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Wed, Jan 05, 2011 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4 and Document 5

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (Middle) with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (R) after their meeting in Algiers on September 6, 2008. Rice arrived in Algeria, as part of an official tour in North African states. After the meeting Rice said they had discussed their "great interest in the fight against terrorism and cooperation" in this field. (Photo: sept 2008/Reuters)

WikiLeaks: Algeria New U.S. Ally against al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb

Algeria’s government was badly shaken by al-Qaida bombings three years ago as the terrorist organisation opened a new front in north Africa and the country’s “sclerotic and suspicious” security forces struggled to respond, US diplomatic cables show.

But secret reports from the US embassy in Algiers reveal that intelligence co-operation with the US has since improved so much that Washington considers Algeria the most important country fighting al-Qaida in the Maghreb region.

In December 2007, however, there was an embarrassed silence from President Abdelaziz Bouteflika after near simultaneous suicide bombings of a UN building and the supreme court in the capital killed 41 people.

US embassy cables show disarray, confusion and an inability to handle basic security problems. Bouteflika requested European help “to tap cell phones whose sim cards are changed” while the US had been asked earlier to help in countering car bombs, the documents show.

Many of the embassy’s Algerian contacts attributed the president’s silence after the attacks “to his embarrassment that the suicide bombers were previously known to the security services” and had benefited from an official reconciliation programme for former militants. Some of 250-plus Islamists who had been granted amnesties had joined al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqim).

Document 1: Suicide bombings that killed 41 in Algiers shook the government and raised troubling questions about President Bouteflika and his amnesty programme for Islamist militants. US embassy reports uncertainty over whether security services can prevent new attacks by Bin Laden’s resurgent and tactically adaptive North African wing.

Document 2: American diplomats hear of “profound dismay” at highest level at decision to require Algerian visitors to US to undergo “enhanced screening” after new al-Qaida terror threats. Ambassador forced to stress Washington’s appreciation of Algeria’s counter-terrorism cooperation.

Document 3: As al-Qaida finds new recruits the US steps up security and intelligence collaboration with a suspicious Algerian government. Progress is shown in stopping fighters reaching Iraq. Military cooperation also grows but is hampered by a “sclerotic” system. Algeria refuses to accept even a single detainee back from Guantanamo Bay despite repeated US attempts.

Document 4: US officials are told that Algerian, Mauritanian, Nigerian and Malian chiefs of staff have agreed to set up a regional command for joint counter terrorism operations at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria. Algerians ask for US intelligence and security equipment for Sahel operations.

Document 5: Algeria’s foreign minister “forcefully objected” to “intolerable, inappropriate, and inopportune” US decision on airport security. Thirteen of the 14 countries listed were Muslim, sending a message that was inconsistent with President Obama’s Cairo speech.

Read related article “Algeria goes from security joke to US ally in Maghreb” in the Guardian here.

Source: WikiLeaks

Thursday, 20 December 2007, 10:12

S E C R E T ALGIERS 001809
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/19/2027
TAGS PTER, PINS, ASEC, AG
SUBJECT: AFTER THE LATEST ALGIERS BOMBINGS: THIS WILL BE A
LONG HAUL
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S) SUMMARY: The December 11 bombings in Algiers demonstrate that Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) can adapt its tactics to discredit the Algerian government even if it cannot destabilize the state. Its tactics have evolved and it is more frequently targeting foreigners. AQIM seeks to copy tactics used by Al-Qaida in Iraq and we expect in the future to see AQIM resort to operations such as kidnapping, attacks by women suicide bombers and more suicide vests, for example. The Algerian security forces appeared to enjoy some success dampening AQIM operations in October and November, but there is no sign that they can completely secure the capital. Indeed, they are warning in public and private that they cannot. Their public line is, therefore, that the country must soldier on even with the occasional terrorist atrocity. Behind closed doors, however, the December 11 bombings have opened a debate about whether President Bouteflika’s amnesty program is appropriate or not; some in the security services want to cast it aside and use an iron fist. According to the Portuguese ambassador, who joined his prime minister in a meeting with Bouteflika on December 16, the Algerian president appeared shaken and unsure of how to respond to the bombings. His advisors appear glum, and Bouteflika himself has yet to say anything to the nation in the wake of the bombings. Looking forward, we see a terror organization able to adapt and shift tactics and targets facing a government that easily holds military superiority but is not exactly sure what more it can or should do. None of our contacts think the security services will be able to prevent new attacks. They do not know when those attacks might occur or what form they will take. Thus, the security situation could stay roughly as it is now, or it might deteriorate further; we do not expect it to improve. Our contacts all expect more terror attacks, although none knows when or what form they will take. Al-Qaida tactics in Iraq are probably the best guide. The Embassy has already adopted stricter security measures for staff and dependents and is urging the non-official American community in forums like the OSAC to do the same. In the weeks and months ahead, we will have to reevaluate our posture more frequently in response to the greater AQIM threat. END SUMMARY.

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AQIM IS AN ADAPTIVE ORGANISM

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2. (SBU) AQIM is using a variety of tactics to keep the Algerian government guessing and that are slowly raising concerns among the foreign community and the broader public in Algiers. The following list shows the evolution of AQIM tactics:

— Summer 2006: ambushes with roadside bombs and gunfire against Algerian army patrols in the mountains east of Algiers;

— October 2006: first car bombs in years in the Algiers region, hitting two police stations;

— December 2006: first attack on foreigners in years, using a roadside bomb to hit a U.S.-Algerian company bus in Algiers suburb, killing two (no Amcits);

— February 2007: multiple, coordinated, powerful car bombs in towns scattered in the mountains outside Algiers;

— March 2007: another roadside bomb against a bus full of foreigners, this time a Russian company bus west of Algiers;

— April 2007: suicide van and truck bombs simultaneously hit Prime Minister’s offices in downtown Algiers and destroy a police station east of the city center near the airport; there were two suicide vehicles against the police station in a tactic very similar to that seen in Iraq;

— July 2007: suicide truck bomb hits Algerian army base at Lakhdaria, east of Algiers, killing dozens of soldiers;

— September 2007: another suicide truck bomb, this one driven by a 15 year old, hits Algerian coast guard base at Dellys, east of Algiers, again killing dozens; — September 2007: first suicide vest attack, this one directly targeting President Bouteflika in Batna, 200 miles east of Algiers;

— September 2007: drive-by suicide car bomb attack on a French/Italian company convoy in the mountains east of Algiers

— September 2007: suspected planning of a kidnapping of two French nationals working at the Algiers airport leads to the sudden departure of the two men;

— December 2007: roadside bomb attack again targets a Russian company bus west of Algiers;

— December 2007: simultaneous suicide truck bombs destroy UN offices and damage Supreme Court building in central Algiers; one of the truck drivers was 64 years old, something heretofore unseen here.

