Email |  Print | RSS | Comment |  

 Email |  Print

Mon, April 04, 2011 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6 and Document 7

British troops in Helmand Province, 2009. (Reuters)

WikiLeaks: Afghan and U.S. Contempt for British Military

President Hamid Karzai, Helmand governor and US commander criticise UK failure to impose security and engage with Afghans.

Britain’s four-year military stewardship of the troubled Helmand province has been scorned by President Hamid Karzai, top Afghan officials and the US commander of Nato troops, according to secret US diplomatic cables.

The dispatches expose a devastating contempt for the British failure to impose security and connect with ordinary Afghans.

The criticism of the British operation in Helmand centres on its failure to establish security in Sangin — the town which has become totemic as the place that has claimed more British lives than any other in Afghanistan.

The Helmand governor, Gulab Mangal, told a US team led by the vice-president, Joe Biden, in January 2009 that American forces were urgently needed as British security in Sangin was inadequate and did not even extend to the town’s main bazaar, according to a cable sent from the US embassy in Kabul. “I do not have anything against them [the British] but they must leave their bases and engage with the people,” Mangal said.

In another cable in January 2009 the governor, who has received strong backing from the UK and the US, is reported to have delivered a scathing dressing down to British officials on the state of security in Sangin.

“Stop calling it the Sangin district and start calling it the Sangin base – all you have done here is built a military camp next to the city,” he said. British troops, the same cable reported, told US officials that immediately outside the town “cowboy country begins”.

Read related article “WikiLeaks cables expose Afghan contempt for British military” in the Guardian here.

Source: WikiLeaks

Document 1: Nato commander criticises British anti-drug strategy. Discussion of the efforts to counter the narcotics trade in Afghanistan. Nato commander Dan McNeill says he has been ‘particularly dismayed’ by the British approach, which was tactically wrong and failed.

Friday, 06 April 2007, 10:45

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001132

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
OSD FOR KIMMITT
ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR
STATE FOR INL/AP, INL/FO, AND INR
CIA FOR CNC

EO 12958 DECL: 04/04/2017
TAGS SNAR, KCRM, AF
SUBJECT: ONDCP DIRECTOR WALTERS’ MARCH 17-20 VISIT TO
AFGHANISTAN
REF: KABUL 1014

Classified By: DCM Richard B. Norland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (U) SUMMARY: Director of the Office of Drug Control Policy John Walters visited Afghanistan March 17-20 to discuss with senior Afghan and international officials this year’s progress on reducing the poppy crop. Senior ISAF officials told Walters that although eradicating poppy would, in their estimation, increase the security threat, it needed to be done and they would be as supportive as their mandate allowed. ISAF is also increasingly convinced of the links between narcotics traffickers and insurgents. Senior Afghan government officials agreed with the need to take strong action against growers and traffickers but acknowledged that widespread corruption and the weakness of the justice system made that difficult. Many made the point that considerable progress in other parts of the country was at risk of being overshadowed by the lack of progress in Helmand. They all emphasized the importance of increasing development aid, and pitched the idea of funneling more assistance through government ministries instead of international contractors. Lastly, Walters visited the Afghan Eradication Force base camp in Helmand, where discussions with Deputy Minister of Interior for Counter-narcotics Mohammad Daud and local elders illustrated how difficult it is for the central government to exert its authority on controversial issues. END SUMMARY.

KARZAI NEEDS TO TAKE ACTION

—————————

2. (C/NOFORN) ONDCP Director Walters met with COM ISAF General McNeill in Kabul, and separately with RC South Commander Major General Van Loon (Dutch) in Kandahar. McNeill told Walters there had been a lot of action on counter-narcotics, but little progress. He was particularly dismayed by the British effort. They had made a mess of things in Helmand, their tactics were wrong, and the deal that London cut on Musa Qala had failed. That agreement opened the door to narco-traffickers in that area, and now it was impossible to tell the difference between the traffickers and the insurgents. The British could do a lot more, he said, and should, because they have the biggest stake.

3. (C/NOFORN) McNeill thought the missing ingredient in the counter-narcotics effort was Karzai. Despite some public statements, he had failed to take a real stand. Karzai needed to keep his support base happy, and as a result, he placated many of those involved in the drug business, especially in the west and south of the country. However, by not taking the issue on, Karzai was tacitly signaling his OK for poppy production. While the international community could come down harder on Karzai, McNeill observed that for the time being, Karzai is the only one who can lead, so for now we have to ride with him. The counter-narcotics effort has to have an Afghan face, and that is going to take time.

HIGH VALUE TARGETS

——————

4. (C) To Walters’ question on going after high value targets, McNeill said it was necessary to prosecute a few to keep faith with the general public. But he was skeptical it would have any real effect on the trafficking networks, as those arrested would simply be replaced by others. McNeill described having been called to answer questions before the Afghan parliament, and said that during the session, the parliament had come down hard on MOI Zarar for not doing more on narcotics arrests and basic law enforcement. McNeill also criticized the timing and conduct of eradication, arguing that farmers eradicated in the spring would be fighting by summer. He asserted that Governor-led eradication was extremely disorganized and said that, for now, eradicators are only going where the local power brokers allow them to go. He suggested that there be a more direct link between eradication and provision of assistance, so that a compact with the people could be created.

KABUL 00001132 002 OF 004

VAN LOON AGREEMENT ON TIMING, NEED FOR ASSISTANCE

——————————————— —-

5. (C) In a meeting the next day in Kandahar, RC South commander Major General Van Loon, who was accompanied for part of the meeting by Kandahar Governor Asadullah, argued that provision of alternative livelihoods needs to start much earlier. Once the poppy seeds are in the ground, there is no option for the farmer. Provision of licit crops and other assistance needed to start early in the summer, before farmers made planting decisions. Both Asadullah and Van Loon thought cooperation among the central government, assistance providers, and eradication elements was poor. While farmers are promised alternatives, they do not often see results on a local level. There needs to be more active involvement with local councils, and there should be more of a direct link between development assistance and non-cultivation of poppy. Van Loon suggested this approach would work in Kandahar, where farmers were making their own decisions on what to grow, but would probably not work in Helmand, where large-scale traffickers were in charge.

