Email |  Print | RSS | Comment |  

 Email |  Print

Thu, Dec 16, 2010 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6 | Edited by Crethi Plethi

WikiLeaks: How India Can Help Stabilise Afghanistan

Read the related article here.

Wednesday, 28 March 2007, 12:06

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 001485
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
SCA FOR AMBASSADOR WILLIAM B. WOOD
EO 12958 DECL: 03/28/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, EAID, ECON, ENRG, SCUL, SOCI, AF, IN
SUBJECT: OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIAN SOFT POWER IN AFGHANISTAN
REF: A. NEW DELHI 1327 B. NEW DELHI 729 C. HOWARD-KESHAP E-MAIL 09MAR07
NEW DELHI 00001485 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

1. (C) SUMMARY: As requested, this cable contains specific, concrete ideas for opportunities for India to use soft power in helping Afghanistan’s reconstruction, with the broader objective of seeking ways for the U.S. to synergize its efforts with Afghanistan’s “natural ally.” Some of the ideas are new, many are not, but the intent is to develop a brief reference for the opportunities which are available. India has significant aid to offer, including affordable Indian professionals (versus more expensive Westerners), energy production, and training capabilities in areas such as law enforcement, election commission training, foreign service training, and administrative services, much of which can be relatively cheaply accomplished in India.

2. (C) Trilateral cooperation on infrastructure and capacity building projects among the U.S., Japan and India could also bring economies of scale and/or effective divisions of labor. Transit through Pakistan would greatly enhance India’s ability to contribute to Afghan reconstruction. We would also have to overcome Pakistani objection to Indian force protection if India is to expand its role. The recommendations contained herein come with the caveat that Post has only an outsider’s view of Afghanistan, and realizes that Embassy Kabul and Washington (not to mention the government of Afghanistan) are best placed to identify Afghanistan’s needs. END SUMMARY.

Background: A Natural Ally, Already Giving Generously

——

3. (C) Indian experts on Afghanistan, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX believe India is well-regarded and liked in Afghanistan, and calls India a “natural ally” to the Afghan people. India and Afghanistan are considered to be close, and share good relations. There are no diplomatic issues between the two countries, nor is there any significant political or popular opposition in India to aid to Afghanistan. As Afghanistan transitions to a better future, diverse, democratic, multi-ethnic India can serve as a giant role model. India is already a major donor to Afghan reconstruction, with around $750 million pledged — making it, we believe, the fifth largest donor country — and is already involved in projects in a wide range of sectors, including electricity, road construction, and telecommunications, and has even in the past contributed as it could to agriculture and health. Indian aid to Afghanistan is tempered by what New Delhi perceives as Pakistani intransigence, which questions India’s motives and does not allow for much cheaper overland transit of goods, personnel or equipment.

NEW DELHI 00001485 002.2 OF 005

WHAT INDIA CAN OFFER

——

Affordable Professionals

——

4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX when asked to highlight India’s contribution, immediately answered that the best bang for the buck comes from India’s professionals, specifically engineers. India’s relatively low-paid engineers are more cost-efficient employees than those from Western countries, XXXXXXXXXXXX maintains. Without having specific figures on hand, XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated that Afghanistan could hire many times the number of India engineers to live and work in the country for the same price as one European. Indian engineers are currently engaged in power construction, public works projects, telecommunications infrastructure, and road construction.

Affordable Training

——

5. (C) The GOI is already bringing Afghans to India for training in various fields much more cheaply than what most other countries can offer. From 2002-2006, more than 1300 Afghans were trained in various Indian institutions and universities, and since March 2006, India has offered short-term training courses for 500 Afghans annually. In addition, 500 Afghan students annually will be offered graduate and post-graduate education in India. XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that by bringing Afghans to India for training, Afghanistan is able to train five-to-six times as many people as would otherwise be possible. Training programs exist in law enforcement, diplomacy (at India’s Foreign Service Institute), urban development, English, agriculture development, IT, civil administration parliamentary procedures and other capacity building areas. We believe India would welcome ideas for other areas that would match Afghanistan’s needs. Given India’s experience in running elections for a billion people, one new area to consider would be training, either in India or Afghanistan, for Afghanistan’s central/local election commissions and election officials. Another new area where India would seem to match up well would be training for parliamentary procedures and support, political party organization, and local administration. If needed again, India could likely revive past training programs for Afghans in justice, journalism, civil aviation, or the small programs on marketing and enterprise development for women and in-service teacher training.

