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Maandag, 20 December 2010 | Cablegate | Bewerkt door Crethi Plethi

Maged Abdelaziz

WikiLeaks: Egypte Weigerde Kernwapens Na Ineenstorting Sovjet-Unie

Tijdens een ontmoeting tussen de Egyptische ambassadeur voor de Verenigde Naties Maged Abdelaziz en de Amerikaanse onderhandelaar over nucleaire wapenbeheersing, Rose Gottemoeller, op 7 Mei 2009 vertelde Abdelaziz dat Egypte via de zwarte markt nucleaire kennis, materieel en wapens aangeboden had gekregen na de ineenstorting van de Sovjet-Unie.

Volgens Abdelaziz sloeg de Egyptische president Hosni Mubarak het aanbod echter af. Iets wat Gottemoeller in het Amerikaanse memo classificeert als een poging om te tonen dat Egypte een verantwoordelijk lid van de internationale gemeenschap is.

Het onderwerp kwam ter sprake tijdens een gesprek over de oprichting van een kernwapenvrije zone in het Midden-Oosten, iets wat prioriteit had voor Caïro en waar ook de Amerikaanse president Barack Obama zich sterk voor maakte. Begin mei 2009 had Gottemoeller verschillende bilaterale gesprekken met ambassadeurs en topfunctionarissen van Egypte, Canada, Brazilië, Filipijnen, Japan, Algerije en het Verenigd Koninkrijk over de NPT (Non-proliferatieverdrag) bijeenkomst van de Verenigde Naties. Deze gesprekken vonden plaats in de marge van de vergadering van de voorbereidingscommissie, NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), voor de VN bijeenkomst.

In het document lezen we: “In een kennelijke poging om Egypte af te schilderen als een verantwoordelijk lid van de internationale gemeenschap beweerde Abdelaziz dat Egypte nucleaire wetenschappers, materialen en zelfs wapens kreeg aangeboden na de ineenstorting van de Sovjet-Unie, maar dat Egypte al deze aanbiedingen had geweigerd.”

Toen Gottemoeller aan Abdelaziz vroeg hoe hij wist dat dit waar was antwoordde hij dat hij op dat moment zelf in Moskou was en directe persoonlijke kennis over dit feit had.

Het incident roept nieuwe vragen op over wat andere staten of groepen met al het nucleaire materiaal hebben gedaan tijdens de chaos van het uiteenvallen van Rusland en de voormalige Sovjet-republieken in de jaren ’90. Uit het Amerikaanse document valt niet op te maken wie het aanbod aan Egypte heeft gedaan en Maged Abdelaziz heeft geweigerd om commentaar te leveren op het uitgelekte memo.

Maria Rost Rublee, een expert in de geschiedenis van het Egyptische nucleaire programma, verteld desgevraagd dat ze van drie goed ingelichte bronnen (een voormalige Egyptische diplomaat, militair officier, en nucleaire wetenschapper) heeft vernomen dat “(niet overheid) partijen” van een anonieme voormalige Sovjet-republiek hadden geprobeerd om splijtbaar materiaal en technologie te verkopen aan Egypte.

“Mubarak weigerde. Hij was erg voorzichtig geworden na Tsjernobyl, zelfs over kernenergie, en annuleerde zijn nucleaire programma,” zei Rublee, docent aan de universiteit van Auckland en auteur van de studie over “Non-proliferatie normen – Waarom sommige landen kiezen voor het pad van nucleaire terughoudendheid”.

Rublee vertelde dat dit Amerikaanse memo het voor de eerste keer openbaar maakt dat een Egyptische functionaris heeft beweerd dat zijn regering daadwerkelijk kernkoppen en de hulp van nucleaire technici kreeg aangeboden.

Volgens Olli Heinonen, die 27 jaar voor het IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) in Wenen heeft gewerkt, waren het niet vertegenwoordigers van de voormalige staten die nucleair materiaal aanboden, maar mensen die op een gemakkelijke manier probeerden veel geld te verdienen.

