technology. He compared the prospects for nuclear terrorism (“still in the realm of the imaginary”) to bio-terrorism (“an ideal weapon for terrorism … anthrax could pose a serious problem …it is no longer an academic exercise for us.”) and indicated conceptual support for a joint bio-terrorism exercise. Singh stated that the text of the 1997 HHS/Ministry of Health Joint Statement included provisions for modeling bio-terrorism attacks, which could be used as a mechanism to support a joint exercise. (NOTE: Embassy HHS Attache reviewed the 1997 and 2005 HHS/MoH agreements and found no such mention of modeling bio-terrorism. End Note.) He concluded that although other relevant Ministries “work at their own pace,” MEA would confer with them to secure their buy-in. Embassy will pursue the matter with MEA and other GOI interlocutors with an eye to conducting a joint and multi-agency bio-terrorism tabletop exercise by late 2006.

Operationalizing Anti-Terrorism Finance

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7. (C) Noting that both sides have identical interests in combating terrorist groups but no practical experience in joint operations with each other, the DCM revisited the suggestion to create a contact group of experts — with the MEA as the hub but including the Indian Finance Ministry and the nascent Financial Intelligence Unit as well as the Embassy Economics Section — to focus on squeezing LTTE finances (Refs A and B). The DCM and Singh agreed that to keep the operation out of the spotlight it could adopt an innocuous name such as the “Subgroup on Terror Finance.”

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PolCouns underscored the importance of moving from exchanging data on terrorist finances to shutting down money flows, particularly in light of the LTTE’s wealth (i.e. it’s ability to fund both a navy and an air force) and its recent egregiously violent attacks. J/S Kumar was tasked to develop ideas about modalities of the group’s operations; he observed that although a cooperative effort is the most effective way forward, “most of our people are cagey regarding cooperation and joint operations,” and “do not even trust others in their own government”; however, he added, their buy-in will be required. The DCM reassured Kumar that these operations would be kept in secure channels and well away from the media. Please see Action Request in Para 17.

Aviation Security

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8. (C) Taking note of the increase in aviation links between the US and India under the Open Skies agreement, including twice-daily non-stop flights, the DCM requested an official briefing on the GOI’s anti-hijacking policy (Ref C) — specifically, a full briefing to relevant Embassy elements (RSO, ECON, POL, etc.) plus advice on how Embassy can best brief US airlines on how they are affected by the GOI policy. Singh agreed to arrange the briefing. RSO added that Continental particularly had asked the Civil Aviation Ministry for this information but was only informed of the existence of a policy (and not the elements of that policy). (NOTE: A GOI Civil Aviation representative was slated to brief the CTJWG but was unable to travel to Washington to attend the meeting. End Note.) Before turning to a broader review of CT training opportunities, RSO noted that, pending a June 1 approval deadline, a DS/ATA Airport Security Consultation is slated for June 26-30.

Making CT Training Smarter

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9. (C) After RSO provided an update on ATA courses for India currently in the pipeline (Para 18), Singh passed to the DCM a GOI “wish-list” of ATA courses (Para 19) and a list of courses the GOI could offer to USG law enforcement/military officers (Para 20). RSO pointed out that the Airport Security Consultation could be used to bootstrap other related training, such as on travel document authentication.

10. (C) Moving forward, RSO asked for points of contact among GOI subject-matter experts to identify course objectives ahead of time, to allow USG training providers to modify courses (where possible) to meet GOI objectives. RSO noted the broad spectrum of USG elements that would benefit by having this information.

India “Can’t Afford to Lag Behind” on Bio-Metrics

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11. (C) Singh raised the issue of bio-metrics cooperation, in which the GOI “can’t afford to lag behind,” he said. The

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MEA’s Consular/Passports/Visas Division coordinates with the Home Ministry in this area. He underlined the role of document authentication in disrupting terrorist (and other illicit) travel and the transit of weapons and other contraband shipments. Singh and the DCM agreed on the importance of harmonizing document standards. The DCM reminded Singh that one problem the USG has in repatriating Indian nationals is the difficulty in verifying their identities; the Embassy’s Consular Section works with the Home Ministry but bio-metrics may offer a solution.

Streamlining Flow of Tactical Threat Information

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12. (C) The DCM underlined the importance of the Embassy (through the RSO) being able promptly to inform US businesses with equities in India of “the ground truth” on terrorist threat information and terrorist attacks, including hoaxes. Stories periodically appear in the Indian press that sensationalize alleged threats against American interests. While these stories are often based on faulty information, they do serve to increase security concerns in the American corporate community in particular. The DCM explained the USG “No Double Standard” and offered that GOI sources and methods could still be protected under that policy. When Singh asked how such incidents are handled in Washington, RSO informed him the DS Protective Liaison Division keeps close contact with the diplomatic community. One DS Agent typically services several diplomatic missions — and is able to share tactical terrorist threat information on a real-time basis. Singh concurred that such a service in India is necessary beyond what state police agencies may provide, and suggested the MEA, with inputs from the state police and Home Ministry, would be the likely information provider. The DCM then explained the function of the Embassy’s EAC to evaluate imminent threat information and decide on an appropriate response, indicating how reliable real-time GOI terrorist threat information would fit into the Embassy’s decision-making process. Singh agreed in principle to create a real-time response mechanism to disseminate GOI terrorist threat information, with RSO as the Embassy’s POC. He saw this as important both to the diplomatic community and India’s growing pool of expatriate businesses.

“No Complaints” on Intel Sharing

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13. (S) Singh reported that there were “no complaints” from Delhi on US-India intelligence sharing overall, and introduced J/S Kumar as a key contact for intel sharing. The DCM concurred n the positive state of intelligence cooperation. He conveyed his understanding that earlier US concerns in this area have largely been resolved.

Continuing the Ideological Discussion

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14. (S) The DCM and Singh revisited the CTJWG discussion on

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combating extremist ideology particularly through the Internet without leaving a USG fingerprint. They agreed to schedule separate meetings to pursue this issue and explore how much can be accomplished and how best to do so.

Future Meetings Planned

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15. (C) In addition to issue-specific Embassy-GOI meetings to be held over the summer, Singh said that he planned to meet S/CT Ambassador Crumpton in September on the fringes of the UNGA. The DCM noted that Undersecretary Nick Burns plans to visit India in late summer, which would offer an interim opportunity to review CT progress, among other issues.