GOVERNOR-LED ERADICATION AND PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION

——————————————— ——

6. (C) Following Asadullah’s departure, Van Loon agreed that the Governor was making progress on eradication, but he took issue with his targets and methods. Asadullah was using Afghan Police (ANP) to do eradication, which further damaged the already corrupt reputation of the police among average people, and allowed Asadullah to pocket the funding he had been given to hire local labor to carry out eradication. The employment of ANP in eradication means they are not out in the community performing their security functions. In addition, Van Loon said Asadullah has been careful to eradicate only those fields not controlled by powerful people in the Province.

7. (C/NF) Van Loon was somewhat defensive in discussing the failure of Uruzgan Governor Monib to take any action on eradication. He argued that the security situation was outside the Governor’s control, and prevented him from moving around much. In addition, the province is extremely poor, and so until more alternative livelihoods are available, the international community should not push too hard on eradication. He said that Monib understood the need to do something, and plans were now being drawn up with the British Embassy Drugs team and the Ministry of Counter-narcotics.

8. (C) RC South has begun developing information on ties between traffickers, insurgents, and government officials. They recognize that going after corrupt officials may be too difficult, given the delicate tribal and other balances needed to keep the Afghan government generally intact. But they hope to use the increasing connections between traffickers and insurgents to their advantage; the latter are a legitimate target for ISAF, while pursuing the former is not within ISAF’s direct mandate.

VISIT TO HELMAND

—————-

9. (C) On March 20 Director Walters visited the INL-funded Afghan Eradication Force’s (AEF) forward operating base in Helmand. During the visit he discussed Helmand eradication with Deputy Interior Minister Daud and members of the provincial eradication commission, who represented tribal elders and the poppy growing communities in the operating areas of the AEF base. Walters told Daud and the commission members that he was disappointed with the recent lack of eradication progress in areas with the highest concentration of poppy cultivation, like Marja sub-district. The commission responded that Helmand needs time–a few growing seasons–to wean farmers away from dependence on the poppy crop. Walters acknowledged that eradication affects farmers, but he reminded the commission that Helmand enjoys other

KABUL 00001132 003 OF 004

agricultural options and has the potential to become Afghanistan’s “bread basket.” All farmers, he said, know that growing poppy is illegal, and they must also learn that poppy cultivation feeds insecurity in the province and throughout Afghanistan.

GOA MINISTERS – MORE ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT

——————————————— ———

10. (C) Walters met over dinner with a number of Afghan officials, including the Ministers of Interior, Agriculture, Counter-narcotics, and Education, the Chief of the National Directorate of Security, and a member of Parliament. The wide-ranging discussion included talks on the kinds of alternative crops that could profitably be grown around the country, the challenge of fighting corruption and creating a functioning judicial system, and the general pre-requisite for licit livelihoods of energy, irrigation, and roads.

11. (C) Two themes emerged. First, there should be much more active involvement by local government in decision-making on what kind of assistance is provided. Billions are being spent around the country, but the perception at the local level is that little is being done. Involving local government, whether through Provincial Development Councils, the Governors, or other mechanisms, will help address this problem. Second, Ministers unanimously called for more assistance to be channeled through the government, rather than through international contractors. They argued that unless this happened, capacity in the Ministries would never be built. It would also lead the population to conclude that central government officials, rather than Taliban or other insurgents, could deliver now and in the future. While all acknowledged the challenges of maintaining accountability for vast sums, they argued that at least some measure of assistance should be disbursed in this way.

COMMENT

——-

12. (C) Director Walters’ meetings with GOA and international community officials highlighted the complexity of Afghanistan’s poppy dilemma. Little consensus exists on how to solve the problem: the GOA wants time, more development assistance, and greater discretion on how to spend development funding; ISAF wants to see poppy elimination programs become more integrated with security strategy; the UK Embassy argues for incremental improvements within a broader capacity-building enterprise. These debates rage within a political environment where power is diffuse and Kabul competes for regional and local influence with provincial offices and tribal structures. Every decision requires inordinate time and effort as we work to broker agreements between competing interests.

13. (C) In the background, the poppy continues to grow, and Walters’ aerial surveillance of rich poppy fields in Helmand offered immediate and powerful visual evidence of the scope of the problem. The difficulties of eradicating poppy in the same area where complex ISAF military operations are in full swing were also exposed. The long-term challenges are immense but should not overshadow the short-term necessity of political engagement, and Director Walters’ visit highlighted the great importance of making poppy elimination one of the GOA’s central priorities. No one ministry can win this battle alone. It requires concerted government will, and President Karzai needs to take control of this effort and publicize its importance for all of Afghanistan. Ambassador stressed this point during President Karzai’s counter-narcotics meeting on March 27 (reftel). As of the first week in April, we are approaching the end game of this season,s eradication efforts in Helmand and will soon be evaluating the campaign’s impact in the light of Walters’ observations during his recent visit. END COMMENT

14. (U) Director Walters’s party cleared this cable.

KABUL 00001132 004 OF 004

NEUMANN

Source: WikiLeaks

Document 2: Karzai questions UK effectiveness. The Afghan president meets US senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman. He stresses the importance of security in Helmand province and suggests American troops are preferable to British.

Sunday, 21 December 2008, 06:24

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003237

NOFORN

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT

EO 12958 DECL: 12/20/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MASS, KDEM, AF, PK
SUBJECT: KARZAI URGES CODEL MCCAIN TO SUPPORT ZARDARI AND
WELCOMES INCREASE IN U.S. FORCES

Classified By: A/DCM Val Fowler for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. Accompanied by the Charge d’Affaires, Senators John McCain, Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham dined with President Karzai at the Presidential Palace December 6. Flanked by many from his cabinet, including the Foreign and Defense Ministers, Karzai urged the Senators to secure strong U.S. support for Pakistan President Zardari in his efforts to free Pakistan from extremism, noted the progress Afghanistan has made with the support of international assistance, welcomed incoming U.S. forces and described efforts to combat widespread corruption. He also stressed the toll that civilian casualties took on public support for military operations.

