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Maandag, 13 December, 2010 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6, Document 7, Document 8, Document 9 | Bewerkt door Crethi Plethi
President Bush en Koning Abdullah van Saoedi-Arabië. De beide families hebben een lange en persoonlijke band met elkaar.
WikiLeaks: Arabische Staten Minachten Iran
Koning Abdullah van Saoedi-Arabië zei in een vergadering tegen de Iraanse minister van buitenlandse zaken “bespaar ons uw kwade bedoelingen.” De opmerking was een weerspiegeling van de diepe Arabische vijandigheid ten opzichte van de Islamitische Republiek van Iran, een steeds terugkerend thema tijdens privé-gesprekken tussen de leiders in het Midden-Oosten in de afgelopen jaren.
De uitgelekte WikiLeaks documenten van het Amerikaanse Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken laten een litanie van klachten zien van Saoedi-Arabië en kleinere Golfstaten, alsmede Egypte, Jordanië en anderen, over onderwerpen zoals de nucleaire ambities van Teheran, de Iraanse betrokkenheid in Irak bij sjiitisch extremisme en de steun voor de sjiitische Hezbollah in Libanon en de Palestijnse Hamas.
“U hebt als Perzen zich niet te bemoeien met onze Arabische aangelegenheden,” zei de Saoedische monarch in een gesprek met Manouchehr Mottaki, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van Iran. “Iran heeft als doel om problemen te veroorzaken,” vertelde hij in een gesprek aan een functionaris van het Witte Huis. “Zij zijn zonder twijfel onvoorspelbaar.”
Abdullah verklaarde: “Moge God verhinderen dat wij slachtoffer worden van hun kwade bedoelingen. Wij hebben gedurende jaren de juiste relaties gehad, maar bottom line is dat ze niet kunnen worden vertrouwd.” Amerikaanse diplomaten noteerden eerder dit jaar soortgelijke opmerkingen uit de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten, die werd omschreven als “46 seconden van Iran, de tijd die een vlucht van een ballistische raket nodig heeft.” Abu Dhabisch kroonprins en plaatsvervangend commandant van de VAE strijdkrachten, Sjeik Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, refereerde aan Iran als een “existentiële bedreiging” en was bezorgd dat de VAE “in het kruisvuur terecht zou komen als Iran wordt uitgedaagd door de VS of Israël.” In een eerder gesprek suggereerde Bin Zayed zelfs dat de VS grondtroepen zouden moeten sturen als luchtaanvallen niet genoeg waren om Iraanse nucleaire doelen “uit te schakelen.”
De Arabisch-Perzische vijandschap heeft al eeuwen een sterke onderstroom van rivaliteit tussen soennitische en sjiitische moslims, maar nam aanzienlijk toe na de islamitische revolutie onder leiding van Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini en het omverwerpen van het gezag van de sjah in 1979 en heeft zich ontwikkeld tot een strijd om de hegemonie in de regio. De conservatieve soennitische regimes in Saoedi-Arabië en de andere Golfstaten signaleren de Iraanse “verborgen hand” achter de ondermijning van hun gezag. De fanatieke steun van Teheran voor Hezbollah en Hamas wordt gezien als manieren om de Iraanse invloed in de regio te verspreiden.
De minister van buitenlandse zaken van de VAE ziet “Iran als een enorm probleem dat veel verder gaat dan nucleaire capaciteiten,” meldt de ambassade in februari 2010. De “Iraanse steun voor terrorisme is breder dan alleen Hamas en Hezbollah. Iran heeft invloed in Afghanistan, Jemen, Koeweit, Bahrein, de oostelijke provincie van Saoedi-Arabië en Afrika.”
In een gesprek met generaal David Petraeus van het Amerikaanse Central Command eind 2009 wees koning Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa van Bahrein “naar Iran als de bron van veel problemen in Irak en Afghanistan … [en] betoogde krachtig voor het nemen van maatregelen ter beëindigen van hun nucleaire programma met alle noodzakelijke middelen. Dat programma moet worden gestopt. Het gevaar van het door laten gaan is groter dan het gevaar van het stoppen.”
In Oman vertelde Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Said de toenmalige commandant van het Amerikaanse Central Command, admiraal William Fallon: “Iran is een groot en krachtig land en we moeten er wat mee doen.” Een hoge Omaanse minister noemde Koeweit, Bahrein en Qatar als de drie landen in de Golf regio die waarschijnlijk zouden willen dat de VS Iran moet aanvallen.
De chef van de militaire inlichtingendienst van Koeweit vertelde Petraeus dat Iran sjiitische groepen ondersteunt in de Golf en extremisten in Jemen. Jemen en Saoedi-Arabië hebben herhaaldelijk Iran beschuldigd van het leveren van wapens en geld aan de Houthi-rebellen in de Saada regio [Noord-Jemen]. Amerikaanse documenten bevestigen ook dat Qatar, het rijkste land in de regio, achter de schermen een uitgesproken criticus was van Iran, terwijl het publiekelijk hartelijke relaties onderhield met Iran én de VS.
“Iran is slim en zorgt dat haar tegenstanders de weg kwijt raken in het streven naar afspraken,” zei de Qatarese premier Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Thani. “Ze houden je bezig met een deal en beginnen dan vanaf nul met een nieuwe gesprekspartner. Iran zal geen afspraken maken. Iran wil kernwapens.” Bin Jassim “zou niet verbaasd zijn als Iran een test uitvoert om aan de wereld zijn prestaties te tonen.” Eind vorig jaar gaf hij een beknopt overzicht van de relatie van Doha met Teheran: “Ze liegen tegen ons en wij liegen tegen hun.”
De belangrijkste Arabische bondgenoten van Washington buiten de Golfstaten, Jordanië en Egypte, staan ook zeer vijandig tegenover Iran. Beide landen hebben vredesverdragen met Israël, wat hen ook impopulair maakt in Iran.
De Egyptische opvattingen over Iran, zoals Amerikaanse gesprekspartners ze optekenen, zijn eendrachtig negatief. Generaal Omar Suleiman, de hoofd van de Egyptische inlichtingendienst, noemde Iran “een ernstige bedreiging voor Egypte … ze ondersteunen de jihad en beschadigen de vrede”. Hij zei dat hij Iran gewaarschuwd had tegen inmenging in binnenlandse aangelegenheden (en het ondersteunen van groepen zoals de Moslimbroederschap) en kreeg een “zeer positieve reactie” van zijn Iraanse ambtgenoot die aangaf dat Iran zich niet zou mengen in Egypte.
De Egyptische president Hosni Mubarak viel zijn Iraanse ambtgenoot Mahmoud Ahmadinejad aan door hem een extremist te noemen die “niet rationeel denkt.” Hij vertelde tegen een Amerikaanse congreslid: “Iran veroorzaakt altijd problemen.”
Mubarak was, net als Koning Abdullah van Saoedi-Arabië, sceptisch over de plannen van de VS om na de inwijding van Barack Obama te proberen met Teheran in overleg te komen. Margaret Scobey, de Amerikaanse ambassadeur in Cairo, beschreef Mubarak als iemand die “een hardgrondige haat had tegen de Islamitische Republiek, herhaaldelijk naar Iraniërs verwijzend als ‘leugenaars’, en ze te beschuldigen van het destabiliseren van Egypte en de regio. Hij ziet de Syriërs en Qatarezen als hielenlikkers van Teheran en verwijt hen ook leugenaars te zijn.”
Het is duidelijk uit de documenten dat de gevestigde Arabische regimes Iran als een bedreiging zien voor hun binnenlandse politiek en voor de vrede en stabiliteit in het Midden Oosten.
Bron: WikiLeaks
xSunday, 22 March 2009, 10:14
S E C R E T RIYADH 000447
NSC FOR JBRENNAN AND JDUNCAN; STATE FOR S/WCI
EO 12958 DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, KWBG, SA, AF, IN, PK, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER BRENNAN’S MEETING WITH
SAUDI KING ABDULLAH
REF: RIYADH 427
Classified By: Pol Counselor Lisa Carle, 1.4(b),(d)1. KEY POINTS
— (S) Saudi King Abdullah welcomed White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan, S/WCI Ambassador Williamson, and Ambassador Fraker to his private palace March 15 for a 90-minute discussion focused on U.S. Saudi-relations, counterterrorism cooperation, the Yemeni Guantanamo Bay detainees, Iran, and Iraq.
— (S) Brennan presented the King with a letter from President Obama expressing a personal message of friendship, appreciation for our close and collaborative relationship and concern over the disposition of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo.
— (S) The King said he had told Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki only minutes before that Iran should stop interfering in Arab affairs, and had given Iran a one-year deadline to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia.
— (S) The King expressed a complete lack of trust in Iraqi PM al-Maliki and held out little hope for improved Saudi/Iraqi relations as long as al-Maliki remains in office.
— (S) When asked what advice he had for President Obama, the King said he had “one request”: that it was “critically important to restore America’s credibility” in the world.
U.S. SAUDI RELATIONS
2. (S) PLEDGES OF FRIENDSHIP: Brennan asserted that the U.S./Saudi alliance must remain strong, and assured the King of President Obama’s wishes for a long and healthy U.S./Saudi relationship, and the President’s personal commitment that Saudi Arabia had a friend in the White House. The King replied that he appreciated the sentiments and that he had great respect for President Obama. “We (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) spilled blood together” in Kuwait and Iraq, the King continued, and Saudi Arabia valued this tremendously. Friendship can be a difficult issue that requires work, Abdullah said, but the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have done it for 70 years over three generations. “Our disagreements don,t cut to the bone,” he stated.
3. (S) U.S. CREDIBILITY IS CRITICAL: The Bush Administration is now in the past, the King said. Both President Bushes were his friends, but the recent President Bush didn,t take his advice on dealing with issues in the region, and they found their problems “compounded.” The King said, “we are ready to consult, provide guidance and to do whatever is necessary. We are people of the region and we know it well.” Brennan responded that President Obama wants to listen, and asked what advice the King would offer to President Obama. Abdullah said his one piece of advice was that restoring U.S. credibility in the world was critically important. Brennan responded that this was an important issue for President Obama as well. Brennan said that under President Obama we will restore our credibility. He said the U.S. is a great country and we know what we have to do.
4. (S) THE WORLD NEEDS OBAMA: Brennan said President Obama looked forward to seeing the King at the G-20 summit in London. “Thank God for bringing Obama to the presidency,” the King answered, which has created “great hope” in the Muslim world. “May God grant him strength and patience, Abdullah continued, “May God protect him. I’m concerned about his personal safety. America and the world need such a president.”
5. (C) THAT WITHOUT WHICH NO SAUDI MEETING IS COMPLETE: Abdullah said “as a friend” that “it was a mistake” to limit access of Saudi citizens to the U.S., since “this damages bilateral relations and the image of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia.” The King noted there were 60,000 Saudi students abroad, about one third of whom were in the U.S., and “others would have gone” but for the difficulties in gaining access to the U.S. The King noted that for many years very senior Saudi officials, including Prince Saud al-Faisal, had studied in the U.S. He then noted that Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Adel al Jubeir (who was interpreting for the King) had studied in the U.S. and was “half American” as a result. He also said he was aware of, and appreciated, Ambassador Fraker’s efforts to improve the visa situation “even though there were people in Washington who fought him.” Finally, he observed that anyone from Saudi Arabia who studies in the U.S. inevitably becomes a friend and advocate of the United States and that we only hurt ourselves by cutting off this flow of students.
