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Winter 2014 | ITIC

This study is originally published by The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. The study is an overall analysis of ISIS, also known as ISIL, Islamic State (or IS). The study is structured in nine sections,^[1] which if read in conjunction with each other, draws a complete picture of ISIS. You can also download the study in PDF format here.

The United States’ underestimation of ISIS

With the US military pullout from Iraq, the Americans believed that the Iraqi Army, in whose reestablishment the US invested considerable resources, would be able to respond to threats posed by the ISI (from which ISIS emerged). The consolidation of the global jihad in Syria and the establishment of ISIS were not perceived by the Americans as a particular threat. America related to ISIS in the internal Syrian context, as a potential but not immediate security threat, whose very existence complicated the Syrian civil war and made it difficult for the Americans to provide support for the rebel organizations.

President Obama admitted after the fact that the Americans had underestimated ISIS’s capabilities and danger, and overestimated the Iraqi army’s ability and motivation to fight the extremist organizations. President Obama said as much to a reporter on September 28, 2014. Asked whether he agreed with the statement by Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James Clapper about underestimating ISIS and overestimating the Iraqi army he answered, “That’s absolutely true” (CBS News, September 28, 2014).

During 2013, the threats of terrorism and subversion from operatives who joined the ranks of the global jihad in Syria became apparent. Nevertheless, the American concept was still that the risk of “Syria veterans” was relevant mainly to the countries of Europe, where most of the Western fighters in Syria came from, and not to the United States, where relatively few came from. The American concept changed gradually, but in earnest when the number of foreign fighters grew and ISIS achieved significant military victories in Iraq, particularly the occupation of Mosul.

The change in the perception of the threat posed by ISIS and formulating an American response

The American perception of the threat posed by ISIS changed after its military achievements in June 2014, mainly the capture of Mosul and the declaration of the Caliphate State. The collapse of the Iraqi army in Mosul showed the United States and other Western countries that ISIS was a dangerous jihadi organization and a threat to America’s Middle East assets. It also showed that ISIS might to export terrorism and subversion. In addition, ISIS’s dramatic successes in Iraq indicated that a decade of US military presence in Iraq had failed, and sparked internal American political disputes.

ISIS’s propaganda campaigns also contributed to the change in the American position. Videos of beheadings of Western hostages, massacres of ethnic and religious minorities and the mass exodus of residents from areas captured by ISIS in Iraq all magnified the image of ISIS as a threat to the United States and other Western countries and contributed to its demonization in the US and the West. They also led American (and Western) public opinion to support the campaign against ISIS.

The American response to the threat of ISIS since June 2014 has consisted of two stages:

1. In the first stage (June to mid-September 2014), the American response was limited and pinpointed. It included aerial attacks, sending American advisors, increasing intelligence surveillance and providing humanitarian aid to communities in need. The limited response was intended primarily to help local forces (especially Kurdish forces and the Iraqi army) protect US assets in Iraq. During the first stage, the American response focused on aerial attacks in Iraq, without action in Syria.
2. In the second stage (beginning in the second half of September 2014), when it became clear that limited reactions were not a significant response to the threat posed by ISIS, President Obama outlined a comprehensive strategy for a long-term campaign. It was designed to degrade the power of ISIS until its destruction. The strategy was based on intensive aerial attacks, reinforcing local forces and damaging ISIS’s centers of power by means of an Americanled international coalition. The United States still did not send American ground troops to fight in Iraq or Syria (“boots on the ground”). With the new strategy in place, the United States and its allies began an aerial campaign against ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

The limited American response (June — mid-September 2014)

After ISIS captured Mosul, when it became apparent that the organization represented a threat to important interests of the US and its allies in the Middle East, America began to confront it directly. The first stage of American response consisted of cautious, limited reactions in Iraq, intended to assist the local forces (the Iraqi army and the Kurdish forces) and prevent their collapse in the face of the momentum of the ISIS offensive.

In late June 2014, in the wake of ISIS’s military achievements, the US sent American military advisors to Baghdad, members of the Special Forces, to assist the Iraqi army. The United States also increased its intelligence collection in northern Iraq. However, the Americans made it clear at this stage they did not intend to send ground troops to fight ISIS on Iraqi soil.

The reports of ISIS’s massacres of the Yazidi, and fear of destabilizing pro-Western countries in the Middle East such as Jordan and Lebanon, impelled the United States to increase the intensity of the aerial attacks to address the emerging crisis in Iraq. On August 8, 2014, the US began to attack ISIS positions in Iraq in several sites: the Erbil region (assisting in the defense of the Kurdish autonomy), the Sinjar Mountains (supporting the besieged Yazidis), and the Mosul dam area (helping the Kurds regain control). The US also provided humanitarian aid in the city of Amerli (where members of the Turkmen Shi’ite minority were besieged). At this stage, the American activity was limited and included sporadic aerial attacks on ISIS targets and humanitarian aid drops.

The targets attacked by the Americans until mid-September 2014 included ISIS positions, trucks, artillery batteries and armored vehicles. In his speech in the Senate (September 16, 2014), US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said that the US had carried out more than 160 successful aerial attacks causing the deaths of ISIS operatives, destroying weapons and equipment and enabling Iraqi security forces and Kurdish forces to regain control of occupied territory and key infrastructures, including the Mosul and Haditha dams.