Sinds die tijd zijn er enkele kilo’s verrijkt uranium en plutonium in beslag genomen van smokkelaars. En er zijn af en toe meldingen geweest over voormalige sovjet-wapenspecialisten die hun kennis aan het buitenland probeerden te verkopen. Zo heeft het IAEA geprobeerd om erachter te komen wat een Russisch-Oekraïense wetenschapper, die baanbrekend werk had verricht met betrekking tot de Sovjet-atoombom in het Majak complex, deed in Iran in het midden van de jaren ’90. De wetenschapper, nu weer terug in Moskou, is een expert in implosietechnieken die nodig zijn voor het uitrusten van nucleaire kernkoppen.

De vrees dat een terroristische organisatie de beschikking krijgt over een nucleaire bom blijft aanwezig. Zo richt Al Qaida zich bijvoorbeeld op het Pakistaanse nucleaire programma als mogelijke bron voor een terroristische bom, maar een nog groter gevaar is als een al bestaande kernmacht zoals Pakistan door een radicaal Islamistische partij geregeerd gaat worden of via machtsovername de beschikking krijgt over het kernwapenarsenaal van een land. Dat angstscenario is dichterbij dan we denken aangezien het radicaal sjiitische Iran dichtbij het verkrijgen van een kernwapen is.

Tijdens het gesprek ging het ook over Israel en het Vredesproces in het Midden-Oosten waarbij een link werd gelegd naar VN resolutie 984 van 11 April 1995. Deze Resolutie was bedoeld als garantie voor landen die geen kernwapens hebben door vast te leggen dat al het mogelijke gedaan moest worden om een kernoorlog tegen te gaan. Dit gold ook voor het tegengaan van de verspreiding van kernwapens. Gottemoeller wees erop dat het Midden-Oosten (inclusief het Vredesproces en Iran) en de uitvoering van de VN Resolutie 984 de hoogste prioriteit had voor barack Obama.

Maged Abdelaziz erkende dat er inderdaad een verband was met de 1995 Resolutie en het Vredesproces, maar dat dit niet gevolgen mocht hebben voor een snelle uitvoering van de Resolutie. Egypte had, volgens Abdelaziz, zich jarenlang sterk gemaakt voor vrede in het Midden-Oosten en zou dat blijven doen, maar Egypte was niet bereidt om nog eens “50 jaar” te gaan zitten wachten op vooruitgang in de uitvoering van de 1995 Resolutie. Ook zei hij dat een nieuwe aanpak van Iran een goede zaak zou zijn en dat het uitgesloten is dat Iran kernwapens mag bemachtigen. Tegelijk wilde Egypte ook dat de Iraanse zaak rondom kernwapens niet de uitvoering van de 1995 Resolutie in de weg mocht staan.

De bedoeling van de 1995 Resolutie om veiligheid en stabiliteit in de regio te bevorderen hing voor Caïro nauw samen met de binnenlandse veiligheid. Verklaringen van de Israëlische premier over Israëlisch bezit van kernwapens droegen volgens Abdelaziz niet bij aan het bevorderen van een stabiele en veilige situatie. Hij zei dat Egypte zijn regionale veiligheid nooit zou opgeven voor de belangen van de internationale gemeenschap. Al deze punten zouden in een latere ontmoeting tussen Obama en Mubarak opnieuw besproken worden.

Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 13 May 2009, 15:37

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000497
SIPDIS
GENEVA FOR CD DEL, UNVIE FOR IAEA
EO 12958 DECL: 05/11/2019
TAGS PARM, KNNP, NPT
SUBJECT: A/S GOTTEMOELLER,S 5 AND 7 MAY BILATERAL MEETINGS
ON THE MARGINS OF THE NPT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE
Classified By: VCI – Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller. Reasons 1. 5 (b) and (d).