APPRECIATION FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT TO AFGHANISTAN

2. (C) Karzai thanked the Senators for U.S. assistance and shared his optimism regarding the future of the bilateral relationship: “Never before has a country welcomed a foreign presence so much. (Our cooperation) will be a great success.” Karzai then joked that “reconstruction is something we complain about, but inside we are very happy with it. We complain because we want more money from you.” Karzai went on to describe how small businesses have sprung up all around the country in the last four years as a result of international assistance, and how those businesses are vital to Afghanistan’s sustainability. Karzai also touched on other areas of progress, claiming that this year Afghanistan would see 50,000 students graduate from college whereas a few years ago, there were not 50,000 college graduates in the country.

PAKISTAN’S ZARDARI: A GOOD MAN TRYING TO FREE HIS COUNTRY OF EXTREMISTS

3. (C) Responding to Senator McCain’s comment that the delegation had just arrived from meetings in Islamabad, Karzai stressed the importance of U.S. support for Pakistan’s president, calling Zardari “a good man who wants to free his country from extremists.” Karzai noted that he had an excellent relationship with Zardari and felt the two had a special rapport, adding “never in 60 years of Pakistan’s history have we had such good bilateral relations.” Karzai described how, when he arrived in Istanbul for trilateral talks earlier this month, Zardari called him directly and asked to meet with him privately before their official meeting the following day. Zardari came to Karzai’s room where they chatted over dinner for hours, “covering all topics imaginable.” Returning to the issue of U.S. support for Zardari, Karzai said the Pakistani President felt “lonely, threatened and under siege.” Zardari believed he received too little support from the international community: India was still wary because of historic enmity between the two countries; Russia withheld its support because Pakistan had helped the Afghans defeat the Soviets; China disapproved of Zardari’s close relationship with the U.S.; and the Arab countries wouldn’t support him because he wasn’t “one of them.” Karzai urged the Senators: “America is the only place he can turn – help him. Give him all you can; forget his past.”

NEED TO FOCUS ON COMMUNITIES AND FIGHTING CORRUPTION

4. (C) Calling himself “a traditional Afghan,” Karzai said his government won the previous election because of the backing of the tribes, but lack of progress and growing insecurity at the local level had left many communities disillusioned and vulnerable to militants. The government needed to re-establish those ties and focus on strengthening local infrastructure. Karzai said he had raised this issue with Senator Biden when Biden suggested sending more troops and more civilians to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction and security efforts. Karzai agreed those elements were important, but told Biden that even more important was shifting the assistance focus to the community or village level and concentrating on capacity-building to bolster the traditional element of Afghan society.

5. (C) Karzai acknowledged the scope of corruption that plagues the country, saying “the more we dig (into corruption), the more scared we get.” The President told the Senators he had fired Governor Raufi of Kandahar after a three-month investigation (the same amount of time Governor Raufi was in the position following the dismissal of the

KABUL 00003237 002 OF 002

previous governor). He also noted his recent firing of the Minister of Transport for embezzling funds linked to construction of Kabul’s new airport. Responding to the question of whether either of these men would be prosecuted, Karzai confirmed prosecutors were pursuing a case against the Minister of Transport. Karzai also tied the prevalence of widespread, but low-level corruption to the despair of many impoverished Afghans: “When someone doesn’t have hope for the future, he will steal.” On the other hand, Karzai related a story from a trip to Paktya when residents challenged him on his “negative” radio addresses: “Things are better than you say, don’t you know that?” Karzai told them he recognized the improvements but just wanted everyone to do still better.

AFGHANISTAN WELCOMES INCOMING U.S. FORCES

6. (C/NF) Karzai welcomed the incoming U.S. brigades, but took the opportunity to question the effectiveness of the British in Helmand. “Freeing Helmand from the Taliban is important: Helmand is not with us.” He then semi-seriously suggested that everyone stop taking notes, “especially my people,” and related an anecdote in which a woman from Helmand asked him to “take the British away and give us back the Americans.” He said there was a broad understanding among Afghans of the value of American forces, and that he regularly hears requests from the South to increase U.S. troop presence there. “Afghans don’t recognize NATO, they recognize America,” said Karzai. He offered the example of a villager from Uruzgan who gave the Dutch Task Force Commander a present, saying, “Take that back to Washington with you.”

KARZAI: AFGHANS WILLING TO DIE IN BATTLE BUT DO NOT UNDERSTAND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

7. (C) Karzai raised the issue of civilian casualties, stressing the impact these deaths had on public opinion and support. “Freeing Afghanistan from terrorists is important and building institutions is important, but even more important is making sure Afghan civilians don’t suffer in the pursuit of these terrorists.” He emphasized that these incidents were “pushing our population away from us.” The Afghan people will be your best allies, he asserted, but we have to find a way to solve this. “Afghans will die on the field of battle a thousand times (fighting militants), but civilian casualties they do not understand.”

ELECTIONS: KARZAI PRAISES SENATOR McCAIN’S GRACIOUSNESS

8. (C) Karzai praised Senator McCain for what he called “a marvelous concession speech” and noted that he had called Senator McCain immediately afterward to congratulate him on the speech. Karzai added, “I hope that if (Afghanistan’s) election results go a different way next year, I will have 20 percent of the guts you showed and be able to concede as graciously as you did.”

9. (U) CODEL McCain did not have the opportunity to clear this message.

WOOD

Source: WikiLeaks

Document 3: Hamid Karzai criticises UK military. The Afghan president appears to question the “moral platform” of British troops, saying 4,000 soldiers are not able to improve the security situation in Helmand.

Saturday, 21 February 2009, 04:27

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000376

SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 02/16/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, SNAR, AF, PK, IR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI PREVIEWS STRATEGIC REVIEW IDEAS

FOR USD/P FLOURNOY

1. (C NF) President Karzai on February 15 told Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Flournoy that his government welcomed the opportunity to join in the USG’s strategic policy review. He suggested his team likely would advocate for: 1) greater efforts to target terrorist leaders and sanctuaries in Pakistan; 2) additional work to strengthen Afghan communities to enhance security; and 3) new multilateral talks with individual groups of Taliban who agree to respect the Afghan constitution. On the contentious issue of civilian casualties, Karzai expressed satisfaction with the recent agreement on specific military operations and a willingness to move forward. The President predicted Iran would respond positively to the new US administration’s offers of dialog.