Outlining a comprehensive strategy for the campaign against ISIS (US President Barack Obama’s speech on September 10, 2014)

President Barack Obama outlining the American strategy in his speech (Whitehouse.gov, September 10, 2014)

The new American strategy was formulated in late August and the first half of September 2014. The new strategy was reflected in President Barack Obama’s speech to the nation on September 10, 2014. He presented ISIS as a brutal terrorist organization threatening the entire Middle East (including US assets), and said that if left unchecked, it would also directly threaten the United States. He noted that so far no attempt by ISIS to carry out attacks in the US had been detected but there was concern that foreign operatives who fought in its ranks would return to their countries of origin and seek to carry out terrorist attacks.

Obama outlined a comprehensive strategy for a multi-dimensional campaign against ISIS, carried out by an international coalition led by the United States which would take several years (i.e., even during the next American administration). The objective of the campaign was to neutralize ISIS’s threat to the West until it could be destroyed (“we will degrade and ultimately destroy ISIL”). However, the President reiterated that in contrast to wars waged by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq, he would not send American ground troops to fight in Iraq or Syria.^[114] Obama’s strategy was approved by Congress and its implementation began in the second half of September 2014.

The following are the key elements of the American campaign as expressed in President Obama’s speech and other statements, as well as remarks made by senior officials, and American media reports:

1. A systematic and ongoing air campaign against ISIS: Aerial attacks will be carried out in Iraq and Syria. They will be directed against senior ISIS operatives and the organization’s logistical and operational infrastructure, in cooperation and coordination with the Iraqi government implying that the Americans are reluctant to cooperate with the Syrian regime).
2. Military support for local forces fighting against ISIS in Iraq and Syria: They include Iraqi security forces, Kurdish forces, and the so-called moderate Syrian opposition. On September 26, 2014, General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters that between 12,000 and 15,000 fighters would be necessary to take control of the area controlled by ISIS.^[115] American support for the rebels will be provided in the following ways:
   1. Sending American military personnel to Iraq on support missions:
      1. American military personnel will assist local forces with training, intelligence and operation of equipment and weapons, but not in direct combat against ISIS. President Obama made it clear, saying, “As I have said before, American forces will not have a combat mission — we will not get dragged into another ground war in Iraq.”
      2. A limited number of military personnel will be sent to Iraq: President Obama said he would send 475 American troops to Iraq to join the Americans already there. On September 16, 2014, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said that at the end of the process, when all the US troops had arrived, an estimated 1,600 American soldiers would remain in Iraq to serve as trainers and coordinators of operations and to assist the Iraqi Army and Kurdish forces. There were 1,414 American advisers in Iraq in early November 2014. They included 600 military personnel in advisory roles at joint operations centers. They also operate in Baghdad and Erbil and at headquarters at the division level and above (The New York Times, November 2, 2014).
      3. On November 9, 2014, President Obama announced that 1,500 additional soldiers were about to be sent to help train Iraqi soldiers and Kurdish militias (CNN, November 9, 2014). That would almost double the initial number of military personnel that the United States was expected to send to Iraq.
   2. Assistance in training anti-ISIS forces in Syria and Iraq:
      1. The US intends to implement a program to train 5,000 fighters from the so-called moderate rebel organizations in Syria for one year. The training will take place in Turkey and Saudi Arabia (The New York Times, November 2, 2014).^[116]
      2. The Turkish media reported that America and Turkey had reached an agreement to train 2,000 Syrian opposition fighters. During the first phase they would use the Kirsehir army camp in the heart of Anatolia, where Turkey trains its Gendarmerie forces. The Syrian fighters will be trained under American-Turkish supervision (Aydinlik.gazete.com). However, according to the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, Turkey will apparently refuse to allow the training of Kurdish militia fighters in Syria on its territory and they will be trained by the Americans in the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq (Hürriyet.com.tr, November 15, 2014).
      3. According to American Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on November 16, 2014, the United States is in the process of setting up four training centers for the Iraqi and Kurdish forces in Iraq. He said that the government was expediting the processing of Iraqi requests for arms, equipment and supplies.
3. Financial aid:
   1. The White House said that President Obama had approved the immediate transfer of $25 million in military aid to Baghdad and the Kurdish region. At the same time, he urged Congress to approve his $500 million plan recommended by the Pentagon for training and arming the so-called moderate rebels in Syria. However, he made it clear that in the fight against ISIS, “we cannot rely on an Assad regime that terrorizes its own people.”
   2. According to the Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, the American army estimates that the amount will cover the annual cost of training and equipping for more than 5,000 opposition operatives (in Syria) for one year. The aid package provided by the United States to the so-called moderate rebels will include light weapons, vehicles, basic military equipment (i.e., communications equipment) and strategic and tactical training.
4. Harming ISIS’s sources of power:
   1. The United States will harm ISIS’s sources of funding, improve its intelligence relating to the organization, fight its radical Islamic ideology, and improve American defense capabilities in dealing with it, including the problem of foreign fighters who join ISIS.
   2. American Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen set out the strategy for harming ISIS’s funding sources (October 23, 2014), saying “Our strategy involves three mutually supportive elements. First, we are working to disrupt ISIL’s revenue streams in order to deny it money in the first place. Second, we aim to limit what ISIL can do with the funds it collects by restricting its access to the international financial system. And finally, we continue to impose sanctions on ISIL’s senior leadership and financial facilitators to disrupt their ability to operate […]”.
5. Further humanitarian aid to civilians and population groups which were harmed by ISIS: American Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel noted the assistance from the United States, Iraq, Britain, Canada and France to the Yazidi in the Sinjar mountains and the Shi’ite Turkmen in Amerli, specifying the amount of aid provided by America. In addition, American aid to displaced Iraqis amounted to over $186 million in the 2014 fiscal year. Hagel added that the United States provided the greatest amount of support to millions of Syrians affected by the civil war (Secretary of State Kerry announced the addition of $500 million in humanitarian aid to Syria, which has amounted to over $3 billion since the beginning of the civil war).