Administrative Service

——

6. (C) India is already in the process of sending some

NEW DELHI 00001485 003.2 OF 005

thirty Indian Administrative Service officers to Afghanistan (ref a). As other ministries and government offices are identified as needing outside expertise, India could be asked to increase these numbers and administrative programs could be specifically targeted to receive specialized training.

Affordable Energy

—–

7. (C) The India-led Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul power transmission line is running ahead of schedule and on budget, and should provide significant energy to Afghanistan. India is contributing to further energy production with the Salma Dam project in Herat province, and has some smaller projects ongoing, including in solar energy production. India has expertise in power generation through mountainous and difficult terrain, and could be called on for additional assistance in this area. Indian firms are also global leaders in wind power. The best incentive for full-scale Indian assistance, not to mention private sector investment, would be a political agreement which would allow power lines to transit Pakistan, connecting India all the way through to Central Asia.

People-to-People

——

8. (C) India was proud to provide food aid (in the form of high protein biscuits) during the 2002 “Back to School” campaign, as well as humanitarian assistance in earthquake relief in 2002. Should such a need arise again, India should be one of the first countries Afghanistan turns to. People-to-people exchanges are also popular in India with several NGOs promoting youth and cultural exchanges with counterparts in Pakistan and the U.S. If and when appropriate, India should be encouraged to develop exchange programs with symbolic significance, such as inviting the Afghan national women’s soccer team, or kids from the Afghan Youth Sports Exchange (maximum exposure if they have anyone willing to come to play cricket). As is being done in another exchange program here, young Afghans could be invited to visit top Indian (or locally-based American?) corporations in the field of their interest to take on short internships. Numerous other possibilities exist, but one other area that seems ripe is Bollywood. We understand Bollywood movies are wildly popular in Afghanistan, so willing Indian celebrities could be asked to travel to Afghanistan to help bring attention to social issues there.

Straight Donations

——

9. (C) In addition to humanitarian and medical supplies provided in 2002, India has provided direct donations of materiel to Afghanistan, and could likely fill specific requests in the future. Our research indicates that India

NEW DELHI 00001485 004.2 OF 005

has given buses, minibuses, utility vehicles, aircraft, education kits, books, school desks, laboratory equipment, musical instruments, computers and sports supplies.

Multi-lateral Partnerships

——

10. (C) The 21st Century Leadership Alliance can provide the basis for greater cooperation between the U.S., India and Japan in promoting democracy and good governance in Afghanistan. The recent inception of the joint U.S.-Japan-India project to develop the Public Administration program at Kabul University could serve as a model for similar cooperation in other fields, such as agriculture, veterinary science, English or other foreign language development, or even faculty development. In addition to three-way collaboration, XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out that, even when the U.S., India and Japan are not working together, they could coordinate better on divisions of labor which could more effectively target donor money and efforts, and take advantage of each country’s area of expertise. Additionally, we could explore ways to use the U.S.-Japan Strategic Development Alliance to approach India on other coordinated trilateral projects.

IMPEDIMENTS TO INDIA’S CONTRIBUTION

——

Pakistan Withholds Transit Access

——

11. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX and other Embassy contacts, transit through Pakistan is imperative for the economic integration of the region, and would be mutually beneficial for Pakistan, Afghanistan and India. However, India’s perception is that Pakistan is creating obstacles that prevent such a land route from becoming a reality, and Afghan Embassy officials have indicated that they are pessimistic that the Government of Pakistan (GOP) will budge on this issue (ref b). We should use every opportunity to continue to press the GOP to allow this essential transit route. This issue will be on the agenda at the upcoming South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meeting April 3-4, and XXXXXXXXXXXX, who told PolCouns March 12 that obtaining a transit route from Afghanistan through Pakistan to India was the “only benefit of Afghanistan’s membership in SAARC,” and that SAARC would be a disappointment if it didn’t advance the transit issue. (COMMENT: Transit across Pakistan would also reduce India’s reliance on Iran. END COMMENT.)