—————–

FOCUS ON PAKISTAN

—————–

2. (C NF) The fight for stability in Afghanistan must be taken to the terrorist planners and their sanctuaries in Pakistan, Karzai said. He noted he had long argued for greater efforts in this direction, including in public remarks in Kabul in 2005. Karzai expressed frustration that the close relationship between the United States and Pakistan had yet to yield a serious campaign against terrorist leaders operating there. Instead, he argued, Afghanistan paid the price of perceived US and Pakistani reluctance to grapple with the problem. Pakistan, of course, had long used Islamic fundamentalism as a policy tool. But “Pakistan is a puzzle to me now,” Karzai admitted. “I see things happening on a massive scale in the northwest that are not the work of ISI,” the Pakistani intelligence service.

3. (C NF) On cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Karzai said, “Zardari is of a different (positive) mindset.” The Pakistani President has yet to move, however, from good intentions to implementation, and is weak. Karzai asked Flournoy whether the US strategic review envisioned more direct bilateral military cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the US or NATO as broker, or whether only greater US-Pakistan military cooperation was under consideration. Flournoy replied that the regional strategic review, while urgent and extremely important to the new US administration, was only just underway.

———————–

RENEW COMMUNITY SUPPORT

———————–

3. (C NF) The President underscored his analysis that the support of communities was key to countering the insurgency. When I first returned to Afghanistan, Karzai mused, I had only 14 American soldiers with me. But we had the Afghan people with us, they believed in the moral correctness of what we were doing, and even Helmand was safe for girls to go to school. Now, 4000 (sic) British soldiers are in Helmand, and the people are not safe. “We must stand on a higher moral platform than the bad guys,” the President said.

4. (C NF) Community empowerment is not about the arming the tribes, Karzai noted. Media speculation about this approach is misleading. We need ordinary people, the elders and the villagers, to trust in the government’s ability to do the right thing, and give them what they need to be able to defend themselves, the President said. In turn, the government must minimize civilian casualties, limit night raids, and make sure women and children are protected during military operations. Increasing the numbers and capabilities of the police and army, and strengthening government institutions, are also important, Karzai added.

———————-

TALK TO AFHGAN TALIBAN

———————-

5. (C NF) Afghanistan and the US together should formally launch a process of peace-making with those Taliban who are not al Qaeda or part of any terrorist network, Karzai proposed. There are groups and individuals who would accept the Afghan constitution, who have “run away” from us because of our own failings, he said. Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and religious leaders have the right resources to make such a process work and should participate. But US partnership with Afghanistan is key to success and has been the missing element in efforts to date.

6. (C NF) If there really was a Taliban movement, Karzai said, I would be greatly worried by US reports that Iran is supporting the Taliban. But I do not think the Taliban is really a movement. It is the result of three decades of past Pakistani policy, plus a lot of poor, desperate kids who lack

KABUL 00000376 002 OF 002

connection to a family or community.

————————-

FRIENDS DESPITE FRICTIONS

————————-

7. (C NF) On several topics, Karzai said, recent frictions in the bilateral relationship represent “annoyances” between “friends.” “We have been hurt by some recent statements,” he said, and also I know my “loud speeches” on civilian casualties hurt your feelings. Still, the two nations have common interests, and the two peoples are friends. Afghanistan is very grateful for the generosity of US aid in reconstruction and development. The agreement on civilian casualties is a “good start” and we can now move forward to implement it and so speak with one voice on this issue. On Iran, Karzai said, Afghanistan cannot be a channel, but we can help you convey the nuances of your demands. Iran is likely to respond positively to US offers of dialog even though it will never give up its nuclear programs. Progress in curbing poppy cultivation this year probably largely reflects market forces such as high wheat prices. Afghans consider poppy “not respectable,” however, and with stability and hope for the future will respond to international efforts to replace its cultivation with alternate livelihoods.

8. (C) Comment: Coming in the immediate aftermath of Special Representative Holbrooke’s visit, this meeting reflected Karzai’s effort to stick by his agreement to re-found the relationship. His calm, constructive comments on civilian casualties contrast sharply to his attitude previously.

9. (U) Undersecretary Flournoy cleared this cable.

WOOD

Source: WikiLeaks

Document 4: Helmand governor criticises UK military strategy. Gulab Mangal tells visiting US president Joe Biden that the British strategy in the province is flawed. He says the UK has failed to build on American achievements. The cable describes the governor as a skilled politician with no desire to embarrass the UK leadership.

Tuesday, 20 January 2009, 10:40

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000140

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD

EO 12958 DECL: 01/15/2019
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, MARR, MASS, AF
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT-ELECT BIDEN AND SENATOR GRAHAM
DISCUSS SECURITY IN HELMAND
REF: A. KABUL 65 B. KABUL 71

Classified By: By Ambassador William Wood for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. Vice President-elect Joseph Biden and Senator Lindsay Graham visited Camp Bastion in Helmand Province January 11 and were briefed by Brigadier General Gordon Messenger, the British Commander of Task Force Helmand, and UK Senior Civilian Advisor Hugh Powell. COMISAF General McKiernan, RC-South Commander Major General Mart De Kruif and British Ambassador Sherard Cowper-Coles also attended. Helmand Governor Mangal also discussed security and U.S. assistance with Biden and Graham. During the UK briefings, Ambassador Wood and U.S. Brigadier General Nicholson met separately with Mangal to hear his concerns and recommendations for next steps. End Summary.

Task Force Helmand Briefing for Biden and Graham

——————————————— —

2. (C) The UK leadership briefing was somber. Senior Civilian Advisor Hugh Powell noted the UK had only 4000 troops in Afghanistan’s largest province, equaling one-third the troop density of RC East. British troops were covering the bulk of the population centers, but Powell noted that, given stretched resources, the British were aiming for “good enough.” (This is a phrase that is being used more often by the UK civilian and military leadership.) BG”>BG Messenger explained that his forces and the Afghan National Army were largely fixed to their Forward Operating Bases and PBs.