Interviewed by CNN on October 1, 2014, General (Ret.) John Allen, who served in senior positions in Afghanistan and Iraq as special presidential envoy to coordinate the activities of the coalition against ISIS, discussed the political objectives of the campaign against ISIS. Regarding the campaign in Iraq, he said that from a United States perspective, the ultimate objective was the establishment of an Iraqi sovereign state led by a government in Baghdad, which would control the entire territory of Iraq and not just a single ethnic community. In Syria, he said, the intention was to help moderate members of the opposition to enable them to defend themselves against the Assad regime and Al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations. He said the process of training them might take years. He did not go into detail about the nature of the final political solution to be reached in Syria, but noted that President Assad would not be part of it.

General John Allen, special US envoy to the coalition against the Islamic State (Photo credit: Chad J. McNeeley/US Navy/DoD)

The words of General John Allen apparently reflect a certain degree of American optimism regarding the prospects of the United States to impose a sovereign Iraqi government on all the territory of Iraq, including all its ethnic communities. Such optimism may also express an American intention to invest most of its efforts and resources in the campaign against ISIS in the Iraqi arena. As for Syria, the American expectation is apparently much lower and is limited to strengthening the “moderates” who oppose the Bashar Assad regime. General John Allen (and other Americans who have spoken on the subject) did not explicitly state that their goal was to overthrow the Assad regime and did not elaborate on the nature of the final political solution to be reached in Syria.

Establishing the international coalition

Following President Obama’s speech the United States initiated intensive diplomatic activity, led by the President and Secretary of State Kerry with the intention of forming as broad an international coalition as possible. The coalition is intended to reinforce American legitimacy to act against ISIS at home and abroad and to provide the campaign against ISIS with practical assistance, even if limited (clearly the United States will lead the campaign and bear the brunt of the military, financial and political burden). The coalition was formed mainly in the first half of September 2014 during the NATO summit in Wales (September 4-5, 2014) and at an international conference in Paris attended by about 30 countries (September 15, 2014). At the conferences American officials met with potential key partners, after which the outlines of the new coalition began to emerge.

Many dozens of countries (over 60, according to the American administration) have declared their participation in the coalition. However, particularly important are countries playing an active role in the campaign against ISIS, which can be divided into three groups:

1. Western countries — So far France (which was the first country to realize its commitment),^[117] Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada and Denmark have actively participated in aerial attacks in Syria.
2. Arab countries — So far, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain have actively participated in aerial attacks in Syria. Qatar, Kuwait and Egypt support the coalition but have not yet actively participated in aerial attacks. Egypt, which is fighting terrorism at home, refused to actively participate in attacks against ISIS but announced that it would support the campaign against ISIS in other ways (political support, exchange of information, harming funding sources, providing an ideological Islamic response to the jihadi worldview of ISIS).
3. Turkey — Turkey is an important country in the coalition which, in ITIC assessment, is a category in itself. That is because on the one hand, it is assisting the United States and trying to avoid a rift with it: Turkey has agreed to train fighters of the so-called moderate Syrian rebel organizations on Turkish territory together with the United States, to train the Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq and to aid the Iraqi army. It also allowed the Kurdish forces to move reinforcements to the Ayn al-Arab (Kobanî) front through Turkish territory (after prolonged hesitation and stalling). On the other hand, it does not actively participate in aerial attacks, does not effectively supervise its long border with Syria (ISIS’s main logistics artery), and has hesitated to aid the Kurdish forces in Ayn al-Arab (Kobanî). That is because its political agenda and interests differ from those of the US.

The coalition does not include Russia and China, because of global considerations and Russia’s fundamental support for the Assad regime. Syria is also absent from the coalition, perceived by the United States as part of the problem rather than part of the solution; also absent is Iran, which continues to encourage terrorism, undermine American interests in the Middle East and expand its political influence in Iraq and Syria. Thus cooperation with Iran would be problematic, although not impossible.

In summary, the coalition formed by the US is heterogeneous and its members have their own differing interests, capabilities and constraints. Countries in the coalition willing to be actively involved carry out military tasks in the anti-ISIS campaign in different locations: Western countries provide air support in Iraq, but have reservations (at least at this stage) about operating in Syria (possibly due to political and legal difficulties related to violations of Syrian sovereignty); the Arab countries, however, do operate in Syria but have so far not attacked in Iraq (probably due to the Iraqi government’s refusal to allow the Sunni Arab countries to carry out to air operations in its territory). The members of the coalition are united in their fear of being excessively drawn into the Syrian and Iraqi fray, which is manifested by limited aid in aerial attacks and an absolute refusal to involve significant ground forces in combat.

Limitations raised by the UN regarding the legitimacy of the campaign

Following President Obama’s speech, the United States worked intensively to have the UN legitimize the campaign against ISIS. One step in that direction was the hearing in the Security Council attended by foreign ministers, headed by Secretary of State John Kerry (September 19, 2014). The Security Council issued a statement calling on UN members to help the Iraqi government fight ISIS. It also called for the prosecution of those who violated international humanitarian law in Iraq and committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.