The Security Issue

——

12. (C) Security continues to be an issue of public concern in sending Indians to work in Afghanistan. Since 2003, two Indian engineers have been abducted, and three other workers

NEW DELHI 00001485 005.2 OF 005

have been executed in Afghanistan. The Indian media says Indians who work specifically on road-building projects in Afghanistan are targeted due to Pakistani and Taliban fears that completion of a highway to Central Asia will increase India’s influence in the region, thereby threatening Pakistan’s interests in the region. Pakistan is also said to be opposed to India assuming a larger security role in Afghanistan. As Sudha Ramachandran said in a recent article, given Pakistan’s sensitivities, India is not able to provide its own security for Indians working in Afghanistan. India will need to work out, with those suspicious of its motives, a way to protect its people on the ground, or it will not achieve its full potential in using soft power in Afghanistan.

13. (U) As an outsider looking in, Post realizes that Embassy Kabul and Washington (as well as the government of Afghanistan) are best placed to identify Afghanistan’s needs. MULFORD

WikiLeaks: India a diffident ally in the ‘war on terror’ – US

Friday, 23 February 2007, 11:41

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 000909
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/07/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, PINR, PBTS, MOPS, KDEM, KISL, KTFN,
EFIN, ECON, ASEC, KCRM, PK, IN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: INDIA COUNTER-TERRORISM JOINT WORKING
GROUP
NEW DELHI 00000909 001.2 OF 006
Classified By: DCM Geoffrey Pyatt, Reason 1.5 (B,D)

1. (S) Summary: Embassy New Delhi warmly welcomes the visit of Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Frank Urbancic, and looks forward to adding dynamism to the India-U.S. Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) and developing an atmosphere where ideas and information are easily exchanged by both sides in an atmosphere of trust. Goals for the CTJWG include better integration of efforts regarding bioterrorism, money laundering, terrorist financing, tracking terrorist movements, law enforcement, border security, and information sharing/operational cooperation. The GOI’s traditional concerns over U.S. engagement with Pakistan and longstanding distrust left over from the Cold War-era between our intelligence communities have been difficult to overcome. However, the sustained increase in acts of violence by political and religious extremists in India have demanded better cooperation on counter-terrorism. In a recent meeting, your counterpart, Ministry of External Affairs Additional Secretary (International Organizations) KC Singh, mentioned favorably the idea of semi-annual meetings between GOI and S/CT, and he clearly sees the U.S. CT relationship as among India’s most important. Improving our counter-terrorism cooperation is a crucial step in building the strategic relationship President Bush envisions with India, and your visit offers us an excellent chance to do so. End Summary.

Reviving a Stalled Working Group

——————————–

2. (S) Your visit comes nearly a year after the last U.S.-India CTJWG, which was held in Washington in May 2006. Although the working group was supposed to be held regularly throughout the year, it has stalled until now for two important reasons. The first was a scandal in New Delhi in summer 2006, in which our primary working-level CT interlocutor at the Indian National Security Council was arrested and charged with treason for allegedly passing information to the United States. Although there is little truth to the espionage accusations, the scandal cast a negative shadow over the CTJWG, and slowed further discussions for several months. In a recent discussion with the DCM, KC Singh raised this scandal again, noting that it was impacting his effort to build a U.S.-India dialogue on cyber terrorism. Second, Indian officials were extremely concerned about the August 2006 agreement between Pakistani officials and Waziri tribesmen in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas because of their ongoing concern about Afghanistan’s stability. India’s criticism of our Counter-Terror cooperation with Pakistan reached a new intensity after the Waziristan agreement, as Indian officials bitterly accused their U.S. CT counterparts of failing to take India’s concerns into account in allowing the agreement to go forward. Since then we have worked to reduce these tensions, and U/S Burns’ visit to New Delhi, accompanied by Virginia Palmer, in December 2006 went a long way in this regard. We have also worked across the inter-agency spectrum to share more information with India. The next step is to revive the CTJWG and work to expand our operational CT cooperation.