1. (SBU) Summary: Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, held several bilateral meetings May 5 and 7 on the margins of the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) in New York. This cable reports on her meetings with: Brazil’s Head of Delegation Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares, Australia’s Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and Counter-proliferation John Sullivan, Canada’s Ambassador Marius Grinius, Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Tibor Toth, Egypt’s Ambassador Maged Abdelaziz, Philippines, Ambassador Libran Cabactulan (President-designate of the 2010 NPT Review Conference), Japan’s Ambassador Tarui Sumio, Conference on Disarmament President, Algeria’s Ambassador Idriss Jazairy, and the United Kingdom’s Ambassador John Duncan. (SBU) Meeting with Brazil’s Ambassador Luiz Filipe de Macedo Soares (7 May) 2. (C) A/S Gottemoeller opened the meeting by saying that there was a good story to tell on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as the United States moved toward ratification. When the Senate first addressed the Treaty in 1999, there were two main concerns which led to the negative vote in the Senate: whether the treaty was verifiable and whether the U.S. nuclear stockpile could be maintained without testing. There have been great strides in both these areas in the last ten years, and the Administration would work closely with the Senate, and particularly with those Senators who were not members then, to ensure the facts were presented clearly. It would be hard work, but it was

achievable. 3. (C) Soares said there was reason for optimism regarding the current PrepCom The Zimbabwean was an able diplomat who had successfully managed adoption of the Durban Convention in one week. Soares noted that the debate thus far was very different from last year, saying contentious issues were not addressed, noting that the U.S. opening statement had not addressed Iran, and Iran itself had not been very aggressive. With the adoption of the RevCon agenda and procedures, the essential work had been done. Now, if the parties could agree to a short statement, that would be helpful, noting that the Chairman would soon circulate a draft document for parties to consider. 4. (C) Responding to A/S Gottemoeller,s question regarding his assessment of the state of play in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Soares said that his impression was that the CD would adopt a program of work (POW) along the lines of the Algerian Ambassador’s proposal. Soares opined that he hadn’t heard of any opposition, and Pakistan, in particular, had agreed to it. He wasn’t sure about Iran, but felt they wouldn’t oppose as it wasn’t in their interest. A/S Gottemoeller noted that there was much work to be done in preparing for negotiations, but her impression was everyone could be ready to begin in January. She asked about support within the G 21, to which Soares replied that in their last meeting, none had spoken against the Algerian proposal. In an implied reference to linkages, Soares opined that it was important not to lose sight of the other issues on the CD,s agenda, and that it was indeed possible to work on more than one issue at a time. (SBU) Meeting with Australia,s Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and Counter-proliferation John Sullivan (7 May)

5. (C) A/S Sullivan began the meeting by congratulating the United States on a successful PrepCom and giving credit to the United States for the positive atmosphere. He noted that nearly all delegations seemed to be showing some “restraint” this year, and there weren,t as many personal attacks as in past PrepComs. He added that other delegations had commented to him that even Iran,s statements showed some constraint. 6. (C) A/S Sullivan asked when the P5 1 negotiations with Iran were scheduled to commence. A/S Gottemoeller said that Washington was still working out tactics and timing, but President Obama made it clear the Middle East (including Iran) was a priority for his Administration; the President,s selection of George Mitchell as the Middle East envoy showed his dedication to resolving the Iran issue quickly and diplomatically. A/S Sullivan said that the P5 should give credit to Arab League partners for “reining in” Iran, but had hopes that the United States could lead peaceful Middle East negotiations. He added that the new positive atmosphere of the NPT community could pave the way for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) at the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon). A/S Gottemoeller asked how the Australians foresee the 2010 RevCon unfolding: would it be all Middle East, all the time, or would we focus on other issues? A/S Sullivan said that he believed the Middle East issue must be resolved first before States Party can make headway anywhere else. He noted his experience as the Ambassador to Cyprus, and explained how he saw hatred passing down from generation to generation, and he believed the Middle East was the same way. 7. (C) A/S Gottemoeller raised the issue of Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations and asked what Australia,s views were on Ambassador Jazairy’s non-paper. She said she