On September 24, 2014, President Obama led a hearing of heads of state at the UN Security Council. He focused on the need “to confront the real and growing threat of foreign fighters.” He also noted that American intelligence agencies estimated that more than 15,000 foreign fighters from more than 80 countries had gone to Syria in recent years. Many of them joined the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Nusra Front and ISIS, and constitute a threat to the residents of Syria and Iraq and to their own countries of origin. President Obama called on the Security Council to adopt resolutions calling on all countries to prevent the recruitment, organization, passage and equipping of foreign fighters (Whitehouse.gov. September 24, 2014).

On September 24, 2014, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2178 (under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter^[118]). It requires countries to take certain steps to address the foreign terrorist fighter threat.

Main points of the resolution:

1. Highlighting the threat posed to the international community by “foreign terrorist fighters” who join organizations such as ISIL,^[119] the Al-Nusra Front (ANF) and other organizations (in Syria and Iraq) affiliated with Al-Qaeda.
2. Calling on the various countries to take effective measures to “prevent and suppress recruiting, organizing, transporting, and equipping of foreign terrorist fighters, and the financing of foreign terrorist fighter travel and activities.”
3. Appropriate preparation of the various countries in the area of legislation, which will ensure that their legal system and regulations allow the prosecution of foreign fighters, or the prosecution of those who help them, and their penalization in a manner consistent with the gravity of the offense.
4. Improving international cooperation in all matters related to preventing foreign fighters from leaving for Syria and Iraq and to preventing them from passing through the various countries.
5. Emphasizing the need for all countries of the world to cope with “violent extremism” among local communities and NGOs, which may find expression in terrorism (Note: For reasons of political correctness, the terms “Islamic extremism” or “violent Islamic extremism” are not used).

Hence the UN Security Council resolution granted legitimacy to international cooperation in coping with foreign fighters. However, it does not deal with the civil war in Syria and Iraq, the two morasses in which ISIS and the other jihadi organizations thrive, and the roots of jihadi Islamic terrorism. Thus, any resolution focusing only on foreign fighters deals with one of the symptoms of the problem and not with the problem itself.

Aerial attacks in Syria and Iraq within the new strategy

September 23, 2014, two weeks after President Obama’s speech, marked the beginning of the air campaign against ISIS, called “Operation Inherent Resolve.” In the early hours of the morning, the United States, with the help of some of its allies, carried out large-scale aerial attacks against ISIS targets in Syria. They focused on targets in the area of Al-Raqqah, ISIS’s “capital city” in Syria, and also attacked other ISIS targets in eastern Syria (Al-Hasakah, Deir al-Zor, Abu Kamal) and targets of a terrorist organization affiliated with Al-Qaeda called Khorasan (See below). It was the first time that the United States had attacked targets in Syria since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011.

Between the end of September 2014 and the end of October 2014, the United States and its allies carried out more than 632 aerial attacks in Iraq and Syria. Of the aerial attacks, 553 were carried out by the US and 79 by other members of the coalition. In Iraq, 346 aerial attacks were carried out and in 286 in Syria (Al-Jazeera, October 24, 2014). The United States was joined by aircraft of Arab countries in Syria, and by aircraft of Western countries in Iraq. In ITIC assessment, despite America’s basic preference for aerial attacks in Iraq, the attacks in Ayn al-Arab (Kobanî) have diverted part of the American air effort to Syria.

The main targets of for aerial attacks are ISIS’s military infrastructure, including operatives, bases, outposts, headquarters, weapons, and command and control facilities. So far, it the most impressive success of the aerial attacks was apparently in Ayn al-Arab, where they helped curb the efforts to take over the city, giving a breathing space the Kurdish forces fighting against ISIS.

In addition, the US and its allies are devoting considerable attention to attacking the ISIS oil infrastructure (mainly refining facilities), which represents ISIS’s most important source of funding. As early as the start of the air campaign, the American Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that 13 aerial attacks have been carried out against 12 ISIS refining facilities in Al-Mayadeen, Al-Hasakah and Abu Kamal. The strikes were carried out by American aircraft with aircraft from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Americans reported that according to initial evidence the strikes were successful (Centcom.mil, September 24, 2014). On November 3-5, 2014, ISIS oil production facilities in Iraq were also attacked.

In late October 2014 the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that aerial attacks by the US and its allies had killed at least 521 people. The dead included 464 ISIS operatives, 57 Al-Nusra Front operatives and 32 civilians (including six children and five women). In ITIC assessment most of the ISIS operatives (a few hundred) were killed in and around the city of Ayn al-Arab. The number of terrorist operatives killed so far is high (relative to the number of civilians), an indication of good intelligence on the part of the Americans and their allies (although the quality of this intelligence is liable to deteriorate as the strikes continue). On October 25, 2014, the US announced the first death of an American soldier fighting against ISIS. The casualty was a 19 year-old Marine, one of the soldiers fighting in Iraq against ISIS. He was killed in Baghdad in unclear circumstances.

The Khorasan terrorist network: another target for American attacks

Most of the American aerial attacks have been directed against ISIS targets. However, in the first 24 hours of the massive air offensive (October 23, 2014), attacks were also directed at targets of a terrorist organization called Khorasan, which is affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and against targets of the Al-Nusra Front, where Khorasan operatives were located. General Martin Dempsey, Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the American army, said the targets attacked west of Aleppo belonged to the Khorasan terrorist network, which he called a group with significant explosives capability that had hatched a plot to attack American and Western interests immediately (Haaretz.co.il, and Reuters.com, September 24, 2014). The Khorasan network continued as a target of aerial attacks in November.