Bringing India on Board to Expand our Counter-Terror Cooperation

NEW DELHI 00000909 002.2 OF 006

——————————————–

3. (S) India’s lingering zero-sum suspicion of U.S. policies towards Pakistan, its fiercely independent foreign policy stance, its traditional go-it-alone strategy toward its security, and its domestic political sensitivities over the sentiments of its large Muslim population, have all contributed to India’s caution in working with us on a joint counter-terrorism strategy. While India has been very keen to receive information and technology from us to further its counter-terrorism efforts, India provides little in return, despite our belief that the country should be an equal partner in this relationship. India frequently rebuffs our offers of support for their police investigations of terrorist attacks, and our offers of training and support are often met with a stalled logistical pace. For example, our Legatt offered forensic and investigative support to India in the wake of the Samjauta Train bombings, but India refused. One of the most important tasks we will have with India at the CTJWG is to reinforce that we must make this relationship reciprocal. We must keep in mind that it will be a slow process to build the kind of trust necessary with India to achieve the relationship that we are seeking, but we must reinforce to our Indian counterparts the positive direction we seek for our partnership.

4. (S) Another consideration to keep in mind is that our perception of India’s lack of cooperation on U.S. CT concerns often stems in part from India’s lack of capacity to manage these issues bureaucratically. India just this month began to stand up a Counter-Terrorism Cell in the MEA’s office of International Organizations. The Cell was put in place largely to manage India’s new Counter-Terrorism Joint Mechanism with Pakistan, including bringing India’s intelligence agencies in line with the Prime Minister’s thinking on India’s relations with Pakistan. This Cell will now bring five additional people on board to manage these issues, although all of the arrangements are still being handled by just two officers. Additionally, India’s police and security forces are overworked and hampered by bad police practices, including the wide-spread use of torture in interrogations, rampant corruption, poor training, and a general inability to conduct solid forensic investigations. India’s most elite security forces also regularly cut corners to avoid working through India’s lagging justice system, which has approximately 13 judges per million people. Thus Indian police officials often do not respond to our requests for information about attacks or our offers of support because they are covering up poor practices, rather than rejecting our help outright.

5. (S) That said, using every opportunity available to signal our interest in learning from India — which has successfully tackled “asymmetrical” insurgencies in Punjab and Kashmir — will go a long way to reduce this distrust and may prompt Indian officials to be more receptive to our offers of support. There is much India could offer us of value to strengthen our counter-terrorism efforts. For instance, they can give us more information about the nature of the terrorist threat in India and South Asia, and help us develop new strategies for defeating terrorists derived from India’s experience in Kashmir. They also may have information about Bangladeshi, Nepalese, Sri Lankan, and Pakistani terrorists that they could share.

NEW DELHI 00000909 003.2 OF 006

Relations with Pakistan

———————–

6. (S) Your visit comes a little over a week after the horrific bombing of the Samjauta (“Friendship”) Train between New Delhi, India and Lahore, Pakistan. Most of the 68 killed in the fires that destroyed two of the train’s coaches were lower-middle class Pakistani mohajirs (emigrants from India) who came to India to visit relatives after years of separation. While investigations continue to find the culprits, the Indian press is hinting that Lashkar-e-Taiba or another Pakistan-based terrorist group was behind the attacks. If this is true, it would not be the first time that Pakistan-based terrorists have killed fellow Sunni Muslims on Indian soil. Police investigators tell us that all of the evidence India has found in the September 2006 attacks in a Sunni mosque in Malegon points to Lashkar-e-Taiba, which, along with the Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad, HUM, is trying to foment religious tension as a means of boosting recruitment and hindering Indo-Pak peace efforts.

7. (S) Despite bombings in Panipat, Malegon, Mumbai, Varanassi, Delhi and Kashmir in the past year, this year marks probably the closest period of friendship between India and Pakistan since their Independence from Great Britain in 1947. The two countries are working closer to resolve their dispute over Kashmir, and even amidst the tragedy of the train bombing Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri traveled to New Delhi on February 20th to continue the Composite Dialogue. Both sides have signaled their strong intention to continue with talks, despite the terrorists’ efforts to disrupt the peace process. Nonetheless, India remains frustrated with Pakistan’s seeming inaction against terrorist groups in Pakistan, who have launched multiple attacks in India’s heartland. Near weekly arrests of terrorists here are a constant reminder that these groups are working to establish sleeper cells in India as relations with Pakistan continue to improve. India is also concerned about infiltration of Pakistani terrorists through Bangladesh and Nepal, as well as local terrorists’ connections to Iraq, Afghanistan, and al-Qaida. India and Pakistan are holding their first Counter-Terrorism Joint Mechanism meeting on March 6th in Islamabad to build better dialogue on these issues. This Mechanism is designed to keep talks going between India and Pakistan regardless of continued terrorist attacks, and it is important that the Indian press does not confuse our Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group with the India-Pakistan Counter-Terrorism Joint-Mechanism.