3. (C) Powell raised the issue of building governance and Biden broke in to press Powell on what “building governance” meant in practical terms. Powell described governance as having a few key people in the right places. Biden asked for more specifics about what was needed. Powell made a strong pitch for a unified command of the police mentors under CSTC-A. Biden asked where these mentors would come from and Powell suggested that non-troop contributing countries could provide them.

4. (C) Senator Graham asked attendees for a definition of success (in establishing greater security). BG”>BG Messenger defined coverage of more area as a key element of success. COMISAF and RC-S MG de Kruif added that Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) control of Afghanistan’s large cities – even in unstable provinces – is now the norm.

Mangal Presentation to Biden and Graham

—————————————

5. (C) Governor Mangal, accompanied by Afghan National Army (ANA) General Mohaidan and Helmand Police Chief Colonel Shirzad, briefed the visiting officials on his efforts to combat terrorism, corruption and narcotics in Helmand. He welcomed increased support from the U.S., and described significant progress in Helmand, noting eight out 13 districts were now under government control. However, Mangal quickly added there was still much to do to improve security in the province. Even in the eight districts under GIRoA control, the security footprint was far too small; more forces could expand the security zones around the cities to allow communities room to promote commerce and civil engagement. Mangal observed there was still no presence in Baghran and Vashir in northern Helmand or in Kanashin or Dishu in the south.

6. (C) The Governor made clear his view that U.S. forces are urgently needed. New forces should help secure the open border with Pakistan, while the capabilities of the ANSF could be strengthened to support any mission. He praised the work of the ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP) and said that with additional help they would take on more missions. He noted that the October attack against Lashkar Gah was repulsed by the ANSF, well supported by ISAF forces. Coordination between these security forces was excellent and he expressed full confidence the U.S. forces would work well with Helmand’s ANSF leadership.

7. (C) Thanking Mangal for his efforts and praising his hard work, Biden then discussed President-Elect Obama’s desire to establish “a new contract” with Afghanistan, a message Biden had already shared with President Karzai (Ref A). Biden

KABUL 00000140 002 OF 003

stressed the importance of improved governance by the central government and the need for increased capacity in the ANSF; international forces alone could not bring security and prosperity to Afghanistan. The U.S. was prepared to increase assistance and would sustain existing commitments, but the GIRoA needed to actively tackle corruption and support more effective governors and military leaders – like Mangal and Mohaidan.

8. (C) Biden continued, saying the U.S. government was committed to long-term support for Afghanistan. He cautioned, however, that if the Afghan government failed to effectively address key problems, such as poor governance, poppy cultivation, and corruption, it would be difficult to retain the strong U.S. public support necessary to continue large-scale assistance to Afghanistan.

Mangal Calls for Extension of “Garmsir Model”

———————————————

9. (C) While the Helmand Task Force briefed Biden and Graham, Governor Mangal met with the Ambassador and BG”>BG Nicholson. The Ambassador thanked the Governor for his hard work and congratulated him on the large Counter Narcotics Shura he conducted January 4 in Lashkar Gah. Mangal stressed he was fully engaged in improving security, fighting corruption and building the capacity of the Afghan security forces. He was confident incoming U.S. forces would be able to achieve progress in extending security in north and south Helmand.

10. (C) Raising concerns regarding the UK security strategy, Mangal described his disappointment during a recent visit to Sangin. He noted that the bazaar in central Sangin was still outside the security zone; the situation in Kajaki was much the same. “I do not have anything against them (the British) but they must leave their bases and engage with the people.” He said even in Nad Ali the area of control was still too small.

11. (C) The Ambassador asked if the problem in Sangin was rooted in the civilian or military approach. Mangal said he thought both elements were at fault because there was “neither development and nor security” for the town. Mangal explained that the approach of the U.S. Marines in Garmsir was the right model for promoting community security in Helmand. The forces had remained in place for enough time to allow the bazaar, schools and clinics to reopen and then they planned a successful handover to ensure the new security zone could be maintained by the UK and the ANSF. Unfortunately, the UK has not built on the U.S. achievement by expanding the security zone around Garmsir still further.

12. (C) Mangal said he had told the UK team that even if they brought in thousands of additional troops, they would need a new plan and a shift of focus to connect to the people. As in Garmsir, success lay in clearing a large enough area around the town to encompass the bazaar, establishing visible reconstruction and development projects and engaging directly and often with local residents.

13. (C) The Ambassador thanked the Governor for his detailed and frank assessment, agreeing the situation posed a serious challenge. He said the UK was working well with the U.S. and that he was confident the British shared our vision for the region. Now, we must emphasize to them that the bazaar equals the city and the city equals hope – together this represents Afghanistan delivering security and economic development to its people.

Mangal: Promoting Successful Communities and Undermining SMA

——————————————— —————

14. (C) The Governor appreciated the chance to share key concerns with Ambassador and BG”>BG Nicholson. The Governor is a skilled politician and clearly had no intention of embarrassing the UK leadership, but wanted to highlight the Garmsir model as the right formula for Helmand. His focus on Sangin also has a strong political element. If he can successfully move Sangin into a “Garmsir Model,” he knows opposition strongman Sher Muhammad Akhundzada (SMA) will be weakened and some Alizai may move away from his camp. Progress in Sangin would be a preemptive political strike against SMA. This will become more important as poppy eradication kicks off and efforts are launched against narco facilities in the upper Sangin Valley.

KABUL 00000140 003 OF 003

WOOD

Source: WikiLeaks

Document 5: UK ‘not up to task’ of securing Helmand, says US. A cable from American officials in Afghanistan outlines the security situation in the country. The analysis says that the south and east pose the biggest problems, with agreement between the Americans and the Afghans that the British are not capable of securing Helmand.