was impressed with his ability to get consensus within the NAM so quickly, although Israel must be brought on board before any real action could take place on FMCT negotiations. A/S Sullivan agreed with A/S Gottemoeller,s comments, but said that Australia was not clear on the US plans for a way forward. He asked whether the US plan was to move forward on negotiations without consensus, or was the plan to begin negotiations only after all States agreed to commence negotiations? He said Australia was hesitant to make a decision on a way forward until they had clarification from the United States. A/S Gottemoeller requested Gary Larson, Charge d,Affaires from the US Mission to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), speak to the FMCT issue. He said that the process was progressing but the United States was giving a lot of study on the best way forward. He noted that Australia was only one Presidency away from becoming President of the CD, and that that FMCT negotiations may not begin until their Presidency, because of sensitivities with Israel. A/S Sullivan agreed and noted that his government had meetings scheduled with Israel this week and that FMCT probably would be raised. A/S Sullivan asked whether the United States believed other parties would expect quid-pro-quo verification measures, and Mr. Larson said one challenge for the nuclear weapons states and three non-states Party to the NPT would be handling expectations, including on negative security assurances (NSAs). A/S Sullivan noted that Australia did not have a strong position on NSAs one way or another. 8. (C) A/S Sullivan raised the issue of US ratification of the CTBT and asked what the US position was on process and timelines. A/S Gottemoeller reiterated President Obama,s pledge to ratify at an early date, and noted that while the

US goal was to gain the Senate,s advice and consent, we needed to do it carefully. A/S Sullivan asked how post-START negotiations would be affected by CTBT ratification. A/S Gottemoeller explained that START negotiations would commence earlier than CTBT, but that CTBT hearings would likely follow ratification of the post-START agreement. A/S Sullivan noted that he had been struck by the South Korean delegation,s remarks that US ratification of the CTBT would give the United States a greater “moral authority” and “diplomatic legitimacy” within the nonproliferation community, and hoped that the new Administration,s nonproliferation objectives would encourage or influence other countries (i.e. Iran) fulfill their own nonproliferation obligations. 9. (C) A/S Sullivan then raised the issue of the Russians and his experience with them as Chairman of the Australia Group. He noted that while the Russian mood on post-START was positive for now, the issue with NATO and Georgia could quickly sour negotiations, as it has in other fora. (SBU) Meeting with Canada,s Ambassador Marius Grinius (7 May) 10. (C) Ambassador Grinius noted his disapproval in the Russians trying to link CFE and START issues, and noted the problems with PAROS; he hoped that Russia would reconsider their plans for linking the two issues. A/S Gottemoeller asked Grinius about his take on the mood of the PrepCom. He cited a pleasant meeting he recently had with the Ambassador from Egypt, and compared it to a meeting before the PrepCom in which the Ambassador was “very aggressive.” He believed most countries have much higher expectations for a positive PrepCom following the positive remarks by A/S Gottemoeller and President Obama,s statement in the opening remarks. He noted that all States, Article VI obligations have become much more important and he believes there will be renewed

effort from all States to encourage adherence to the Treaty. He also stated that he believed the United States had done a poor job highlighting their successes under Article VI and hoped that the new Administration would have a better public relations story than in the past. 11. (C) Grinius noted that during his trip to Washington last week, he met with John Wolfstahl at the National Security Council (NSC) to discuss CTBT and was encouraged by US plans to submit the Treaty to the Senate. A/S Gottemoeller discussed the recent STRATCOM conference on CTBT and stockpile reliability. She noted that the US voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing did not affect the confidence the United States has in its stockpiles and the overall consensus was that acceding to the CTBT probably would not put the reliability of the US stockpile at risk. 12. (C) Grinius fully supported US efforts to move quickly towards negotiations on FMCT and noted that it was time for the CD to “smoke out” Pakistan, Iran and Israel on their positions. He asked how the United States intended to use the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement to advance nonproliferation objectives. Adam Scheinman from the NSC said it was no longer considered the “US-India Deal” and that the United States was referring to it as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) – India Cooperation. Grinius did not think this rebranding was fair, saying that most NSG members “gave up” and “joined the bandwagon” rather than fully supporting a nuclear agreement with India. He also noted that before India could enjoy open nuclear trade, it would have to do more in the form of export controls. A/S Gottemoeller agreed, stating that Washington will be much harder on India if they don,t strengthen export controls and nonproliferation measures.