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EXPECT MORE ATTACK METHOD VARIATION A LA IRAQ

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3. (S) The Al-Qaida in Iraq network, which already has ties to jihadi groups in Algeria, has strong influence on AQIM elements. The suicide bomber in July 2007 was nicknamed “Abu Musaab” because he was so enamored with Zarqawi in Iraq. The AQIM videos strongly resemble videos from Iraq in terms of the music, Quranic citations and filming of hits on enemy targets they show. They strongly pitch the alleged American wrongdoings in Iraq and Palestine to recruit men to join AQIM. AQIM is also copying tactics we have seen in Iraq, including use of suicide vehicle bombs and vests. (Comment: Notably, during the 1990s violence in Algeria, there was only one suicide attack. We have now seen nine since April 2007. End Comment.) Water Resources Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, who previously held top jobs in the Interior Ministry, warned Ambassador on December 16 that it would be easy to imagine AQIM resorting to SVBIEDs driven by women or women attacking a target wearing a suicide bomb vest. Security officers at other embassies have pointed to the use of kidnappings in Iraq and worry that AQIM could actively start such a campaign in Algeria. Historically, AQIM has paused between vehicle bomb attacks, although we do not know if that is due to resource constraints or tactical decisions. History suggests we may have a pause lasting as long as months before the next car bomb attack, although it could be much sooner. In any case, our intelligence is incomplete and we may not see the next attack, in whatever form it takes, coming.

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IRAQ AND PALESTINE HELP RECRUITMENT

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4. (C) A prominent conservative Islamist political leader, Abdallah Djaballah, told the Ambassador on December 17 that the suicide attacks demonstrated the influence of the Iraqi jihadis whose appeal to religious sensitivities finds a ready audience here. In addition, he noted, Islamist extremists released under the government’s amnesty program are hugely frustrated because they can find no jobs and lack any means to support themselves. They are easy to recruit, he claimed. AQIM’s choice to put a video of Ayman Zawahari ranting about Palestine last week is likely to further boost recruitment. The website has had over 35,000 hits in a week. Djaballah warned that many young Algerians react strongly to any suggestion that foreign forces are attacking Islam itself, and Palestine, along with Iraq, is the perfect symbol. Jaghloul Abdelghafar, a counselor at the Presidency working on extremism issues, echoed the point about Algeria suffering because of Palestine and Iraq to the Ambassador December 18. He stated that there is a “hard-core five percent” that will always plague Algeria. Political scientist Lyes Boukraa, who has written two books about the terrorism phenomenon in Algeria, told DCM December 18 that he thought the terror groups have more potential recruits than they need.

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ALGERIAN SECURITY FORCES: FRUSTRATED

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5. (S) The Algerian government is trying to figure out how best to contain and eliminate the extremist problem.

Algerian military forces conducted major sweeping operations in the troublesome mountains east of Algiers as well as along the eastern border region near Tebessa in November. They also continued to try wrapping up AQIM support networks and, until the December 11 bombings, they appeared to be having some successes. The number of security force casualties reported in the press dropped steadily in October and November 2007 from the spike seen in September 2007 due to the AQIM suicide attack in Dellys. In contrast to 1994-1996, the Algerian army and gendarmerie can deploy to any location in the country and immediately establish control. AQIM in its December 12 communique felt obliged to tell the government very directly that it had not disappeared.

6. (C) The government now is warning the public that it cannot completely contain the terrorist threat. Interior Minister Zerhouni told the press after the December 11 bombings that there was no such thing as perfect security posture since bomb attacks were so easy. Other terror attacks are possible even though the terror groups are weakening, Zerhouni told the press December 12. He also commented that the security forces had relaxed somewhat after their successful security measures for the November 29 local elections, and the suicide bombers had exploited that opening. Head of the Defense Ministry’s External Relations Director General Sefendji told DATT on December 17 that the Algerian military had enjoyed successes in combined air-ground operations against terrorist groups in mountainous areas, but they could not stop suicide attacks in Algiers. National police chief (DGSN director) Ali Tounsi told the press on December 15 that the security services had put in place special measures to protect the Constitutional Council in view of the threat information the GOA had. However, he commented, there was no way to protect against such an “exceptional” attack. Tounsi pledged that the GOA would stand up new, stronger security measures in Algiers in the wake of the December 11 bombings. Pressed by Ambassador for details about the measures on December 18, Tounsi would only say that police reinforcements would surge into the capital in the coming days. He declined to give more details but said he would consider the Ambassador’s strong suggestion that the DGSN brief the key ambassadors about the new security plan. (Comment: Tounsi appeared not entirely on top of the brief and probably couldn’t have provided many details even if he had wanted to. The Interior Ministry is avoiding repeated requests from embassies for information on Interior Ministry plans and operations. End Comment.)

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HARD LINE OR SOFT TOUCH ?

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7. (S) Water Resources Minister Sellal, who is often rumored to be on a short list to be the next prime minister, told Ambassador December 16 that the GOA ought to strike much harder against the terrorists than it is doing. He was entirely in favor of the iron fist, he stated flatly. However, he noted, current political reality (“la conjuncture politique”) does not allow for such a tough policy. Indeed, Prime Minister Belkhadem had reiterated on December 12 that Bouteflika’s signature national reconciliation program would continue. Ahmed Fattani, publisher of L’Expression newspaper who has good contacts in the security services, told Ambassador December 17 that many in the security forces want to launch a broad campaign of arrests. For this reason, he said, they leaked to him information that some 250 of the Islamist extremists previously released under President Bouteflika’s amnesty program had rejoined the AQIM fight against the government. Fattani claimed that some in the security services said the number was even higher, but L’Expression used the 250 number so as not to anger Bouteflika further.

8. (S) Bouteflika himself has made no public remarks in the wake of the December 11 bombings. The Portuguese ambassador, who accompanied his prime minister in a meeting with Bouteflika on December 16, told the Ambassador on December 18 that Bouteflika appeared very distressed by the Algiers bombings and unsure of what to do. According to the Portuguese, Bouteflika urged Portuguese Prime Minister Socrates to convince European states to help the Algerian security services. Bouteflika reportedly asked for advice on how to secure fixed sites and sought help from the Europeans to tap cell phones whose SIM cards are changed. One of Bouteflika’s aides, Rachid Aissat, who was the Algerian DATT in Damascus and Moscow in the 1960s, earnestly asked the Ambassador on December 16 for help in countering car bombs. The GOA, he conceded, had no good sense of how to respond. (Comment: Many of our contacts interpret Bouteflika’s silence since December 11 to his embarrassment that both suicide bombers were previously known to the security services and had benefited from the provisions of the national reconciliation program. End Comment.)