Tuesday, 09 December 2008, 03:21

S E C R E T KABUL 003176

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA FOR A/S BOUCHER AND PMOON
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR SECRETARY GATES, USDP EDELMAN AND WILKES
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD

EO 12958 DECL: 12/08/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, AFIN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DECEMBER 10-11, 2008 VISIT TO
AFGHANISTAN BY SECDEF ROBERT M. GATES

Classified By: Acting DCM Valerie C. Fowler for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

1. (C) Embassy Kabul warmly welcomes your visit to Afghanistan. The overall state of the security situation here is more nuanced than the negative drumbeat coming from the media. Steady advances in success by Coalition and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) do not grab the headlines that a spectacular suicide attack does. Progress in development in support of a balanced COIN strategy continues below the radar screen. Those achievements, however, are hindered and ultimately threatened by poor performance on the governance front.

——————————————— —–

The Fundamental Challenge of Governance

——————————————— —–

2. (C) Karzai is at the center of the governance challenge. He has failed to overcome his fundamental leadership deficiencies in decisiveness and in confidence to delegate authority to competent subordinates. The result: a cycle of overwork/fatigue/indecision on the part of Karzai, and gridlock and a sense of drift among senior officials on nearly all critical policy decisions.

3. (C) Karzai struggles with striking the correct balance between institutional and traditional (i.e. tribal) governance. In fairness, there are no easy answers. He has given a notional nod to General McKiernan,s proposal to support formal agreements between Afghan authorities and district-level councils. The latter would be responsible for certain governance and security functions in their districts. This proposal is aimed at ensuring freedom of travel along the Ring Road, the lack of which undermines public confidence in the Afghan government and in the international community’s efforts. Some questions remain on how to ensure district security arrangements do not create independent local militias.

4. (SBU) Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) Director Popal has earned and maintains Karzai,s backing to improve sub-national governance. Popal has launched the Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP), to form local councils (separate from McKiernan,s plan) to strengthen ties between sub-national institutional government and the tribes. We will be one of the largest donors to this new and ambitious plan, providing $6 million for ASOP in three provinces.

———

Elections

———

5. (C) Next year,s presidential and provincial council elections will be the defining event for 2009. Election factors already dominate nearly everything political here. Karzai,s popularity has fallen through the floor, but the absence of a credible opponent means it is still Karzai,s election to lose. Public ill ease over personal (not national) insecurity and disgust over unconstrained corruption are Karzai,s greatest vulnerabilities. He installed Hanif Atmar as Interior Minister to turn up the heat on both problems. Atmar is talented and may turn around perceptions, but after seven years of unmet expectations Afghans will be hard to convince.

6. (C) Politicians and the Kabul punditry are fascinated with the political jockeying between Parliament and the Independent Election Commission (IEC) over the election date. In the end, we expect all will agree to the IEC,s proposal for an August vote, based on security and logistical reasons.

7. (C) More problematic is the insecurity in the south and east, which is prompting some ) including Karzai, other Pashtuns and some RC-South partners ) to raise the specter of Pashtun disenfranchisement and the possible illegitimacy of the vote. It is much too early to judge the prospects of failure. We and Karzai agree the British are not up to the task of securing Helmand, but we also think the expected arrival of additional U.S. combat brigades this spring and summer, in tandem with the constant flow of newly-minted Afghan troops to the field will provide an adequately secure environment for the election.

————————–

Taliban reconciliation

————————–

8. (C) Karzai’s senior-level Taliban reconciliation initiative is more about strengthening his political base and his relationship with the Saudis than anything else. “Negotiations” have been much less tangible in reality than is depicted in the press. The public is split: many welcome the promise (whether real or not) of reduced violence and instability via a possible reconciliation with the Taliban, while others (mainly non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear a Karzai backroom deal that could harm their political interests or set back hard-fought human rights advances. We have advised Karzai to negotiate from a position of strength and to restate our shared &red lines.8

———————————–

Karzai and civilian casualties

———————————–

9. (C) Karzai’s recent heated public statements about “bringing down NATO aircraft” and timelines for coalition withdrawal reflect both deep and heartfelt anger, as well as a certain amount of elections grandstanding. Civilian casualties anger him most. General McKiernan has directed substantial changes to coalition tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), but those cannot eliminate the possibility of civilian casualties, especially when the Taliban has clearly adopted “human shield” tactics. ISAF and the Embassy work increasingly more effectively with Afghan counterparts on improved post-incident response (to affected communities and the media), and investigations.

10. (C) Karzai hears of these efforts, but is not mollified. You can address his upset by acknowledging the problem and recognizing such mistakes hurt us all. In the months since the Shindand incident, and specifically as a response to civilian casualties, the Afghans have drafted a technical framework agreement on security measures, as a means to exert greater control over coalition operations. The Ambassador told Spanta that Washington cannot take this up until after the new Administration is in place, a point you should underscore with Karzai.

——————————-

Steps to Improve Security

——————————-

11. (C) The Coalition and Afghan security forces have increased our area of control and taken the fight to the Taliban, with increasing effectiveness. The Taliban response has been a forced shift in tactics from insurgency to terrorism to challenge the will of Afghans and the international community. Taliban acts of violence are highly visible and the immediate effect is that ordinary Afghans do feel less safe with random violence – particularly kidnappings – on the rise, and travel around the country more insecure. Atmar is countering, by looking to accelerate reform of the police. We are supporting him. The Focused District Development (FDD) program to retrain and equip the police is going well and will broaden to include the Border Police. Nonetheless, professionalizing the Afghan National Police (ANP) and reforming the Ministry of Interior are ongoing challenges. We also are working with the IDLG, NDS, and the Ministry of Defense to engage community support for security along the highways.

12. (C) Our greatest success on the security side is the advances in numbers and capabilities in the Afghan army. The army is the most trusted governmental entity, and is currently leading more than 60 percent of joint military operations. The International Community recently agreed to support the expansion of the army force structure to 134,000 (which includes a 12,000-troop trainee, transient, patient “float”). Army expansion will help meet future security requirements and take some of the pressure off of the police to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The principal challenge for both the army and police training program is a shortage of trainers, either from the U.S. or Allied nations. Karzai recognizes and is grateful for the central role of U.S. security assistance in developing the Afghan security forces. He will welcome reaffirmation of our support for eventual Afghan self-sufficiency and independence in the security and law enforcement fields; however, the army will continue to depend for some years on Coalition enablers such as close air support and intelligence assets.

