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Mon, Jan 24, 2011 | IsraelNationalNews | by Avi Yellin

In this photo released by the U.S. Embassy in Israel, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, center, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, right, and Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, left, are seen during their meeting in Jerusalem, Sunday, March 30, 2008. (AP Photo/U.S. Embassy in Israel, Matty Stern, HO)

WikiLeaks: US Orders to Spy on Israel and Palestinians

WikiLeaks Reveals Bush Administration Orders to Spy on Israel.

The WikiLeaks website last week leaked a secret State Department cable (see cable below) from October 31, 2008, directing United States officials to spy on Israel. The cable, dated only days before the 2008 American presidential elections, was signed by then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.

The recently leaked cable reveals former U.S. President George W. Bush’s foreign policy czar instructing American diplomats in Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as well as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA, to conduct a massive espionage operation against the Jewish state. The sought-for information covered all aspects of Israel’s political system, society, communications infrastructures and the Israel Defense Forces.

Regarding the IDF, US diplomats and spies were instructed to gather intelligence on planned Israeli military operations against the American-backed Palestinian Authority, Syria and Lebanon.

American agents were also asked to probe the attitudes of Israeli military commanders and to gather information on “IDF units, equipment, maintenance levels, training, morale, and operational readiness[;] IDF tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting conventional and unconventional counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations[; and] Israeli assessment of the impact of reserve duty in the territories on IDF readiness.”

As for political leaders, Rice instructed diplomats and spies to provide detailed information about government plans, potential ways Washington can influence politicians, how politicians decide to launch military strikes, the attitudes of Israeli leaders towards the U.S. and more.

Rice also sought information about various aspects of Israeli society. She instructed diplomats and spies to gather details on everything from “Information on and motivations for any increased Israeli population emigration from Israel” to detailed information on Israeli residents of Judea, Samaria and the Golan Heights.

Regarding residents of the Golan, Samaria and Judea, collectively labeled by Rice as “settlers,” the cable requested information on “Divisions among various settlement groups[;] details on settlement-related budgets and subsidies[;] settlers’ relationships with the Israeli political and military establishment including their lobbying and settlement methods.”

Bush’s secretary of state expressed deep interest in all details related to Israel’s military and nonmilitary communications infrastructure. For instance, she directed American officials to gather information on “Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and planned upgrades to national telecommunications infrastructure, networks, and technologies used by government and military authorities, intelligence and security services, and the public sector.”

Perhaps most interesting, Rice requested personal data on Israeli leaders, asking for “official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.”

Rice’s secret orders also included espionage against the American-backed PA and its rival Hamas. The cable requested “biographical, financial and biometric information on key PA and Hamas leaders and representatives, to include the young guard inside Gaza, the West Bank and outside.”

It is not presently known whether or how the information gathered on Rice’s orders was put to use by the U.S. or if the espionage efforts against Israel put in place by the Bush administration are still in effect under President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Source: WikiLeaks

Reference ID: 08STATE116392

Created: 2008-10-31 15:03

Classification: SECRET//NOFORN

Origin: Secretary of State

R 311525Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
DIA WASHINGTON DC//DHI-1B/CLM//DP//
CIA WASHINGTON DC//NHTC// 0000

S E C R E T STATE 116392

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2033
TAGS: PINR KSPR ECON KPAL PREL PTER XF
SUBJECT: (S) REPORTING AND COLLECTION NEEDS: PALESTINIAN
ISSUES

REF: A. 08 STATE 001379
¶B. 08 STATE 64936

Classified By: CATHERINE BROWN, DAS, INR/IPC. REASON: 1.4(C).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: This cable provides the full text of the
new National HUMINT Collection Directive (NHCD) on
Palestinian Issues (paragraph 3-end) and encourages
Department personnel at post to assist in compiling
Palestinian biographic information (paragraph 2).

¶A. (S/NF) The NHCD results from a recent Washington review of
reporting and collection needs for Palestinian Issues and
sets forth a list of priorities intended to guide
participating USG agencies as they allocate resources and
update plans to collect information on Palestinian Issues.
The priorities may also help the Embassy manage reporting and
collection, including formulation of Mission Strategic Plans
(MSPs).

¶B. (S/NF) This NHCD is compliant with the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which was
established in response to NSPD-26 of February 24, 2003. If
needed, GRPO can provide further background on the NIPF and
the use of NIPF abbreviations (shown in parentheses following
each sub-issue below) in NHCDs.