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COMMENT

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9. (S) AQIM is very far from being able to bring down the Algerian government but it can certainly make it look weak and foolish. From a narrow security perspective, the December 11 attacks represent not so much the result of diminished Algerian security capabilities as a successful change in AQIM targeting to hit the UN and the Constitutional Council. Security and military contacts have been asking us for a technological fix for the car bomb threat for months. They do not seem to fully appreciate the fact that they are now fight an al-Qaida group, and not just the old Algerian terrorist group GSPC of the late 1990s. AQIM subscribes to international jihadist goals as well as attacking the Algerian government. The more success the GOA has killing the senior terrorist leaders from the GSPC, the more quickly the newer amirs recruited under the al-Qaida banner will rise to the forefront.

10. (S) Looking forward, we can imagine that the security situation could stay roughly as it is now or deteriorate; we do not expect it to improve. None of our contacts think the security services will be able to prevent more terrorist attacks. They do not know when those attacks might occur or what form they will take. AQIZ tactics in Iraq are probably the best guide. Meanwhile, the GOA is slow at best to share information with us. As a result, the Embassy has taken stricter security measures for staff and dependents, and upgraded security of our chancellery and main staff residence. We are telling the non-official community in forums like the OSAC to do the same. In the weeks and months ahead, we will need to reevaluate our posture more frequently in response to the greater AQIM threat. FORD

Source: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 06 January 2010, 17:38

S E C R E T ALGIERS 000020
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, MOPS, PINR, AG, US
SUBJECT: ALGERIA STRONGLY PROTESTS TSA LISTING
REF: ALGIERS 15 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

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1. (S/NF) MFA Americas Director General Sabri Boukadoum expressed to the Ambassador January 6 the GOA’s “profound dismay” regarding Algeria’s inclusion on the TSA list for enhanced screening. He said this message came directly from President Bouteflika. The TSA decision, Boukadoum stressed, did not accurately reflect the level and quality of our bilateral relations, especially in regard to counterterrorism cooperation. Algeria’s placement on the list had created the impression that Algeria was part of the problem, a misunderstanding that is now circulating in the international press. Boukadoum told the Ambassador that Algeria’s leadership would like an official U.S. statement to correct this impression. Ambassador replied that the intent of the new measures was to ensure air travel safety and not to discriminate or embarrass our friends and partners. Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. valued its counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria and hoped the bilateral relationship would continue to grow and develop. END SUMMARY.

GOA Not Pleased, Seeks Removal from List

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2. (C) MFA Americas Director General Sabri Boukadoum called the Ambassador to the MFA on January 6 to deliver instructions expressing the “profound dismay” of Algeria’s highest authorities at Algeria’s inclusion in the TSA list of countries subject to new air passenger screening measures. MFA Director for the Protection of Algerian Citizens Overseas Hocine Sahraoui, a representative of the presidency, Houria Khiari, and U.S. desk officer Abdulmutalib Bouacha also attended. Boukadoum stressed several times at the outset of the meeting that his demarche instructions came directly from the “highest authority” — i.e., President Bouteflika.

3. (C) Boukadoum told the Ambassador that he had been asked to convey two main points. The first concerned Algeria’s inclusion on the TSA list. Algeria respected and understood the U.S. need to secure the safety of its citizens and interests. But Algeria’s inclusion on this list did not accurately reflect either the level or the quality of our bilateral relations, and especially the nature of those relations with regard to the fight against terrorism. The placement of Algeria on a list that includes state sponsors of terrorism and countries of interest creates the impression that Algeria is part of the problem and less than a full partner in the fight against terrorism.

GOA Seeks U.S. Statement on Algeria as Key CT Partner

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4. (C) The second point, he said, besides the GOA’s desire to be removed from the list, was that the country’s leadership hoped to see an official U.S. statement that would underscore Algeria’s important counterterrorism partnership with the U.S. — in order to help correct the erroneous image of Algeria that had been created by coverage of the TSA story in the international media and on the Internet. “We are partners,” he said. “The highest levels did not appreciate this.”

5. (C) Boukadoum said Algeria’s Ambassador to the U.S. Abdullah Baali would deliver the same message in Washington. Baali also had instructions to see Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano.

U.S. Focus is on Air Travel Safety

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6. (C) The Ambassador said GOA views would be reported fully and immediately to Washington. He told Boukadoum that President Obama had addressed the issue squarely in a statement the previous day. The problem was that on Christmas Day a terrorist had gotten through. This had been a systemic failure, and as a result the President had ordered two reviews — one of our watch list system, and another of aviation screening procedures. The intent of the new measures was not to discriminate against or embarrass any persons, groups, or countries, and most especially not our friends and partners. The intent was to do the necessary to ensure air travel safety, for everyone. President Obama had thus made clear on January 5 that he had personally ordered, and approved, the new measures. And he had promised that more steps could be on the way in coming days, whether with regard to information integration or passenger screening.

U.S. Values Counterterrorism Cooperation with Algeria

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7. (C) At the same time, the Ambassador continued, the President also had made clear that an important part of our approach would be to deepen cooperation with our international partners. This was where Algeria, and US-Algerian cooperation, came in. The Ambassador noted that we have worked together to improve both the quality and level of our bilateral exchanges in recent years, and he hoped that trend would continue. It was unnecessary to say how much the United States valued its counterterrorism cooperation with Algeria, as well as our overall relationship with Algeria. We hoped to continue to develop and build on the progress that has been made.

8. (C) Boukadoum reiterated that Algeria’s disagreement was not with the measures themselves. Rather Algeria protested its inclusion on TSA’s list because it gives the impression that Algeria is not cooperating. “We are cooperating on counterterrorism, and we will continue to do so,” he stated. Meanwhile, Boukadoum asserted that other countries with nationals who have committed terrorist acts have not been placed on the list. Boukadoum argued that to suggest that Algeria is part of the problem is simply unfair. He regretted that international press coverage of the TSA screening measures had cast Algeria in this light and not as country that is a victim of terrorism.

Comment

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9. (S/NF) A key line in this demarche was the point that Algeria’s inclusion on the TSA list “does not reflect the level and quality of our relations, or the nature of our relations in the fight against terrorism”. With this, the GOA implicitly brought the quality of the entire relationship into play. What grates is that, instead of being seen as a nation that has suffered from terrorism and as an active leader in combating it, they feel instead cast as part of the problem and associated with state sponsors. This sense of damage to Algeria’s international reputation, and especially by the way the story has pinged around in the press and on the Internet, is what undoubtedly fueled President Bouteflika’s “profound dismay”. That said, it is encouraging that Algeria carefully separated the meeting yesterday — to inform us of their approval of EP-3 overflights by Africa Command against AQIM in the Sahel — and the meeting today on the TSA issue. This suggests they are trying to separate issues and limit damage. But domestic and regional public opinion does count, so the leadership will want to redress somehow what they perceive as a blow to their national dignity and international prestige. Hence the request that a senior U.S. official make a statement that will help turn around the negative image in the international media.