——————————————— ——–

Survey of Security in Afghanistan by Region

——————————————— ———

13. (SBU) RC-East remains focused on a balanced COIN approach synchronizing operations to protect the populace and push the insurgents out while pursuing mutually reinforcing efforts in development and governance assistance; the Embassy, USAID and CJTF-101 are coordinating more closely than ever USG efforts in RC-East. The Commanders, Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding is critical to delivering quick, effective assistance projects, which, in coordination with USAID and local officials, supports both locally identified needs and longer term development goals. In RC-South, the number and lethality of IED attacks is up dramatically; significantly, in some areas the number of IEDs reported by the public to ANSF or ISAF forces is also up, reflecting public support for the Government. The approximately 2300 Marines of the recently departed 24th MEU carried out successful operations in the Garmsir District in Helmand. The insertion of other U.S. forces into the South could have a positive impact on Karzai,s confidence and quiet concerns about whether the presidential election can be safely held.

14. (SBU) RC-West and RC-North remain relatively quiet, although RC-West has become less stable in the past few months. A rash of kidnappings in Herat, combined with a series of insurgent attacks, including at least one that upset public access to basic needs, had resulted in a widespread lack of confidence in local governance. The GIRoA apparently recognized the danger of leaving this key region that borders Iran (and will eventually be linked to Khaf, Iran by rail service) open to growing insurgent movements and the appeal of a parallel source of governance. MoI Minister Atmar has just sacked a number of senior security officials in Herat in response to this popular unrest.

————————-

Afghan-Pak relations

————————-

15. (S) There,s been a sea change in bilateral ties since Musharraf,s exit. Karzai and Zardari have warm relations, which has spread to other parts of the bilateral civilian-side relationship. We also see promising signs of cooperation on the security side ) increased coordination and communication between the respective security forces along certain parts of the border, and a November meeting in Islamabad between NDS Director Saleh and ISI Director General Pasha. The two governments also convened a largely symbolic but positive &mini-jirga8 meeting in October. Continuing – though reduced – infiltration from the FATA and the recent Mumbai attacks have done little, however, to diminish Afghanistan,s ongoing distrust of the Pakistan Army and conviction that ISI is supporting rather than countering terrorism.

16. (U) We very much look forward to your visit.

DELL

Source: WikiLeaks

Document 6: ‘UK military want to leave Sangin because of lack of popular support’. US account of a visit to Sangin by Helmand Governor Mangal in January 2009. Governor is shocked by how little UK forces have achieved, and the poor state of security. US diplomats describe the visit as a serious setback for the British who are divided over policy: the military want to leave and the civilians are waiting for US forces to arrive.

Wednesday, 14 January 2009, 11:52

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 000071

SIPDIS

KABUL FOR USFOR-A COS,
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR WILKES
CG CJTF-101 POLAD

EO 12958 DECL: 01/14/2014
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, KDEM, AF
SUBJECT: FRUSTRATIONS CONTINUE IN SANGIN DISTRICT

Classified By: PRT Director Valerie C. Fowler for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d)

Summary

——–

1. (SBU) The UK PRT/Task Force Helmand (TFH) transported Helmand Governor Mangal, several of his staff and members of the local media to the Sangin District for an extensive outreach program. January 5, 2009. The visit lasted six hours and included visits to the District Center, Sangin School, Sangin Bazaar and the under-construction industrial park. It was the Governor,s second trip to the city in three months. In practical terms the visit was a serious setback for the British PRT,s relationship with Governor Mangal as the lack of visible progress in Sangin is clearly frustrating Mangal.

Governor Mangal’s Frustrations

——————————-

2. (U) The Governor has been pushing the PRT/TFH to expand the secure areas in and around the city but during the visit to Sangin he was only allowed about 200 meters beyond the FOB perimeter and was unable to walk through the bazaar. He had sent his security staff forward to work with the UK Stabilization officer in anticipation of having 500 people attend the event. However, a Taliban threat the previous night affected coordination for the event and only 100 local residents attended the Shura.

3. (SBU) Prior to departing Sangin, the Governor called a meeting with the UK leadership and US PRTOFF and expressed his displeasure with the situation and PRT/TFH efforts in Sangin. He said, “Stop calling it the Sangin District and start calling it the Sangin Base, all you have done here is built a military camp next to the city. I asked you people to do reconstruction and yet the District Governor remains in the FOB and how can you expect a city to recover if the Bazaar is not in the security zone.” Mangal said he would direct the District Governor to establish a compound in the city and he wanted the PRT to deliver reconstruction, schools, clinics, and roads, with the bazaar being the heart of an economic zone, as it is in Garmsir.

4. (SBU) Also present during the day were the ANA commander and District Governor who leveled several charges that UK troops were searching compounds, walking on the roofs of homes and treating the local population badly — including pointing weapons at people and going into areas where women were working. These comments were raised during the Shura and in early meetings the Governor had with the elders. In the public forum of the Shura, Mangal strongly defended the ISAF forces, work and called upon the local community to work with ISAF to defeat the Taliban. In the private meeting these comments from the local leadership inflamed an already tense situation, and caused Mangal to say that PRT coordination must be improved as well as the attitude toward the local population. PRT/TFH noted that there has been progress in many other areas of Helmand, and reminded the Governor that Musa Qala, Garmsir and Nad Ali operations all occurred since the UK had liberated Sangin and there have never been sufficient, ISAF or Afghan forces, to control the whole district.

PRT/TFH Frustrations

——————–

5. (C) Following the visit, the PRT and Task Force leadership convened to review the day’s events. It was clear from the discussion the UK is also frustrated with the situation in Sangin and all had hoped for greater progress by this point. UK leadership seems to be divided into two camps. The first wants to do no more in Sangin and move resources from the area into Gereshk and Garmsir where progress is possible and the population is more supportive; the military seems to favor this route. The second camp (the civilian approach) wants to simply hold what they have and wait for the U.S. to interject troops and funds they think will allow them to re-allocate forces and perhaps expand the Sangin Zone.