Khorasan is a geographical term predating Islam. It refers to the area of modern-day Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Pakistan. The term was preserved in Persia under the Sasanian Empire, and it is still used in Iran (it is the name of provinces in the eastern part of Iran). ISIS also uses this term in the maps of the Islamic Caliphate it distributes.

The Khorasan network was established by Al-Qaeda operatives who came to Syria from Afghanistan and Pakistan, at least some of them via Iran. They were several dozen operatives with operational experience who joined the Al-Nusra Front (Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria) and operated under its auspices for approximately two years. It came to the attention of the public when the US Attorney General told an interviewer that the United States had has been monitoring the group for about two years, and that in the summer of 2014 aviation security measures had been intensified in fear of planned attacks by the network (News.yahoo.com, September 26, 2014; Reuters.com, September 28, 2014).

The Khorasan network’s leader is Muhsin al-Fadhli (aka Abu Osama the Kuwaiti), assumed to be about 33 years old. He was one of Osama bin Laden’s close advisors and fought in Afghanistan and Chechnya. He was among a group of veteran Al-Qaeda operatives who fled from Afghanistan to Iran following the American invasion in 2001. In 2013, he went to northern Syria, where he met a group of veteran Al-Qaeda operatives and headed a network called Khorasan. In Syria he recruited operatives for terrorist attacks, mainly holders of Western passports. In 2012, the American Department of State offered a reward of $7 million for information leading to the location of Muhsin al-Fadhli (State.gov, October 18, 2012; Reuters.com, September 28, 2014; News.yahoo.com, September 26, 2014).

Muhsin al-Fadhli (State.gov)

Initial assessment of the aerial attacks’ impact

It is too early to assess the impact of the aerial attacks on ISIS’s military conduct or on its governmental and economic infrastructure. CENTCOM Commander General Lloyd Austin noted in a lecture that the coalition led by the US had the upper hand and had managed to reduce ISIS’s ability (CNN.com, November 7, 2014). For example, he said that “They are afraid to congregate in any sizable formation. They know if we can see them, we’re going to engage them and we’re going to hit what we’re aiming at.” He also said that the strikes had significantly degraded the group’s ability to communicate and added that the coalition was able to listen in on ISIS communications.

ISIS’s anti-aircraft weapon destroyed in an American aerial attack (YouTube, August 22, 2014)

US Air Force aerial attack in Ayn al-Arab (Kobanî) (From a US Army video, October 23, 2014)

In a speech entitled “Attacking ISIL’s Financial Foundation”, American Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen addressed the first results of attacks on ISIS’s economic infrastructure (October 23, 2014). He said, “There are good indications, however, that recent coalition military have begun to impair ISIL’s ability to generate revenue from oil smuggling. Airstrikes on ISIL oil refineries are threatening ISIL’s supply networks are depriving it of fuel to sell or use itself. Moreover, our partners in the region, including Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government, are committed to preventing ISIL-derived oil from crossing their borders. Last week, the International Energy Agency reported that ISIL’s ability to produce, refine and smuggle oil had been significantly hampered.”

So far, in ITIC assessment ISIS’s military infrastructure has suffered blows as a result of the aerial attacks (killing of operatives,^[120] destruction of weapons, damage to headquarters and bases). ISIS’s oil refining facilities in eastern Syria have also been damaged and as a result its revenues have dropped (although they are still much higher than those of other terrorist organizations). They also raised the morale of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces and apparently of the Iraqi army. However, so far in ITIC assessment the organization’s military capabilities have not been significantly damaged and ISIS’s ability to run the governmental infrastructure in the various districts has not been impaired. ISIS’s attractiveness to Sunni Muslims within and outside Syria and Iraq did not decrease following the aerial attacks; it may even have increased.

The most significant result of the aerial attacks to date has apparently been curbing the ISIS onslaught in the city of Ayn al-Arab (Kobanî). Although the aerial attacks did not prevent the ISIS offensive in the city and the entire region, they have helped the Kurdish forces stop ISIS from advancing and helped repel the forces from several places (although it is too early to estimate the consequences of the attack on the city). In Iraq the aerial attacks helped the Iraqi army and Kurdish forces resist pressure by ISIS in centers of fighting in the province of Al-Anbar and in the north, but did not prevent ISIS from continuing its proactive military operation, or the organization’s increasing pressure on Baghdad.

ISIS is learning lessons from the losses and damage it has sustained in the aerial attacks. According to a number of reports, ISIS is gradually adapting to the new situation of continuous aerial attacks. It is doing so by strictly enforcing security rules, making its military forces less visible, reducing the movement of its forces in open areas (moving in small groups using motorcycles and SUVs) and assimilating within the civilian population. That is liable to create future problems for the United States and its allies when updating the list of targets in Syria and Iraq prepared by intelligence services and to increase the risk of non-involved civilians getting killed as the aerial attacks continue. In addition, ISIS’s willingness to cooperate with other rebel groups, including the rival the Al-Nusra Front, has apparently increased to a certain degree.