10. (S/NF) It is worth remembering that no country is more important than Algeria in the fight against al-Qa’ida in the Sahel and Maghreb. So it is probably worth looking for a good chance to make that point publicly, and at as high a level as possible. If we do not, it is doubtful that we would see any dramatic gestures or sudden moves by Algeria. On the contrary, counterterrorism cooperation would probably continue, to the extent it is in the interest of both sides. It would more likely be a matter of what we don’t see – mil-mil relations frozen instead of advancing, efforts to expand law enforcement cooperation slowed, large commercial contracts going to non-U.S. bidders, reduced Embassy access to senior officials, and generally less receptivity to coordination on regional issues and in multilateral fora. PEARCE

Source: WikiLeaks

Friday, 22 February 2008, 11:28

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000198
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY –CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NEA FOR K.HARRINGTON AND M.POPAL
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2023
TAGS PREL, PGOV, AG
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR A/S WELCH VISIT TO ALGERIA
REF: A. ALGIERS 111 B. ALGIERS 110 AND ALGIERS 140 C. 07 ALGIERS 1806 D. 07 ALGIERS 1807 AND 08 ALGIERS 0075 E. ALGIERS 141
Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) We and the Algerians are looking forward to your visit next week. There was a prominent article about your visit, generated with help from our PAO, in best-selling el-Khabar newspaper on February 21. You will be visiting just as the government machine is gearing up to amend the Algerian constitution to enable President Bouteflika to run for a third term in 2009. There is no strong, influential voice criticizing this effort; only small parties and a few notable individuals have spoken against the building momentum (ref A). The only issue that appears unresolved inside the top civilian and military leadership is whether or not there should be a change to the constitution that establishes a vice president as well. This vice president would be the obvious successor to Bouteflika, especially if his health prevents him from serving out a third term that would expire in 2014. We are arranging for you to meet with former Prime Minister Ouyahia, the man most frequently thought to be tapped for vice president.

AN UNHAPPY COUNTRY

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2. (C) There is much discussion among political circles about the constitution, the third term and the succession issue, but precious little discussion about how to address long-standing political alienation and social discontent throughout the country. Housing is woefully short, while unemployment and underemployment are endemic (at least 50 percent among young people). In a relatively new phenomenon, many young people are trying to flee the country, by small boat if necessary. The average age at which Algerians marry is now into the mid 30s – a vivid indicator of how unhappy the twenty-somethings are. Meanwhile, most world food price hikes are being passed to consumers, resulting in strikes by different labor groups almost weekly (see ref B for example. Notably, while you are here we expect school teachers nationwide to strike; on the positive side, school closures may ease traffic during your visit, inshallah.) Almost daily there are isolated demonstrations with the occasional government office in some distant town attacked. Meanwhile, voter turnout for the 2007 legislative and local elections was lower than ever before because Algeria’s young people do not see the political system as having any relevance to addressing their problems. This is not the quaking state of the early 1990s. The government is firmly entrenched. However, much of political and social elite sense that Algeria is drifting (see also ref C).

THE VISION THING

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3. (C) These political, economic and social problems notwithstanding, Algeria is richer than ever. The oil and gas sector is running up record export revenues – USD 70 billion likely in 2007, while imports will only be about USD 45 billion, according to the IMF. As a result, the GoA is piling up record foreign exchange reserves, now around USD 110 billion. The public knows about the riches and the GoA’s inability to relieve problems like housing and unemployment hits at the GoA’s credibility. Bouteflika and his team have only one approach to energize the economy: spend tens of billions of dollars on infrastructure as well as some grandiose projects to generate jobs and also create a Bouteflika legacy. The construction industry is growing but not as fast as in other oil-boom states. Red tape, burdensome regulations and centralization slow project implementation and impede new private investment. The GoA seems incapable of addressing these systemic problems. This inability stems from a lack of vision at the top. Bouteflika and his team have yet to make a choice on whether Algeria will be a market-driven economy where Algerians must integrate into the world economy or an economy whose government still provides the old social contract of the 1960s and 1970s. We have small technical assistance projects to help the GoA reform its financial and education sectors, but bureaucratic ineptitude and a lack of Algerian urgency slow progress. We therefore extract small, new reforms where we can get them. (Treasury DAS McDonald will be here at the same time as you to look at Treasury-funded assistance

ALGIERS 00000198 002 OF 004

programming.)

TERRORISM PROBLEM NOT A THREAT TO STABILITY

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4. (S/NF) The social discontent enables al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to find a steady supply of recruits but not enough to threaten stability. There are terror-related attacks almost daily now, usually in the mountains east of Algiers. (There are occasional attacks in southern and western Algeria now too.) AQIM and other Islamist extremists usually hit Algerian security forces, but there are regular threats against Western interests, especially French and American. The terrorists’ tactics have not much changed except in one important manner: nine suicide car bomb attacks since April 2007. AQIM can’t threaten the government’s stability but it has hurt the credibility of Bouteflika’s national amnesty program; it likely weakened him in internal debates with the Algerian hard-liners inside the security force leadership. It has hurt the credibility of the Algerian security forces among the Algerian public and the Western community here. In particular, the December 2007 attack that destroyed the UN headquarters here deeply embarrassed the Algerian government. When the UN said it would conduct its own investigation into the security shortcomings before the attack, the hypersensitive Algerian authorities reacted vehemently and forced the UN to back down. Watching this brittle response, Western companies and embassies now are jittery. Many say that they are watching us for signals on when to send out expatriates. Algiers has seen no incidents since December 11 but there are constant threat reports in sensitive channels.

COUNTER-TERROR COOPERATION VERY GOOD

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5. (S/NF) As the AQIM threat has ratcheted up, we have increased our collaboration with Algerian military intelligence. They are prickly, paranoid group to work with, but with them we have rolled up several networks that sent Algerian jihadis to Iraq. According to information from an al-Qaida in Iraq cell, 64 Algerian fighters reached Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. Thus, our collective work is not perfect, but the number of Algerians fighting in Iraq likely would have been far higher were we not working closely together. We have also helped the GoA roll up AQIM networks that were planning attacks inside Algeria. Notably, the Algerian authorities do not like to discuss our cooperation against AQIM publicly. Instead, they limit themselves to saying that they cooperate with the U.S. and other nations against international terror networks. We have a new FBI office at the embassy that we hope will establish collaborative programs with the Interior Ministry, but the Algerians are not rushing to cooperate.

MILITARY TO MILITARY: WE MUST BE PATIENT

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6. (S/NF) While the Algerians are not rushing to expand our mil-mil relationship. it is slowly growing. For the first time in early 2007 the Algerians themselves proposed some joint activities, and we undertook training exercises here involving the navy and air force. AFRICOM has offered much more, but the Algerians purposely keep a foot on the brake. They want to avoid dependence in their military relations, so they spread out activities among foreign partners. They have limited administrative capacity, and the officers who work on bilateral activities with France or Germany or Russia are the same ones who work with us. They are not good at multi-tasking. Part of the Algerian caution also results from bureaucratic gamesmanship and paranoia. In contrast to programming with some other countries, Algerian military intelligence clears all our bilateral military activities. (They likely seek to enhance their own position within the Algerian power structure by controlling the security relationship with the U.S.) In addition, GoA security personnel are exceptionally careful in their contacts with foreigners due to their CI concerns. Probably because Algerian military intelligence was not ready, the Algerians lost their chance to have a high-level bilateral military committee meeting at the Pentagon in April 2008 that would have drawn up plans for expanded activities into 2009. Their failure to reserve the April dates probably will push that meeting into the autumn or even to the next administration. We warned them clearly but their own system was too sclerotic to respond.