DETAINEES
6. (S) GUANTANAMO WILL BE CLOSED: Brennan explained that President Obama had made a commitment to close Guantanamo to eliminate the potential propaganda benefits its existence provided to Al-Qaeda, but also because it was the right thing to do. Brennan reassured the King, however, that President Obama would remain strong on counterterrorism. Brennan presented the King with a letter from President Obama addressing the issue of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo. Brennan noted that he had met with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN) the day before to discuss at length The issue of the Yemeni detainees. Brennan further stated that he would be traveling to Sanaa the next day to meet with President Saleh, as the issue of the remaining 99 Yemeni detainees still needed to be resolved. Brennan praised MbN as an outstanding counterterrorism partner, and that the MOI was doing a wonderful, courageous job in countering the terrorist threat to the Kingdom. Returning to the subject later in the conversation, Brennan warned that the U.S. feared Yemen could become another Waziristan, and urged that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia needed to work together to keep Al-Qaeda in Yemen from growing even more dangerous. The King replied that having Somalia next door to Yemen only adds to the danger. Brennan said that the capabilities of the Ministry of the Interior security forces had grown impressively over the past 10 years. Brennan added that counterterrorism and intelligence sharing cooperation between our countries had never been better and that MbN deserved the credit. In an unusual concession, made at the conclusion of their conversation, the King said, “be assured I am fully briefed on the work you are doing with Prince Mohammed bin Nayef.”
7. (S) HOW TO TRACK DETAINEES: “I’ve just thought of something,” the King added, and proposed implanting detainees with an electronic chip containing information about them and allowing their movements to be tracked with Bluetooth. This was done with horses and falcons, the King said. Brennan replied, “horses don,t have good lawyers,” and that such a proposal would face legal hurdles in the U.S., but agreed that keeping track of detainees was an extremely important issue that he would review with appropriate officials when he returned to the United States.
IRAN
8. (S) A “HEATED EXCHANGE”: The King noted that Iranian FM Mottaki had been “sitting in that same seat (as Brennan) a few moments ago.” The King described his conversation with FM Mottaki as “a heated exchange, frankly discussing Iran’s interference in Arab affairs.” When challenged by the King on Iranian meddling in Hamas affairs, Mottaki apparently protested that “these are Muslims.” “No, Arabs” countered the King, “You as Persians have no business meddling in Arab matters.” The King said the Iranians wanted to improve relations and that he responded by giving Mottaki an ultimatum. “I will give you one year” (to improve ties), “after that, it will be the end.”
9. (S) “SPARE US YOUR EVIL”: The King expressed hope the U.S. would review its Iran policy and “come to the right conclusion.” Brennan responded that President Obama was personally reviewing U.S. Iran policy and wanted to hear the King’s thoughts. Abdullah asserted that Iran is trying to set up Hizballah-like organizations in African countries, observing that the Iranians don’t think they are doing anything wrong and don’t recognize their mistakes. “I said (to Mottaki) that’s your problem,” recounted the King. Abdullah said he would favor Rafsanjani in an Iranian election, were he to run. He described Iran not as “a neighbor one wants to see,” but as “a neighbor one wants to avoid.” He said the Iranians “launch missiles with the hope of putting fear in people and the world.” A solution to the Arab/Israeli conflict would be a great achievement, the King said, but Iran would find other ways to cause trouble. “Iran’s goal is to cause problems,” he continued, “There is no doubt something unstable about them.” He described Iran as “adventurous in the negative sense,” and declared “May God prevent us from falling victim to their evil.” Mottaki had tendered an invitation to visit Iran, but Abdullah said he replied “All I want is for you to spare us your evil.” Summarizing his history with Iran, Abdullah concluded: “We have had correct relations over the years, but the bottom line is that they cannot be trusted.”
10. (S) AN EMPTY CHANNEL: The King said “three years ago” Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei had sent his adviser Ali Akbar Velayati with a letter asking for Abdullah’s agreement to establish a formal back channel for communication between the two leaders. Abdullah said he had agreed, and the channel was established with Velayati and Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal as the points of contact. In the years since, the King noted, the channel had never been used.
11. (S) A DANGEROUS NEIGHBORHOOD: Brennan responded that the Saudis lived in a dangerous neighborhood with Iran across the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia sharing a long border with Yemen, and with a number of other troublesome countries nearby. Brennan noted that we have a lot of work to do in the Middle East together. The King responded that the world,s attention was focused on the region. He further stated that he believed that the U.S. could help in this sensitive region, but that we should not take matters lightly. Brennan noted that President Obama is fully aware of the dangers in the region, that the U.S. knew that it had to remain involved in constructing a solution, and that we would seek the King,s counsel in dealing with the many issues in the Middle East. The King asked if that included Iran. Brennan responded that it did. Brennan said that we had our eyes wide open to Iranian ambitions, that we were not nave to the dangers Iran posed to Saudi Arabia, and that Iran could not be allowed to succeed in its destabilizing activites. Brennan observed that the President had ordered a complete review of U.S. Iran policy and made reference to a passage in the President,s letter that we needed to test Iran,s intentions to cease its destabilizing behavior and live up to its international obligations. Brennan further observed that the U.S.-Saudi partnership had to remain strong and that together, and with others, we needed to thwart Iran,s nuclear ambitions. “That is important,” responded the King. Finally, Brennan said the President wanted the King to know he had a good friend in the White House who would be willing to assist in any way that he could. The King thanked Mr. Brennan, said he appreciated the sentiments, said that he had great respect for President Obama, and reflected that we had been great friends for many years and would remain friends as our disagreements were minor.
12. (U) SEE REFTEL: Ref A provided a separate readout on the Iran discussion and the King’s meeting with Mottaki.
IRAQ
13. (S) IN THE HANDS OF GOD AND IRAN: Brennan expressed the importance the U.S. attaches to achieving peace and stability in Iraq. The King replied that this was “in the hands of God,” though he agreed that Iraq was vitally important to both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The King also pointed out that “some say the U.S. invasion handed Iraq to Iran on a silver platter; this after we fought Saddam Hussein.”
14. (S) NO HOPE FOR MALIKI: The King said he had “no confidence whatsoever in (Iraqi PM) Maliki, and the Ambassador (Fraker) is well aware of my views.” The King affirmed that he had refused former President Bush’s entreaties that he meet with Maliki. The King said he had met Maliki early in Maliki’s term of office, and the Iraqi had given him a written list of commitments for reconciliation in Iraq, but had failed to follow through on any of them. For this reason, the King said, Maliki had no credibility. “I don,t trust this man,” the King stated, “He’s an Iranian agent.” The King said he had told both Bush and former Vice president Cheney “how can I meet with someone I don,t trust?” Maliki has “opened the door for Iranian influence in Iraq” since taking power, the King said, and he was “not hopeful at all” for Maliki, “or I would have met with him.”
AN ALERT AND ENGAGING HOST
15. (S) I MISS MY HORSES: The King appeared alert and at times animated, entertaining his guests with anecdotes about his encounters with Iranian leaders (septel), and throwing up his hands in complaint when asked if he spent time with his horses: “I see them on television when they race,” he said. “I love horses,” he exclaimed, “every couple of weeks I get to see them, and then I have a very calm and restful sleep.”
16. (S) DIALOGUE AND REFORM AS DUTY: In response to Brennan,s praise for the King,s interfaith dialogue initiative, his commitment to advancing rights as reflected by his recent appointment of the first female (deputy education) minister, the King said “Thanks for the sentiment but I did nothing special, only what I thought was my duty. I believe we do our duty as determined by God.”
17. (S) PARTICIPANTS:
Saudi Arabia — Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud — HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, Assistant Minister of the Interior — Ambassador to the U.S. Adel al-Jubeir (interpreter)
U.S. — John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism — Ambassador Ford Fraker — Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson — John Duncan, NSC Director for Counterterrorism — Shaun Coughlin, Special Assistant, S/WCI — Embassy control officer/notetaker
18. (U) Assistant to the President Brennan cleared this cable.
FRAKER
Bron: WikiLeaks
Monday, 16 May 2005, 09:12
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 002178
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/16/2015
TAGS PREL, MASS, PHUM, ELAB, IR, IZ, XF”>XF, SA, PK, FR”>FR, TC
SUBJECT: MBZ ON IRAQ, IRAN, PAKISTAN
REF: ABU DHABI 1008
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison. For reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d).1. (U) Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed,s weekly Sunday “VIP Majlis” provided an excellent opportunity for a visiting National Defense University delegation to observe first-hand the UAEG,s informal consultative process. MbZ, brothers MinState Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan and Interior Minister Sheikh Saif, and Labor Minister al Ka’abi were joined by several dozen prominent Abu Dhabi officials and businessmen for the weekly gathering at Bateen Palace.
NDU
—
2. (U) NDU President Lt. Gen. Dunn and National War College Deputy Commandant Ambassador Wahba briefed MbZ on several new NDU initiatives, including opportunities for UAE students in the Information Resources Management College program, which emphasizes threats, vulnerabilities, and risks in a net-centric environment. Ambassador Sison praised the UAE’s selection of NDU candidates, noting that several were serving in key positions today: GHQ Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff MG Mohammed Hilal al-Kaabi, GHQ Director of General Procurement Obaid Al Ketbi, Deputy Commander UAE Air Force Brigadier Ali, and MbZ’s aide Yousef al Otaiba had all benefited from NDU programs.
Iraq
——
3. (C) Ambassador Sison noted that day’s visit to Iraq by Secretary Rice, highlighting the Secretary’s encouragement
SIPDIS for continued momentum in the political process and her meetings with PM al-Jaafari and KDP leader Barzani. MbZ voiced disdain for al-Jaafari, citing (again) his concerns over the Prime Minister’s ties to Iran. These concerns were aimed at Jaafari’s Dawaa Party colleagues, as well. While agreeing that it was important for Iraq’s Sunni Arabs to be more involved in the political process and in drafting the constitution, MbZ complained that “there wasn’t one worthwhile Sunni” on the scene. He criticized new Sunni Defense Minister Dulaimi as being “in it for himself.” Nor did MbZ have anything good to say about former Iraqi Finance Minister Mahdi’s nomination as one of two Vice Presidents, complaining that Mahdi “did not work for the people of Iraq.” Nonetheless, MbZ said he agreed with the USG’s efforts to encourage the various Iraqi factions to work together. The UAE would continue to help train Iraqi police forces at the UAE’s police academy in Al Ain and provide reconstruction assistance. It was important for the region as a whole that the U.S. and its allies “got it right” in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, he underscored. (Note: MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba had a few days earlier shared with Ambassador concerns passed by former PM Allawi that Dulaimi was “devious,” “bad news,” “very close” to Iranian intelligence, and had been introduced to the Iranians by Chalabi. Yousef had also noted the UAEG,s impression Mahdi had not always been a “team player” in the government of former PM Allawi. End note.)