The American campaign against ISIS: implications and chances of success

President Obama has set the US the clear, but in ITIC assessment pretentious, goal of destroying ISIS with a comprehensive campaign of several years. By setting the final goal as the destruction of ISIS, he has created high expectations for his and the next administration. Their ability to meet the expectations is of great importance. That is because the campaign extends beyond the narrow perspective of the war on terrorism, and its outcome will affect the America’s status the Middle East and around the globe for years to come. Thus not only is President Obama’s foreign policy being tested, but the image of American regional and international power also faces a significant challenge.

One question is whether the United States will succeed in the campaign against ISIS and realize the strategic goals set forth by President Obama. In ITIC assessment it will be very difficult for America to achieve all the goals it set for itself, for the following reasons:

1. The political assumptions and goals, both declared and undeclared, which are at the root of the campaign against ISIS seem to be unrealistic:
   1. The intention to establish a central democratic regime in Iraq, which will impose its control over the whole country, failed even during the years the US maintained a large military force in Iraq. The current goal is even more unrealistic, after the US has withdrawn its troops from Iraq and the country is divided into its religious-sectarian components.^[121]
   2. As for Syria, it is impossible to rely on the so-called moderate rebel organizations to eradicate ISIS. That is because those organizations are fragmented, their military capabilities are limited and they lack effective leadership. Even if American aid strengthens the Western-oriented rebel groups to the point where they may be able to stand up to their enemies more successfully, it is still unlikely that they will be able to overcome the Assad regime and ISIS and other jihadi organizations.
2. The difficulty of uprooting an organization with a Salafist-jihadi ideology like ISIS: ISIS is not just an isolated terrorist organization whose influence is confined to a single territorial area. It is an organization with a radical Islamic ideology supported by Sunni population groups and drawing its strength from the disintegration of the social and governmental systems in Iraq, Syria and the Middle East as a whole. In Afghanistan and Pakistan the United States also failed to uproot the global jihad, although it did manage to weaken Al-Qaeda after it had invested considerable resources and a prolonged military presence (which is now coming to an end).^[122] Foreign fighters also join ISIS because of the political and social distress in the Arab-Muslim world and in Muslim communities in the West, and therefore it is not enough to streamline counterterrorist measures and strengthen international cooperation.
3. The limitations of military force in fighting against terrorist organizations: Aerial attacks against an organization such as ISIS, which has a well-formulated ideological worldview and enjoys the support of Sunni population groups, cannot lead to its elimination. In the Second Lebanon War and Operation Protective Edge, Israel learned the limits of military power in fighting Hezbollah and Hamas. Both are radical Islamist terrorist organizations, one Shi’ite and the other Sunni, which are firmly rooted within the local populations. Moreover, in ITIC assessment even the massive military involvement of American troops in Iraq and Syria (currently not on the agenda) would not lead to the elimination of ISIS and the establishment of stable regimes (during its stay in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American army learned first hand the limits of military force in imposing law and order and establishing an effective central government in societies divided both politically and socially).
4. The basic weakness of the local power centers that the United States relies on:
   1. The Iraqi Army, in whose establishment the US has invested considerable resources and power, remains unmotivated and does not enjoy legitimacy among Sunni Muslims. The Iraqi Army may prove effective in protecting Baghdad and Shi’ite population centers, but not in occupying and controlling the Sunni areas where ISIS is based. It is doubtful whether additional American investments of money, military equipment and advisors to strengthen the Iraqi Army would change this basic situation.
   2. The Kurdish Peshmerga forces may prove effective in protecting the Kurdish autonomous region, and possibly also in limited offensive operations. On the other hand, their effectiveness and motivation will be far lower in operations in Sunni and Shi’ite areas.
   3. The Iranian-supported Shi’ite militias in Iraq may prove effective in protecting Baghdad and Shi’ite population centers. However, military aid to those militias will not provide them with offensive capabilities allowing them to occupy the Sunni areas that ISIS controlled. Moreover, strengthening the Shi’ite militias also come at the price of increasing Iran’s political influence in Iraq.
   4. The so-called moderate Syrian rebel organizations: The organizations are divided organizationally, differ from one another in ideology and are lacking effective (political and military) leadership. Aid from the United States and the West could strengthen their resistance against ISIS and the Syrian regime, but it is doubtful whether it would provide them with significant offensive capabilities against their enemies.
5. The weakness of the coalition supporting the US: It is a heterogeneous coalition with different political interests and constraints, limiting the scope of participation of the various countries. The coalition countries are expected to provide limited aid to the aerial attacks against ISIS. In addition, Turkey, which is of great importance, has interests and political constraints of its own and at least for the time being does to want to be deeply involved in the fight against ISIS. Moreover, in the future, if and when the coalition has to cope with difficulties, some of its members are liable to abandon the campaign. The bottom line is that the US bears the brunt of the fighting and will have to bear the consequences over the years.
6. The major difficulty in effective cooperation with Bashar al-Assad’s regime and with its supporter, Iran:
   1. The Assad regime could have aided in fighting ISIS no less and maybe even more than most of the countries in the coalition and the so-called moderate rebel organizations supported by the United States. However, America regards the Assad regime a factor in the process leading to the establishment of ISIS and the civil war in Syria, and not part of the solution. Cooperation with it is liable to alienate the Americans from the Sunni Muslim population in Syria and undermine United States cooperation with the so-called moderate rebel organizations.
   2. Cooperation with Iran, which has influence and presence in Syria and Iraq, is also politically problematic. Iran supports terrorism, strives for hegemony in the Middle East and to harm American influence in Syria and Iraq and to harm American allies (Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan). Although there may be future tactical collaborations against ISIS with Iran (and the Syrian regime as well), it is difficult to expect them to become key partners in the coalition.