ALGIERS 00000198 003 OF 004

REGIONAL POLICIES: FAR APART FROM US

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7. (C) Bouteflika is very much his own foreign minister and his thinking about regional politics has evolved little from the 1970s. He loyally attends all the NAM and African Union summits, and he places huge weight on the United Nations, liberation ideology and negotiation over use of force (especially Western armed forces). The Algerians are surprisingly ill informed when events are moving in the region; they also lack a good grounding in underlying trends in areas like the Middle East. Arab satellite TV seems to be a big source of their information. Hence, you will find that the Algerians take nettlesome positions on the regional questions of import to us:

— Peace Process: They line up behind the Arab League consensus, arguing in private that it is hopeless to try to exclude Syria and Hamas from the efforts to reach a settlement (ref D). They appreciate our pledge to work for a viable Palestinian state and to achieve short-term, concrete improvements for the Palestinians. So far, we have seen little enthusiasm in response to our demarches for more aid to the Palestinian Authority, but they likely would respond to a strong request from the Arab League. The Algerian public, particularly the Islamists, is now less preoccupied with violence in Algeria and vehemently anti-Israeli. The GoA, therefore, is unlikely to make any unilateral gestures to Israel.

— Lebanon: The Algerians back Arab League efforts and hope for consensus to develop among the Lebanese factions. Their senior MFA official working Middle East issues has repeatedly cautioned us against trying to isolate Syria on Lebanese issues (ref E). Underlining how our efforts complement Arab League efforts will make the most headway with the Algerians.

— Iraq: President Bouteflika told Senator Nelson last summer that the U.S. should not withdraw too quickly from Iraq lest security deteriorate further. The MFA and Algerian military intelligence have made the same point to us more recently, although publicly the GoA says little. There is an Iraqi embassy in Algiers, but relations with the Iraqi Government are cool. The Algerians have no intention of reopening an embassy in Baghdad. In part, they are still angry about the murder of two of their diplomats in Baghdad in 2005. Despite their repeated inquiries, they have received no information on who was responsible. In addition, public and government distrust of the Iraqi Shia makes the GoA unwilling to take any risks on Iraq policy. Their military intelligence likely would work discretely with Iraqi intelligence to disrupt al-Qaida activities, but we doubt Algerian officers would actually go to Iraq.

— Iran: Algerian officials remember Iranian support for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and are suspicious of Iran’s regional intent. President Bouteflika in private has told the Iranian President to cooperate with the UN on the nuclear issue. The GoA is also adamant that we should continue on the diplomatic track and recognize even small Iranian steps when we see them; they were reluctant to endorse more pressure on Iran during Ambassador Schulte’s visit here in late November. The Algerian leadership has a bit of sympathy for Hizballah and Hamas as liberation fighters, but their heads tell them to be wary. Thus, you will hear understanding from them when we warn them of the dangers of these terror groups, but the Algerians will immediately insist that Israel and the U.S. have to resolve the Palestinian and Lebanese problems. Underlining how Hizballah and Hamas threaten the very progress on the Lebanese and Palestinian issues that the GoA wants will be the most effective arguments.

— Western Sahara: This is the issue that the GoA cares the most about and you will likely receive an earful. The GoA still lingers over the hope that the Baker Plan will come back despite our telling them repeatedly that it is finished. The top Algerian leadership stress that they view a Saharan referendum on independence as a matter of national liberation as a matter of principle. They don’t want to destabilize Morocco, and they doubt the Western Sahara is so important to the throne’s hold on power. They do not want to start armed hostilities, although we are less sure they would – or could – stop every possible Polisario provocation. The Algerians likely will try to wait for the end of this American administration hoping that the next one will be less supportive of the Moroccan autonomy proposal. Explaining the

ALGIERS 00000198 004 OF 004

exhaustion of broad American patience with the long-standing dispute will be the best way of shaking loose the Algerian fixation on Baker.

AND THE GUANTANAMO PROBLEM

————————–

8. (S) For the past two years we have sought GoA approval for the repatriation of some of the two dozen Algerians held at the facility. During the April 2007 visit of S/WCI Williamson we all agreed on principles to govern the return of Algerians, but since then the GoA has refused to agree to accept even a single detainee back despite our repeated attempts. We think that President Bouteflika and military intelligence chief LTG Medienne agree that it would be harmful to Algeria to take any detainees back, and that consensus at the very top makes any movement by lower officials impossible. The GoA has told us we can send detainees back to the countries where we detained them, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is a non-starter. We need you to explain firmly that the Guantanamo detainee issue will not go away and probably will become more important in the next year as we move closer to shutting down the detention center at Guantanamo.

FORD

Source: WikiLeaks

Sunday, 25 October 2009, 09:28

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000948
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 10/20/2029
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, MCAP, MOPS, SNAR, AG, ML, MR, NG,
UV, US
SUBJECT: ALGERIA SAYS BAMAKO SUMMIT KEY TO REGIONAL
CAMPAIGN AGAINST AQIM
ALGIERS 00000948 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador David D Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Algerian Minister Delegate for Defense Guenaizia told visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Ambassador Vicki Huddleston October 19 that the Algerian, Mauritanian, Nigerien and Malian chiefs of staff had agreed to set up a regional command for joint counter terrorism operations at Tamanrasset in southern Algeria. He indicated the command could eventually be expanded to include Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad. For its part, Algeria was determined that terrorists not be allowed to set up logistics, training and supply bases along its frontiers, i.e., in neighboring countries, with the intent of delivering weapons and explosives to Algeria. Algeria has taken the lead in sensitizing its southern neighbors to the nature of the threat and the need for combined action. Huddleston asked how the U.S. and others could support this effort. Guenaizia replied that intelligence-sharing was fundamental. So was provision of certain technical means, like IED jammers. A delegation from Northrop Grumman was coming to Algeria this week to discuss the capabilities of a Boeing 737 aircraft with a modified AWACS array. But the U.S. could perhaps assist most before the impending Bamako summit by helping secure the requisite top-level political will among Sahel countries that would make the summit a success and facilitate effective military cooperation. Here, he contended, the biggest problem was the Malian political leadership. The U.S. could help by talking to Mali and others with influence in Mali to ensure the necessary level of political will was there. Huddleston said she expected the U.S. would indeed be engaging Mali and its neighbors to help make the summit a success. Guenaizia welcomed the expected visit of General Ward of Africa Command in late November. END SUMMARY.