Iran
—-
4. (S) Turning to Iran, MbZ voiced certainty that the EU-3 efforts with Iran would break down and that Iran would resume its nuclear activities ) if it had not already done so. Repeating concerns first voiced to us in February (reftel), MbZ appeared convinced that it was only a matter of time before Israel or the U.S. would strike Iranian nuclear facility targets. U.S. installations in the Gulf could be targeted by Iran in the aftermath of such an action, he warned. MbZ agreed with the USG,s tough line with Tehran and the Europeans. A nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize the Gulf region and possibly allow terrorist access to WMD. MbZ asked Lt. Gen. Dunn whether it would be possible for &anyone8 to “take out” all locations of concern in Iran via air power; Lt. Gen. Dunn voiced doubt that this would be possible given the dispersed locations. “Then it will take ground forces!” MbZ exclaimed. Ambassador noted that the UAE’s Director of Military Intelligence, BG”>BG Essa al Mazrouei, would pay counterpart visits this week to CENTCOM, J-2, DIA, and CIA for discussions on Iran and Iraq-related matters. MbZ said he looked forward to sharing “contingency planning” scenarios in future conversations.
Pakistan
——–
5. (C) Ambassador asked about MbZ’s visit the week before to Lahore to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf. MbZ chuckled and asked why the USG “always” convinced the Pakistanis to delay news of the capture of senior Al Qaeda operatives such as Abu Faraj al Libbi. MbZ went on to congratulate Washington for its decision to allow U.S. firms to bid for contracts to provide F-16s and other defense technology to Pakistan. It was important to support Musharraf as he battled the terrorists, he emphasized. While the Indians had and would continue to balk at the decision, the region needed Musharraf to stay strong. There was no alternative leader in sight, MbZ opined. Besides, he continued, the F-16 decision would not tip the military balance between India and Pakistan. Even if it had, India’s strength as a stable democracy would ensure that it would not ever be in as “risky” a situation as its neighbor. MbZ then slapped his knee and said “you,ll never guess what Musharraf asked me…he asked me whether the UAE had received approval for the Predator!” (Note: the USG’s inability to meet the UAE’s request for an armed Predator remains a sore point for MbZ, although he has not directly raised the issue with us for some time.)
Gyrocopter, GAWC
—————-
6. (SBU) MbZ also referred to his interest in exploring selling the UAE’s “gyrocopter” (a helicopter-supported UAV co-developed with Austrian company Schiebel) to the U.S. Air Force, an idea he first floated during Gen. Moseley,s visit for the May 3 F-16 ceremony. MbZ noted that his aide would pass detailed gyrocopter specifications to the Embassy this week. (Note: We will be exploring this initiative with CENTAF and CENTCOM in relation to force protection aerial surveillance system needs at Al Dhafra airbase for the 380 th Air Expeditionary Wing. End note.)
7. (C) Lt. Gen. Dunn complimented MbZ on the Gulf Air Warfare Center (GAWC), which he and the NDU group had toured that morning. MbZ expressed satisfaction over the relationship between the UAE and U.S. Air Forces, but expressed disappointment that more GCC countries had not joined recent GAWC classes. Ambassador noted the recent robust participation by Saudi Arabia in the GAWC’s fourth class, which had included six Saudi F-15s and two young pilots who were also members of the Saudi royal family. MbZ asked whether the two high-ranking Saudis had actually completed all requirements for graduation or had been “passed through.” Ambassador confirmed that they had completed all course requirements. MbZ commented that “the real reason” the Saudis had turned out for the GAWC class had been “to see what the UAE was up to” with the F-16 Block 60 and other procurement successes. Although Egypt and Jordan wished to join in the next GAWC class, MbZ added, they also wanted the UAE Air Force to pay fuel costs. MbZ said he had asked both countries “to go talk to ADNOC,” the state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.
France
——
8. (U) MbZ noted that he would travel to Paris June 18-20 to meet with President Chirac, recalling that he had canceled his trip to France at the last minute in mid-January.
Camel Jockeys
————-
9. (SBU) On the margins of the MbZ conversation, Ambassador thanked Interior Minister Sheikh Saif for his assistance the week before in allowing G/TIP visitor Feleke Assefa access to camel jockey rehabilitation and social support centers. Ambassador noted that a Tier 3 ranking remained a possibility despite the UAEG,s vigorous efforts since mid-March with UNICEF, IOM, and others. A trafficking in persons reassessment would take place in August, she noted, and it was important for the UAE to continue the good work it was doing in solving the problem. MbZ aide Yousef al Otaiba promised to forward a copy of the UAE-UNICEF TIP implementing agreement and budget. (Note: he has done so; we have forwarded the document electronically to G/TIP and NEA/ARPI. End note.)
Labor and the FTA
—————–
10. (SBU) Labor Minister al Ka’abi noted he had received reports that the U.S. and UAE sides had moved closer on the text of the labor chapter of the FTA during the last day of negotiations. He reiterated the UAEG,s concern that it receive some recognition of its unique demographic situation, as only 15 percent of the population held Emirati citizenship. SISON
Bron: WikiLeaks
Monday, 22 February 2010, 12:46
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000097
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/IR
EO 12958 DECL: 2020/02/22
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ETTC, UNSC, IR, AE
SUBJECT: CODEL LOWEY WITH UAE FOREIGN MINISTER ON IRAN
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)1. (S/NF) Summary. In a February 17 meeting, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (AbZ) discussed Iran with a four-member Congressional delegation led by Chairwoman Nita Lowey of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. AbZ told the Codel the nuclear issue is only one aspect of the Iran problem, and that Iran’s regional meddling was a serious concern. He pledged the UAE’s backing as the US rallies support for new sanctions but questioned whether they would achieve the desired effect. AbZ noted the UAE’s growing concern that Gulf allies were being shut out of Iran sanctions planning. End Summary.
IRAN’S REACTORS AND REACH
————————-
2. (S/NF) AbZ began by expressing pride in the US-UAE 123 agreement and the bilateral relationship generally. According to AbZ, the 123 is a powerful example for the region and provides a transparent alternative to Iran’s nuclear model. The UAE views Iran as a huge problem that goes far beyond nuclear capabilities. Iranian support for terrorism is broader than just Hamas and Hizballah. Iran has influence in Afghanistan, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, the Eastern Province of KSA, and Africa (AbZ mentioned Nigeria specifically). Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez have close, cooperative ties. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, the expeditionary aspect of its foreign policy will become ever more challenging for neighboring states.
POSSIBILITY AND FUTILITY OF SANCTIONS
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3. (S/NF) Lowey asked what AbZ thought about tougher sanctions against Iran and how the UAE can help with China. AbZ said the US and its allies “have to decide how to stop Iran” and that the UAE was surprised at the Chinese attitude. AbZ noted the Emiratis and the Saudis have spoken to the Chinese, and the UAE expressed a willingness to expand its energy ties (Note: AbZ seemed to be indicating that this was intended as a carrot, but he acknowledged the difficulty of supplanting an Iran-China trade relationship that reached $50 billion last year. End Note.)
4. (S/NF) AbZ urged quick action on tough new sanctions. The UAE is conscientious in its efforts to enforce existing UNSC sanctions but the Iranians have been able to find other routes, bypassing UAE ports, to import what they need. AbZ predicted that smart and swift implementation of new sanctions could still be ineffective but said that we must try.
GULF NEIGHBORS FEELING LEFT OUT
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5. (S/NF) AbZ highlighted a growing belief the UAE and the GCC are being left out of our Iran sanctions consultations. AbZ told Chairwoman Lowey that the P5+1 negotiations with Iran should be expanded to included the GCC. AbZ said there is a “trust barrier” to full GCC support for US policy, as there is a deep suspicion that the US is proceeding without consulting Gulf allies.
6. (S/NF) AbZ raised (as he likes to do regularly) the 2005 EU package offer to Iran that was briefed to the UAE by the Iranians, not the US or another ally. Things have improved since then, but “we still need some serious trust building between the US, the EU, and the GCC” on this issue. The DCM reminded AbZ (and the Codel) that there are extensive and privileged communications between the UAE and the USG on policy towards Iran and on sanctions planning. AbZ acknowledged there was trust from the UAE, but the rest of the GCC had continuing concerns. “Your problem today is to fix your relations with the GCC, quickly. A few countries in the region are already dealing with Iran as if they had the bomb.”
7. (S/NF) AbZ said GCC states are left wondering what will happen to them in any deal the US and Iran reach through back channel conversations. He compared the current multilateral conversations over Iran’s nuclear program with negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program, asking why North Korea’s neighbors are part of the Six Party negotiations, but the GCC is not equally involved in similar conversations about and with Iran.
“WHAT IF?” SCENARIOS
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8. (S/NF) In response to questions from members of Congress, AbZ said that if Iran goes nuclear others in the region will move forward on the same track and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty will completely break down. He said a crisis or confrontation in the region would create oil supply problems worldwide. 14 million barrels a day pass through the Strait of Hormuz. That said, he noted that the US and UAE militaries have plans to keep Hormuz clear.
9. (S) AbZ concluded the meeting with a soliloquy on the importance of a successful peace process between Israel and its neighbors as perhaps the most effective way of reducing Iran’s regional influence.
10. (SBU) Members of Congress in attendance: Congresswoman Nita Lowey, Congressman Tom Cole, Congresswoman Barbara Lee, Congresswoman Donna Edwards. OLSON
Bron: WikiLeaks
Saturday, 01 March 2008, 05:49
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000174
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/01/2018
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, ENRG, KWMN, IR, IZ, MU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON’S MEETING WITH SULTAN
QABOOS
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)——-
SUMMARY
——-
1. (C) Sultan Qaboos discussed both domestic and regional issues during his February 19 meeting with Admiral William J. Fallon, CENTCOM Commander. On the domestic front, the Sultan described his desire to empower the government to be more responsive to citizen concerns. Seeking to strengthen the role of Omani women, the Sultan plans to convene a conference in 2009 designed to increase the participation and leadership of women in all aspects of Omani society. Sultan Qaboos also shared plans for continued infrastructure development in Oman and described efforts underway to obtain more natural gas. On Iraq, the Sultan advised against a premature withdrawal of U.S. forces and stated that more regional assistance would be forthcoming if Iraqis would “come together” to take charge of, and invest in, their own country. Sultan Qaboos shared U.S. concerns about Iranian meddling in Iraq and elsewhere, but contended that Tehran knew confrontation with the U.S. was not in its interest. Iran’s “charm offensive” in the GCC had succeeded in lessening suspicions of some officials about the true intentions of Iranian policies. End Summary.
2. (C) CENTCOM Commander Admiral Fallon, accompanied by the Ambassador, met February 19 with Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id for approximately 2 hours at one of the Sultan’s castles — Husn al Shumugh — in the interior of Oman. (Note: The Sultan was outside of Muscat on his annual 4-6 week “meet the people tour” during which he visits selected sites outside the capital. End Note.) The Sultan appeared in good health and was cheerful, although he commented that his role as ruler of Oman was demanding and did not allow him time to do all the things he wanted to do, such as reading more books. “My office is wherever I am,” he stated, noting that he constantly had to attend to paperwork and urgent requests from his staff, among other tasks. The Sultan added that despite his busy schedule, he always made time to “watch the news,” though he did not elaborate on his preferred media outlet.