8. (S) Despite India’s progress with Pakistan, Indian officials continue to advise us that our direct intervention in Indo-Pak negotiations could hamper the Prime Minister’s efforts to move the process forward. Opposition BJP leaders charge frequently that India is selling out on Kashmir or soft on Pakistan at the behest of the U.S. Indian officials are extremely tight-lipped about the negotiations between the two countries, and they often bristle at any outside government’s attempt to push the process forward.

Your Meeting with NSA Narayanan

——————————-

NEW DELHI 00000909 004.2 OF 006

9. (S) One very important meeting we are scheduling for you for Thursday, March 1st, is with National Security Advisor MK Narayanan. As a former intelligence official, no other senior Congress Party leader has more influence over PM Singh and party chief Sonia Gandhi’s decision making on national security issues than Narayanan. Narayanan is traditionally tough-talking, and will speak his mind about how he sees our CT cooperation progressing. This will be an opportunity to stress our interest in making the relationship more reciprocal, and we will provide you with a list of all of the information we have passed to the GOI in recent months with a direct comparison to what we have received in return. You should tell Narayanan that we are overcoming our concerns, and we seek similar improvement of attitudes in the Indian security agencies, whose paranoia remains undiminished.

Important Points for the CTJWG

——————————

10. (S) South Asia terrorism issues: KC Singh is taking the lead on this session, and may use the opportunity to talk about India’s concerns about Pakistan even as the Composite Dialogue moves ahead. He will likely brief you on the terrorist groups operating in Pakistan that are launching attacks in India. He will also discuss India’s concern about stability in Afghanistan. This may be an opportunity to discuss our strategy in Afghanistan in response to the anticipated Taliban Spring offensive as well as preparations for the SAARC meetings in New Delhi on April 3-4. You should stress that the U.S. and India have common goals against terrorists in South Asia, that we believe groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba have become a global threat, one that we all face with India. You could also stress our efforts — through both engagement and pressure — to press Pakistan to crack down on all of the terrorist groups operating on its soil, as well as our continued concern about infiltration through Bangladesh and Nepal, and the progress we have seen in Islamabad’s CT cooperation.

11. (S) Middle East terrorism issues: You are taking the lead on this session. India is very concerned about the security situation in Iraq, partially because of a concern that instability and sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims there will spill over into India. With Iran, India has had some recent differences over the nuclear issue. Nonetheless, India enjoys fairly good relations with most countries in the Middle East, including Israel, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, and India may be a positive partner for the U.S. in bringing stability to the region. KC Singh was Ambassador in Tehran, and can give you superb insight on the Iranian regime.

12. (S) Bioterrorism: You will make a few remarks and then XXXXXXXXXXXX

will take over the presentation. We have a number of efforts in place to discuss bioterrorism issues and biosecurity, including a proposal from 2005 for a joint exercise in response to a bioterrism attack. Our Indian counterparts have signaled their interest to press ahead with these programs.

13. (S) WMD Terrorism: You will make a few remarks on this session, and then hand the discussions off to XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX. Our Indian counterparts are likely to remain silent during this session, although they have said they will

NEW DELHI 00000909 005.2 OF 006

listen to the presentation, and KC Singh may respond briefly. These discussions could impact the ongoing negotiations over the U.S.-India nuclear deal, and Indian officials want to avoid any discussion of safeguarding their nuclear material. They will not have the permission necessary from higher-level officials to address this issue at all in response to our briefing.

14. (S) ATA Training and Law Enforcement Cooperation: You will begin the discussion and then our RSO will continue with his briefing. We need more cooperation and, frankly, openness from the Ministry of Home Affairs in order to achieve this program’s full potential.

15. (S) The delegation will participate in informal working-level break out sessions over lunch with our Indian hosts. This may be an opportunity to discuss any outstanding issues from the previous sessions with KC Singh, and raise our concerns about Indian bureaucratic inertia and paranoia.