U.S. RECOGNIZES ALGERIA’S LEADING ROLE

————————————–

2. (C/NF) Visiting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) Ambassador Vicki Huddleston met October 19 with Algerian Minister Delegate for Defense Abdelmalik Guenaizia and other senior generals, including Defense Ministry (MND) SG Major General Ahmed Senhadji, MND Director of External Relations and Cooperation General Mekri, MND Director of the Directorate of Documentation and External Security (DDSE) Major General Lallali and Colonel Mohamed Benmousset, Project Manager for Major General Senhadji. She told Guenaizia that the United States recognized Algeria’s leadership in Africa, including Algeria’s history of support to Africa’s independence movements, promotion of economic and social development, and on security matters. Huddleston acknowledged Algeria’s own experience in combating terrorism and underscored USG appreciation for Algeria’s lead on efforts to secure the Sahel region and prevent terrorism from taking root in neighboring countries. She recalled her cooperation with Algeria when she was ambassador in Mali to confront the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), forerunner of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), after the GSPC captured European tourists and brought them to northern Mali from Algeria in 2003. Algeria’s commitment to combat GSPC in the region was clear, she said, and its engagement with Mali was impressive. The U.S. played its part through training to increase Mali’s military planning capacity. In the end, Huddleston concluded, we were successful. GSPC fled Mali to Niger and then to Chad, where GSPC leader “al-Para” was captured and returned to Algeria. Huddleston noted the regional military chiefs of staff meeting held in Tamanrasset in July and the planned regional heads of state summit in Bamako demonstrated that Algeria understood once more the importance of a coordinated regional response to combat terrorism in the Sahel. The U.S. recognized Algeria’s commitment to working with the countries of the region, she stressed, and Algeria’s leading role in that effort. She explained the goal of her visit was to learn how the U.S. can support Algeria’s effort.

3. (C) Guenaizia thanked Huddleston for focusing her discussion on counterterrorism. Terrorism, he emphasized, was not a local phenomenon in the region. It was brought from outside with all its horrors, he said, and it is a phenomenon the people of the region reject. When the threat

ALGIERS 00000948 002.2 OF 004

first emerged in Algeria, the international community misunderstood the scope of the problem and left Algeria alone to fight in the 1990s. Algeria faced an international embargo in its time of need, he said. Despite this embargo and the challenge of protecting an area of 2.3 million square kilometers and a population of 34 million, he said, Algeria became self-reliant and prevailed with the overwhelming support of the Algerian people the security services and the army.

MUST MAINTAIN PRESSURE

———————-

4. (C/NF) Guenaizia said today the situation had improved considerably, but terrorism remains a serious threat, and Algeria will maintain the same level of pressure and dedication to its counterterrorism efforts. He stressed, however, that terrorism was not only a threat to Algeria, it threatened the entire region and beyond. AQIM, he argued, wants to embed itself in the region and, therefore, Algeria intended to take the fight beyond Algeria’s borders. Like a skilled boxer, he said, the key is to keep pressure on your opponent and increase your room for maneuver. Guenaizia made it clear that Algeria will not tolerate a situation in which AQIM or other armed groups are able to establish camps for logistics and training along Algeria’s frontier in neighboring countries with the intent of facilitating the entry of trained insurgents, weapons and explosives into Algeria.

5. (C/NF) Guenaizia said the situation in northern Mali presented the greatest obstacle to combating terrorism. The nexus of arms, drug and contraband smuggling in northern Mali created an enabling environment, Guenaizia argued, and provided a source of logistical and financial support. Guenaizia added that terrorists will use any means available to finance their activities, including corruption and hostage-taking. Thus, he underlined, fighting terrorism requires “implacable” political will to neutralize all avenues of support terrorists can exploit. Guenaizia asserted that increased drug trafficking represented a critical problem in this regard. Thousands of tons of drugs now cross through the region, he said. Based on clashes with Algerian security forces, Guenaizia assessed that those involved in drug trafficking were well organized and had military training. Guenaizia said that Morocco was a major smuggling route for cannabis and hashish and was not doing enough to interdict traffickers. Huddleston told Guenaizia the U.S. was equally concerned with drug trafficking in northwest Africa, particularly Colombian drugs transiting west Africa and the Sahel en route to Europe. The drug trade added another source of finance for terrorists, and its destabilizing effect on local populations could expand the geographic scope of terrorist recruitment efforts, she said, citing the example of the Boko Haram in Nigeria.

6. (C) Guenaizia cautioned that the terrorist network in the Sahel is a sophisticated organization. “These are not simple warlords we are facing,” he emphasized. They use the best explosives, have honed their bomb-making expertise and use sophisticated means to deploy explosives against their targets, Guenaizia underscored. He added that information to build highly sophisticated IEDs is easily obtainable from the Internet. No country is safe, he went on; “We need to remain vigilant.”

TAMANRASSET REGIONAL COMMAND

—————————-

7. (C/NF) Guenaizia noted that regional chiefs of staff met in the southern Algerian city of Tamanrasset in July to create a mechanism to allow militaries in the region to coordinate efforts against terrorist threats while at the same time respecting each country’s sovereignty. Military leaders of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, he said, agreed to establish a regional command in Tamanrasset that will host military representatives from each country and coordinate joint operations against AQIM targets. Joint military efforts, Guenaizia elaborated, are necessary to prevent AQIM from implanting itself in the region. He called this the fundamental challenge. Regional military leaders are

ALGIERS 00000948 003.2 OF 004

now sensitized to the problem, he asserted, and are willing to wage a common CT campaign. He indicated that the command could eventually be expanded to include Libya, Burkina Faso and Chad. For its part, Algeria will provide resources to optimize the command center’s capacity. “What we can’t obtain among ourselves,” he added, “we will seek from our friends.”

8. (C/NF) Guenaizia cautioned that, although the regional command in Tamanrasset was an important first step, he didn’t expect immediate results. The meeting in Tamanrasset, he noted, concerned military coordination, but successful action hinged on two operational aspects: military readiness and political will. Guenaizia said regional military leaders had done their job, now it was up to the civilian leaders of the region to demonstrate the political will to act. “We are waiting for the Bamako summit,” Guenaizia stressed.

HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP

———————

9. (S/NF) As to how the U.S. and others could support the regional effort, Guenaizia emphasized (repeating himself three times to make the point) that sharing intelligence was fundamental. Guenaizia reminded Huddleston that Algeria once agreed to U.S. surveillance overflights years ago, but the experience yielded few positive results for Algeria even though the intelligence collected related directly to Algeria’s national security and used Algeria’s sovereign airspace. Huddleston replied that the U.S. and Algeria were already sharing a lot of intelligence. There would be a willingness to conduct overflights, but she underlined that any overflight mission would have to be linked to direct action on the ground. The cost of one mission, she emphasized, was around USD 50,000, so we had to be sure of the result. Huddleston suggested Guenaizia could raise this matter during AFRICOM Commander General Ward’s expected visit in November.