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CONCERNS ABOUT IRAQ
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3. (C) The Sultan expressed concern over a premature withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Recognizing recent improvements in the security situation, he counseled that American troops should only leave “when the time is right.” He stressed that Iraqis had to “take charge” of the fate of their country, but questioned whether the different factions would be able to “come together” to accomplish this. He pointedly asked the Admiral, “Do you really think Prime Minister Maliki and his government are capable of pulling the country together?” The Sultan did not directly respond to Admiral Fallon’s comment on the need for assistance and investment for Iraq from elsewhere in the region. Instead, he stated that if the Iraqi people helped themselves and invested in their own country, others would follow suit.
4. (C) The Sultan appeared to follow events in Iraq closely. He commented, for example, that the Kurds had apparently “come out well” in recent central government talks on budget issues, and asked about the status of electricity production in Iraq. The Sultan seemed to take a particular interest in Admiral Fallon’s discussion of Iraqi Shia leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, including the status of Hakim’s health and his possible successors.
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INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
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5. (C) In addition to emphasizing the need for outside investment in Iraq, Admiral Fallon highlighted the importance of assistance from regional states for infrastructure development in Afghanistan and other Central Asian nations. Again the Sultan sidestepped the issue and shifted the conversation to the critical role of roads and highways in economic development. He then mentioned infrastructure projects for Oman currently under consideration, including construction of a new dam and a freight rail line from the northern port of Sohar to the planned port in Duqm. The Sultan hoped that the southern port of Salalah could be linked by rail to Muscat and, eventually, to other GCC states.
MUSCAT 00000174 002 OF 003
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IRANIAN ISSUES
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6. (C) The Sultan commented that the Iranians are “not fools,” and claimed that Tehran realized there are “certain lines it cannot cross” (i.e., direct confrontation with the U.S.). Regarding GCC relations with the Iranian government, he stated, “Iran is a big country with muscles and we must deal with it.” He continued that Iran’s “charm offensive” in the region had achieved a degree of success as some GCC authorities (he did not mention names) were now less suspicious of Iranian intentions. The Sultan added, laughing, that “I must say that as long as (the U.S.) is on the horizon, we have nothing to fear.”
7. (C) Responding to Admiral Fallon’s frustration with Iranian interference in Iraq, the Sultan remarked that Iranian meddling abroad was “almost a game” to the regime in Tehran, and said that Iran’s leaders would have to stop this practice if Iran wanted to “join the world as a noble country.” The Sultan hoped that Iraqi leaders would clearly tell and convince Iranian President Ahmadinejad during his upcoming visit to Iraq to cease Iran’s unhelpful interference in their internal affairs. On the possibility that Iran is waiting out the President’s final term before re-assessing its strategy, the Sultan said that Tehran should realize that it has to deal with the U.S. as a country, and not just the current administration.
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THE SEARCH FOR GAS
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8. (C) After noting Iranian dependence on imports of refined fuel, the Sultan described Oman’s efforts to obtain more natural gas to fuel growing domestic power needs and large-scale industrial projects. Oman had committed too much of its limited gas production to long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) export contracts. As a result, the government was trying to boost production by taking smaller and less productive gas fields away from Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) — 60% owned by the government and 34% owned by Royal Dutch Shell — and awarding them to outside companies such as British Gas and BP. The Sultan claimed these firms were in a better position to increase productivity in these fields, and pointed to the progress of U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum Company in raising oil production in former PDO concession areas, such as Mukhaizna.
9. (C) Looking offshore, the Sultan said he hoped that new gas fields would be found in the Gulf of Oman to help ease the country’s natural gas shortage. India’s Reliance Industries was currently exploring a deepwater oil and gas block in this body of water, but had made no significant discoveries yet. Qatar would begin supplying gas to Oman by 2013, the Sultan noted, but not in quantities sufficient to meet outstanding needs. He added that Oman was still supplying limited gas from Musandam to Ras al-Khaimah in the UAE due to an agreement he made with its emir — and which the Sultan felt he could not break — well before Oman was squeezed for this resource.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION
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10. (C) Sultan Qaboos shared that he placed a great deal of importance on education, and noted that a study of history provided the context needed to better understand present trends and events. Regarding claims that some rulers in the region wanted to keep their people uneducated in order to more easily control them, the Sultan explained that this strategy could easily backfire as it also left the populace more susceptible to influence by extremists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Former Egyptian president and pan-Arabist leader Gamal Abdal Nasser, the Sultan said, had “set the region back” by being “anti-everything” and engaging in vitriolic rhetoric designed to keep the masses ignorant.
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EMPOWERING THE GOVERNMENT AND WOMEN
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11. (C) On domestic politics, the Sultan announced that he would hold the first-ever combined meeting of his Cabinet of Ministers and the Majlis al-Shura (the directly elected lower
MUSCAT 00000174 003 OF 003
house of Oman’s bicameral advisory body) on February 26. By meeting together, the Sultan hoped that the Cabinet and the Majlis would learn how to cooperate better and jointly focus on important issues. He commented that both bodies also needed to “demonstrate more leadership” and avoid past foot-dragging on promises made to the populace. “People need to see the results of decisions,” the Sultan stated.
12. (C) Letting Admiral Fallon and the Ambassador in on a “secret,” the Sultan confided that he planned to call for a conference of all “notable women” in Oman in 2009 in a bid to encourage Omani women to expand their participation and leadership in different aspects of Omani society. Minister of Social Development, Dr. Sharifa bint Khalfan al-Yahyaiya (one of Oman’s three female cabinet ministers) will chair the meeting on the Sultan’s behalf. Lamenting that no women won seats in the October 2007 election for the Majlis al-Shura, Sultan Qaboos observed that Omani women were stuck in tradition and needed to be empowered to “take more charge” and to be “less shy.” “Some customs (regarding women),” he added, “shouldn’t be kept.” Nevertheless, gradual change is occurring in Oman, the Sultan asserted. His philosophy was to “let it happen,” rather than hold it up to public debate, as the latter course of action often led to factional fighting, internal strife, and other ills.
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A RECURRENT THEME: MORE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT
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13. (C) In concluding the meeting, Sultan Qaboos returned to his goal of improving the responsiveness of the Omani government to citizen concerns. He stated that he would be pressing “harder” on his ministers to engage in more and better public relations efforts before the Omani police and to effectively enforce their decisions so that the people could see the benefits of announced actions. Giving one particular example, the Sultan said that rather than simply announce a new development project, the government should explain the downstream employment opportunities the project would generate for Omani citizens. Effective cooperation between ministries and the Majlis Oman was also needed to strengthen the civil institutional framework in Oman, the Sultan added.
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COMMENT
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14. (S/NF) In discussing his desire for operational change in the senior government ranks, the Sultan twice implied (but did not directly state) that such change was needed to prepare the country for his eventual departure from power. The Sultan’s comments indicated that he may feel the government is too dependent on his authority and should be empowered to run more effectively without constant direction from the palace. End Comment.
15. (U) This message has been reviewed by Admiral Fallon. GRAPPO
Bron: WikiLeaks
Thursday, 07 August 2008, 07:43
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 000565
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/07/2018
TAGS PREL, PARM, IR, MU
SUBJECT: OMAN REMAINS WARY OF IRANIAN EXPANSIONISM
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo per 1.4 (B and D).Summary
——-
1. (S/NF) Minister of the Royal Office and head of the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Ali bin Majid al-Ma’amari, reviewed Oman’s view on Iran from a security perspective, highlighting Omani awareness of Iran’s deceptive tactics and expansionist ideological desires in the region. During an introductory meeting with NAVCENT commander VADM William Gortney, accompanied by the Ambassador, General Ali addressed the Iranian nuclear file, security in the Strait of Hormuz, and Iranian interference in the region. Ali Majid’s suspicious view of Iran stands in stark contrast to conciliatory if not obsequious public comments of Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin ‘Alawi regarding Iran and its role in the region. End summary.
Won’t Oppose Further Sanctions on Iran
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2. (S/NF) Characterizing Oman’s preference for “frankness and clarity,” General Ali began his comments on Iran by noting the reality of Iran as a nearby neighbor, which influenced Oman’s relations with Iran. Toward the end of the discussion, he compared Oman’s normal relations with Iran to the relations of other GCC members with Iran. Throughout the meeting, he frequently touched on the theme of how different Oman was from other GCC member states, whose real intentions and positions often eluded Omani comprehension.
3. (S/NF) The Iranian nuclear issue stood at the forefront of the General’s mind. He described the nuclear file as an international issue, noting that resolution of this issue should be dealt with through international bodies such as the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Oman would respect decisions of these groups and play its role in the international community. Oman would not oppose imposition of further measures against Iran by the international bodies; however, Oman did not want to play an active role in advocating for such measures itself.
Iranian Intentions Clear: Stall for Time
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4. (S/NF) Ali Majid stated that Oman was aware of Iranian stall tactics in the talks over the nuclear issue. Instead of responding by the August 5 deadline, the Iranian side offered a new initiative for talks, confirming reports from the U.S. and others that Iran indeed is trying merely to buy time. Letting the 5 August deadline pass in responding positively to the P5 1 proposal made the Iranian intention to stall “very clear to Oman.” The Ambassador noted that the U.S. has been working with allies around the world, and especially within the EU, to further restrict Iranian economic activity in an effort to influence Iran’s position on the nuclear file. General Ali agreed that sanctions to date were having an impact on the Iranian economy, despite Iran’s public denials. Moreover, he said, Iran believed the U.S. would never attack Iran, a belief that encouraged Iran to persist in its stall tactics. Nevertheless, he advocated a non-military solution as the best option for the U.S., and suggested that over the long term, establishment of U.S. relations at some level with the Iranian government might enable the U.S. to better influence the Iranian government and people.
Empty Threats Against the Strait
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5. (S/NF) Responding to the Ambassador’s question about recent Iranian statements threatening the Strait of Hormuz, Ali Majid dismissed the threats as “empty words” and perhaps a feeble attempt to up its bargaining leverage vis a vis the P5 1. VADM Gortney echoed the Ambassador’s comments that such rhetoric negatively impacted the world’s view of Iran and ultimately would undermine Iran’s standing in the international community. On this same issue, the General expressed his pleasure with the White House press statement on August 5 responding to the IRGC commander’s comments regarding closure of the Strait, agreeing that Iranian closure of the strait would be suicide (i.e., more harmful to Iran’s own economic interests). He also commended the U.S. for not escalating the rhetoric but instead putting Iran’s comments into proper perspective.
Iraq and Iranian Expansionism
MUSCAT 00000565 002 OF 003
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6. (S/NF) Prior to delving into the nuclear issues, Ali Majid acknowledged that Iranian interference in Iraq prevented achievement of a stable security environment there. He allowed that, at a minimum, Iran indirectly supported Shi’a militia in Iraq. Elaborating on his theme of “Iranian expansionist” ideology, he noted that the Iranian national radio broadcast commenced with the prelude “the voice of the Islamic Republic from Tehran.” Focusing on “from Tehran,” he astutely raised Omani concerns that such language revealed Iran’s true intentions: a “greater Islamic Republic” with Tehran at its center. He further speculated that Iran wanted to give the impression that the Islamic Republic might already encompass “Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and even the Gulf.”