Comment

——-

KABUL 00000071 002 OF 002

6. (C) Enemy forces are still within 500-600 meters of the District Center and UK soldiers told DOS PRTOFF that at the edge of the city, “Cowboy Country begins.” Any sizeable reduction in UK forces would almost certainly bring the District Center under regular indirect fire and further destabilize an already tenuous situation. The UK effort in Helmand is already in a “wait and see” mode, wildly speculating when and where U.S. troops will go, obsessed about CERP amounts, and doing nothing to correct the difficult situation already in Sangin.

7. (C) During the visit, Mangal made a strong reconciliation push to the assembled body, saying he was willing to meet with anyone and guarantee their safety if they wanted to discuss reconciliation. The message was clearly directed to the absent Alizai leadership, leaving the next move up to them. The offer was well received by the group and DOS PRTOFF believes that if Mangal can sustain his outreach efforts to Sangin, and deliver more reconstruction and development programs, he has a chance to bring in the fence sitters and undermine some of the Alizai support still reserved for Sher Mohammid Akunzda.

WOOD

Source: WikiLeaks

Document 7: Hamid Karzai threatens a ‘tribal solution’ in Helmand. Karzai threatens to implement a ‘tribal solution’ in Helmand, that will involve replacing the UK favoured governor, Gulab Mangal, with corrupt tribal powerbroker Sher Mohammad Akhundzada. The cable says that Karzai is not just hopeful that Akhundzada can deliver security, but also votes in the presidential election.

Saturday, 22 November 2008, 10:09

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003030

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A
NSC FOR WOOD
OSD FOR MCGRAW
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-101 POLAD

EO 12958 DECL: 11/21/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, EAID, AF
SUBJECT: POLITICAL AND SECURITY SITUATION IN HELMAND:
SPANTA AND SPENZADA VIEWS

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

——-

Summary

——-

1. (C) President Karzai is willing to consider a combined ISAF-ANA (with key roles for the U.S. and UK) security plan to improve stability in Helmand, but is convinced reinstating Sher Mohammad Akhunzada (SMA) as governor is the best way to achieve stability (and bring out votes in next year,s election). There is no known decision or timeline for replacing Governor Mangal with SMA. Spenzada welcomed international collaboration with Mangal to increase aid projects in Alizai areas to bolster Mangal,s tenuous position.

2. (SBU) The subject of Helmand security, Sher Mohammad Akhunzada and the role of PRTs came up in two recent meetings: an 11/18 meeting between FM Spanta and the Ambassador and an 11/17 meeting between Deputy NSA Ibrahim Spenzada and Polcouns.

——————————————— ————

London visit: Karzai challenges UK for a Helmand security plan

——————————————— ————

3. (C) FM Spanta confirmed that Helmand security was the top issue of Karzai,s London discussions. The exchange centered on the best means to bring Taliban-controlled areas under government control (according to the NDS, five of Helmand,s 13 districts are undr Taliban control). The UK and Afghanistan discussed a combined ISAF-ANA approach (with implicit understanding of lead roles for the U.S. and UK) and an Afghan-led solution.

4. (C) Deputy NSA Spenzada put it in starker terms — Karzai told the British that he wanted to see their Helmand security plan. If the UK didn,t have one, he would take a &tribal solution.8 Spenzada confirmed &tribal solution8 meant reinstating Sher Mohammad Akhunzada (SMA) as Helmand governor.

5. (C) UK General Richards told Spanta the UK was prepared to offer to send 2000 additional soldiers to Helmand once Karzai requested it officially. Spanta said the London visit helped reduce misunderstandings, but he expressed disappointment in the British, contending they were not ready to fight as actively as American soldiers.

———————————–

Karzai,s view on SMA and the Alizai

———————————–

6. (C) Spenzada said there was no decision or timeline for reinstating SMA as Helmand Governor. He explained that Karzai sees control of the Alizai as key to improving stability in the province, and he was convinced only SMA could bring control t the Alizai. The Alizai are the majority and hold control in the troubled districts of Kajaki, Musa Qala and Sangin. Karzai believes the Alizai dominate the Barakzai, Poplazai, Ishakzai and other Helmand tribes. In Karzai,s calculation, control of the Alizai translates into control over all the weaker tribes, too.

7. (C) At a 10/31 meeting with the Ambassador, Governor Mangal disputed SMA,s monolithic control of the Alizai. Mangal pointed to his recentsuccess in installing an Alizai ally as chiefof Kajaki district. Despite SMA,s continuingefforts to undermine him, Mangal appeared upbeat about winning more Alizais to his side.

8. (C) Spenzada agreed the Alizai were split ontheir support for SMA, and that the non-Aliza tribes strongly opposed SMA,s return. Spenzada described SMA as ∂ of the problem8 and recognized that unrestcould return if Karzai reinstated him. Spenzda said he and other Karzai advisors have failed to change Karzai,s mind on reinstating SMA.

9. (C) Although unsaid by Spenzada, a key underlying factor i Karzai,s calculation is his belief that SMA can deliver Alizai votes in next year,s election. Karzai,s Helmand vote accounted for six percent of his total support in 2004.

10. (C) Spenzada characterized Governor Mangal as a good official and a good person. He encouraged the United States to continue to work through Mangal to increase aid projects

KABUL 00003030 002 OF 002

in Alizai areas, to bolster Mangal,s political position.

——————————————— –

Musa Qala: Perceptions of unfulfilled promises

——————————————— –

11. (C) Musa Qala District sub-governor Mullah Salam has complained that the international community has failed to deliver on reconstruction pledges to Musa Qala. Spenzada also suggested the United States do better. He suggested we bear in mind the promise/deliver problems from Musa Qala as we examine our plans for assistance to the Alizai.

——————————————— ——-

Karzai comments on PRTs undermining local governance

——————————————— ——-

12. (SBU) On November 16, Karzai stated at a press conference that PRTs were weakening the government by controlling resources, implementing projects and making arrests. Spenzada explained that Karzai believed the local people were going directly to PRTs for resource requests, and undermining the authority of local officials. Polcouns informed Spenzada that PRTs make an extra effort to redirect requests to local authorities, collaborate confidentially on those requests, and then turn to local authorities to inform the public on those decisions. Spenzada promised to pass along this information to Karzai.

WOOD