16. (S) Terrorism Finance and Anti-Money Laundering Legislation: KC Singh will lead this session, and XXXXXXXXXXXX will provide our response. Discussion will be focused on prompting the GOI to improve their anti-money laundering regime and compliance with international standards under the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat incidents of terrorism financing. GOI is currently participating as a FATF observer for the first time at the ongoing FATF Plenary meeting from February 19-23. We want to use the CTJWG platform to listen to GOI’s growing concerns about terrorist financing for future consideration to provide relevant technical assistance.

17. (S) Biometrics and Border Security: You will begin this session and then hand the discussions off to XXXXXXXXXXXX.

18. (S) Airline/Airport Security and Anti-Hijacking Policy: KC Singh will lead this session. He may discuss some of the various threats India has seen lately to its commercial airlines. He will likely follow up on our previous offer of assistance and anti-hijacking training, as well as India’s new hijacking policy, which would affect direct flights by Delta, American, Continental, and Northwest airlines.

19. (S) Ideological Dimensions of Countering Terrorism: KC Singh will lead this session. He will likely discuss India’s frustrations in dealing with Pakistan on terrorism issues. He may, however, initiate a more in-depth discussion of Prime Minister Singh’s efforts on behalf of those who are disenfranchised among India’s Muslim population. The purpose of this session is to initiate a discussion on local facilitators of terrorist attacks in India by the country’s minority Muslim population, and to learn from India’s many decades of experience in this area. 20. (S) Information Sharing and Enhancing Cooperation: This will be a closed-door discussion of our efforts to increase intelligence sharing. This may be the most crucial segment of the discussion, and ORA will take the lead in the presentation. Our RSO may also discuss our efforts to gain more information from the GOI about terrorist threats to US interests in India and sharing of information about arrests of terrorist suspects. The GOI will likely discuss a new

NEW DELHI 00000909 006.2 OF 006

point of contact the MEA is establishing in the new CT Cell to answer these questions.

21. (S) The meetings will be followed by a wrap up discussion and a GOI-hosted dinner.

Summary: A Real Opportunity

—————————-

22. (S) Summary: Overall your efforts in India will be an important step toward our goal of building a strategic partnership with India. Without a more effective CT component, and if India remains suspicious of our CT intentions, our overall relationship will not live up to its potential. As you approach the meetings, the most important element will be to break down the barriers we face to building a more productive partnership with our GOI counterparts, including at a working level. Our measure of success should be in taking steps forward, however small, toward achieving this operational goal. End Summary. MULFORD

WikiLeaks: Indian concern over security in Afghanistan

Thursday, 25 February 2010, 12:56

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 000355
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/17/2020
TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, PARM, KNNP, ENRG, IR, PK, IN
SUBJECT: NSA MENON DISCUSSES REGIONAL SECURITY AND TRADE
ISSUES WITH CODEL MCCASKILL
Classified By: Ambassador Tim Roemer for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

1. (C) SUMMARY. In a meeting with CODEL McCaskill February 17, National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon touched on regional security issues including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, as well as several trade-related issues including defense acquisitions, India’s Medium Multiple Role Fighter Aircraft (MMRCA) tender, export controls, civil nuclear cooperation, and genetically modified foods. Menon credited intelligence shared by the United States with helping to protect targets in the vicinity of the February 13 Pune bombing, leaving the terrorists no alternative but to go after a soft target instead. Terrorism would be “the primary issue” in the planned February 25 Foreign Secretary-level talks with Pakistan, but Menon allowed that the agenda could expand after the first round of talks depending on Pakistan’s response. Menon cautioned that if the Pakistani establishment felt U.S. commitment was flagging in Afghanistan it would not do what was needed in the West. Menon was skeptical about the effect of new sanctions on the divided Iranian elite, but India would continue to implement any sanctions approved by the UN Security Council; Menon hoped they would be carefully targeted. He emphasized the importance for the U.S.-India relationship of “being seen to be sharing technology,” and would encourage the Indian Embassy in Washington to explain India’s proposed reforms on export controls directly to Senate staff. Menon confirmed the government would introduce civil nuclear liability legislation in the next Parliament. END SUMMARY.

Menon Touts “Full-spectrum” Relationship, Discusses Pune Bombing

– – –

2. (C) In a wide-ranging meeting with CODEL McCaskill February 17, National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon touched on several regional security and trade-related issues. Whereas the U.S.-India relationship used to be too narrow, Menon said we now had the opposite problem, a “full-spectrum” relationship touching on virtually every area of life, with correspondingly high expectations for what we can accomplish together.