Comment: Encouraging Signs Continue

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16. (C) We are encouraged by the MEA’s continued receptivity to engage with us more deeply than in recent history on CT issues. Barriers appear to be dissolving even regarding very sensitive issues, such as intelligence sharing and bio-terrorism preparedness. As far as the US-India CT dialogue is concerned, Ambassador Singh embodies the adage that “the right man in the right place at the right time can turn the tide.” He has yet to ensure the other actionable parts of the Indian bureaucracy march in the same direction and to the same tune, but it is clear he is serious about making practical CT cooperation work and serious about working with us to do so.

Action Request for SCA and S/CT

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17. (C) Given the GOI’s expressed interest in “doing more” on the LTTE (Refs A and B and Para 7), Embassy requests further guidance from SCA and S/CT on moving in coordination with Delhi against LTTE finances and arms flows. We expect also to be queried about what steps the USG is prepared to take against LTTE fund-raising in the US.

ATA Courses In Train for India 2006

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18. (SBU) Begin list of ATA courses for India 2006:

— ATA-5345 Executive Course on Cyber-Terrorism Duration: June 12-14 Location: Hyderabad Status: Offer accepted

— ATA-2994 Post-Blast Investigation Duration: July 17-August 4 Location: Baton Rouge Status: Offer accepted

— ATA-5062 India Senior Crisis Management Course Duration: August 21-26

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Location: Washington Status: Pending GOI approval

— ATA-5956 Airport Security Consultation Duration: June 26-30 Location: New Delhi, Mumbai, Hyderabad, Jaipur Status: Requested by the GOI. Pending formal approval

— ATA-5737 India VIP Protection Course Duration: August 7-25 Location: Baton Rouge Status: Pending GOI approval

GOI “Wish List” for CT Courses

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19. (SBU) Begin lightly edited text of GOI document “ATA Training Courses – Requirements of Indian Police:

Methodology and equipment for countering suicide bombing and fidayeen attacks.

Countermeasures against improvised explosive devices and land mines used against transport vehicles

Terrorist communications systems

Channels of terrorist financing – Modus Operandi and countermeasures

Building personal profile of terrorists/criminals: How to build the profile (including modus operandi) of terrorists and criminals associated with organized crime

Database development: — What databases are available to investigators in the US? — How have these databases been built/developed? — What are the laws associated with the creation and access to these databases?

Experience Sharing: The most valuable input to agencies charged with the task of maintaining security is the experience of other such agencies. At the moment US security forces are dealing with “rural” militancy in Afghanistan and “urban” militancy in Iraq. It is not necessary to send a large number of officers from India. US officers with appropriate experience could come to India for 2-3 day sessions with Indian officers. This idea is an extension of the cooperation between the defense forces of the two countries. We would thus suggest the following:

Experience Sharing/Afghanistan: — What were the problems faced in Afghanistan at the strategic level; at the tactical level? — What strategies evolved to resolve the problems? — How successful were the strategies and what were/are the problems faced in implementing the strategies? — What were/are the equipment used in these areas by the

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security forces? — In retrospect, what else could have been done?

Experience Sharing/Iraq: — What were the problems faced in Iraq at the strategic level; at the tactical level? — What strategies evolved to resolve the problems? — How successful were the strategies and what were/are the problems faced in implementing the strategies? — What were/are the equipment used in these areas by the security forces? — In retrospect, what else could have been done?

General policing as related to terrorism: — Forged documentation and travel documents — Money counterfeiting — Money laundering

Security Management: — Airport security — VIP protection

Intelligence gathering techniques including practical demonstration of the techniques

Illegal immigration management including border patrolling techniques

Forensics medicine: new methodology and tools available to assist investigations

Forensic science: — DNA fingerprinting — Other special techniques such as use of polygraph — Use of voice prints and other biometric measures

End Text.

GOI Offer of CT Courses for USG Personnel

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20. (SBU) Begin lightly edited text of GOI document “Counterterrorism Courses for US Forces Personnel in India”:

— Money Laundering at CBI Academy, Ghaziabad

— Counter-Insurgency and Commando Course at Border Security Forces Training Center & School, Hazaribagh.

— Weapons & Tactics Course at Central School of Weapons and Tactics, BSF Training Center & School, Indore.

— Bomb Disposal Course at NSG Training Center, Manesar. (NOTE: NSG is the National Security Group, whose mandate includes VIP protection and response to major acts of terrorism occurring at diplomatic and GOI facilities. End Note.)

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— Young Officer-Leg. II (Integrated) Course at BSF Academy, Tekanpur

— Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare Course at Assam Rifles Training Center & School, Dimphu (Nagaland)

— Training at Greyhounds Regional Training Center, Hyderabad (NOTE: The Greyhounds is a GOI security force targeting India’s Naxalites/Maoists. End Note.)

End Text.

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21. (U) XXXXXXXXXXXX

23. (U) Visit New Delhi’s Classified Website: (http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) BLAKE

WikiLeaks: US fears possible bioterror attack in India

Thursday, 08 June 2006, 12:05

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 NEW DELHI 003997
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/07/2016
TAGS PTER, PREL, PGOV, TBIO, PINS, KSCA, PINR, EAIR, SENV,
KHIV, IN
SUBJECT: INDIA BEHIND ON BIOTERROR PREPARATIONS BUT TAKING
SOME STEPS
REF: A. NEW DELHI 3658 B. NEW DELHI 3636 C. NEW DELHI 3611 D. STATE 82566
Classified By: A/PolCouns Atul Keshap for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

1. (C) Summary: The GOI regards a bioterrorism attack as an event of such low probability that the potential impact does not register high on New Delhi’s agenda. We have no reason to believe terrorist organizations operating in India have access to pathogens at this time; also, bioterrorism is inconsistent with the strategy of most terrorist groups active in India. Furthermore, terrorists’ fear of becoming a victim of such attacks themselves reduces the likelihood of a bioterrorism attack in the near future. However, the possibility of a bioterror attack cannot be ruled out.

