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Sat, Feb 12, 2011 | WikiLeaks

Tahrir Square: Protesters line up against Egyptian military tanks at an entrance to Tahrir Square. (feb 05, 2011; Ivan Watson/CNN)

WikiLeaks: Egypt’s Military Will Ensure Transfer of Power

NDP insider and former minister Dr. Ali El Deen Hilal Dessouki dismissed public and media speculation about succession. He said Egyptian military and security services would ensure a smooth transfer of power, even to a civilian.

Dessouki called opposition parties weak and democracy a “long term goal.” He said that the MB had no legitimate political role, adding that mixing religion and politics in Egypt was not wise and would not be permitted.

Source: WikiLeaks

Reference ID: 09CAIRO1468
Created: 2009-07-30 14:02
Classification: SECRET
Origin: Embassy Cairo

VZCZCXRO0333
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #1468/01 2111444
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301444Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3306
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001468

SIPDIS

NEA/ELA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EG
SUBJECT: NDP INSIDER: MILITARY WILL ENSURE TRANSFER OF POWER

REF: 08 CAIRO 2091

Classified By: Economic-Political Minister-Counselor Donald A. Blome
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. KEY POINTS

— (S) NDP insider and former minister Dr. Ali El Deen Hilal
Dessouki dismissed public and media speculation about
succession. He said Egyptian military and security services
would ensure a smooth transfer of power, even to a civilian.

— (S) Dessouki called opposition parties weak and democracy
a “long term goal.” He said that the MB had no legitimate
political role, adding that mixing religion and politics in
Egypt was not wise and would not be permitted.

¶2. (S) Comment: Dessouki is an NDP insider who has held a
number of key positions. His assurances that the Egyptian
military and security services would ensure a smooth
succession to a civilian (by implication Gamal Mubarak) were
unusually straightforward and blunt. The idea that the
military remains a key political and economic force is
conventional wisdom here. However, other observers tell us
that the military has grown less influential, more fractured
and its leadership weaker in recent years (reftel). They
suggest that in a succession scenario in which President
Mubarak is no longer present, outcomes are less predictable.
End comment.

¶3. (S) On July 22, PolOff met with National Democratic Party
(NDP) Media Secretary, and member of the influential NDP
Policies Committee Dr. Ali El Deen Hilal Dessouki. Without
prompting, he offered newly-arrived PolOff advice on how to
approach political issues in Egypt. He counseled PolOff not
to “run around” town asking questions about Egypt’s next
leader, suggesting that most offered only opinions not facts.
He said that this kind of wide-ranging engagement “by our
friends” demonstrated a certain “naivete.” Dessouki
suggested that PolOff also steer clear of the many
uncorroborated reports and misguided analysis in the local
media. He also underscored a common NDP refrain that Egypt’s
opposition political parties were weak and self-serving.

¶4. (S) Dr. Dessouki’s most important message, he said was to
always keep in mind that “the real center of power in Egypt
is the military,” a reference he said included all security
forces. Dessouki noted that while the military did not
intervene directly in matters of day to day governance, it
leaders were determined to maintain order and that the
importance of a “legal transition” should not be
underestimated. Dessouki did acknowledge that the military
is concerned about maintaining its “corporate interests,” but
was emphatic in his declaration of their commitment to a
“constitutional” transition of power. Dessouki went on to
say that the military has “no objection to a civilian” as the
next president (a remark that can be interpreted as a pointed
reference to Gamal Mubarak). Dessouki then reiterated that
the NDP has not yet selected its candidate for the 2011
presidential elections (a point Gamal Mubarak himself has
made to us).

¶5. (S) Dessouki acknowledged there would be some violence
around the upcoming 2010 parliamentary and 2011 presidential
elections, but suggested security forces would be able to
keep it under control. Widespread politically-motivated
unrest, he said, was not likely because it was not part of
the “Egyptian mentality.” Threats to daily survival, not
politics, were the only thing to bring Egyptians to the
streets en masse. Dessouki said the NDP focus on economic
reform would continue up to the elections and after any
transition of power. He added that Egypt was moving towards
democracy, but that a transition from a “pharoanic” political
system would take a long time.

¶6. (S) Disdainful of its political import, Dessouki said the
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was not a credible political
organization. As evidence of their pure self-interest, he
cited the MB’s refusal to “integrate” and become a part of
the mainstream political process despite invitations from the
last three Egyptian presidents. Dessouki referred to recent
arrests of MB members (septel) as evidence they operated
extra-legally. (Note: Separately, on July 26 Dessouki
publically denied press reports that the NDP is pursuing a
deal with the MB that would promise an end to the arrests in
exchange for a stop to MB “internal and external” activities.
End note.) Dessouki warned that because Egyptians are very
religious people, politics and religion is a volatile mix.
In a more strident tone, Dessouki went on to say that he, and
President Mubarak, “would not tolerate” the existence of

CAIRO 00001468 002 OF 002

political parties with a religious agenda whether Muslim or
Christian and suggested that there was no such thing as a
“moderate Islamist.”

Tueller