7. (S/NF) Ali Majid linked the nuclear issue and the interference in Iraq by speculating that a resolution might entice Iran into ceasing its interference in Iraq. He offered a rhetorical question on whether Iran was serious about challenging the major powers or is it posturing in the media for domestic consumption. He conceded that he truly did not know the answer, but that with Iran’s continued attitude on the nuclear issue, the security situation in Iraq would remain unresolved. Citing Oman’s preference for a non-military solution, he nevertheless acknowledged that a nuclear-armed Iran as opposed to war with Iran posed “an extremely difficult dilemma for all of us.”
Playing to Their Domestic Audience
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8. (S/NF) Acknowledging Iran’s revolutionary zeal, the General attempted to put Iranian public statements in perspective when he described as exaggerations those comments by Iranian President Mahmud Ahmed-I Nejad or other Iranian figures, particularly regarding military capabilities. “Countries that believe they have some specific military weapons advantages usually keep them secret,” he averred. He asserted that in the end, all power resided with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
9. (S/NF) Ali Majid portrayed Shi’a ideology as another factor complicating possible military conflict with Iran. Iranian leaders would not balk at sacrificing a quarter of their 60 million citizens in a military conflict. The Shi’a tradition of martyrdom spanned 14 centuries. The annual self-flagellation of Shi’a over 1,400 years served as an example of this martyr psychology. Beyond its Shi’a ideology, pride in its Persian national identity compelled Iran to demand international recognition and respect.
10. (S/NF) Returning back to comments about GCC countries, General Ali singled out Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar as three Gulf countries that probably would want the U.S. to strike Iran. However, he urged the U.S. to determine whether such voices were speaking on the basis of logic or emotion. He likened private entreaties of these countries to the U.S. for military action on Iran to the Iraqi opposition in exile providing the U.S. false information on Iraq that led to the invasion of Iraq. At the beginning of the meeting, Ali Majid had noted that, in contrast to Oman, other GCC members did not always speak with candor or clarity, leaving Oman to question the real motivations or intentions of its GCC brethren.
11. (S/NF) Punctuating his comments about Iran’s irrationality, Ali Majid pointed to Libyan leader Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s recent comment that “Iran is crazy” not to pay attention to the history of Yugoslavia and Iraq, whose ignoring of U.S. pressure resulted in their collapse. Interestingly, he referred to Qadhafi’s transformation from pariah to emerging member of the international community by noting that Qadhafi had once been “our enemy.”
Oman in a “Strategic Relationship” with the U.S.
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12. (S) Shifting from Iran, Ali Majid underscored Oman’s “strategic relationship” with the U.S. and highlighted Oman’s cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism issues. He described Oman’s zero tolerance for extremism and refusal to negotiate with terrorists as a policy established at least since 1970 (the year of the Sultan’s assumed power). Oman has been and continues to prepare itself to confront terrorism, he said, as it is not exempt from the plotting of terrorists. While Oman is “encircled by problems” — specifically mentioning Yemen, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan —
MUSCAT 00000565 003 OF 003
Oman remains vigilant in preventing such problems from reaching the Sultanate. On the topic of Oman’s partnership with the U.S., he harkened back to when the Soviets had sought a warm water port during the time of their invasion of Afghanistan and were rebuffed by Muscat as an example of how “Oman has stood at the side of the U.S.” He also highlighted the irony that now the world faced “not the Soviets but the Taliban.” He quickly followed this by noting that the U.S. would be wise to support talks with moderate members of the Taliban, which Oman encouraged as a way toward achieving security in Afghanistan.
13. (S/NF) Participants in the meeting included VADM Gortney, the Ambassador, the admiral’s executive officer, Embassy Muscat’s OMC Chief, and GRPO (notetaker). Sayyid Munthir bin Majid al-Sa’id, head of the Royal Office Liaison and Coordination Service participated as notetaker and translator for General Ali.
Comment
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14. (S/NF) In light of recent, more conciliatory statements by Minister Responsible for foreign Affairs Yusuf bin ‘Alawi, Ali Majid’s blunt assessment of Iranian intentions comes as refreshing reassurance of the official Omani position on Iran. While careful to flag Oman’s longstanding preference for a non-military solution to the Iran question and, less directly, Oman’s inability to actively confront Iranian obstinacy, the Sultanate nevertheless maintains a clear-eyed view of Iran, its increasingly threatening behavior and the potential repercussions for the region. His comments regarding attitudes and perceptions of fellow GCC members were startling as they would appear to confirm oft stated views of GCC counterparts of Oman as the sometimes “odd man out” in the GCC. Ali Majid’s comments suggest that while not entirely comfortable with this, the Omanis acknowledge it. Ali Majid, as the Sultan’s top security official and advisor, is known for taking a more hard-line view of matters relating to regional security. However, given his closeness to the Sultan and his status as a member of the inner-most circle of the Sultan’s confidants, such views to a senior U.S. officer can be assumed to accord with those of Qaboos. GRAPPO
Bron: WikiLeaks
Tuesday, 23 February 2010, 10:47
C O N F I D E N T I A L DOHA 000070
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/13/2020
TAGS PREL, KWBG, KPAL, IR, QA
SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY’S MEETING WITH QATAR’S AMIR
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).————–
(C) KEY POINTS
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— The Amir of Qatar urged the U.S. in his February 14 meeting with Senator John Kerry (D-MA) to do everything in its power to find a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Amir said the best way to begin is by moving first on the Syrian track.
— In Qatar’s view, now is the time to reach out to Damascus. The Syrian Government can help Arab extremists make tough choices, but only if the U.S., whose involvement is essential, demonstrates to Syria early on a willingness to address the return of the Golan Heights and supports Turkey’s mediation efforts between Israel and Syria.
— According to the Amir, Hamas will accept the 1967 border with Israel, but will not say it publicly so as to lose popular Palestinian support.
— The Egyptians’ goal, according to the Amir, is to stay in the game and maintain their relationship with the U.S., which is built around brokering regional peace, for as long as possible.
— The Amir recommended that the U.S. and Qatar establish a small bilateral committee to discuss how to advance regional peace. Qatar can help move Hamas, because Qatar does not “play in their internal politics.” That does not mean Qatar shares Hamas’ ideology, stressed the Amir.
— On Iran, the Amir said President Ahmadinejad is strong because he is uncorrupted. The Amir also advised the U.S. to continue ts efforts to open a dialogue with the Iranian ladership.
End Key Points.
1. (C) Senator Joh Kerry (D-MA), the Chairman of the Senate Foreig Relations Committee(SFRC), joined by Ambassador,P/E Chief, and SFRC staff member Dr. Jonah Blank met February 14 with the Amir of Qatar, Hamad bn Khalifa Al Thani. The meeting took place at Waba Palace, the residence of the Amir, and the Amir began the meeting by pointing out that the comfortable chairs on which the U.S. party was seated were made in Syria.
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IMPORTANCE OF THE SYRIAN TRACK
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2. (C) This opening led Senator Kerry to remark that he had held great discussions with Syria’s President, Bashar Al-Asad, when he met him in Damascus some months ago. The Amir said President Asad is committed to “big change,” but Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri’s death and complications resulting from Syria’s alleged involvement in it had brought about “complications” for Asad. The Amir added that “Bashar is still young and can grow.”
3. (C) Senator Kerry said he took away from his visit to Damascus that Asad wants change. The Amir added that the Syrian President also wants peace with Israel and that the arrival of a U.S. Ambassador in Damascus would help in this regard. Senator Kerry said he had wanted a U.S. Ambassador in Syria a year ago, but agreed that the naming of an Ambassador is a positive development.
4. (C) The Amir cautioned that the Syrians will not accept everything the U.S. proposes, stressing that the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights continues and that the return of this land to Syria is paramount for Damascus. The Amir observed that the “Syrians have lost confidence in the U.S. and that the Israelis now have the upper hand in the region because of the support of the United States.” The Israeli leaders need to represent the people of Israel, who themselves do not trust Arabs. The Amir said this is understandable and “we can’t blame them” because the Israelis have been “under threat” for a long time.
5. (C) What has changed, continued the Amir, is that Arabs “for sure” now want two states — Israel and Palestine. When you consider that many in the region perceive that Hizballah drove Israel out of Lebanon and Hamas kicked them (at least initially) out “of the small piece of land called Gaza,” it is actually surprising that the Israelis still want peace. The region, however, is still “far away” from peace, concluded the Amir.
6. (C) Senator Kerry responded that in his long experience with the region, it was not unusual for people to take positions adverse to their own interests. Yasser Arafat went from living as a terrorist in Tunisia to signing an agreement with Israel on the White House lawn. The transformation of Arafat is an example of how actors in the region need to take risks if we are to move forward in advancing regional peace. Turning the conversation back to Syria, Chairman Kerry pointed out that Syria’s facilitation of arms to Hizballah and its turning a blind eye to missile upgrades in Lebanon do not represent risk-taking in the promotion of peace.
7. (C) The Amir pointed out that any progress toward regional peace had come about due to American involvement. He implied that it would take U.S. intervention on the Syrian-Israeli track to address these issues and asked Senator Kerry what he would have Damascus do.
8. (C) The Chairman responded that President Asad needs to make a bolder move and take risks. He observed that if the Syrian President wants peace and economic development for his country, he needs to be more statesman-like, which would in turn help Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu engage him.
9. (C) The Amir agreed with Senator Kerry’s assessment of Asad’s aims and said he is ready for peace, but asked if the Israelis are ready. Would Israel accept to resume Turkey’s mediation between Syria and Israel? Would the U.S. play a role in advancing the Syria track?
10. (C) If we can get Abu Mazen back to the negotiating table, we can engage on border issues — including Israel’s borders with Syria, advised Senator Kerry. Abu Mazen right now is not strong enough, though, to make necessary compromises with Israel because the Palestinian people have wanted him to stick to his guns on a settlement freeze and the Goldstone Report. The Chairman added that Netanyahu also needs to compromise and work the return of the Golan Heights into a formula for peace.
11. (C) The Amir encouraged the U.S. to work the Golan Heights issue first. He stressed that Syrians are very different from Iranians in “mentality,” and said the Syrians turned to Iran for support only because they had nowhere else to go. Now is the time, the Amir told Senator Kerry, to reach out to Damascus.
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PARAMETERS FOR DISCUSSION
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12. (C) Senator Kerry responded that the U.S. is prepared to play a strong role in bringing about peace in the region. President Obama, said the Chairman, understands that he personally must engage and do so strongly. The Senator told the Amir that in his speech to the U.S.-Islamic Forum the previous evening, the Senator had focused on former President Clinton’s parameters for peace and the 2002 Arab League peace initiative. Now, said the Senator, is the time to put those back on the table and resume talking, with the U.S. acting as a legitimate agent of peace. Chairman Kerry told the Amir he is convinced that we can see great progress in the coming year by moving swiftly from proximity talks, to direct talks between the parties and ending with final status discussions.
13. (C) To be successful, continued Senator Kerry, we must begin by agreeing at the outset the amount of land each side (Israelis and Palestinians) will obtain in the end and use that understanding to draw the borders. If both sides make good compromises, we can address the settlement issues in the context of giving something up so that the borders, when drawn, contain the agreed-upon amounts of land for both sides. The Amir agreed with the Senator’s assessment and complimented President Obama for being the first U.S. President to take on the Middle East conflict in the first year of his term.