2. (C) Advances in the biotech sector and shifting terrorist tactics that focus on disrupting India’s social cohesion and economic prosperity oblige the GOI to look at the possibility of terror groups using biological agents as weapons of mass destruction and economic and social disruption. The plethora of indigenous highly pathogenic and virulent agents naturally occurring in India and the large Indian industrial base — combined with weak controls — also make India as much a source of bioterrorism material as a target. In addition, India’s notably weak public health and agricultural infrastructure coupled with high population density means that a deliberate release of a disease-causing agent could go undetected for quite a while before authorities become aware. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, India is particularly vulnerable to agriculture attacks. Moreover, lack of communication, coordination, and cooperation among key stakeholders from different sectors will continue to remain a major impediment to the GOI’s capacity to respond to a bioterrorism attack.

3. (C) Fortunately, terrorist groups operating in India are not focused on bioterror, according to Delhi-based terrorism analysts, although XXXXXXXXXXXX told us recently that the GOI believes jihadi groups are seeking to recruit or employ biology/bio-tech PhD graduates from within India (Ref C). Recent indications of receptivity by GOI interlocutors on biodefense cooperation and steps the GOI seems to be taking to prepare for a possible bioterrorist attack (Refs B-D and Septel) may presage the writing of a new chapter in India’s counterterrorism preparedness and in US-India CT cooperation. End Summary.

Just Waking Up to the Threat

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4. (C) In recent meetings with GOI representatives and Indian scientists, two themes emerged regarding the bioterror

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threat: India’s public health and agriculture surveillance systems are sorely lacking, and the GOI is currently ill-equipped to prepare for or respond to a bioterrorism attack. Representatives from the Agriculture and Health Ministries, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), and law enforcement were all quick to point out the weaknesses in the various disease surveillance systems, noting there is no well-established collection of baseline epidemiological information/data (naturally occurring disease burden) which is needed for India to distinguish between a natural outbreak and a terrorist attack. Given the number of diseases endemic to India, the GOI would have a hard time differentiating between a newly emerging or re-emerging disease and a bioterrorism attack. Additionally, while individuals within various ministries are cognizant of the extent of the threat to India, there does not appear to be strong movement to shore up vulnerabilities or have key stakeholders move outside their traditional lanes. The appearance of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), H5N1 strain, within India’s borders may change India’s views on the need to prepare. XXXXXXXXXXXX, for example, made the extrapolation between the country’s capacity to deal with a newly emerging disease and the implications for its ability to respond to bioterrorism. Most GOI interlocutors seemed unaware that executing a biological terrorist attack (i.e. obtaining and releasing pathogens) requires far less sophistication than executing a chemical or nuclear terrorist attack.

Biological Attack Potentially Devastating

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5. (C) The impact of a biological attack or the accidental release of a disease-causing agent in India could be devastating, given the high population density in Indian cities and the growing mobility of India’s middle class. Most biological warfare (BW) agents do not produce symptoms for many hours or several days, so Indians exposed to a contagious BW agent could easily spread the agent to thousands before symptoms manifest. Release in an Indian city could facilitate international spread — Delhi airport alone sees planes depart daily to numerous European, Asian, Middle Eastern and African destinations, as well as non-stop flights to Chicago and Newark.

But GOI Says India Not Ready For Bioterrorism

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6. (C) In early May meetings, GOI officials indicated to XXXXXXXXXXXX and Poloff that Delhi is neither ready for nor focusing on bioterrorism or biodefense; XXXXXXXXXXXX and Poloff were struck by the frank admissions from some interlocutors. XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated that detection and protection of “soft systems” like the logistics chains for food, milk, and water delivery are “inadequate” in the face of a determined terrorist. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated frankly that New Delhi is ill-prepared to handle a bioterrorist attack: “The government does not have the requisite experience.” “The terrorists have surprise on their side, we need more preparation, and we need more scientists working with police, who typically focus more on (conventional) terrorism investigations than on protection and response,” XXXXXXXXXXXX added.

7. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was unconvincing in his assertion that the GOI has biodefense well in hand. As with criminal matters, XXXXXXXXXXXX indicated that disaster management in India begins at the local government level. Districts and municipalities must then appeal to state governments to assist in situations beyond their capacity to control, and states to the federal government — processes that could cause critical delays in a fast-moving attack or disaster situation. XXXXXXXXXXXX

At Best, A Third-Tier Priority

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8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX was candid, however, that biodefense was his third priority after chemical and nuclear/radiological incidents. He also mentioned that the NDMA was planning chemical and nuclear disaster response exercises in the coming weeks, but had no plans as yet to conduct a biological disaster response exercise, let alone one that focused on a bioterror attack. (NOTE: EmbOffs noticed that XXXXXXXXXXXX’s comments frequently returned to chemical/nuclear accident response despite their questions on biological terrorism response. Furthermore, he never mentioned, and may be completely unaware, of XXXXXXXXXXXX, suggesting poor knowledge-sharing and coordination within the GOI on bioterror defense. XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Note.). XXXXXXXXXXXX turned down XXXXXXXXXXXX’s reiteration of the USG proposal for support for a GOI (or joint US-India) bioterrorism exercise (see Para 24), saying India was “not yet ready”; he appeared unenthusiastic, though not immediately dismissive, of Poloff’s request that the NDMA invite relevant Embassy officers to view the exercises the

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NDMA already has planned.

9. (C) Contradicting his earlier assertion, XXXXXXXXXXXX gave a frank assessment of India’s ability to respond to a major biological attack or disaster. Less than two percent of the Uttar Pradesh and Bihar state budgets go for health, for example, which means that village-level health care in UP, India’s most populous state with over 130 million inhabitants, is scant; nor are there sufficient veterinary facilities in these two agriculture-dependent states. He bemoaned the fact that the public health sector was slow to benefit from private sector biotechnology advances.

Opportunity: Terrorism/Natural Outbreak Overlap

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10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX both agreed that India would derive a dual benefit from improved disease surveillance and biodefense preparations that could counter either a bioterrorism attack or a natural disease outbreak. XXXXXXXXXXXX shared with us that some of his police and security colleagues had speculated that AI in India was initially introduced as a bioterrorism attack, or as a test by terrorists of their (purported) bioterrorism capabilities and a probe of Indian defenses and response. XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that, rather than acquire exotic BW agents, terrorists operating in India have access to a number of naturally-occurring disease-causing agents that could be easily spread in food or water supplies, such as cholera; according to technical literature, 70% of naturally occurring multi-antibiotic resistant bacteria are found in India. Although many BW agents are sensitive to large-scale dilution in a municipal water supply, they would be well suited for use in smaller bodies of water common in India, such as a small apartment complex’s water tank, urban water trucks that service middle-class communities in the summertime, or a rural well; cholera outbreaks are an annual summer event in Delhi.

