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Sat, April 09, 2011 | 06TELAVIV4256

Israel's Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman attended a meeting at the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, in Jerusalem, in this Feb. 8 file photo. (Ronen Zvulun/Reuters/File)

WikiLeaks: Avigdor Lieberman Moves Towards Israeli Mainstream

Summary:

In a meeting with the Ambassador on October 24, Yisrael Beiteinu (YB) party leader Avigdor Lieberman confirmed that he would join the governing coalition with the titles of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Strategic Threats, perhaps as early as October 25. Lieberman would not predict how Labor would react to YB joining the coalition, but he described Peretz as an “indecisive leader,” and echoed the press in claiming that the Labor Party central committee was against Labor leaving the coalition. (Note: Following two meetings with Olmert, Peretz announced that he will recommend to Labor Party members that Labor remain in the expanded coalition. End Note.) Lieberman maintained that YB would take a hit in the polls for joining the coalition due to disappointment from the right; he described his move as one intended to promote government stability that would allow Prime Minister Olmert the opportunity to focus on the major policy challenges facing Israel rather than worry about keeping his coalition together. The budget will not become a major hurdle now that Yisrael Beiteinu is in the coalition, in Lieberman’s view. Lieberman also discussed Iran — Israel’s number one strategic threat — and his ideas for dealing with the Palestinians and neighboring states. The Ambassador emphasized the importance the U.S. places on implementing the AMA and on Israeli commitments regarding outposts and settlements.

End Summary.

Source: WikiLeaks

Cable dated:2006-10-25T16:56:00

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004256

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2011
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KPAL, KWBG, IS, IR, EG, JO, LE, SY
SUBJECT: LIEBERMAN JOINS THE COALITION

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reason 1.4 (B/D)

1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with the Ambassador on October 24, Yisrael Beiteinu (YB) party leader Avigdor Lieberman confirmed that he would join the governing coalition with the titles of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Strategic Threats, perhaps as early as October 25. Lieberman would not predict how Labor would react to YB joining the coalition, but he described Peretz as an “indecisive leader,” and echoed the press in claiming that the Labor Party central committee was against Labor leaving the coalition. (Note: Following two meetings with Olmert, Peretz announced that he will recommend to Labor Party members that Labor remain in the expanded coalition. End Note.) Lieberman maintained that YB would take a hit in the polls for joining the coalition due to disappointment from the right; he described his move as one intended to promote government stability that would allow Prime Minister Olmert the opportunity to focus on the major policy challenges facing Israel rather than worry about keeping his coalition together. The budget will not become a major hurdle now that Yisrael Beiteinu is in the coalition, in Lieberman’s view. Lieberman also discussed Iran — Israel’s number one strategic threat — and his ideas for dealing with the Palestinians and neighboring states. The Ambassador emphasized the importance the U.S. places on implementing the AMA and on Israeli commitments regarding outposts and settlements. End Summary.

LIEBERMAN’S ROLE IN THE GOVERNMENT

2. (C) Lieberman confirmed that his ministerial portfolio would be focused on strategic threats, namely Iran. In addition, he wants to assume the role of a Director of National Intelligence-like coordinator for Israeli security services (e.g., Mossad, Shin Bet, the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission – IAEC, National Security Council -NSC, etc.) so that the government decision-makers are provided with “the best of Israeli thinking.” He talked of having a “small” 15-20 person staff to assist him in his ministry, which media reports indicate will be located within the office of the Prime Minister.

IRAN IS THE STRATEGIC THREAT

3. (C) Lieberman said a comprehensive/global strategy is needed to deal first and foremost with Iran, which he compared with Nazi Germany. “The Iranian leader is not so stable, and could take dramatic steps…. They state their intention to destroy us very clearly.” All other regional challenges were dependent on how Israel and the U.S. dealt with Iran. The Ambassador noted that discussion of the Iranian threat has been a major component of our strategic dialogue with Israel. Lieberman went on to criticize the recent Lebanon war as failing to deal with Syria and Iran, and he assessed that Israel’s position is now “worse off” than before the war. “Iran has a strong incentive to push a confrontation between Syria and Israel.”

PALESTINIAN PROBLEM REQUIRES A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION

4. (C) Lieberman complained that Israel’s approach to Palestinian issues had always been too narrow. He argued for an approach combining security/military action with economic development and political elements. The Ambassador noted that we also saw economic development and political solutions as critical. In this regard, the Ambassador described USG objectives vis a vis AMA, focusing on the importance of quality of life, freedom of movement, crossings and market access for Palestinians as the best way to prevent power from accruing to Hamas.