¶C. (S/NF) Important information responsive to the NHCD often
is available to non-State members of the Country Team whose
agencies participated in the review leading to the NHCD’s
issuance. COMs, DCMs, and State reporting officers can
assist by coordinating with other Country Team members to
encourage relevant reporting through their own or State
Department channels.

¶2. (S/NF) State biographic reporting – including on
Palestinians:

¶A. (S/NF) The intelligence community relies on State
reporting officers for much of the biographical information
collected worldwide. Informal biographic reporting via email
and other means is vital to the community’s collection
efforts and can be sent to the INR/B (Biographic) office for
dissemination to the IC. State reporting officers are
encouraged to report on noteworthy Palestinians as
information becomes available.

¶B. (S/NF) When it is available, reporting officers should
include as much of the following information as possible:
office and organizational titles; names, position titles and
other information on business cards; numbers of telephones,
cell phones, pagers and faxes; compendia of contact
information, such as telephone directories (in compact disc
or electronic format if available) and e-mail listings;
internet and intranet “handles”, internet e-mail addresses,
web site identification-URLs; credit card account numbers;
frequent flyer account numbers; work schedules, and other
relevant biographical information.

¶3. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD outline – priority issues:

¶A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process

1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations
with Israel (SRCC-1)
2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1)
3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process
(SRCC-1)
4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1)
5) Role of International Community in the Peace
Process (SRCC-1)

¶B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance

1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1)
2) Security Forces’ Capabilities (DEPS-1)
3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1)
4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1)
5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2)
6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1)
7) US, Regional, and International Foreign
Policy (FPOL-4)

¶C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control

1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and
Response (TERR-2)
2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security
Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2)
3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces
(CINT-5)

4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4)

¶D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism

1) International and Indigenous Terrorist
Activities (TERR-2)
2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian
Terrorists (TERR-2)
3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1)
4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2)

¶E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure

1) Human Rights (HRWC-3)
2) Demographics (DEMG-3)
3) Water Management (ENVR-4)
4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5)
5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3)

¶F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions

1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on
the Peace Process (LEAD-1)
2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1)
3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1)
4) Military Response to Palestinians and
Terrorism (FMCC-2)
5) Settlements (SRCC-1)
6) US and International Community (FPOL-3)

¶G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications
Systems (INFR-3)

¶4. (S/NF) Palestinian NHCD – Full text — reporting and
collection needs under priority areas listed in paragraph 3
above:

¶A. Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process

1) Conflict Resolution and Palestinian Relations with
Israel (SRCC-1).
–Key positions, negotiating strategies, red lines, and
points of flexibility of Fatah-affiliated Palestinian
Authority elements, HAMAS, and other Palestinian parties
concerned with the peace process, conflict resolution, and
future dealings with Israel.
–Negotiating positions for Palestinian talks with Israel on
bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Palestinian
Authority control in Jerusalem, right of return of
Palestinian refugees to Israel, Israeli settlements in the
West Bank, and East Jerusalem, exchanges of territory,
borders and security, and “end of claims”.
–Attitudes of the general public toward Palestinian-Israeli
talks.
–Attitudes of Palestinian security forces toward peace
negotiations with and attacks on Israel inside Israel and the
Palestinian territories.
–Details of all formal and informal channels, used by the
Palestinian leaders to discuss peace steps with Israel.
–Palestinian perceptions of and relations with Israeli
leaders and negotiating counterparts.
–Palestinian positions on negotiations with Israel regarding
water, transportation and energy infrastructure issues,
access to the Israeli economy, and safe passage between areas
of Israeli and Palestinian control.

2) Final Status Issues (SRCC-1).
–Details regarding final-status arrangements on issues of
security, borders and border crossings, and refugees.
–Information regarding final-status agreements on water,
economics, legal matters and prisoners, infrastructure and
environment, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty,
governance, and access to/control of the “Holy Basin”).

3) Perceptions of US Role in the Peace Process
(SRCC-1).
–Palestinian leadership and citizen perceptions regarding
the US role and efforts to influence the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process.
–Palestinian plans, intentions and efforts to influence US
positions on the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations.
Palestinian efforts to galvanize regional and international
support to influence US positions on the Palestinian-Israeli
peace negotiations.
–Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities
related to US policies and programs on the peace process
including extent of support for US and other counterterrorism
efforts.