Food Defense Resonates

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11. (C) Noting the GOI interest especially in food supply protection, XXXXXXXXXXXX informed XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX of the September 25-29 FBI-Joint Terrorism Task Force International Symposium on Agro-Terrorism. CBI later requested further information from the Embassy on the symposium, indicating possible CBI participation.

12. (SBU) XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX found a receptive audience with XXXXXXXXXXXX, who voiced concerns over vulnerabilities to agriculture and the food supply, noting not only the obvious health consequences of any outbreak or contamination, but also emphasizing the direct economic impact. XXXXXXXXXXXX mentioned that

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when the AI outbreak first occurred, the GOI was initially concerned that the public health sector would face a secondary health crisis — malnutrition due to loss of the primary protein source. He suggested the USG consider in the food defense discussion including aquaculture, the water supply, and the use of water in food preparation and production. XXXXXXXXXXXX also noted GOI’s overall weaknesses in agricultural disease surveillance and detection. Furthermore, he indicated the GOI did not have baseline data which could help determine whether an outbreak was newly emerging or a result of deliberate introduction.

Stovepiping Hinders Inter-Agency Cooperation

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13. (C) Discussions with GOI officials indicate bureaucratic inertia among the various ministries to interact with each other on these issues, which may impede the GOI’s ability to prepare for, and respond to, an act of bioterrorism. One sign seemed to be the inclusion of only XXXXXXXXXXXX inXXXXXXXXXXXX meeting on bioterrorism when the USG proposals on food defense and increasing awareness and communication at the sub-federal level (reiterated to the MEA at the April 19 US-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group meeting in Washington) clearly would necessitate broader interagency participation, especially law enforcement and agriculture. The Agriculture Ministry XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed a keen interest in learning more about the recent US-India biosafety and pathogen security workshop in Pune, yet indicated that no one in the Ministry of Agriculture was able to attend. XXXXXXXXXXXX Perhaps the formation of the NDMA will help eliminate some stovepipes as NDMA develops GOI’s bioterrorism preparedness strategy. Regardless, there remains a clear need to encourage multi-sectoral GOI engagement in preparation for, or response to, a bioterrorism attack.

Access to Biomaterials “Not Very Difficult”

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14. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff the difficulty of manufacturing biological weapons is offset in India by the relative ease of procuring biological materials such as harmful bacteria, parasites, viruses or toxins that either exist naturally or are cultured in academic labs that maintain loose supervision. “It would be unlikely that a bio-agent is brought in by terrorists from outside the country if it can be easily obtained within India itself,” added XXXXXXXXXXXX; “Getting into a facility to obtain

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lethal bio-agents is not very difficult here.” (COMMENT: Biological agents do not require sophisticated weaponization for dispersal. Food and water supplies can be tainted or a “typhoid Mary” scenario could be employed. End Comment.)

15. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX echoed XXXXXXXXXXXX’s assessment that academic facilities maintain very loose security procedures; basic entry barriers exist, but monitoring is not stringent. “The harsh reality is that you can bribe a guard with a pack of cigarettes to get inside”, said Lele. “A disgruntled scientist who has been working in India in his lab for several years without a promotion is a good candidate for bribing,” he added.

16. (SBU) A March 21 “Indian Express” article quoted XXXXXXXXXXXX as having requested (and obtained) police protection from angry poultry farmers whom he feared would attack the lab to retaliate for the lab’s detection of the H5N1 avian influenza virus that led to the farmers having to cull their flocks. The article concluded: “Contrary to the image its name evokes, the lab has almost zero security. A couple of guards, armed only with batons, man the entrance of the laboratory.”

17. (SBU) SciOff has also seen photographs taken by a senior Indian army officer, XXXXXXXXXXXX, from his tour of what he called “frontline field laboratories for diagnostics of infectious diseases.” The photographs demonstrated a host of poor laboratory security and safety practices, including families sleeping in labs and disposable gloves being washed for re-use or being disposed of as non-hazardous biological waste (Ref A).

A Source of Biological Agents for External Attacks

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18. (C) Terrorists planning attacks anywhere in the world could use India’s advanced biotechnology industry and large bio-medical research community as potential sources of biological agents. Given the strong web of air connections Delhi shares with the rest of the world and the vulnerabilities that might be exploited at airports, a witting or unwitting person could easily take hazardous materials into or out of the country. (NOTE: The British High Commission’s air security officer noted that checked luggage is inspected well away from the airline check-in desks, and hand luggage is only inspected just before the departure gates; passengers could easily slip contraband from hand luggage into an exterior pouch in already-inspected checked luggage en route to the check-in desk, whence it is not inspected arrival at the passenger’s destination. End Note.)

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Over-the-Horizon Threats an Enduring Indian Blind Spot

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19. (C) The GOI’s level of preparedness to combat bioterror attacks may be attributed in part to what the dean of India’s strategic establishment and former Defense Secretary K Subrahmanyan calls the “Panipat Syndrome,” an Indian tradition of not anticipating strategic threats. (NOTE: According to Subrahmanyan in three separate decisive battles, Indian empires declined to defend themselves against Western invaders by reinforcing strategic choke-points like the Khyber Pass. They instead waited for the advancing force to reach Panipat — a town only 40 miles from Delhi, and over 450 miles after penetrating the Khyber — before reacting.

20. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXX’s comments provide a case in point. To place his priority list in context, the December 1984 Bhopal accident still looms large in India’s psyche; although India has not suffered a nuclear disaster, the GOI has viewed from a distance the examples of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, reminders of potential disasters that might await India’s own civil nuclear program. In contrast, biological threats belong almost solely to the realm of the possible — they come last because there has been no correspondingly dire biological attack or accident to focus Delhi’s attention. The closest India came to bioterrorism was a late 2001 series of Anthrax attacks that turned out to be a hoax. When Poloff asked XXXXXXXXXXXX about the series of MEA-funded books on bioterrorism that IPCS edited and published, he remarked, “Yes, but only Europeans actually buy the books, Indians don’t.”