10. (S/NF) The provision of technical means was also key. Guenaizia complained that in many ways Algeria still faced an embargo in regards to the provision of technical equipment, including counter-IED measures and sensors for intelligence gathering. He informed Huddleston that a Northrop Grumman delegation will arrive in Algeria this week to discuss the capabilities of an AWACS-type platform based on a Boeing 737 airframe. Algeria also needed sophisticated IED jammers, he said. Insurgents use cell phones to detonate IEDs remotely, he stressed, resulting in huge casualties for Algerian forces. Guenaizia lamented that despite this critical need, Algeria’s partners had been slow in responding to Algeria’s request to purchase jammers. He did not refer directly to U.S. end-use-monitoring rules, but he shared an anecdote about Algeria’s difficulties purchasing jamming technology from Portugal, a request, he continued, that has been pending for more than a year with no response.

11. (S/NF) He said the U.S. and others could perhaps assist most before the Bamako heads of state summit by helping secure the requisite top-level political will among Sahel governments needed to make the summit a success and facilitate effective military action. DDSE Major General Lallali said the key to securing commitment for effective cooperation rested with top-level leaders in Bamako. Lallali said Mali’s political leadership was the biggest problem. “We need a signal from Bamako that shows their commitment,” Lallali stated. Malians are suffering from terrorism, he said, yet when local populations try to fight back, the authorities crack down on those populations.

12. (S/NF) Lallali complained that Malian officials have alerted insurgents that their cell phone calls were being monitored and leaked sensitive intelligence. Lallali also accused Mali of facilitating ransom payments for hostages. He called Mali a favorable business environment for terrorists and believed many wealthy and powerful families in Mali benefited from illegal trafficking. He termed the XXXXXXXXXXXX the “Terrorist Bank” and said, “we need to suppress that bank,” noting the connection between drug trafficking and support for terrorist finance and logistics. Lallali commented that Algeria’s effort in the UN to criminalize

ALGIERS 00000948 004.2 OF 004

ransom payments aimed to curb corruption’s role in facilitating terrorism. He implored DASD Huddleston to “please do something with them.”

13. (S/NF) Guenaizia agreed that trust was an issue with Mali. Although Algeria has provided materiel and training support to Mali to help resolve the Tuareg issue, it was not inclined to give Mali weapons and communications gear because of concerns that such equipment might be trafficked to Ivory Coast or Guinea. Guenaizia said there was a “double language” in Mali– its political leadership did not share the commitment Mali’s military leaders demonstrated. In order to succeed in the fight, Guenaizia affirmed, Mali had to cooperate fully. The Bamako summit has to deliver a clear political commitment. The U.S. could help by talking to Mali and others with influence in Mali to ensure the necessary level of political will was there. Huddleston agreed that complicity in Mali regarding the desire to share in the spoils of illegal trafficking seemed to have become worse since her tenure as ambassador. She concurred that Mali’s cooperation was essential but said that engaging Mali was a task for the entire region, not only Algeria. Huddleston cited the potential role of other partners in the region with influence in Mali, like Libya and Burkina Faso. She also suggested involving the AU to press for a general statement on fighting terrorism in the Sahel that would not single out Mali but rather deliver a broad message that countries in the region should act in concert and not allow terrorists to operate with impunity. The U.S., she said, will engage Mali and others in the region to play a constructive role in the region’s fight against terrorism.

BETTER COMMUNICATION

——————–

14. (S/NF) Huddleston told Guenaizia that U.S. military assistance in the region aimed to improve the capacity of militaries in Mali, Mauritania and Chad through training and equipment. President Tandja’s bid for a third term in office, she regretted, probably meant the U.S. will not be able to assist Niger, but we will extend our assistance to Burkina Faso soon. It was important, she stressed, that U.S. efforts were in step with regional efforts already underway. In this regard, Huddleston emphasized that communication among regional governments and other partners, like the U.S., was essential. Huddleston referred to recent talks between the U.S. and European allies on security in the Sahel, during which the European Commission and France mentioned plans for assistance. Guenaizia noted Europe’s interest in getting involved and said that some European governments had tried to insert themselves into the Tamanrasset meeting. He bluntly stated that Africa had already endured a period of colonialism. Lallali interjected that European participation could complicate matters.

15. (S/NF) Huddleston clarified that outside partners did not have to be involved directly but needed to be apprised of future steps and planning in order to provide support. Huddleston suggested regular meetings by the MOD with the Ambassador and DATT in Algiers. Guenaizia said he had no objection, both with the U.S. and others. The threat concerns all. But cooperation had to advance gradually. We should review progress in stages, he added. Immediate efforts, he reiterated, should focus on pressuring Mali and achieving a successful summit in Bamako. The next step was to allow time for standing up the regional command in Tamanrasset and determining equipment needs. He suggested in two to three months we might be able meet and take stock of that effort. In this regard, Guenaizia welcomed the expected visit of General Ward of Africa Command in November.

16. (U) DASD Huddleston did not clear this cable.

17. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. PEARCE

Source: WikiLeaks

Tuesday, 12 January 2010, 17:50

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000039
SIPDIS
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PINR, MOPS, AG, US
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN FM: TSA LISTING “INTOLERABLE,
INAPPROPRIATE, INOPPORTUNE”
REF: A. ALGIERS 20 (NOTAL) B. STATE 001187
ALGIERS 00000039 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador David D Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary

——-

1. (S/NF) Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci January 11 summoned the Ambassador and forcefully objected to Algeria’s placement on the TSA enhanced screening list. He termed the decision intolerable, inappropriate, and inopportune. It reflected neither the reality of Algeria’s security situation, its counterterrorism efforts nor our close bilateral cooperation. Further, the U.S. had not communicated the TSA decision to Algeria prior to releasing it to the press, which was how the GOA had learned of the measure. The GOA now had to contend with not only the collective humiliation felt by domestic opinion but also incomplete and inaccurate information regarding Algeria’s CT efforts circulating in the international press as a result of the story. Medelci reinforced the earlier MFA demarche (ref A) formally requesting removal from the list and a high-level U.S. statement to help correct the record regarding Algerian cooperation on counterterrorism. He pointedly asked the Ambassador to communicate this message to the Secretary and said the GOA would be monitoring the U.S. reaction closely. End Summary.

TSA Decision Ignores Reality of CT Cooperation

——————————————— –

2. (S/NF) Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mourad Medelci summoned the Ambassador to the MFA January 11 to underscore Algeria’s dissatisfaction with its placement on TSA’s enhanced screening list. Medelci began by noting he had had a productive visit to Washington in early December. He had been favorably impressed with both the quality and level of his meetings and had appreciated their focus on bilateral security and counterterrorism cooperation. The visit had underscored the strategic importance of our countries’ counterterrorism partnership on this sensitive issue. “We are confident in the direction this cooperation is leading,” he remarked. “After my visit, I was eager to report my discussions in Washington to President Bouteflika, meetings which demonstrated that our relations have reached a new level.”