Moreover, the American campaign, however long it lasts, is also prone to entanglements, which are integral to the struggle against terrorism. For example, it may increase the motivation of ISIS, global jihad organizations and supporters of ISIS around the world to respond to the aerial attacks with terrorist attacks; it may lead to unintended casualties among the civilian population as a result of the ongoing aerial attacks; the US may be drawn into situations not included in the strategy announced by President Obama and his aides (such as additional American troops getting more deeply sucked into the Iraqi morass and perhaps even the Syrian morass). All of the above are liable to lead to domestic criticism and in Western countries if things go wrong (and they are liable to go wrong), if only because of the very complex, fluid, volatile and changing nature of the civil wars in Syria and Iraq.

Beyond all those difficulties, ISIS is a consequence of the disintegration of Syria and Iraq, a part of profound and powerful processes that have occurred in the Middle East in recent years. The processes, known as the Middle East upheaval, have changed the face of the regional political map as it was shaped after World War I and remained for nearly a century. A new order has not yet emerged to replace nation states that have collapsed, and many opposing political and social forces are fighting for power. This is the nature of the morass from which ISIS and other jihadi organizations emerged, and until the morass has been drained, a process that may take many years, it will be impossible to eradicate the weeds.

Evaluation of ISIS’s weaknesses

In recent months, ISIS has managed to brand itself in the Arab-Muslim world and in the West as a powerful terrorist organization with exceptional capabilities. Its military successes, its governmental consolidation and the fact that it has been joined by organizations and operatives, versus the weakness of its enemies and rivals, have fed this image, in some cases leading to ISIS’s enhancement beyond its actual power and capabilities.

However, an analysis of ISIS’s power and patterns of action indicates the organization’s weaknesses and a certain vulnerability which the US might take advantage of. Is main weaknesses are:

1. The large gap between ISIS’s actual power and its pretensions: ISIS has a small core of operatives (their number is estimated at between 25,000 to 31,000) through whom it controls the millions of residents and significant parts of the territory of Iraq and Syria. The small number of its operatives may make it difficult for ISIS to defend itself against massive military ground initiatives, if and when regular forces that are superior in terms of size and quality are deployed against it. Moreover, if ISIS’s military power weakens significantly, ISIS may find it hard to impose effective control over the local population over time, let alone realize its far-reaching ambitions (taking over Iraq and Syria and other countries).
2. The weakness of the coalition put together by ISIS in Iraq: In ITIC assessment, it is a loose coalition composed of Salafist-jihadi organizations that have been joined by Sunni tribes and Ba’athist Iraqi military personnel and officials from the time of Saddam Hussein. There is no ideological adhesive bonding them, and the cooperation between them is based on a convergence of interests, centering on hostility to Shi’ites and the central government in Baghdad (which is perceived as Shi’ite-affiliated). In addition, ISIS’s excessively brutal methods and its attempts to enforce an extreme version of Islamic law alienate it among its allies, which may abandon it when circumstances change and the momentum of ISIS’s military successes is brought to an end. The participation of tribes from the province of Al-Anbar in western Iraq in the fighting against ISIS alongside the Iraqi army, and disagreements that deteriorated into violent clashes between ISIS and a large tribe in the area of Deir al-Zor, illustrate the difficulty of preserving the coalition over time.
3. The large number of enemies versus the lack of significant allies in Syria: In the Syrian arena ISIS is forced to fight against the Syrian regime, while simultaneously having to cope with rebel organizations and the Al-Nusra Front (Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria), both of which are hostile to it. Most of the Syrian population controlled by ISIS does not identify with its ideology and with the brutal coercion of its Islamic code of conduct. The Syrian regime, Iran and Hezbollah are hostile to ISIS and may try to harm it when circumstances permit. Moreover, the religious-sectarian schism in Syria may make it very difficult for ISIS to expand its control to other areas populated by those who are hostile to it (i.e., areas populated by Alawites, Kurds or Druze).
4. The centrality of ISIS’s leader: ISIS has a centralized hierarchical structure revolving around the charismatic character of its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. He is the head of the Islamic Caliphate and is the final arbiter on military, religious and governmental matters. He appoints ISIS’s leadership and institutions him and their dependence on him is absolute (as far as the ITIC knows, there is no second in command who may inherit all of al-Baghdadi’s powers in an organized fashion). Therefore, should al-Baghdadi be out the picture, it could shake ISIS and weaken it significantly, even if it does not lead to its collapse.
5. ISIS’s economic vulnerability: ISIS’s governmental and military capabilities rely heavily on its high revenues from the infrastructure, mainly the oil infrastructure (oil refining and smuggling oil products to areas not under ISIS’s control). An effective campaign against petroleum product smuggling and its production system may weaken ISIS at the military level and impair its ability to provide the local population with a governmental alternative. The United States is aware of that and from the start of the campaign has focused its aerial attack on the oil infrastructure held by ISIS. That, however, is insufficient. In the fight against the petroleum product smuggling networks, the United States will require the close cooperation of Turkey and the Kurdish autonomous region and, if possible, of the Syrian regime as well, to block the smuggling ISIS uses.
6. ISIS’s ideology: ISIS represents a radical Salafist-jihadi interpretation of Islam dating back to the Middle Ages (the Hanbali school). Although it is perceived as attractive by many young Muslims today, it school of thought is not accepted by most Muslims. Many clerics in the Arab-Muslim world and in Muslim communities in Western countries object to both its radical interpretation of Islam and ISIS’s acts of cruelty and brutality presented in the media. Most Muslims accept the moderate schools of thought. Therefore, military measures against ISIS must be accompanied by a battle for hearts and minds designed to foster moderate Islam, which finds expression in the Shafi’i and Maliki schools. Egypt (which is the target of a terrorist campaign) can play an important role and has indeed announced that it will support the fight against ISIS by providing an ideological Islamic response to the worldview it represents. In Western countries, the battle for hearts and minds must cultivate the moderate streams in the local Muslim communities, coupled with further steps to reduce the sense of alienation and discrimination among them.