Luckily, Not On (Most) Terrorists’ Radar Yet, Either

——————————————— ——-

21. (C) Bioterrorism would at most appeal to the larger jihadi terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) — XXXXXXXXXXXXtold us recently that the GOI believes jihadi groups are seeking to recruit or employ biology/bio-tech PhD graduates with an aim to carrying out bioterrorist attacks (Ref C). Naxals and Northeast separatist terrorists rely heavily on local support, their area of operations is limited to the territory they seek to “liberate,” and they lack operational reach into major cities like Delhi, Pune, Hyderabad and Bangalore — all factors that suggest they would not seek to employ bioterrorism. “Groups like al-Qa’ida and its affiliates like LeT and JeM, who are fighting for a religious cause, are more likely to indulge in the use of BW since they are not concerned about popular support,” XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested. He claimed that such groups already possess the combination of expertise and contacts to gain access to harmful bio-agents. Even if terrorist groups active in India do not yet possess in-house BW capabilities, India boasts more capable

NEW DELHI 00003997 008 OF 009

biological scientists — well in the thousands — than any other developing country. Recruitment of Indian scientists by anti-US extremists, either for ideological brotherhood or for commercial gain, could pose a significant threat. XXXXXXXXXXXX terrorism analyst XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that jihadis over the past year have shown they can adapt to using novel tactics and targeting economic and scientific institutions that fuel India’s engines of growth and prosperity; under this rubric, a bioterrorism attack could wreak havoc with India’s economy and cripple investor confidence.

GOI Starting to Take Action?

—————————-

22. (SBU) According to a short April 28 article on “newindpress.com,” Home Secretary VK Duggal in April asked Health Secretary Prasanna Hota to assist in preparing a manual on standard operating procedures for bioterrorism attacks response. The article also stated that Health Ministry Director (General Health Services) SK Srivastava would create a technical committee to assess other countries’ best practices in bioterrorism preparedness and prevention. There was no indication in the article of what timelines the Home and Health Ministries are following; none of our interlocutors mentioned this initiative to us.

Comment: Wake Up and Smell the Biohazard

—————————————-

23. (C) Strategies to improve public health human and animal sectors are vital for the GOI, as are enforced regulations to safeguard biological materials. New Delhi needs to be more aggressive in laying out solid actionable plans to implement biosecurity and public health improvements.

24. (C) As a US-India CTJWG agenda item, a bioterrorism exercise is one of the most politically sensitive issues for the GOI. Many other countries are also ill-prepared to address a bioterrorism attack; however, few live in the kind of dangerous neighborhood that India does, where terrorism, lax security, petty corruption, high population density, weak public health and agricultural infrastructures, and a booming and sophisticated biotech industry coexist. New Delhi’s past concern over displaying their lack of preparation on biodefense was possibly a determinant in the GOI having declined to follow-through on a joint bioterrorism exercise despite the Home Ministry having initiated the request in 2004. In contrast, their current apparent receptivity to a bioterrorism tabletop exercise (articulated by XXXXXXXXXXXX at the April 19 CTJWG in Washington), if

SIPDIS it comes to fruition, will be a significant demonstration of trust and confidence in this element of the evolving CT partnership with the USG.

25. (U) Visit New Delhi’s Classified Website:

NEW DELHI 00003997 009 OF 009

(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/) MULFORD

WikiLeaks: ‘Big idea’ missing in US-Indian relations

Friday, 09 January 2009, 13:06

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000048
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK, IN, TSPL, KNNP, ETTC,
ENRG, TRGY
SUBJECT: MENON TOUGH ON PAKISTAN, BULLISH ON BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP IN DISCUSSION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 32 B. NEW DELHI 29
Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)

1. (S) SUMMARY. Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon on January 8 discussed Pakistan and the bilateral relationship in the context of the U.S. political transition with visiting Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher and Ambassador Mulford. Boucher and Menon were in full agreement on the need to ensure that Pakistan eliminate Laskhar-e-Tayiba, but disagreed on some tactics. Boucher urged Menon to “tone down” the Indian rhetoric and avoid any military movements that could be misinterpreted. Menon defended India’s strategy of publicly pressuring Pakistan’s security services, saying they had not yet made the strategic decision to cut ties with Lashkar-e-Tayiba, and that the civilian government was powerless to force this change. Menon agreed with Boucher that important progress was being made on preventing a future attack, with good cooperation with the U.S., but cautioned that for the moment the issue of Pakistan had become defining. Menon stressed the importance of focusing the bilateral relationship with the next U.S. administration on issues with broader popular appeal. He said India was very keen on an early visit by the next Secretary of State, and requested an early, quiet conversation to reassure India about U.S. nonproliferation policy. The Indian government planned to sign its Safeguards Agreement and to begin negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on an Additional Protocol at the end of January, but would not make a decision about designating a nuclear reactor park site for U.S. firms prior to the January 11-16 visit of the U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) delegation. Menon said he hoped for a deal on End Use Monitoring (EUM) “as quickly as possible.” END SUMMARY.

Menon Tough on Pakistan, Bullish on Bilateral Relationship

– – –

2. (C) In a meeting January 8, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon discussed with visiting Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and Ambassador Mulford issues including the Mumbai terrorist attack investigations, developments in Pakistan, End Use Monitoring (EUM), next steps in civil nuclear cooperation, and the bilateral relationship in the context of the U.S. political transition.

Pakistan Has Taken “No Irrevocable Steps” Post-Mumbai

– – –

3. (S/REL UK) Boucher recounted for Menon his impressions from his visit to Paksitan (ref A), that Zardari and Gailani were committed to ridding the county of terrorism and had made real strides with the terrorist groups operating in the tribal areas, but that they now understood they also had to tackle Punjabi-based groups like Lashkar-e-Tayiba, which was much more difficult. “We’re not giving them any breaks: they must eliminate Lashkar-e-Tayiba,” Boucher stressed, adding that it would require persistence. The U.S. hoped to encourage a continuous flow of information, but Pakistan still prefered the mechanism to be a high-level dialogue.

4. (S/REL UK) Menon replied that Pakistan was “nowhere near the threshold of proving sincerity” in its response to the Mumbai attacks and had so far taken no “irrevocable” steps toward eliminating Lashkar-e-Tayiba as a threat to India. His worry was that the problem was “more basic,” that the civilian government was incaable of taking action against Lashkar and the military had not yet made the strategic shift required to do so. He recounted that Jaish-e-Mohammad was

NEW DELHI 00000048 002 OF 004

behind the assassination attempt on former Pakistani President Musharraf in 2003, but even that did not move the Pakistani Army to crack down; the group remains operational and has grown more lethal. Furthermore, compared to the Musharraf era, the Pakistan Army was “not responsible right now,” according to Menon, who cited provocations such as cease-fire violations.