13. (C) Grinius believed the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone would be a dominant issue at the RevCon. He noted Canada,s pro-Israel policy and that his government was discussing ways to move forward on a NWFZ before the RevCon. Grinius passed a copy of the Canadian paper on institutional reform, and highlighted its recommendation for a three person team, similar to the one in the BWC, consisting of the past, present, and subsequent PrepCom Chairs supported by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs in Geneva. He noted that having a three person team would allow further consultations in the lead up to the 2010 RevCon and such a team could share the Chairperson,s responsibilities to better facilitate a Conference. 14. (C) A/S Gottemoeller then discussed Article X and asked for Canada,s position on DPRK withdrawal. Grinius said he raised the same question during a meeting on the margins of the UN First Committee, and everyone laughed. He believes that no country wants to address the question. He believes that States Parties need to address the issue in full Plenary because the DPRK fully believes that they are no longer party to the Treaty. He suggested the United States may be in a position to call for a meeting on the DPRK and noted Canada,s support for a formal discussion. A/S Gottemoeller asked whether he believed a smaller meeting with more like-minded states would be preferable, or if it should be a large scale meeting with all delegations. He noted his support for either, although he suggested that a smaller meeting would be easier to manage. Scheinman asked whether Canada believed withdrawal and compliance issues could adequately be dealt with in the NPT process, or if it needed to be elevated to the UN Security Council. Grinius said that Canada believes it should first be handled in the NPT

channels and if no resolution is met, then it should be elevated. (SBU) Meeting with the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Tibor Toth (7 May) 15. (C) Executive Secretary Toth opened the meeting by thanking the United States for its opening statement which was very supportive of the CTBTO. He then asked about the US strategy for gaining the Senate,s advice and consent for the CTBT. A/S Gottemoeller discussed the recent STRATCOM conference on CTBT and stockpile reliability. She further stated that the Administration would ensure they had all the votes necessary before it formally requested the Senate,s advice and consent. 16. (C) Toth then discussed the upcoming conference on verification, which will be held in Vienna from 10-12 June 2009. He explained that the intent of the meeting is to have technical level discussions on verification, and he believed it would be very helpful and fruitful if the United States strongly supported the meeting and sent several technical representatives from government and national laboratories to provide presentations and serve on discussion panels. Toth then asked whether the Secretary would be willing to provide brief remarks at the Article 14 Conference in New York, after the UNGA meeting this fall. He noted that the invitation would be going out soon, and A/S Gottemoeller said she would inquire once she returned to Washington. 17. (C) A/S Gottemoeller asked how the CTBTO was preparing for alleged future DPRK nuclear tests. Toth explained that the International Monitoring System (IMS) was monitoring the area regularly. Toth stated that the IMS performed well after the 2006 DPRK test, and he was confident the IMS would

detect any future test. Toth further stated that the IMS was studying how to better prepare for the DPRK vis-a-vis Iran and other countries. He noted they were looking at additional site installations in the region and more active monitoring, but noted that the CTBTO has a small budget and could only make limited increases. Before concluding the meeting, Toth asked that the United States reconsider its $20M “red ink” policy towards the CTBTO, noting that the Organization will face extensive financial trouble in FY2010. He said there was a $15-20M deficit in the regular budget, which will substantially affect the work of the Agency. A/S Gottemoeller asked if paying the U.S. arrears would solve the CTBTO,s financial problems or was their greater need. Toth replied that even after the U.S. paid in full, the CTBTO would still have a significant shortfall. A/S Gottemoeller said she would convey his concerns to Washington. (SBU) Meeting with Egypt,s Ambassador Maged Abdelaziz (7 May) 18. (C) Abdelaziz began by praising President Obama,s recent speech in Prague and US/Russian efforts to negotiate a follow-on START agreement. He then proceeded to ask about the new Administration,s policy for the Middle East in the context of the NPT. A/S Gottemoeller said that policy still was evolving but that certain contours already should be clear: the President is serious about the Middle East peace process and has appointed a special envoy to that end; there is an evolving policy on Iran, which includes direct diplomacy; and the Administration is advocating the quick commencement of negotiations on a verifiable FMCT. All of these initiatives, she argued, contribute to the kind of atmosphere that will be required to make progress on the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Abdelaziz said he was encouraged the United