4) Role of Regional Neighbors (SRCC-1).
–Palestinian perceptions of the policies of regional
neighbors (Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Libya
and other Arab states and Iran) regarding a
Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement.
–Views and perceptions of regional neighbors on the impact a
Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement would have on
neighboring Palestinian populations.
–Palestinian views of other countries’ plans and efforts to
support or oppose the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.
–Palestinian perceptions of plans and efforts by individual
regional neighbors to facilitate or hinder the development of
institutions needed for a free and democratic Palestinian
state.
–Palestinian views about plans and efforts of Syria or
Lebanon to resolve border disputes with Israel.

5) Role of International Community in the Peace Process
(SRCC-1).
–Palestinian perceptions about policies, plans, efforts and
support for strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli
issues from European Union members, especially France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Russia and multilateral
bodies, including the Quartet (United States, European Union,
United Nations, and Russia), the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, the Arab League, and the United Nations.
–Palestinian views on amounts and uses of international
assistance provided to the Palestinian Authority as part of
bilateral or multilateral negotiations.

¶B. Palestinian Leadership and Governance

1) Governance Issues (DEPS-1).
–Status and relative strength of factions within the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and internal
decision-making processes of these factions.
–Relations between the Palestinian Authority and the PLO and
its factions.
–PLO and HAMAS finances and sources of funding.
–Evidence regarding the effectiveness of the Palestinian
Authority in governing areas under Palestinian Authority
control; status of political reform and influence of
President.
–Indications of challenges to Palestinian Authority rule.
Extent of popular loyalty to Palestinian Authority
leadership.
–Information on municipal government structures, independent
local power bases, and relationships between the Palestinian
leadership and local leaders.
–Plans and intentions of the Palestinian Authority to
consider or reject the formation of a new Palestinian
National Unity Government.
–Details on efforts of HAMAS to exert influence over
Palestinians to consolidate their support.
–Attitudes, plans, and tactics of Islamist and secular
groups to determine or affect the choice of a successor to
the current Palestinian Authority President.
–Level of Palestinian support for HAMAS elected officials.
–Palestinian perceptions of the Palestinian legislative
council and its ability to exercise power.

2) Security Forces’ Capabilities (DEPS-1).
–Plans, intentions, and willingness to sustain efforts to
reform the security forces.
–Relations between the security forces and foreign security
services, especially for cooperation, training, information
sharing, and funding including efforts to target terrorist or
extremist threats to the peace process.
–Changes in the senior leadership of the Palestinian
Authority security forces, including the general intelligence
organization (Mukhabarat) and the Preventive Security
Organization (PSO).
–Leadership dynamics and power relationships among the
Palestinian Authority security forces; relations between
civilian leaders and security forces commanders.
–Level of responsiveness of security forces to civilian
control.
–Decision-making processes and rules of engagement of the
security forces in specific security situations.
–Organizational structure of the Palestinian Authority
security forces.
–Command, control, communications, and intelligence
infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces.
–Information on personnel strength, budget, weapons,
training, force readiness, targeting, tactics,
transportation, and logistics of the Palestinian Authority
security forces.

3) Palestinian Leadership (LEAD-1).
–Goals and strategies of Palestinian officials in the West
Bank and Gaza to insure/undermine the viability of a
democratic Palestinian state.
–Plans and intentions of Palestinian President to call
elections.
–Role of the Prime Minister.
–Identification of key advisers to the Palestinian Authority
President and Prime Minister and their respective areas of
influence.
–Decision making processes within the Palestinian Authority
leadership, including the roles of key ministries and the
views of their leaders on priority issues for the government.

–Palestinian leadership attitudes toward and perceptions of
the US.
–Status of the current Palestinian Authority president’s and
prime minister’s health.
–Identification of possible successors to the current
Palestinian Authority president, views of these possible
successors, and those of other Palestinian leaders outside
the government, on Palestinian-Israeli issues and information
on the relationships of these possible successors with key
Palestinian groups and Israel.

4) Fatah-HAMAS Relationship (LEAD-1).
–Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority leadership and HAMAS
efforts to resolve issues related to reconciliation or to
continue competition.
–HAMAS reaction to peace negotiation efforts. Relationship
between the Palestinian leadership, to include the
Presidency, and HAMAS officials in Gaza and rejectionist
elements.
–Leadership plans and efforts in Gaza and the West Bank to
unify or maintain the division between the two territories.
–Efforts by the Palestinian Authority leadership to involve
HAMAS elected officials in negotiating strategies for the
peace process.
–Details of travel plans such as routes and vehicles used by
Palestinian Authority leaders and HAMAS members.
–Biographical, financial and biometric information on key PA
and HAMAS leaders and representatives, to include the young
guard inside Gaza, the West Bank and outside.