India Focused on Pakistani Military, Dismissive of Civilian Government

– – –

5. (S/REL UK) Boucher observed that while India had begun targeting pressure against Pakistani security services, the U.S. had decided to work through the civilian government. Boucher cautioned that recent statements claiming links between Pakistani security services and the Mumbai attacks made cooperation more difficult, as did some Indian military movements that, though limited, were enough to be noticed. Boucher said Pakistan had a democratic government committed to eliminating terrorism, and that the U.S. would hold them to it. Menon pointed out that India deliberately had not taken action that would undercut the civilian government or impact the Pakistani people, such as cutting trade, travel, or diplomatic representation. But Menon warned, “You’re setting the civilians up for a fall. If you raise expectations of increased civilian power, the military will knock them down.” Furthermore, an Indian embrace of the civilian government would be “the kiss of death.” Menon concluded, “Honestly I do not think the civilian government can solve the problem; the military must choose to act.”

6. (S/REL UK) Boucher shared that the U.S. had not reached the conclusion that Pakistan’s security services were directly involved in the Mumbai attacks and asked Menon to “tone down” the public pressure. Provoking the Pakistan military made constructive cooperation less likely. Menon replied, “What we have seen so far leads us to the opposite conclusion.” (Asked about evidence, Menon added that India’s conclusion was “based on inference.”) The political moment was such that the Pakistani Security Services could make a fundamental shift away from support to terrorist groups if they so chose, but they had not done so. “Let’s not insult one another by telling a story that the Pakistan Army was not involved,” said Menon. The Pakistan Army paid wages to Lashkar-e-Tayiba and sustained the organization, and until these ties were severed, India would continue to regard the Pakistani security services as complicit in the Mumbai attacks. Menon concluded, “They’re either unwilling to take action, or incapable, or both; any way you look at it, they’re involved.”

Good Progress on Preventing Further Attacks

– – –

7. (S/REL UK) Menon agreed that important progress was being made on prevention of further terrorist attacks, with good cooperation with the U.S. He remarked that there was no popular resistance to the idea of FBI involvement in the Mumbai investigations. He agreed with Boucher that India could work with the United States to make itself safer regardless of Pakistan, but he stressed that unless the Mumbai perpetrators were brought to justice it will happen again. Menon concluded, “We have a huge confluence of interests, and as long as that exists we will work together.” Boucher assured Menon that India could rely on the U.S. to keep up the pressure on Pakistan; Menon replied, “And you can count on our pressure on you to help you do it.”

End Use Monitoring: India “Ready For a Deal”

NEW DELHI 00000048 003.2 OF 004

– – –

8. (C) Asked whether India was “ready for a deal” on End Use Monitoring (EUM), Menon replied emphatically, “Yes.” He added that he thought a deal was close, but that it would require “sitting at a table and finding a solution that is neither yours nor ours. We can do it.” He added that EUM was important to India and that he hoped for a deal “as quickly as possible.”

Progress With Energy Agency, But Nervous About U.S. Nonpro Policy

– – –

9. (C) Menon shared that the government was ready to sign its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement and expected to do so “by the end of the month.” Negotiations with the Agency on an Additional Protocol were likewise scheduled to begin at the end of January. Menon expected the next Parliament to take up the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). (Comment: Menon did not mention the possibility of bypassing Parliament raised by External Affairs Minister Mukherjee, reported ref B.) Menon said the government had “rescheduled” a decision about designating a nuclear reactor park site for U.S. firms and that it would not be made in time for the January 11-16 visit of the U.S.-India Business Council (USIBC) civil nuclear delegation.

10. (C) Menon confided that many people in India were “nervous” about nonproliferation policy under the new U.S. administration. He hoped for an early, quiet conversation with the new U.S. administration, saying, “The world has changed in the past eight years, and we need to be sure we share updated views.” Boucher and Ambassador Mulford stressed the bipartisan support for the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as evidence that both political parties were aware of the changed environment.

Bilateral Relationship: Seeking The Next Big Idea

– – –

11. (C) Boucher and Menon discussed a variety of bilateral issues in the context of the U.S. political transition. Menon agreed that the papers exchanged with Under Secretary Burns outlining bilateral issues ripe for progress were “very congruent, almost the same.” Menon stressed the importance of focusing on issues with popular appeal. Many good things were happening on health, education, and agriculture, according to Menon, but nothing that “captures the imagination.” Indians were beginning to view the relationship with the U.S. as only about political-military and nuclear issues.

12. (C) Boucher challenged Menon to think about formulating “the next big idea” to frame the bilateral relationship for the next several years. Boucher suggested that one direction might be toward popular issues, such as agriculture and energy, while another might be toward global issues, such as the environment and trade. Ambassador Mulford suggested that India might leverage its position amid the global financial crisis by elevating its stature in the international financial architecture. Menon agreed, but cautioned that for the moment the issue of Pakistan had become defining. Menon said he was very keen on an early visit by the next Secretary of State, but had not been sure who to ask.

13. (SBU) Assistant Secretary Boucher cleared this message.

NEW DELHI 00000048 004 OF 004

MULFORD

WikiLeaks: Indian Home Minister told FBI that terrorist sleeper cells waiting to strike in India

Friday, 26 February 2010, 06:33

S E C R E T NEW DELHI 000367
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, IN, PK
SUBJECT: FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER DISCUSSES HEADLEY CASE WITH
INDIAN HOME MINISTER CHIDAMBARAM
Classified By: Ambassador Tim Roemer. Reason: 1.4 (b,d).

1. (S) Summary: In a February 23 meeting, FBI Director Robert Mueller told Indian Home Affairs Minister P. Chidambaram that the USG would continue to cooperate with the GOI in providing information on the David Headley case and other cases involving terrorism directed at India. Chidambaram requested direct access to Headley, even if such access produces no information, as well as access to Headley’s spouse, who he said was in Chicago. Chidambaram asked whether a GOI official could monitor Headley’s interrogation and submit questions “in real time.” Chidambaram said he had “a feeling in my bones that Headley was not acting here alone,” but conceded that he had no evidence to support his supposition that Headley formed sleeper cells in India, one of which may have been involved in the February 13 Pune bombing. Mueller assented to Chidambaram’s request for expedited FBI lab assistance regarding forensic cyber and voice recognition analysis. Chidambaram complained that Pakistan had “done damn near nothing” to prosecute Mumbai terror suspects, and Mueller said he would press the Pakistanis to take action during an upcoming visit to Islamabad. End Summary.