In ITIC assessment ISIS’s main weakness is its limited power base within the Sunni population that either cooperates with it or surrenders to its authority. Its collaborations with Sunni tribes and other Sunni power centers are a marriage of convenience based on temporary common interests, which may change as the political and military situations in Iraq and Syria change. Success in the military campaign against ISIS, coupled with an American policy of providing massive assistance to influential figures and groups among the Sunni population in the areas under ISIS’s control, as the United States did in the past in Iraq, may bear fruit in the campaign against ISIS.

If the US and its allies continue the campaign against ISIS, investing a significant military effort in it over time, have the wisdom to take advantage of ISIS’s weaknesses and not be deterred by serious side effects liable to accompany the campaign (casualties, terrorism, criticism from within and without), then, in ITIC assessment, the campaign against ISIS may also have positive results. They will be more modest than the high expectations set by the United States, but they are more realistic. In ITIC assessment, realistic expectations are the weakening of ISIS (as opposed to its destruction); curbing the momentum of its expansion in Syria and Iraq and possibly reducing its territorial assets; improving the self-defense capabilities of local forces in Syria and Iraq and of the various countries in confronting ISIS’s terrorism (in the West and the Middle East) and responding more effectively to the foreign fighters who travel to Syria and return to their countries of origin.

[1] Links to all other nine sections:

You can read the overview — “ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization” — here.

You can read section 1 — “The historical roots and stages in the development of ISIS” — here.

You can read section 2 — “ISIS’s ideology and vision, and their implementation” — here.

You can read section 3 — “ISIS’s military achievements in Iraq in the summer of 2014 and the establishment of its governmental systems” — here.

You can read section 4 — “ISIS establishes itself in eastern and northern Syria” — here.

You can read section 5 — “ISIS’s capabilities: the number of its operatives, control system, military strength, leadership, allies and financial capabilities” — here.

You can read section 6 — “Exporting terrorism and subversion to the West and the Arab world” — here.

You can read section 7 — “ISIS’s propaganda machine” — here.

You can read section 9 — “ISIS response to the American campaign (update to mid-November 2014)” — here.

Notes:

[114] President Barack Obama said that extreme circumstances might arise in which the United States would deploy ground forces, for example, if ISIS were found to be in possession of nuclear weapons and a campaign was necessary too eliminate them. On the other hand, American Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel was more cautious. He said that the administration might consider the recommendation of the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to station ground troops in Iraq to aid local forces. However, he added: “[…] these would not be fighting forces […] there will be no American combat troops in Iraq or Syria […]” (CNN, November 16, 2014).

[115] The ITIC finds this estimate too optimistic. Such an order of battle is not sufficient to take over extensive areas in Syria and Iraq, held by ISIS and its allies, and certainly not to control them over time.

[116] According to an article in The Washington Post, the US administration is considering increasing the role of the CIA in training fighters in Syria, as part of the clandestine aid provided to moderate rebel organizations. According to officials, the CIA is currently testing and training about 400 combat soldiers each month. That is the number of combat soldiers that the Pentagon expects to train when its program peaks at the end of 2015 (The Washington Post, November 14, 2014).

[117] On September 19, 2014, French fighter planes hit an ISIS target in Iraq for the first time. French President François Hollande announced that the French aerial attacks would be carried out in Iraq and not in Syria, and that France would not send ground troops to the campaign against ISIS.

[118] According to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council is authorized, in the event of a “threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression” to impose sanctions on a particular country and to allow the use of force against it.

[119] The resolution used the term ISIL rather than ISIS.

[120] According to the Syrian Monitoring Centre for Human Rights (November 22, 2014), 785 ISIS operatives and 72 Al-Nusra Front operatives were killed in the aerial attacks. A total of 52 civilians were also killed.

[121] US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel pointed out in his speech that “Iraq’s continued political progress toward a more inclusive and representative government — and its progress of reform and reconciliation — will be critical. We believe that Iraq’s new Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, is committed to bringing all Iraqis together against ISIL […]” (website of the Armed Forces Committee of the US Senate, September 16, 2014). In practice, however, the establishment of the Haider al-Abadi government (September 8, 2014) in place of the Nouri al-Maliki government did not increase the legitimacy of the Iraqi regime among the Sunnis.

[122] On May 2, 2011, American forces carried out a targeted killing of Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. In retrospect, it can be stated that killing bin Laden weakened Al-Qaeda but did not eradicate the global jihad organizations. Al-Qaeda’s center in Afghanistan/Pakistan was indeed weakened, but in Iraq and Syria a new and more dangerous center was established. Approximately six months after bin Laden was killed, the ISI sent jihad operatives to Syria, where they established the Al-Nusra Front and initiated a process that subsequently created ISIS and helped change the balance of power in both Syria and Iraq.