5) Economic and Financial Stability (ECFS-2).
–Economic decision-making processes within the Palestinian
Authority government and plans and actions to implement
economic reform, liberalization, and development.
–Palestinian Authority budget allocations and funding
streams.
–Details about employment data and government plans and
efforts to increase employment.
–Plans by Palestinian officials and Palestinian businessmen
in the West Bank and Gaza for coping with economic downturns
caused by political problems.
–Data on Palestinian trade with Israel and Jordan.
–Data on the impact of border closures and
Palestinian-Israeli violence on economic development,
including on the livelihoods of Palestinians with jobs in
Israel or Jordan.
–Information on levels of financial savings by Palestinians
and their ability to withstand prolonged economic hardship.
–Palestinian efforts to develop trading relationships with
non-Israeli buyers and attract foreign investment.
–Plans and efforts to seek funding from international relief
organizations.
–Palestinian plans and efforts to develop and exploit
natural gas reserves off the coast of Gaza.
–Plans to develop or expand energy infrastructure, including
petroleum and natural gas storage/distribution facilities and
electric utilities.
–Financial flows from Diaspora Palestinians and the
motivations for such investment.
–Information on close ties between business families and
politicians.
–Corrupt practices by businessmen and politicians.
–Trends in the business practices of local Palestinian
businessmen, such as changes in enterprise ownership and
control mechanisms and shifts in contract bidding methods.
–Plans and efforts to counteract Israeli closure policies.
–Palestinian perceptions regarding fulfillment of aid
pledges from Donors’ Conference.

6) Civil Society and the Rule of Law (DEPS-1).
–Plans and intentions of leaders of the Palestinian
Authority to encourage political openness, protect civil
liberties, and promote fiscal transparency.
–Plans and actions of Palestinian Authority to implement
judicial and financial reforms.
–Details about the Palestinian justice system and
Palestinian attitudes towards the Palestinian Basic Law and
Sharia/Islamic law.
–Capability and commitment of Palestinian officials and
organizations to maintain order and confront threats posed by
extremist and terrorist groups, clans, and criminal
organizations.
–Details of plans and programs intended to promote and
maintain public order.
–Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups
on Palestinian plans, policies and actions aimed at promoting
the rule of law and public order.
–HAMAS and other Palestinian efforts to apply Sharia and
promote Islamic alternatives in civil society.
–Details on HAMAS’ social welfare network to include
hospitals, education systems, textbooks, libraries and social
services in the Palestinian territories and their funding
sources in the region and worldwide; efforts by PIJ and other
Palestinian organizations to provide similar services and
details of their sources of funding.
–Financial systems used by HAMAS charities in Europe to move
funds to the Middle East.
–Popular attitudes towards HAMAS and other organizations
that provide social services.
–Views and attitudes of the younger generation on HAMAS and
their control of municipalities as well as their social
service programs.
–Evidence of control of the media by Fatah-affiliated
Palestinian Authority or HAMAS to influence the Palestinian
population.
–Details on development of political parties, labor unions,
and/or worker groups.

7) US, Regional, and International Foreign Policy
(FPOL-4).
–Efforts by the Palestinian Authority to gain support for
its strategies and positions on Palestinian-Israeli issues
from the US.
–Palestinian Authority’s objectives and strategies on key
issues in US-Palestinian relationship and views on future of
US relations.
–Information on Palestinian Authority negotiating positions
before discussions with the US and views of Palestinian
officials after discussions with the US.
–Popular attitudes toward and perceptions of the US.

¶C. Palestinian Internal Security and Control

1) Palestinian Counterterrorism Capabilities and
Response (TERR-2).
–Palestinian counterterrorism and internal security
policies, plans, attitudes, commitment and actions in dealing
with extremists and terrorist groups, and clans.
–Actions, ability and willingness of the Palestinian
security services in the West Bank and Gaza to thwart
terrorist attacks and maintain public order.
–Palestinian plans, intentions, objectives and activities
regarding support to and cooperation with US counterterrorism
efforts.
–Cooperation between Palestinian security and intelligence
services and Israeli counterparts on terrorism, including
targeting efforts, technical operations, surveillance,
interrogation, capture and prosecution of known terrorists.
–Attitudes and influence of key Palestinian interest groups
on Palestinian counterterrorism plans, policies and actions.
–Views of Palestinian Authority President, his advisers,
Palestinian Authority security chiefs and senior Palestinian
officials toward the US and its counterterrorism policies;
perceptions of US expectations for Palestinian cooperation in
counterterrorism campaign.