OUTPOSTS AND SETTLEMENTS

5. (C) The Ambassador emphasized the importance the U.S. attaches to Israeli commitments to President Bush on outposts and settlements. “These are not the main issues (now),” Lieberman responded, expressing his view that the question of outposts and settlements must be considered “together” as part of a final package rather than as a first, one-sided step. Lieberman, who lives in a West Bank settlement, reiterated that Palestinian economic issues are critical, and said that Israeli outposts and settlements provide jobs to Palestinians. He also claimed that Palestinians “like IDF security.” The Ambassador underscored that many of the outposts were “illegal” under Israeli law, but Lieberman scoffed that there were only 1,000 illegal houses in the West Bank while there were, he claimed, “100,000 illegal (Arab) houses in the Negev and Galilee.” He added that the outposts in the occupied territories were “encouraged — under the table — by former PM Sharon” and argued that their removal would provoke internal conflict in Israel without advancing a comprehensive settlement.

6. (C) Lieberman disparaged the current leadership of the Palestinian Authority. He called President Abbas “weak and corrupted, and no longer relevant;” Hamas are “fanatics;” and Mohammed Dahlan is unreliable and not a player in the West Bank. He said he thought the U.S. and Israel should first find the right Palestinian partner in the West Bank, and mentioned Mohammed Rashid as one Palestinian leader with potential — “Although he is no Woodrow Wilson.” Salam Fayyad would be a good “Number two or number three,” he added.

IMPORTANCE OF JORDAN; WEAKNESS OF EGYPT

7. (C) Jordan must be involved in any steps taken vis a vis the West Bank, which he saw as the place to start, Gaza being mired in chaos. He criticized Sharon for failing to involve Jordan in consultations regarding disengagement. Lieberman was less emphatic about the importance of Egypt. He faulted President Mubarak for being fixated on the political future of his son rather than serious national security challenges, such as Al-Qaeda’s presence in the Sinai. “Egypt may collapse in 15-20 years and become a really radical country.” Possibly mindful of the 2008 U.S. elections, Lieberman stressed: “We have two years to resolve the situation in the West Bank.” Otherwise, in his view, the situation there will become like Gaza. Lieberman argued that the status quo in Gaza was untenable; he anticipated the need for military operations to prevent the continued smuggling of weapons that could threaten southern Israeli cities such as Ashkelon and Ashdod.

8. (C) Lieberman closed the meeting with a caveat: he admitted that his information comes from the media and is neither complete nor fully informed. He sought a subsequent meeting with us on Palestinian issues once he had vetted ideas off the GOI security establishment. The Ambassador agreed to stay in touch.

BIO NOTES

9. (C) Avigdor Lieberman’s small parliamentary office barely contained the smoke from his Tip O’Neill-esque cigar, which he politely snuffed out before the meeting. Despite the media frenzy surrounding the coalition negotiations, Lieberman kept the meeting closed and confidential rather than opt for a photo-op. He speaks Russian, Hebrew, and Yiddish fluently, and is conversant in English. During the meeting, Lieberman only occasionally asked his aide for assistance in finding the most appropriate English expression. He lives in the West Bank settlement of Nokdim (SE of Bethlehem), and professes to have a wide range of Palestinian contacts, both in the territories and abroad. Our Kadima contacts note that Lieberman and Olmert enjoy a comfortable personal relationship, one that will be crucial to coalition stability in the months to come.

10. (C) Comment: At first blush the deal that Olmert has worked out with Lieberman appears to give each something they critically need. Olmert gets a more stable coalition and hopefully can now focus on real issues rather than exclusively on his political situation. It also gives Olmert some respite from Labor and threats by Peretz and company whenever they don’t like the direction he is heading on policy matters close to Labor’s heart. Lieberman, in return, gets a prestigious title and a seat at the policy table. He will also probably gain access to the best daily intel available to Israeli leaders which will allow him to speak with more authority in public debates as well as within the security cabinet. More importantly, this is an important first step for Lieberman in getting into the mainstream of Israeli political life, which he undoubtedly hopes will bolster him when he launches a run at the PMship in the future. The key question is to what extent Olmert will be constrained in moving too far forward vis-a-vis the Palestinians given his new “partner.” It will also be interesting to see how Lieberman’s entry into the PMO affects the pecking order there. XXXXXXXXXXXXJONES