14. (C) Continuing the presentation of his ideas on the parameters of peace between Israel and the Palestinians, Senator Kerry noted that one of the biggest problems for Israel is the potential return of 5-6 million Palestinian refugees. The parties broached the return issue in discussions at Taba and agreed that the right of Palestinian return would be subject to later negotiation, pointed out the Chairman. If we can proceed from that point on the right of return, the Senator believes there is an “artful way” to frame the negotiations on borders, land swaps, and Jerusalem as a shared capital. 15. (C) Any negotiation has its limits, added Senator Kerry, and we know for the Palestinians that control of Al-Aqsa mosque and the establishment of some kind of capital for the Palestinians in East Jerusalem are not negotiable. For the Israelis, the Senator continued, Israel’s character as a Jewish state is not open for negotiation. The non-militarization of an eventual Palestinian state and its borders can nonetheless be resolved through negotiation.
16. (C) The Amir underscored that Abu Mazen needs Arab support to make the above happen. Hamas “for sure,” he said, will accept the 1967 border but will not say it publicly so as to lose popular Palestinian support.
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DEALING WITH THE EXTREMISTS
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17. (C) Senator Kerry told the Amir he knew Qatar could help the U.S. but asked how we deal with those who advocate violence. The Amir said the short answer is to work the Syrian track, which means pushing for Israel’s return of the Golan Heights to Syria. The Amir said return of the Golan is important not just to Syria but also to Hizballah and Iran. The U.S. must bear in mind that Misha’al, a leader of Hamas based in Damascus, has drawn the conclusion that the Oslo accords were bad for Arafat. He lost the support of his own people and died living under Israeli siege. The Syrians can help Misha’al and others make tough choices, but only if the U.S. demonstrates to Syria early on a willingness to address the Golan. Senator Kerry responded that the U.S. would accept a legitimate discussion of the Golan Heights.
18. (C) What is more, said the Amir, the U.S. needs to support Turkey’s mediation between Israel and Syria. It is important that the U.S. encourage Israel to understand that that resolving the status of the Golan Heights is very important to the United States.
19. (C) Senator Kerry asked the Amir if Hamas is under pressure given the circumstances in Gaza. The Amir answered by saying that Hamas needs Iranian support. He added that the biggest misconception in the region is that the Syrians, who host Hamas leaders in Damascus, go to Iran because they like the Iranians. This is wrong. Syria goes to those who will not shun them.
————-
ROLE OF EGYPT
————-
20. (C) Returning to the pressure Hamas is facing, Senator Kerry observed that economic development in the West Bank is taking place, but not in Gaza. The Palestinian reconciliation that would make possible developmental assistance in Gaza has not happened. The Egyptians have not delivered, said Senator Kerry.
21. (C) The Amir said the Egyptians’ goal is to stay in the game and maintain their relationship with the U.S., which is built around brokering Middle East peace, for as long as possible. According to the Amir, Fatah and Hamas agreed on a memorandum of understanding, but the Egyptians wanted it changed. The Amir remarked that he has a feeling he knows which capital (Cairo) is the source of reports that Gaza is under pressure. He said the economic pressure in Gaza on families is not what it was. He offered as an example that Qatar Charity recently offered a family in Gaza 500 USD, but the family declined the gift saying its members had enough to get by and suggested another family that was in more dire need of assistance. The Amir said the notion that a family would turn down money is new.
22. (C) The Amir told Senator Kerry that everyone knows “Egypt has a problem with the Muslim Brotherhood. Okay, we understand. But Egypt should not expect the world to take external actions that would help it internally.”
23. (C) Asked his advice for President Obama, the Amir recommended the establishment of a small U.S.-Qatar committee to discuss how to proceed. Qatar is close to Hamas, emphasized the Amir, because “we don’t play in their internal politics.” That does not mean we share their ideology or do not disagree with them. “I can remember many arguments with them (Hamas) on the 1967 border with Israel.” The Amir noted that he had mediated with Hamas previously at the U.S. request, namely when he urged Hamas at the previous Administration’s request to participate in Palestinian elections.
24. (C) Returning to the leadership of Hamas, Senator Kerry asked the Amir for his insights into how the leadership, with leaders sitting in both Gaza and Syria, makes decisions. The Amir said the impression that Misha’al sits in Damascus and others take orders from him is wrong. Several key players within Hamas are involved in decisions. They have differences over policy, but “the bottom line is that they all want the Palestinians to take their rights from Israel.”
—-
IRAN
—-
25. (C) Senator Kerry observed that the international community is moving toward imposing additional economic sanctions on Iran. Understanding and respecting that Qatar needs to balance its relationships with regional powers, including Iran, the Chairman asked the Amir for his perspective on where we are going on Iran.
26. (C) The Amir answered by affirming that his first obligation is to defend the interests of Qatar. Due to the natural gas field Iran shares with Qatar, Qatar will not “provoke a fight” with Iran. He added that in the history of the two countries, “Iran has not bothered us.” That said, the Amir noted that Iran is an important country in the Middle East. He faulted the U.S. for “making the mistake of speaking up for protesters” after the disputed Iranian presidential elections.
27. (C) The Iranian regime is strong, continued the Amir, because President Ahmadinejad is uncorrupted. “That is the secret to his success.” Khatami is also not corrupted, but as a reformer he is in a weak position. Rafsanjani, on the other hand, is corrupt.
28. (C) Senator Kerry lamented that every communication the current Administration has attempted to the Government of Iran has gone back channel and been met with no response. There have been non-U.S. initiatives, too. Again, no success. The Chairman observed that the Iranians are scared to talk. The Supreme Ayatollah had met with Russian President Putin, but seems not inclined to meet with other political leaders. Our instinct is that we need to find a way to talk to him.
29. (C) Your instinct is right, replied the Amir. The U.S. needs to talk directly with senior Iranian officials. The Amir then asked, “What if I talk to the Iranian President. What would you have me say?”
30. (C) Senator Kerry responded, “The U.S. seeks serious discussion and sought to create a new foundation for a relationship based on Iran’s non-confrontational compliance with IAEA requirements and other mutual interests.” Those interests include dealing with drug-running, the Taliban, and illicit trade. The Chairman told the Amir he feared that Iran still thinks it is dealing with the 1953 America that tried to overthrow the Iranian government.
31. (C) The Amir responded that you cannot blame them for having that attitude, and Senator Kerry agreed, adding that the U.S. has a very different posture in the post-Cold War world of today. Iran has ambitions; I know this from other regional leaders, said the Senator. These are the first words that come out of their mouths.
32. (C) Iran wants to be a “big power,” agreed the Amir, but what sort? He reminded Senator Kerry the U.S. should not forget that Iranians are Persian and the U.S. needs to approach them in that framework.
33. (C) Senator Kerry stressed that the U.S. “would love to have that dialogue.” The U.S. respects Iranian civilization — talent, art, culture, etc. It is crazy to continue on this collision course. The region needs schools and jobs, emphasized the Chairman, not another war. The Amir agreed that “demographics are a big worry.” Not just for the countries in the region but for the U.S. too.
34. (C) Many scientific and technological transformations are underway, noted the Senator, “but Iran misinterprets the road to being a great power and the degree to which the international community is concerned about Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.” We are at a “fork in the road,” and Iran must choose between confrontation or building partnerships. If the latter, we can open up new opportunities for cooperation in the sciences, technology, education, robotics, energy and other ongoing transformations.
35. (C) Going back to the speech he had delivered in Doha the previous evening, Senator Kerry told the Amir that 17 former U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense had come out in favor of eliminating nuclear weapons. Every stop closer to realizing that goal is a sign of progress, but “no one believes Iranian nukes get us closer to that goal.”
36. (C) Senator Kerry reported that leaders of regional Arab countries tell me they want nuclear weapons if the Iranians have them. The Amir responded that he did not believe they were serious, but are saying this to put additional pressure on Iran.
37. (C) The Chairman noted that the disputed Iranian presidential elections may have derailed U.S. efforts to have serious dialogue with Tehran. The Amir agreed, offering that the Israelis are also using Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons as a diversion from settling matters with the Palestinians. The historical backdrop of Arab-Persian relations does not help, the Amir added.
————–
FINAL THOUGHTS
————–
38. (C) The Amir advised the U.S. to continue trying to open a dialogue with the Iranian leadership. He also told Senator Kerry the U.S. needs to tell the Israelis they are causing the U.S. to lose the hearts and minds of Muslims. There was a time, such as during the Suez Canal crisis, when the Arabs loved the Americans and disliked the British and French, he said.
39. (C) Senator Kerry asked the Amir how the U.S. goes about changing its reputation. The Amir said first and foremost the U.S. must do everything in its power to find a lasting solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the best way to begin is by moving first on the Syrian track.
40. (C) The Chairman of the SFRC said he expects a genuine effort by the President this year on an agreement and expressed his hope that Iranian issues would not complicate matters. The Amir agreed, adding that China likes the distraction for the U.S. as its forces fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.
41. (C) Senator Kerry concurred, noting that China is lending the U.S. money and expanding its influence at U.S. expense. He added that he ran against President George W. Bush saying the war with Iraq was the wrong war in the wrong place and time.
42. (C) The Amir closed the meeting by offering that based on 30 years of experience with the Iranians, they will give you 100 words. Trust only one of the 100.
43. (U) CODEL Kerry has cleared this message.
Lebaron
Bron: WikiLeaks
Sunday, 20 December 2009, 12:14
S E C R E T DOHA 000728
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS ENRG, PREL, TRGY, EPET, QA
SUBJECT: QATAR,S PRIME MINISTER ON IRAN: “THEY LIE TO US;
WE LIE TO THEM.”
Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).— Deputy Secretary of Energy Poneman and Ambassador met December 10 with Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ) to discuss energy research and development, critical infrastructure protection, and Iran.
— HBJ indicated Qatar,s interest in a bilateral critical infrastructure protection partnership.
— The PM was skeptical about the plausibility of Iranian acceptance of a nuclear compromise, saying he would be shocked if Iran abided by a deal to ship Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) out of Iran.
— The best way to deal with the Iranians, he said, is to get them to dictate the terms of any such deal. The U.S. and its partners should strive to get the Iranians to put the details in writing, including timetables for implementation.
— HBJ characterized Qatar,s relationship with Iran as one in which “they lie to us, and we lie to them.”
— According to HBJ, the GOQ tells Iran that it should “listen to the West,s proposal or there will be military action. If not by the U.S., then by the Israelis by the middle of next year.”
End Key Points.
1. (C) Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman and Ambassador met December 10 with Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani. Also present on the American side was State Department Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, David Goldwyn. DepSec Poneman thanked the Prime Minister for the meeting and expressed his hope that the U.S. and Qatar could strengthen their bilateral and investment ties.
————————————–
(C) CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
————————————–
2. (C) The Deputy Secretary extended USG appreciation to the Prime Minister for Qatar,s support for the victims of Hurricane Katrina. The PM observed in response that “We might have our own Katrina,” an apparent reference to security concerns arising from Qatar,s relationship with Iran. Deputy Secretary offered U.S. help to Qatar in protecting its critical infrastructure and in addressing its broader security concerns. Expressing interest in critical infrastructure protection, HBJ said he would talk to the Ministries of Energy and Interior on how best to take advantage of U.S. assistance.
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT
———————————
3. (C) The Deputy Secretary raised science and technology investment, noting DoE interest in partnering with the GOQ on energy-related research and development projects. As an example of possible cooperation, DepSec Poneman cited computer simulation, emphasizing that the DOE national laboratories are international leaders in the field.