2) Role of Palestinian Authority Security
Organs/Individuals in Terrorism (TERR-2).
–Ties between the security forces and Palestinian Authority
leaders and other groups, including Palestinian political
parties, militias, and rejectionist and terrorist groups.
–Participation by Palestinian Authority security forces
personnel in attacks against Israeli targets outside Israel
and the Palestinian Territories.
–Links between intelligence services and terrorist groups.
–Locations of neighborhoods controlled by rejectionist and
terrorist groups.
–Indications of cooperation between Palestinian intelligence
services and terrorist groups.

3) Intelligence Services and Security Forces (CINT-5).
–Plans, intentions, key focus and rivalries of senior PA
security force officials, including the General Intelligence
Organization (Mukhabarat), the Preventive Security
Organization (PSO), Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat), the
National Security Force (NSF), and the Civil Police, as well
as HAMAS’s Security Support Force in the Gaza strip.
–Command, control, communications, and intelligence
infrastructure of Palestinian Authority security forces.
–Indications of counterintelligence operations conducted by
the security forces against foreign intelligence services
operating in or through Palestinian Authority areas.
–Information on signals intercept capabilities and targets,
decryption capabilities, intercept sites and collection
hardware, and intercept operation successes.
–Plans and efforts to illicitly collect classified,
sensitive, commercial proprietary, or protected technology
information from US companies or government agencies.
–Counterintelligence organization plans, efforts, and
abilities, and warning of their use against US personnel.
Details on security forces’ penetrations of Palestinian
rejectionist groups including electronic penetrations.
–Technological capabilities, targets, and activities of
Palestinian security forces.
–Unit deployments and locations, infrastructure and
facilities of Palestinian Authority security forces.
–Details on processes used by Palestinian Authority security
forces to acquire weapons and equipment, either legally or
illegally.
–Intentions by Palestinian security force leaders or rogue
elements to use new capabilities against Israel or the US.

4) Illegal Activities (MONY-4).
–Indications of levels of corruption among Fatah-affiliated
Palestinian Authority and/or HAMAS leaders.
–Individuals, governments, organizations, routes, and
methods involved in arms smuggling, human
trafficking/smuggling, money laundering and corruption in
financial transactions in support of illegal activities.
–Information on illegal weapons transactions with Israelis.
–Activities of Palestinian gangs and irregular militia
forces’ involvement in crime and terrorism.

¶D. Terrorism and Islamic Activism

1) International and Indigenous Terrorist Activities
(TERR-2).
–Structure and internal dynamics of HAMAS militant wing (Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Battalions), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ), al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and
Popular Resistance Committees, Army of Islam, and other
terrorist groups with a presence in the Gaza Strip or the
West Bank, including leadership, membership, decision making
processes, command and control, and factions.
–Popular support for rejectionist groups.
–Tactics, techniques, and operating methods of Palestinian
terrorist groups, including tradecraft, counterintelligence
measures, recruitment activities, underground facilities,
operational tasking, and travel, infiltrations into Israel,
disinformation, denial and deception techniques, and
training.
–Plans and intentions for, and extent and details of
Lebanese Hizballah activities in Palestinian areas or within
Israel, including retaliation for the deaths of Hizballah
senior military leaders.
–Relationship between Palestinian terrorist groups and
al-Qa’ida, and indications of interest by Palestinian
terrorist groups to work with global jihadists.
–Indications of interest by Palestinian terrorist groups in
the acquisition or use of chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons, longer range missiles, or unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs).
–Communications systems used by senior leaders of
Palestinian terrorist groups to direct and control
subordinates and field operatives.
–Use of Inmarsat, fax machines, cellular telephones, and
computer communications, including the Internet, to conduct
terrorist activities.