2. (S) Director Mueller opened the 20-minute meeting by expressing satisfaction over increasingly close bilateral cooperation. Characterizing the information produced by interrogations of David Headley as among the most important intelligence the USG has gleaned in the past 6 – 8 months, the Director assured Chidambaram that we would continue to pass such information in a timely manner to India. Noting that the process of Headley’s proffer of evidence is nearing a critical stage, Mueller observed that Headley has expressed hatred toward India and may “clam up” if his guilty plea is tied in any way to cooperation with the GOI.

3. (S) After thanking Mueller for the “outstanding cooperation” displayed by the USG, Chidambaram stated that he understood from his discussions with Attorney General Holder that the GOI cannot use any information provided by the USG at this time in Indian prosecutions. He noted, however, that GOI investigators had developed information on their own through examination of Headley’s computer and emails. Chidambaram insisted that the GOI have access to Headley: “we must be able to say we had access, even if Headley did not speak.” He also requested access to Headley’s spouse, Shaiza, who he said is in Chicago so GOI investigators can question her on the meaning of her alleged message to Headley that she “saw your graduation.” Director Mueller said he would look into both requests. In reply to Chidambaram’s observation that the “worst outcome would be a light sentence of 2 or 3 years for Headley,” Mueller stated that Headley is looking at a considerably longer sentence.

4. (S) Chidambaram informed Mueller that the GOI would soon send a number of Letters Rogatory to the USG in relation to the Headley case, and Mueller responded that we would welcome such documents. Returning to the issue of access to Headley, Chidambaram asked whether GOI personnel could monitor and pass questions “in real time” to USG personnel conducting Headley’s interrogation. Mueller replied that he would look into this possibility. Chidambaram again thanked the USG for providing information and assistance, but asked whether GOI requests could be handled more promptly. The Home Minister asked for increased cooperation in three areas: 1) cybser security; 2) forensic cooperation; and 3) some financial initiatives and cooperation.

5. (S) Chidambaram confided that “I have a feeling in my bones that Headley was not acting alone” in India and expressed frustration over what he characterized as Headley’s false claim that he had no accomplices in India. The Home Affairs Minister conceded he had no evidence to support his working hypothesis that Headley formed sleeper cells in India, one of which may have perpetrated the February 13 Pune bombing. He noted that the GOI would not file formal charges against Headley until the trial of Mumbai defendant Mir Kasab is finished for fear that Kasab would use the Headley charges as a way to delay conclusion of his own trial. Chidambaram complained that Pakistan had “done damn near nothing” to prosecute Mumbai-related terror suspects, but added that the GOI would present a list of terror suspects to Pakistani officials when the two sides meet for talks in New Delhi on February 25. Mueller said he was traveling to Pakistan and would press the Pakistanis for increased cooperation. ROEMER

WikiLeaks: US works to block Syrian bid to obtain chemical warfare components

Tuesday, 30 December 2008, 14:27

S E C R E T STATE 135048
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/23/2033
TAGS PARM, ETTC, SY, IN, PREL
SUBJECT: SHIELD S04B-08: SYRIA ARRANGING TO ACQUIRE CW
EQUIPMENT FROM TWO INDIAN COMPANIES
Classified By: ISN/CB Office Director Robert Mikulak for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d)

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 4.

2. (S//NF) BACKGROUND: The U.S. has obtained information indicating that a Syrian institution with connections to the country’s chemical and biological weapons programs is attempting to acquire Australia Group-controlled glass-lined reactors, heat exchangers and pumps from the Indian firms XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX . Both firms are believed to have received visits from the Syria institution in the past 3 months and may be close to concluding their respective deals.

3. (S//NF) BACKGROUND CONT’D: We would like to alert the GOI to this information. The GOI has a general obligation as a Chemical Weapons Convention State Party to never, under any circumstances, assist anyone in the development of chemical weapons. The U.S. also has publicly stated its belief that India is a strong partner on nonproliferation issues. We therefore seek the GOI’s assistance in investigating this activity and talking all steps necessary to prevent Indian entities from providing CBW equipment to Syria. We also want to remind the GOI that the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act requires us to report to Congress transfers of goods, services and technology on multilateral control lists, such as the Australia Group, to Syria. Sanctions may be imposed against individuals and entities identified in such reports.

4. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Request Post deliver the points in paragraph 6 to appropriate host government officials and report a response. The points may be left as a nonpaper.

5. (S//NF) Please begin all responses with SHIELD S04B-08 and slug for ISN.

6. (U) Begin talking points/nonpaper:

(SECRET//REL INDIA)

— In the spirit of our cooperation in preventing proliferation we would like to raise a matter of chemical weapons (CW) proliferation concern and request the Indian government’s assistance in investigating this activity.

— We have information that the Indian company XXXXXXXXXXXX may be planning to sell glass components and related chemical processing equipment to an end-user in Syria.

— In addition, we have information that the Indian company XXXXXXXXXXXX may be planning to sell heat exchangers, immersion heaters, pumps, and glass equipment to the same end-user in Syria.

— Further, XXXXXXXXXXXX and probably XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed to support a visit in mid-September 2008 by representatives of a Syrian institution with connections to Syria’schemical and biological weapons programs, to finalize contracts for glass-related equipment.

— XXXXXXXXXXXX is located in XXXXXXXXXXXX, India. — XXXXXXXXXXXX is located in XXXXXXXXXXXX, India.

— While they have legitimate commercial uses, glass or glass-lined chemical reactor vessels, heat exchangers and pumps can be used in the production of CW agents and therefore are controlled by the Australia Group (AG).

— We are concerned that the equipment in question is intended for, or could be diverted to, Syria’s CW program.

— The Syrian Research Council (SSRC) is a key entity behind Syria’s chemical warfare program and may be behind Syria’s biological warfare program as well.

— In light of its CW and other programs of proliferation concern, support to terrorist organizations, and efforts to destabilize other countries in the region, we believe Syria is an unreliable destination for dual-use exports, and Syrian end-user statements or other assurances are neither credible nor trustworthy.