States finally was taking the issue seriously. He acknowledged that the 1995 Resolution indeed was linked to the peace process, but he said this link cannot be abused. Egypt has tried for years to foster peace in the region, and will continue to do so, but it is unwilling to wait fifty more years to see progress in implementing the 1995 Resolution. He said a new approach to Iran would be good, and that Iran cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, but the Iranian nuclear issue also should not prevent progress on implementing the Resolution. The 1995 Resolution was supposed to foster security and stability in the region, and for Cairo the issue relates directly to national security; statements from Israeli,s Prime Minister that his state possesses nuclear weapons do not contribute to security or stability. Abdelaziz said Egypt,s President soon will visit Washington, and he expected all these issues to be raised with President Obama. Egypt needs agreement on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution at the 2010 RevCon, and suggests a package approach to the issue that would include Iran, Israel, and regional security. It further emphasized the need for definite timeframes for implementation. He said if the Middle East Resolution is solved, everything else would fall into place for Egypt, including CTBT and CWC. Abdelaziz acknowledged that the contours of policy elucidated by A/S Gottemoeller address “big picture” goals for the region and the world, but said Egypt would not sacrifice its regional security for global objectives. On FMCT he emphasized the need to deal with existing stocks of fissile material. 19. (C) A/S Gottemoeller asked about Egypt,s view of the interest in nuclear energy throughout the region. Abdelaziz said it was spreading throughout the region, but states were E

concerned about perceived attempts to impose restrictions on civil nuclear technology. He said the idea of responsible vs. irresponsible states is very dangerous, and the best way to handle the growing interest in this technology was to strengthen the IAEA. He respected A/S Gottemoeller,s point that NPT Parties have both rights and responsibilities, but warned against discriminatory approaches to civil nuclear technology. 20. (C) Abdelaziz said positive momentum toward the 2010 RevCon has been established, especially with the decision to negotiate a follow-on START agreement, and the adoption of an agenda for the RevCon. He said the RevCon must produce a final document and progress must be made on the Middle East Resolution, which would help bring all non-parties into the Treaty. A/S Gottemoeller described the ways in which the US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement had brought India further into the nonproliferation regime. Abdelaziz said if this were true, it would better his disposition toward the agreement. Finally, in an apparent attempt to portray Egypt as a responsible member of the international community, Abdelaziz claimed that Egypt had been offered nuclear scientists, materials and even weapons following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Egypt had refused all such offers. A/S Gottemoeller asked him how he knew this to be true, to which Abdelaziz replied he was in Moscow at that time and had direct personal knowledge. (SBU) Meeting with Philippines, Ambassador Libran Cabactulan: President-designate of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (7 May) 21. (C) Cabactulan said the speeches at this year,s PrepCom have been inspiring, but it remains to be seen what the ground truths are about states, goals for the RevCon. He