2) Internal and External Support for Palestinian
Terrorists (TERR-2).
–Evidence of Palestinian popular support for Palestinian and
other terrorist groups; Palestinian public perceptions of
rocket attacks against Israel.
–Contacts and relations between Palestinian terrorist groups
and other terrorist or rejectionist groups, especially
Lebanese Hizballah, al-Qa’ida, and elements of the Arab
population in Israel; influence of Islamic militants.
–Extent and nature of control, sponsorship, and financial
support of Palestinian terrorist groups by Iran, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, or other
countries.
–Plans and intentions, capabilities and motivations of
Palestinian terrorist groups and/or their state sponsors to
conduct attacks against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian,
or other western or allied targets.
–Encouragement from state sponsors to conduct attacks
against US, Israeli, Jordanian, Palestinian, or other western
or allied targets.
–Support mechanisms for Palestinian terrorist or
rejectionist groups, including identities of key individuals
and mechanisms for procuring and moving funds and weapons.
–Smuggling between Gaza and the outside world, including
routes and methodologies; information on weapons shipments
into territories via tunnels, and maritime means for
terrorist use.
–Contacts and relations between HAMAS militants, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Popular Resistance Committees,
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC), Lebanese Hizballah, Fatah al-Islam (FAI),
and other known or emergent terrorist or rejectionist groups
in the region, and elements of the Palestinian Authority.
–Attitudes and motivations of the Palestinian Authority
leadership regarding the activities of HAMAS, al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades and other terrorist or rejectionist groups.
–Evidence of Palestinian Authority’s, or PA senior
officials’ prior knowledge of, funding of, authorization of,
or participation in popular unrest, violent outbreaks, or
terrorist acts.
–Financial support to NGO’s from foreign governments, to
include Venezuela and Turkey.
–Contacts and cooperation between NGOs and terrorist groups,
especially HAMAS charities and any political/humanitarian
entities suspected of passing funds to militants.

3) Islamic Activism (DEPS-1).
–Details about Islamic reformer, oppositionist and militant
(activist) leaders, organizations, adherents, and supporters,
including objectives, plans and strategies, tactics, and
efforts to achieve goals.
–Plans and efforts of internal or external Islamic activists
to affect governance in Palestinian areas.
–Islamic activist plans and efforts to develop political
parties or organize opposition to the governing authorities.
–Relations and cooperation among internal and external
Islamic activists.
–Cohesion and divisions within and among Islamic activist
groups.
–Influence of religious leaders on Islamic activist leaders,
adherents, and supporters.
–Islamic activist influence on national leadership, military
and security services, educational institutions, government
agencies, and NGOs.
–Islamic activist use of public media, including the use of
internet web forums, to achieve strategic, tactical and/or
operational objectives.
–HAMAS ownership of broadcasting stations. Government plans
and efforts to support or defeat Islamic activist efforts.
–HAMAS contacts or connections with Muslim Brotherhood in
other countries.
–Details of HAMAS connections to HAMAS external leadership
in Damascus; HAMAS financial ties to external funding offices
such as Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

4) Threats Against American Citizens (TERR-2).
–Indications of Americans (officials, tourists, or
residents) becoming targets of any terrorist groups operating
in or near Israel, West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
–Palestinian terrorist groups’ perceptions of US
vulnerabilities and their perceptions of how the United
States would respond to attacks against the homeland or US
interests overseas.
–Palestinian authorities’ response to terrorist threats and
attacks against the US interests, persons or facilities.
–Policies, plans, and efforts regarding cooperation by
Palestinian or Israeli officials with the US and regional
neighbors concerning US POW/MIA accounting and recovery
efforts and capabilities to assist or cooperate in recovery
efforts.

¶E. Palestinian Social Development and Infrastructure

1) Human Rights (HRWC-3).
–Palestinian data and perception of the humanitarian impact
of Israel’s closure of Gaza and lack of freedom of movement
in the West Bank due to security checkpoints, the barrier,
and other obstacles to free movement.
–Details about HAMAS and the Palestinian Authority’s
facilitation of humanitarian operations in the West Bank and
Gaza.
–Information on treatment of prisoners or detainees from
opposition groups.
–Palestinian intelligence and security forces’ attitudes
toward and participation in torture, and other human rights
violations.

2) Demographics (DEMG-3).
–Population data for Palestinian areas and Palestinian
Diaspora.
–Details about, and changes to, key demographic indicators,
such as birth rate, fertility rate, mortality rate, and
internal migration.
–Palestinian leadership’s view of demographic trends; use of
data in consideration of two-state solution.
–Palestinian officials’ efforts to deal with the ‘youth
bulge’ and resultant educational, training, and employment
challenges.
–Efforts by Palestinian Authority or HAMAS officials or
institutions to co-opt the youth.