— In addition, the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) requires us to provide periodic reports to the U.S. Congress identifying persons (including individuals and entities) who have transferred to, or acquired from, Iran, North Korea or Syria, items that are on multilateral export control lists, such as glass or glass-lined reactor vessels, or that could make a material contribution to developing a weapon of mass destruction or missile system.

— Under INKSNA, sanctions also may be imposed against persons identified in such reports.

— We therefore request that the Indian government take all steps necessary to investigate this matter and prevent Syria from acquiring dual-use items, such as glass or glass-lined reactor vessels, heat exchangers, and pumps that could be used in its CW programs.

— We look forward to the Indian government sharing with us the results of its investigation into this matter.

End talking points/nonpaper. RICE

WikiLeaks: US steps in to stop export of potential nuclear components from India to Iran

Tuesday, 26 May 2009, 14:23

S E C R E T STATE 053356
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/26/2034
TAGS MTCRE, PARM, PREL, ETTC, KSCA, IN, IR
SUBJECT: INDIAN GRAPHITE SUPPLIER AGAIN DOING BUSINESS
WITH INTERMEDIARY FOR IRANIAN MISSILE PROGRAM (S)
REF: A. 07 STATE 141892 B. 07 NEW DELHI 4592 C. 07 STATE 158831 D. 07 NEW DELHI 5058 E. 07 NEW DELHI 5107 F. 07 STATE 167377 G. 07 NEW DELHI 5333 H. LOWE E-MAIL – JAN 2008 I. 08 STATE 23763 J. 08 NEW DELHI 760 K. 08 STATE 49730
Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASON 1.4 (B), (D).

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 5.

2. (S) Background: In October 2007, we shared with the government of India information related to the supply by the Indian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX of high-density MTCR-controlled graphite to Iran’s Ward Company (Refs A & B). We later advised the GOI that the intended end-user of the graphite was the Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO), a cover company for the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), Iran’s primary developer of liquid-fueled ballistic missiles (Ref I). In response to a follow-on U.S. demarche in November 2007 concerning additional consignments of graphite being readied by XXXXXXXXXXXX for shipment to Ward, Indian officials advised us that they had prevented the onward shipment of one such consignment, and that they were investigating the matter (Refs C – E). We approached New Delhi again in December 2007 with information indicating that four to five tons of graphite awaiting shipment to Ward had been removed from XXXXXXXXXXXX’s warehouse (Ref F). The GOI informed us that they had not cleared the graphite shipment for export, that nothing had gone to the final destination, and that they had taken unspecified action on the case (Refs G & H). In April 2008, the Times of India (TOI) reported that in October 2007, Indian Customs in Mumbai prevented XXXXXXXXXXXX from shipping 1,150 kg of graphite to Ward, and that a second consignment of XXXXXXXXXXXX graphite bound for Dubai was subsequently stopped (Ref K). We requested additional information from India on the status of this graphite, but have not yet received an response (Ref K).

3. (S) Objectives: We want to reiterate our appreciation to Indian officials for the effective action they took in this case, and to remind them that we remain interested in any additional information they can share with us related to the final disposition of the graphite, as well as the results of their investigations or any legal proceedings that resulted from this activity.

4. (S) Objectives (continued): We also want to advise the GOI of information indicating that as of mid-April 2009, Ward and XXXXXXXXXXXX were again engaged in business- related discussions. We are concerned that this recent contact could involve additional efforts to supply graphite to Iranian entities, and want to urge Indian authorities to investigate and take all appropriate measures to prevent XXXXXXXXXXXX from acting as a supplier of sensitive materials to Iran.

5. (U) Action Request: Department requests Embassy New Delhi approach appropriate host government officials to deliver the talking points in Paragraph 6 and report response. Talking points may be left as a non-paper.

6. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET REL INDIA)

— We would like to raise with you a matter of proliferation concern and request your government’s assistance in investigating this activity.

— In October 2007, we shared information with you indicating that in July 2007, the Indian company XXXXXXXXXXXX offered to provide 255 blocks of MTCR-controlled, high density graphite to Iran’s Ward Commercial Company.

— We later advised you that the intended end-user of the graphite was the Sahand Aluminum Parts Industrial Company (SAPICO), a cover name for the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). SHIG is Iran’s primary developer of liquid propelled ballistic missiles and is an entity designated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737.

— In late November 2007, we expressed our concerns that XXXXXXXXXXXX was working to ship additional consignments of graphite to Ward, and that we were aware that Indian officials were holding a shipment of potentially nuclear-grade graphite in the Mumbai Air Cargo Complex near the international terminal.

— We were subsequently pleased to hear that your government prevented the onward shipment to Iran of the graphite being held at the Mumbai Air Cargo Complex, and that you were investigating this matter.

— In December 2007, we informed you that four to five tons of graphite being readied for shipment to Ward had been removed from XXXXXXXXXXXX’s warehouse.

— You responded that your government had not cleared the graphite shipment for export because your investigation was not yet complete, and that the graphite had likely been moved to a location where it could be stored for a longer period of time.

— You later advised us that nothing had gone to the final destination, and that your government had taken unspecified action on the case.

— In April 2008, the Times of India (TOI) reported that in October 2007, Indian Customs in Mumbai prevented XXXXXXXXXXXX from shipping 1,150 kg of graphite to Ward, and that a second consignment of XXXXXXXXXXXX graphite bound for Dubai was subsequently stopped.

— We commend Indian authorities for stopping these shipments, and remain interested in any additional information you could share with us related to the final disposition of this graphite. We also would appreciate knowing the results of your investigations or any legal proceedings that resulted from this activity.

— In addition, we want to advise you of information indicating that as of mid-April 2009, representatives of Ward and XXXXXXXXXXXX were again engaged in business-related discussions.

— We are concerned that this recent contact between Ward and XXXXXXXXXXXX could be related to additional efforts to supply graphite to Iranian entities of proliferation concern.

— Given Ward’s history of acting as an intermediary for Iran’s ballistic missile program, we urge you to investigate this information and take whatever measures are necessary to prevent the supply Xby XXXXXXXXXXXX of sensitive materials to Iran.

— We appreciate India’s cooperation on nonproliferation issues and look forward to hearing of any actions your government takes in response to this information.

End talking points/non-paper.

7. (XXXXXXXXXXXX

8. (U) A word version of this document will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche. CLINTON