3. (S/NF) The discussions in Washington, he asserted, reflected the reality of the relationship. Algeria’s own struggle against terrorism and its contribution to defeat terrorists were well understood. It remained determined to continue that cooperation and reinforce the relationship with the U.S. “We are aware of the risks this threat poses. We must remain vigilant and preserve the progress that has been made,” Medelci said. The progress that both sides have made on the ground underscores the confidence and openness of the strategic partnership.

4. (S/NF) Therefore, the minister said, the GOA had been extremely disappointed with Algeria’s inclusion in the TSA list, as well as the press coverage the decision had generated. The decision was intolerable, inappropriate, and inopportune. It was a contradiction not only to Algeria’s

ALGIERS 00000039 002.2 OF 004

own progress on security and efforts to fight terrorism, but also to our countries’ counterterrorism cooperation. No attacks against the U.S. had been “signed” by an Algerian. Algeria had made major progress in recent years on its internal security. The domestic security environment had been stabilized, airports were secure, and Algeria was now an international partner in the fight against terrorism. TSA’s announcement had made no mention of any of this.

Measures Viewed as Discriminatory

———————————

5. (S/NF) This was not just a matter of Algeria’s inclusion on the list, Medelci said. The GOA protested the discriminatory nature of the whole list. Thirteen of the 14 countries listed were Muslim. This sent a message that was inconsistent with President Obama’s Cairo speech, and the administration’s stated policy of outreach to Muslim communities. The decision will likely give further impetus to those who already question the sincerity of the administration’s approach.

6. (S/NF) The GOA was also disappointed, Medelci continued, that the decision had not been communicated prior to its release and that the Algerian leadership had to learn of it via the media. The minister said the GOA had initially refrained from making a public statement out of concern for U.S. relations, but now, due to the extensive press play and sense of collective humiliation among the public, it felt it needed to respond.

U.S. Focus on Air Travel Safety

——————————-

7. (S/NF) The Ambassador said the intention behind the TSA measures was not to harm or discriminate against any group or country, least of all our friends and partners. The intention was to make air travel as safe as possible for all. The problem was that, on Christmas day, a terrorist had gotten through the system. President Obama had reacted immediately, ordering reviews of both our watch list system and our air passenger screening measures. He had also made clear that our approach would not be static but would evolve as our evaluation of the risk evolved. Algeria’s concerns would be reported in full; Washington had already heard the message from Ambassador Baali. The Ambassador added that the U.S. understood well Algeria’s difficult history with terrorism and appreciated its leadership in the international fight against extremist violence. The U.S. wanted to continue, and build on, our very important counterterrorism cooperation as well as our new partnerships in other areas, including military relations, law enforcement, and economic and trade cooperation.

Going Forward

————-

8. (S/NF) Medelci said the GOA shared the desire to continue building our bilateral relationship. He reconfirmed GOA approval for a recent U.S. request to allow overflights of EP-3E surveillance aircraft. He also welcomed the visit of U.S. Attorney General Holder to conclude work on a mutual legal assistance treaty. The minister underscored as well the GOA’s readiness to assist with the upcoming Department of

ALGIERS 00000039 003.2 OF 004

Commerce trade mission to Algeria in February and offered to meet with the head of the U.S. delegation, schedule permitting. At the same time, he asked that the Ambassador convey his message on Algeria’s concerns about the TSA measures to Secretary Clinton. The GOA shared the U.S. desire to continue building the bilateral relationship. But it would also be watching closely to see how the U.S. responds to its stated concerns and looking forward to an “equitable solution”.

GOA Statement

————-

10. (U) Below is Embassy’s informal translation of the statement issued January 11 by the Algerian MFA:

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mourad Medelci, summoned Monday the Ambassador of the United States of America in Algiers to express the Algerian government’s strong protest over the decision taken by U.S. authorities to include Algerian nationals on a list of countries whose nationals are subjected to specific control measures when arriving and departing U.S. airports:

“In the wake of the decision taken by the U.S. authorities to include Algerian nationals on a list of countries whose nationals will be subjected to specific control measures when arriving and departing U.S. airports, Foreign Affairs Minister Mourad Medelci summoned the Ambassador of the United States of America in Algiers to express the Algerian government’s strong protests over the unfortunate, unjustified, and discriminatory measure.

“This comes after several previous efforts that were deployed, once the TSA measures were known, by the central government and by our Ambassador in Washington with the relevant U.S. authorities.”

END INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF GOA STATEMENT.

COMMENT

——-

11. (S/NF) The past year has seen developments in important new areas of government-to-government cooperation. These include:

— Approval for visits by senior Department of Defense visitors, including Deputy Assistant Secretary Huddleston and the first by AFRICOM Commander General Ward. These have significantly improved the substance of our mil-mil engagement.

— Prompt agreement to allow U.S. military overflights for surveillance aircraft against AQIM targets in the Sahel.

— Repatriation of eight Algerian Guantanamo detainees since 2008 and agreement to cooperate on the return of the remaining Algerian detainees.

— Bilateral cooperation on judicial matters; a mutual legal assistance treaty and a customs agreement are both ready for signature.

ALGIERS 00000039 004.2 OF 004

— Cooperation with our new legatt office, including on a cybercrime investigation that will protect American citizens from hackers and identity thieves.

— Improved police contacts and access for RSO, which plans to launch an anti-terrorism assistance program this year.

12. (S/NF) On the commercial side, the U.S. exported about USD 400 million in oil field equipment and services to Algeria in 2008 and imported USD 19 billion worth of Algerian oil and natural gas. And our commercial interests are rapidly expanding beyond the hydrocarbons sector. Algeria signed two contracts, totaling USD 847 million, in December 2009, to purchase 11 Boeing aircraft. These were presidential decisions, made in the face of heavy French pressure for Airbus. A U.S. firm, Solar Turbines, concluded a USD 320-million contract in October 2009 with Algeria’s state electricity company to supply gas-fired turbines. U.S. companies are also competing for politically sensitive security contracts. Cogent, a U.S. biometrics company, is close to signing a USD 45-million deal to supply the Ministry of Interior with an automated fingerprint identification system but faces heavy competition from France. Harris Radio is bidding on a contract with a potential value of USD 500 million to manufacture and supply radios for Algeria’s defense ministry and signals corps. The Harris and Cogent contracts have significant implications for U.S. commercial and security interests.

13. (S/NF) It is noteworthy that Medelci began and ended this conversation by stressing the importance the Algerian leadership attaches to continuing bilateral cooperation, especially on counterterrorism. But in-between, however, he delivered an unmistakable message that the GOA feels the TSA moves are inconsistent with that relationship and that they will be watching closely to see how we respond to this demarche. Over the past year, we have had a green light to develop important new ties across the board, from military to law enforcement. That light has now turned yellow. PEARCE