3) Water Management (ENVR-4).
–Plans and intentions of Palestinian officials in West Bank
and Gaza to confront environmental issues, particularly
problems with water and waste management.
–Palestinian perceptions of efforts to mitigate the impact
of power shortages on sewer treatment and other civil
services.
–Palestinian strategies and efforts regarding water
management and protection of infrastructure against attack.
–Details about annual water use, and renewable surface and
groundwater reserves.
–Cooperation and disputes with other states regarding
regional water resources to include the aquifers.
–Details about plans and efforts to augment supplies from
non-conventional sources, such as desalination plants.

4) Infectious Disease and Health (HLTH-5).
–Information on the effects of Palestinian-Israeli violence
on public health conditions in Palestinian-controlled areas.
–Details about prevalence, and outbreaks of infectious
disease to include HIV and avian flu H5N1.
–Palestinian Authority plans and efforts to prevent and
manage outbreaks.
–Statistical information on the incidence of chronic and
infectious disease among various population groups (Gaza,
West Bank, Bedouin, urban, agricultural areas, and so forth).

–Details about location and level of contaminants in air,
water, food, and soil, including threat to health from
accidental or intentional release of toxic industrial
chemicals.
–Military and civilian medical capabilities and
infrastructure.
–Details about HAMAS and other Palestinian groups’ medical
assistance to Palestinians.

5) Civilian Infrastructure (INFR-3).
–Information on location and condition of power plants,
roads, hospitals, waste treatment facilities and financial
institutions in the Palestinian areas.
–Information on Palestinian access to fuel for power plants.

–Palestinian perceptions of efforts to deal with impact of
power shortages and efforts to mitigate power shortages on
sewer treatment and other civil services.

¶F. Government of Israel Plans, Policies, and Actions

1) Israeli Leadership Plans and Intentions on the Peace
Process (LEAD-1).
–Government of Israel (GOI) leadership’s negotiating
positions, strategies, and goals in interactions with the
Fatah-affiliated Palestinian Authority officials, with
supporters or elements affiliated with HAMAS, and with other
Palestinian parties concerned with the peace process.
–Israeli leaders’ perceptions of and relations with
Palestinian leaders and negotiating counterparts. Evidence
of informal channels, either sanctioned or unsanctioned by
the Israeli leadership, to discuss peace steps with
Palestinian leaders.
–Israeli leadership views and intentions regarding the
impact of their negotiations with Syria on their negotiations
with the Palestinians.
–Israel’s decision-making process for launching military
operations and determining retaliation for terrorist attacks.

–Israeli leaders’ involvement in decisions on response to
terrorist attacks.
–Israeli leadership intentions and strategy toward managing
the US relationship; views of prime minister and advisors
toward the US and its counterterrorism policies. Israeli
thoughts and views on impact of Israeli domestic politics,
including changes in GOI leadership, on GOI approach to and
conduct of the peace process and negotiations.

2) Conflict Resolution (SRCC-1).
–Negotiating positions for Israeli talks with Palestinians
on bilateral issues, particularly the extent of Israeli
control of Jerusalem, right of return of Palestinian refugees
to Israel, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and east
Jerusalem, exchanges of territory, and “end of claims”.
–GOI views and positions on final-status issues; water
rights, transportation and energy infrastructure issues,
access to the Israeli economy, security, and safe passage
between areas of Israeli and Palestinian control, legal
matters and prisoners, and Jerusalem (including sovereignty,
governance, and access to/control of the “Holy Basin”).
–Attitudes of the Israeli public, including Israeli Arabs,
toward Israeli-Palestinian talks. Efforts by opposition
parties or members of the ruling coalition to influence
government positions on the peace process.
–Attitudes of Israeli security forces toward peace
negotiations with Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.
Current plans and intentions regarding Palestinian access and
movement, in particular, access and movement with economic
consequences, e.g. movement of produce, access to fields, and
movement of commercial goods between Palestinian villages.