4. (C) The Deputy Secretary reported that DoE had recently invested in a nanotechnology program and cited this as another possible area of cooperation, telling the PM there are additional opportunities for GOQ partnerships with private labs. Shaykh Hamad immediately expressed strong interest in nanotechnology, and asked the DepSec to provide him with a paper on that subject. The DepSec agreed, and added that he would be pleased to host Shaykh Hamad at the Sandia nanotechnology facility or another national lab.
5. (C) Turning to genomics and solar technology as they relate to food production and Qatar,s National Food Security Program, Shaykh Hamad told the Deputy Secretary that he supported research in those fields, but expressed his opinion that Qatar,s investment in food and solar technology must be done on a commercial basis.
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(S) IRAN,S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
—————————
6. (S) DepSec Poneman asked HBJ for his views on Iran,s nuclear program. The Deputy Secretary noted that the USG had entered into recent discussions with Iran not out of naivet, but as an effort to address a humanitarian concern (the need for medical isotopes) while also attempting to remove a
meaningful amount of special nuclear material. Even though the effort had not to date resulted in Iranian agreement, it had borne fruit in the form of Russian and Chinese support for the most recent resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna. The PM expressed his skepticism that the West would be able to reach a deal with Iran,s leaders, saying “I,d be surprised and shocked if the Iranians do a deal. You always think you have a deal with them and then you don,t.” He continued, “The EU, Chirac, and Solana…they all thought they had a deal… Solana said two weeks; I advised him it would take two years.”
7. (S) Asked for his advice on how best to approach the Iranians, HBJ said it is imperative that the Iranians commit to draft any deal, including a timetable. He reiterated that it is important to “make them tell you (what they will do). Otherwise they will say ‘yes, but…’ and the ‘but’ will be worse than a ‘no.'” The Deputy Secretary countered that, “They don,t want to make a proposal.” To which HBJ responded, “You don,t understand. Even Mousavi can,t make a deal!” Poneman pressed the issue, saying the U.S. would not be offering a better deal than what is currently on the table. The Prime Minster said, “I know, but this is the way they are.”
8. (S) Referring to the current proposal on the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), Deputy Secretary Poneman stressed: “This is a fleeting opportunity. If they don,t take this deal, what comes next is worse.” The PM noted that the Iranians frequently press the Qataris to have dialogue on their shared natural gas field and attempt to expand the dialogue to include other subjects. HBJ said that the Qataris “are always throwing cold water on their ideas.”
9. (S) On Qatar,s close ties with Iran, the PM added that he knows the U.S. becomes upset at times by what it hears about the Qatar/Iran relationship. However he characterized the relationship as one in which “They lie to us, and we lie to them.” Poneman replied by underscoring that “It would be helpful if everywhere they went, they (the Iranians) heard the same thing.” The PM said for Qatar,s part, he had told Iran that it should “listen to the West, s proposal or there will be military action. If not by the U.S., then by the Israelis by the middle of next year.” Poneman observed that the Russians had pressed the Iranians hard during the Vienna negotiations, reinforcing the view that Iranian failure to accept the Tehran Research Reactor deal would lead back to the UN Security Council. The PM asked if the U.S. believes the Russians were in agreement with the U.S. on the possibility of harsher measures. Poneman replied that, for now, the Russians appear to be holding a similar line to the USG on the TRR deal and we remain in close contact with Moscow.
10. (U) This cable has been cleared by DepSec Poneman at Department of Energy. LeBaron
Bron: WikiLeaks
Wednesday, 02 January 2008, 18:07
S E C R E T CAIRO 000009
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2018
TAGS PREL, PGOV, IS, IZ, SY, EG
SUBJECT: CODEL VOINOVICH MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Stuart Jones Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D)1. (S) Summary. EGIS Chief Omar Soliman told Ambassador and a visiting Codel led by Senator George Voinovich December 31 that he is optimistic progress will be made on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. However, Soliman was concerned with continuing Israeli criticism of Egyptian anti-smuggling efforts. He was worried that the Egyptians would not be able to work out an arrangement with the Israelis for Hajj pilgrims to return to Gaza. On Iran, Soliman said that the USG’s release of the National Intelligence Estimate had altered the calculus through which Arab states are interacting with Iran. On Iraq argued that the Iraqi government needed to amend its constitution and that Prime Minister Malaki should not deal with the Iraqi people in a “sectarian way.” End summary.
2. (S) Soliman led off the New Year’s Eve meeting by telling the Codel that the region is at a special, critical juncture. Egypt is America’s partner. Sometimes we have our differences. But Egypt will continue to provide the USG with its knowledge and expertise on the critical regional issues, such as Lebanon and Iraq. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the core issue; Soliman contended a peaceful resolution would be a “big blow” to terrorist organizations that use the conflict as a pretext. For this reason, President Mubarak is committed to ending the Israeli-Arab “stalemate.”
3. (S) Soliman applauded the Administration’s efforts, commenting that Annapolis had given hope and begun a process. The timing is right for progress based on four factors. First, the PA leadership is moderate and willing to negotiate. Second, Hamas is isolated and politically cut off in Gaza. Third, the Israelis are ready for peace; Soliman assessed that the GOI coalition is broad and strong, and larger than Rabin’s coalition of the mid-nineties. Fourth, Arab states are ready to see an end to “the struggle.”
4. (S) Soliman stressed that Egypt stands ready to help the U.S. effort. The GOE knows both the Palestinians and the Israelis, and knows the obstacles to peace. Soliman recommended two steps be taken. First, both the Israelis and Palestinians must be pressed hard to sign an agreement, which the U.S. and international community could endorse, to be implemented at the proper time. Second, the U.S. should insist that “phase one” of the Roadmap should be completed before the end of 2008.
5. (S) Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Soliman opined that the Palestinian Authority was ready to sign an agreement, but that establishment of a state may take between 1-3 years. While Hamas is isolated politically and unable to stop an Israeli-PA agreement, it remains entrenched in Gaza, and it was unclear to Soliman how long that would last. At one point in the discussion, Soliman seemed to imply Hamas may remain in control of Gaza for more than a year; at another juncture, he told Senator Voinovich that if negotiations proceeded briskly, Hamas may be forced to cede power in Gaza in 3-4 months. The bottom line for Hamas, according to Soliman, is that they must be forced to choose between remaining a resistance movement or joining the political process. They cannot have it both ways, he said.
6. (S) Palestinian training: Soliman reiterated GOE willingness to train and support Palestinian security forces. He claimed that the GOE had training facilities ready, but that he was waiting for an answer from U.S. Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton. (Note: We have advised Soliman that initial training of Palestinian security forces will take place in Jordan, and that we will revisit the option of training in Egypt this spring. End note). He continued that the GOE would keep pressure on Hamas but will maintain “low-level” contacts with Hamas. Egypt, he said, wants Hamas isolated. The Qassam rocket attacks must stop. When they do stop, the GOE will ask Israel to “meet quiet with quiet.”
7. (S) Border issues: Senator Voinovich asked Soliman why the Israelis continue to report problems with Egypt’s anti-smuggling efforts. Soliman said that the Israelis do not complain to him directly, and that GOI-GOE cooperation and exchange of information continues. He was at a loss as to why Israeli politicians continue to criticize Egypt publicly. The GOE would like the USG to be included in the GOI-GOE LAWIO discussions, but the Israelis continue to object. “They don’t want a witness in the room,” Soliman said. Nevertheless, Soliman was willing to turn the page. “We have a short time to reach peace. We need it. We need to wake up in the morning with no news of terrorism, no explosions, and no news of more deaths. We want everyone happy. That is the Egyptian dream.”
8. (S) Syria: Congressman Turner asked if Iran and/or Syria might be play a spoiler role. Soliman answered that Syria wants desperately to halt the United Nations special tribunal on the Hariri assassination. At the same time, the SARG is ready to negotiate with the Israelis, and Soliman believed that the GOI also is ready. Syria, Soliman said, can be induced to play a constructive role but added that there are no guarantees, however, on Syrian performance.
9. (S) NIE: Regarding the USG’s National Intelligence Estimate of Iran’s nuclear program, Soliman was concerned that many in the Arab world were recalculating their position vis a vis Iran based on an assumption that the NIE represented a USG policy shift. Soliman said the Egyptians are working to correct this misimpression among Arab states. “We tell the Arab world: Don’t be happy with the NIE and don’t warm up to Iran. We know that the United States will never allow Iran to have a nuclear bomb.”
10. (S) Iran: Soliman said that Iran remains a significant threat to Egypt. It continues to influence Shiaa in Iraq and the Gulf. Iran is supporting Jihad and spoiling peace, and has supported extremists in Egypt previously. If they were to support the Muslim Brotherhood this would make them “our enemy,” he said. The GOE continues to press the Iranian regime to turn over extremists given “safe harbor” in Iran. This issue, he said, will remain an obstacle to improving Egyptian-Iranian relations. (Soliman met with Iranian former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani earlier in the week. Larijani was in Egypt on a week-long “private visit.”
11. (S) Iraq: Soliman said he remains concerned that the Maliki government in Iraq is not representing all Iraqis (i.e. the Sunni population). The GOE has urged Maliki not to deal with the Iraqi people in a sectarian way, and to amend to constitution to allow greater Sunni representation. In addition, the Iraqi government must remove militias from the ranks of the army and police. In the long run, Soliman did not think that the decrease in violence would be sustainable absent these two steps. In addition, Iranian influence is problematic. Soliman said that the GOE had worked to reconcile 21 clans and tribes in Iraq, with good results, and that this kind of efforts had to continue. He assessed that both Sistani and Sadr were practical men, and able to be dealt with.
12. (U) Delegation composition:
Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) Congressman Mike Turner (R-OH) Congressman Steve Pearce (R-NM) Congressman Rob Bishop (R-UT) Congressman Phil Gingrey (R-GA)
13. (U) The delegation did not clear this message. Ricciardone
Bron: WikiLeaks
Monday, 09 February 2009, 16:10
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CAIRO 000231
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
EO 12958 DECL: 02/09/2019
TAGS PREL, KPAL, EG, IS, QA, IR, SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED EGYPTIAN FM ABOUL GHEIT
MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).——-
Summary
——-
1. (S/NF) Madame Secretary, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit has been looking forward to meeting you since your nomination was first announced. The Egyptian leadership, including President Mubarak, are encouraged by the Administration’s immediate attention to the Middle East and your and the President’s early outreach to them. Overall, the Egyptians believe they did not receive fair treatment from the previous Administration and hope to see improvements. Aboul Gheit likely will explain Egypt’s “soft power”–its ability to influence regional events without benefit of deep pockets. He likely will focus more on the strategic challenges of the region–the peace process and Iran–but may also address some pending bilateral matters. He may ask for your support for Egypt to be part of an expanded G8 or G20 and press the candidacy of Egyptian Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. He may not raise human rights (specifically Ayman Nour), political reform, or democratization; but you should. Aboul Gheit will want to discuss Gaza, including smuggling and counter-tunneling; Iran; and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. On Iraq and counter-terrorism, we and the Egyptians see largely eye-to-eye; intelligence cooperation is close and effective; and our military-to-military relationship is durable but stuck in a force-on-force mindset.