said expectations were high, but cautioned memories are not short, and states will remember the disappointments of 2005. A couple concrete achievements before the RevCon could catapult the Conference to success. He said he was in a listening mode and was ready to “roll-up his sleeves and hit the road.” A/S Gottemoeller discussed the expected timetables for US progress on a follow-on START agreement, the nuclear posture review, CTBT, and FMCT. She said all of these new initiatives should set a positive atmosphere for the RevCon and convince the world that the United States is serious about its NPT Article VI commitments; however, she noted it would not only be the United States that had heavy lifting to do. All NPT Parties will have to work hard to make the 2010 RevCon a success. In particular she noted the importance of dealing with the difficult problems of Iran and North Korea. 22. (C) A/S Gottemoeller asked about the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and what role regional states like the United Arab Emirates might play to help achieve progress on the Resolution in 2010. Cabactulan said it was a very difficult subject that was affected by the peace process and other regional issues, but that progress must be made on the Resolution, or the RevCon could fall apart. He said progress on an FMCT and Israel,s consideration of the CTBT would increase the chances for progress on the Resolution. He was unclear whether a simple reaffirmation of the Resolution would satisfy Egypt, but this was something he would investigate. 23. (C) Cabactulan asked several basic questions on international fuel supply initiatives, expressing confusion about the many different proposals. He also asked how to mitigate concerns that such proposals reinterpret the NPT,s

Article IV. A/S Gottemoeller and Director of Nonproliferation at the NSC Adam Scheinman explained that the diversity of proposals in fact provided greater assurance of fuel supply and that such proposals represented ways of fulfilling the NPT,s Article IV in proliferation-responsible ways. Cabactulan was interested in these responses, but thought more work would need to be done to explain to the international community the benefits of such initiatives. 24. (C) Finally, Cabactulan said his door would always be open for discussion, and suggested he could play a moderating role within the Non-Aligned Movement. (COMMENT: Cabactulan, though perhaps somewhat nave about the particular issues likely to confront him in his role as the President of the NPT Review Conference, clearly was pleased with his appointment and determined to make the RevCon a success. He appeared particularly receptive to consultations with the United States throughout the course of preparations for the RevCon. END COMMENT) (SBU) Meeting with Japan,s CD Ambassador Tarui Sumio (7 May) 25. (C) Ambassador Tarui opened the meeting by observing that everyone was saying this year,s Prepcom was much different. He said that Japan very much welcomed President Obama,s Prague speech, and that the world had high expectations. Tarui cautioned that progress could be achieved in a step-by-step manner, but the world was expecting drastic actions. Tarui worried that if something tangible couldn,t be done quickly, there would be great disappointment. He offered that if negotiations could begin on FMCT, that would constitute a great breakthrough, adding that France had expressed reservations on the Algerian POW, but told him they expected negotiations on FMCT to begin in January. Tarui highlighted FMCT, CTBT, and a follow-on to START as the three

big issues that must be dealt with first. He added that A/S Gottemoeller,s speech was welcomed even by Cuba, and thus we must take advantage of the momentum it generated as soon as possible. Tarui asked if the U.S. was prepared to accept the Algerian proposal, to which A/S Gottemoeller replied affirmatively. Tarui noted that the Pakistani Ambassador had told him very clearly that they were prepared to accept it as well. 26. (C) A/S Gottemoeller said that her list of priorities matched his and that progress on the three issues would constitute an important scene-setter for the RevCon She noted that she had met with Ambassador Jazairy and told him she was impressed with his ability to get the NAM to agree to his proposal and prepared to work with him to get FMCT negotiations started in January. On START follow-on, she noted that the negotiations had begun with a goal of having the treaty completed by December. This was a challenging goal, but she and Anatoli Antonov agreed that fifteen years of experience implementing START provided a good foundation from which to work. While optimistic of reaching the deadline, should negotiations take longer, she hoped our colleagues in the Revcon would see our efforts as evidence of our sincerity. A/S Gottemoeller added that after this treaty was completed, work would begin on a subsequent treaty aimed at further reductions based on the conclusions of the Nuclear Posture Review. ON CTBT, A/S Gottemoeller said that there was hard work ahead, but ten years experience has shown much progress on verification. There were a large number of new Senators since the last time the Treaty was considered, and the Administration would work to educate them on the issues. By the time of the Revcon, we may have begun hearings, but the important thing was to ensure we have a successful vote.