3) Government of Israel Security Issues (SRCC-1).
–Government of Israel (GOI) views and assessments of
military strengths and vulnerabilities.
–Perceptions of threats posed by Palestinian rejectionists,
including the potential for conflict with their state
sponsors, Syria and Iran, and Lebanon.
–GOI negotiating positions, strategies, and goals in
interactions with Syria, and Lebanon, especially on final
status issues.
–Israeli views of an Egyptian or Jordanian role in the
context of final status issues.
–Israeli views on a future regional security pact.
–GOI plans, intentions and reactions to Palestinian
intentions to develop Gaza off-shore natural gas reserves.
GOI plans and actions to continue construction of security
fence including views on boundaries, funding constraints, and
external influences on decision-making.
–GOI plans and actions to implement agreements with
Palestinians on bilateral security measures and to implement
unilateral security measures over Israeli- and
Palestinian-controlled areas.
–Views and actions on prisoner swaps/releases; information
on Israel’s treatment of Palestinian prisoners or detainees,
including interrogation methods.
–Information on and motivations for any increased Israeli
population emigration from Israel.

4) Military Response to Palestinians and Terrorism
(FMCC-2).
–Details on Israel Defense Forces (IDF) operations underway
or planned against the HAMAS-controlled Palestinian militants
in Gaza, terrorists, or terrorist infrastructure, including
targeted assassinations and tactics/techniques used by ground
and air units.
–Israeli efforts to counter short-range rockets and mortars.

–IDF preparations to conduct increased operations against
Palestinian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and
Lebanon.
–Impact of Israeli efforts against rocket attacks on Israeli
views of security.
–IDF preparations to conduct combat operations against
Hizballah or Syrian targets along Israel’s northern border or
inside Lebanon or Syria.
–IDF units, equipment, maintenance levels, training, morale,
and operational readiness.
–IDF tactics, techniques and procedures for conducting
conventional and unconventional counterinsurgency and
counterterrorist operations.
–Israeli assessment of the impact of reserve duty in the
territories on IDF readiness.

5) Settlements (SRCC-1).
–Evidence of Government of Israel support for or opposition
to actions to limit and/or reduce settlement and outpost
growth and construction.
–Information on leaders of the Israeli settlement
establishment, including Golan settlers, their ideology,
motivations and who they claim to represent.
–Divisions among the various settlement groups.
–Details on settlement-related budgets and subsidies.
Settlers’ relationship with the Israeli political and
military establishment including their lobbying and
settlement methods.
–Golan settlers’ views of any potential peace agreement with
Syria.
–Support for settlers within Israeli society.
–Indications of Israeli extremist groups becoming more
active.
–Perceptions of US demands or requirements of Israeli
government regarding, security fences and settlements.

6) US and International Community (FPOL-3).
–Israeli perceptions of US peace process approach;
indications of critical or hostile reaction to US policies
and views of Israeli leadership after discussions with the
US.
–Attitudes of key political and military officials
concerning the state of the relationship with the US.
–Plans to influence views and positions of academics,
journalists, and business, religious and professional
organizations towards the US and the US-Israeli relationship.

–Views of and responses to role of the Quartet.
–Israeli plans and intentions to support US positions in the
UN and other international fora.
–Israeli support for US Iraq/Iran policies and US policies
and attitudes toward other Middle Eastern countries, and
European Union countries; relations with Russia, China,
Turkey, Pakistan and India.

¶G. Information Infrastructure and Telecommunications Systems
(INFR-3).

–Current specifications, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and
planned upgrades to national telecommunications
infrastructure, networks, and technologies used by government
and military authorities, intelligence and security services,
and the public sector.
–Details about command, control, and communications systems
and facilities.
–National leadership use of and dependencies on a dedicated
telecommunications infrastructure.
–Details about national and regional telecommunications
policies, programs, regulations, and training.
–Information about current and planned upgrades to public
sector communications systems and technologies used by
government, military personnel, and the civil sector,
including cellular phone networks, mobile satellite phones,
very small aperture terminals (VSAT), trunked and mobile
radios, pagers, prepaid calling cards, firewalls, encryption,
international connectivity, use of electronic data
interchange, and cable and fiber networks.
–Information about wireless infrastructure, cellular
communications capabilities and makes and models of cellular
phones and their operating systems, to include second
generation and third generation systems.
–Details about the use of satellites for telecommunication
purposes, including planned system upgrades.
–Details about internet and intranet use and infrastructure,
including government oversight.
–Details about foreign and domestic telecommunications
service providers and vendors.
–Plans and efforts to acquire US export-controlled
telecommunications equipment and technology.
–Plans and efforts to export or transfer state-of-the art
telecommunications equipment and technology.
–Details about information repositories associated with
radio frequency identification (RFID)-enabled systems used
for passports, government badges, and transportation systems.

–Official and personal phone numbers, fax numbers, and
e-mail addresses of principal civilian and military leaders.

RICE