2. (S/NF) Summary continued: Aboul Gheit is smart, urbane, with a tendency to lecture and to avoid discussing Egyptian failings with all-purpose recourse to Egyptian sovereign pride. However, because this is his first meeting with you and it is in Washington, he may be more inclined to listen. You should thank him for Egypt’s continuing regional leadership, in particular regarding their efforts to bring about a ceasefire in Gaza, and press him for Egypt to continue to use their influence and good offices to achieve a permanent solution to intra-Palestinian infighting and conflict. You should also stress the need for Egypt to more effectively insure that Hamas cannot rearm via smuggling across — or tunneling under — the border with Gaza. Aboul Gheit will press for your attendance at the March 2 Gaza Donors Conference in Cairo, and may complain about unhelpful Qatari and Syrian behavior. He will also want to explore US intentions towards Iran; President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell during his recent visit here that he did not oppose our talking with the Iranians, as long as “you don’t believe a word they say.” End summary.
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Respect and Appreciation
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3. (S/NF) In terms of regional affairs, Special Middle East Envoy Senator George Mitchell struck the right chord during his recent visit to Cairo when he told President Mubarak that he was here to “listen and hear your advice.” The Egyptians have long felt that, at best, we take them for granted; and at worst, we deliberately ignore their advice while trying to force our point of view on them. You may wish to thank Aboul Gheit for the vital role Egypt played in bringing about a ceasefire in Gaza, and its efforts at making it last. You should ask him what the current state of play is between Hamas and Fatah and have him describe Egypt’s vision of the future for the Palestinians, both among their factions, and vis a vis Israel. Note: Although the Egyptians will react well to overtures of respect and appreciation, Egypt is very often a stubborn and recalcitrant ally. In addition, Egypt’s self-perception as the “indispensable Arab state” is contingent on Egyptian effectiveness on regional issues, including Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
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Egypt and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict
—————————————–
4. (S/NF) Although Aboul Gheit was never enthusiastic about the Annapolis Peace process, resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the primary strategic political goal for the Egyptians. They are proud of their role as intermediary, well aware that they are perhaps the only player that can talk with us, the Israelis, and all Palestinian factions. Mubarak hates Hamas, and considers them the same as Egypt’s own Muslim Brotherhood, which he sees as his own most dangerous political threat. Since the
CAIRO 00000231 002 OF 004
June 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza, the Egyptians, under the leadership of intelligence chief Omar Soliman (the de facto national security advisor with direct responsibility for the Israeli-Palestinian account) have shifted their focus to intra-Palestinian reconciliation and establishment of the Hamas-Israel ceasefire. Soliman brokered a half-year-long truce last year, which Hamas broke in December, leading to the Israeli invasion of Gaza. He has recently re-started those efforts, with the goal of getting Hamas to agree to a year-long ceasefire, which should give the Egyptians space to bring about their political goal of Palestinian reconciliation under a technocratic, non-partisan government headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.
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Gaza and Tunnels
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5. (S/NF) Smuggling through the Sinai Peninsula and into Gaza is an old and complicated problem for Egypt. Egypt views a well-armed and powerful Hamas as a national security threat, a point driven home in dramatic fashion by the January 2008 border breach when Hamas bulldozed the old border fence and more than half a million Palestinians poured into Egypt, unchecked and hungry. Since the closure of the Egypt-Gaza border following the June 2007 Gaza takeover by Hamas, most smuggling of consumer goods and weapons has gone underground. The narrow corridor between Egypt and Gaza is as honey-combed with subterranean passageways as a gigantic ant colony.
6. (S/NF) Although it is not directly in Aboul Gheit’s bailiwick, belonging more to the security and intelligence forces, nonetheless the issue of tunnels and rearming Hamas is the subject of intense scrutiny (by Israel and the Congress), and sensitivity (by the Egyptians). Long criticized by Israel for “not doing enough” to halt arms smuggling via tunnels, the Egyptians have stopped complaining and started acting. Egypt has increased efforts to counter arms smuggling by accelerating its $23 million FMF-funded tunnel detection program along the Egypt-Gaza border and requesting U.S. support to purchase four backscatter X-Ray machines to scan vehicles entering the Sinai for weapons and explosives (note Aboul Ghait may not be of this EGIS-originated request). Egypt also continues to cooperate with Israel, especially via intelligence sharing, to prevent militants from Hamas and other extremist organizations from crossing the Gaza border, and on thwarting militant activity in Egypt. Egyptian efforts are all justified under President Mubarak’s pledge that Egypt with “protect its borders.”
7. (S/NF) Egypt will not take any action that could be perceived as collaboration in Israel’s siege of Gaza, and they have been hyper-sensitive to any suggestion that foreigners are assisting them or overseeing their efforts to counter smuggling. Aboul Gheit publicly distanced Egypt from our January MOU with Israel to combat arms smuggling into Gaza, although he knew about it in advance and consulted with Secretary Rice and me about its contents. The Egyptians do not want to be stuck holding the Gaza bag, and must be able to point the finger of blame at Israel for the plight of the Palestinians. At the same time, Egypt has withstood scathing and widespread criticism in the Arab world for refusing to open the Rafah border crossing to supply Gaza. Even during the height of the December fighting, the Egyptians only sent medicine and medical supplies through the Rafah border; all other humanitarian goods went through the Israeli crossing at Kerem Shalom. They likewise insist that Rafah will only reopen to handle Gazan travellers when the Gazan side is under PA control with EU observers according to the 2005 AMA.
8. (S/NF) Ultimately, Egypt believes that the only realistic and viable solution to erode Hamas’ power and stop arms smuggling is the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza and the opening of Gaza’s border to legitimate trade. While in the short term we can best assist the Egyptians with technical know-how and training, long term counter smuggling success will depend on reducing the financial incentives to smuggling by providing the Sinai Bedouin with legitimate economic opportunities and by regularly opening the Gaza borders to trade, thereby reducing economic incentives to smuggle.
———————————-
The March 2 Gaza Donors Conference
———————————-
9. (S/NF) President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell that he
CAIRO 00000231 003 OF 004
wanted to personally invite you to the March 2 Gaza Donors Conference in Cairo. Aboul Gheit will press hard for you to accept this invitation. He is keen to keep up the momentum on Gaza reconstruction and for Egypt to be seen as taking the lead in helping the Palestinians. It is very important to him that this conference be at the ministerial level, and he will be disappointed if you are unable to accept.
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Iraq and Iran
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10. (S/NF) President Mubarak enjoys recounting for visiting members of Congress how he warned former President Bush against invading Iraq, ending with, “I told you so!” and a wag of his finger. In addition, there are Egyptian misgivings about Nuri Al-Maliki and Shia majority rule in Iraq. Egypt therefore will need additional prodding to continue to take steps to help rehabilitate Iraq into the greater Arab world. You should ask Aboul Gheit when he plans to fully open the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad and exchange accredited ambassadors with Iraq (the first Egyptian ambassador to post-Saddam Iraq was assassinated). As for Iran, Mubarak has a visceral hatred for the Islamic Republic, referring repeatedly to Iranians as “liars,” and denouncing them for seeking to destabilize Egypt and the region. He sees the Syrians and Qataris as sycophants to Tehran and liars themselves. There is no doubt that Egypt sees Iran and its greatest long-term threat, both as it develops a nuclear capability and as it seeks to export its “Shia revolution.” Nonetheless, Mubarak told Mitchell pointedly that he did not oppose the U.S. speaking to the Iranians, as long as we did not “believe a single word they say.” Aboul Gheit will be keen to hear your description of U.S. intentions towards Iran. In his conversation with Senator Mitchell, Aboul Gheit carefully noting he was speaking personally, expressed more interest into bringing the Syrians into negotiations again; President Mubarak was not enthusiastic about dealing with the Syrians at this time.
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U.S. Assistance to Egypt
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11. (S/NF) The greatest Egyptian outrage a year ago — Congressional conditioning of $100 million of U.S. assistance to Egypt — may now be moot, according to our latest understanding of the state of play with the FY2009 appropriations language. Beyond the issue of conditioning, the Egyptians resent the U.S. unilateral decision to cut ESF in half, from $415 million in FY-08 to $200 million in FY-09, a level which the Egyptians find embarrassing, not because they need the money (they say), but because it shows our diminished view of the value of our relationship. In my view, it is important to the U.S. to continue an ESF program aimed at health, education, and poverty eradication to demonstrate concern for the Egyptian people as opposed to a strictly military assistance program. Egypt has also been unhappy with the use of these funds to support democracy in Egypt. It would be useful if you could urge that Egypt accept the FY 2009 levels so that we can proceed to program funds to benefit Egypt, while promising to engage in a serious review of the conflicts that exist and a desire to resolve them as soon as possible.
12. (S/NF) Concerning military assistance, the Egyptian political and military leadership feel that they have been “short changed” by our holding to an FMF level of $1.3 billion, (the same level for 30 years despite inflation), and which they contrast with increases to our military assistance to Israel. Finally, Egypt seeks a higher profile in international financial circles (Finance Minister Youssef Boutros Ghali was recently named Chairman of the IMF’s policy-setting committee, the IMFC, the first from a developing country), and Aboul Gheit is likely to ask for your support to include Egypt in expanded G8 and G20 fora.
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Ayman Nour and Saad Eddin Ibrahim
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13. (S/NF) Egypt’s political leadership considers our public chastisement of their treatment of jailed former opposition Al Ghad party leader Ayman Nour as interfering with internal affairs and infringement on national sovereignty. Mubarak takes this issue personally, and it makes him seethe when we raise it, particularly in public. Aboul Gheit’s view is that we have made Ayman Nour a freedom martyr, and a damaging (and
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distorting) prism through which we view our relationship with Egypt. Much the same can be said about Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the outspoken political science professor and democracy activist who is in self-imposed exile in the U.S. because of spurious law suits brought against him for allegedly defaming Egypt. In a negative development in late January, Egypt,s Attorney General-equivalent took action to advance the only criminal case pending against Ibrahim. You should press Aboul Gheit hard on Nour and Ibrahim, and also urge the GOE to stop arresting other less prominent political activists. Nour’s health is bad and he has served more than half his sentence; he deserves a humanitarian pardon. You may wish to lay down a marker for a future discussion on democratization and human rights concerns. You might note that although you and the President want to improve the relationship, Egypt could take some steps to remove these very volatile issues from the agenda.
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Farouq Hosny
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13. (S/NF) Egypt has mounted a full-scale international campaign to support the candidacy of Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. The Arab League and the African Union have already publicly stated their commitment to Hosny, and the Egyptians believe they also have the support of several Europeans, notably the French. Aboul Gheit will also seek US support — or, at least, not to actively oppose — the candidacy of Farouq Hosny as the next Director General of UNESCO. The U.S. informed him last year that we could not support the candidacy and urged Egypt to put forward another name. Abould Gheit will argue Hosny’s merits for facing down the Islamic extremists who want to narrow the space in Egypt for artistic expression. U.S. objections have been to statements Hosny has made that “Israel had no culture. . .it stole cultural ideas from others and claimed them as its own” and other objectionable remarks. If we plan to derail the Hosny candidacy, we must provide a credible alternate, preferably an Arab and/or Muslim. SCOBEY
Rob Harris:
Mike Garde:
Manuel Rodulfo:
Phil:
Klas Wullt:
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