27. (C) Tarui highlighted the recent speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister, noting that they sought to use it to express support for President Obama,s speech by enunciating concrete steps that could be taken to further nuclear disarmament. The steps were divided into three tiers: 1) measures by nuclear weapons states, 2) measures by the world community, and 3) measures to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy. He ended by noting that non-nuclear weapons states share a responsibility for nuclear disarmament, and that it wasn,t fair to pin everything on the nuclear weapons states, adding that this was a golden opportunity for mankind. (SBU) Meeting with Conference on Disarmament President, Algeria,s Ambassador Idriss Jazairy (5 May) 28. (C) Jazairy opened the meeting expressing appreciation for the positive indications from Washington for his efforts in the CD. He noted his work with the current CD presidents builds upon CD/1840 and that his objective was to develop a formulation in his proposal to sustain both United States and NAM support. He provided the United States with a paper further explaining his proposal and noted that during his meeting with Gary Samore in Washington earlier that week, Mr. Samore agreed that if the document was not tampered with, the United States would support it. Jazairy was concerned that if states tampered with the document, the initiative to begin FMCT negotiations would unweave. A/S Gottemoeller indicated that the United States would take counsel in Washington on the matter. Jazairy noted that France did not like the language on NSAs but told him that it would consider the US position on the matter. He also noted that Samore was aware of the challenge presented by Israel. Jazairy added he would gladly make himself available to the Israelis as part of a P-6 presentation to CD members, during which he would address

their concerns directly. A/S Gottemoeller indicated the United States would see what it could do concerning Israel,s position. Jazairy briefly summarized some of the difficulties he experienced coordinating with the Australians. 29. (C) A/S Gottemoeller queried Jazairy,s views on potential impacts of the transition to the Argentine Presidency on sustaining support for his proposal and about Chinese views. Jazairy did not believe the transition would be a problem and was unaware of any Chinese concerns. A/S Gottemoeller noted that the US was impressed with Jazairy,s achievement to consolidate NAM support for the proposal and that the window of opportunity to launch FMCT negotiations was limited. (SBU) Meeting with the United Kingdom,s Ambassador John Duncan (5 May) 30. (C) Duncan raised three issues during the bilateral: NPT, FMCT, and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). On the NPT, Duncan noted that a vision was lacking for the 2010 REVCON and that articulating such a vision would not be achievable at this meeting. He noted the Acronym Institute,s paper as a useful beginning to start thinking about the matter (Comment: the AI is a UK-based NGO). Duncan noted that difficulty with the French on the Agenda was predictable behavior and that the United States could encourage a French response. He said that the United Kingdom was ambivalent on a P-5 media statement. The Russians indicated that they had ideas but did not believe excessive time should be expended trying to issue a statement as had been done at past PrepComs. 31. (C) On FMCT, Duncan noted that delegations were not staffed to support negotiation of an FMCT and that six months of preparation would be needed to prepare for negotiations.

He noted that China is uncomfortable with the forward momentum and had been attempting to prod the Russians to press for more emphasis on PAROS in the program of work. He noted that the CD is the closest it has been to consensus in 4-5 years. A/S Gottemoeller noted that the United States realizes Israel will be key in getting a mandate and that the United States needs to engage Israel. She also concurred with the United Kingdom,s concern that tabling the Algerian Proposal before it was ready could undermine the effort. Both delegations agreed that closing the deal probably would come under the Argentine Presidency. Duncan noted the negotiations will be a long effort due to verification, though the United Kingdom believes verification is possible. He also noted that the UK has scheduled a trident test for May 18, which has already been announced in accordance with the Hague Code of Conduct, and expressed the hope that the test does not undermine CD negotiations. He also shared the implied threat of the Chinese Ambassador that if the UK did not stop publicly criticizing China for its strategic modernization, that China would make a public issue of the Trident test. 32. (SBU) On the ATT, Duncan noted that the effort was based on modern diplomacy. ATT was neither an export control nor a disarmament mechanism. He noted that there currently was no framework for international arms controls and that standards needed to trickle into legislation. He emphasized that the goal of the ATT was not to stop all military sales, but to introduce “best practices” regarding export controls. A/S Gottemoeller has cleared this cable. Rice