3. (C) Menon welcomed the condolences offered by Senator Claire McCaskill (D-MO) for the February 13 bombing in Pune that killed 10 and injured dozens. The bombing was “a shock, yet not shocking,” considering India’s familiar experience as a terrorist target. Menon credited intelligence shared by the United States with helping prompt the Indian government to protect targets in the vicinity of the attack, such as the Chabad House and Osho Ashram, perhaps leaving the terrorists no alternative but to go after a soft target instead. Three groups had claimed responsibility, but the government had not come to any conclusions about the perpetrators. In India’s long history of dealing with terrorism, Menon said, “Most attacks lead back to Pakistan.”

“Many Pakistans”

– – –

4. (C) Menon recounted that India had entered into the Composite Dialogue with Pakistan on the basis of former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf’s assurance that India would not be targeted by terrorists as long as the talks continued. This dialogue process entered into a pause in 2007 at Musharraf’s request when he was faced with difficult domestic challenges, which ultimately led to his ouster. Since then, India endured serial bombing attacks throughout 2008, two attacks on its embassy in Kabul (one he attributed to the Haqqani Network and the other to Lashkar-e-Tayiba), and then the November 26, 2008 attacks in Mumbai, known as

NEW DELHI 00000355 002 OF 004

“26/11.” Menon lamented that Pakistan had shown itself to be “unable or unwilling to wean itself off from terror as an instrument of state policy.” He alluded to evidence that serving Pakistani officials were involved in the 26/11 attacks.

5. (C) Menon shared his perspective that “We are dealing with many Pakistans, so we need to run many Pakistan policies at the same time.” He stressed that even after the Mumbai attacks India did not sever trade or travel ties with Pakistan because these elements of the relationship were important to achieving an eventual peace with Pakistan. As a “true democracy,” public opinion defined the limits of India’s forebearance, but Menon stressed that India did not wish to play into the hands of the terrorists by shunning dialogue.

6. (C) Terrorism would be “the primary issue” in the planned February 25 Foreign Secretary-level talks, but Menon allowed that after the first talks “it will be up to the Pakistanis how they respond.” A peaceful, stable Pakistan was in India’s national interest, which was “why we keep trying.” Menon confessed that the Indian government’s expectations for talks today were lower than when India had entered into talks with Pakistan in the past because “We don’t think Pakistan is capable of delivering much, but what’s the alternative?” He concluded, “A peaceful, stable Pakistan is in our interest; we will work at it even if they make it hard for us.”

Afghanistan: Menon a “Minority of One”

– – –

7. (C) Turning to Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan, Menon cautioned that if the Pakistani establishment felt U.S. commitment was flagging in Afghanistan it would “sit it out and use the Indian threat as an excuse for not doing what was needed” in the West. Menon said he may be a “minority of one,” but he thought there was more potential for success in Afghanistan than most observers in India. The British were convinced the Coalition would lose because they lost three wars there, but others had been able to tame the country. Menon trumpeted India’s assistance program of small, community-based projects, saying it took Indian officials one-and-a-half years to navigate around the ministries in Kabul to get direct access to local people, but it had paid off enormously. He cited one instance in which 13,000 Afghans had applied for exams to qualify for Indian scholarships; not all of them were qualified, but it showed how strong the desire was for such opportunities. He concluded that success will require “more than just a military effort.”

8. (C) McCaskill agreed we had a chance to succeed because we had adjusted our strategy. McCaskill was confident the United States would continue to sustain the 300,000 strong Afghan National Security Forces even if we began to draw down troops in 2011. Menon observed that “the wonder of the U.S. system is how quickly you learn; that cannot be said of any other country in the world.”

Iran: A Choice Among “Unsatisfactory Strategies”

– – –

9. (C) Menon agreed with Senator Jeff Merkley’s (D-OR) assertion that a nuclear Iran would be bad for everyone. Merkley had supported the Obama Administration’s efforts to seek dialogue with Iran, but it was now clear the Islamic Republic was not open to dialogue. Menon replied that “the last thing we want is another nuclear power in our neighborhood.” That was why India voted against Iran three times at the IAEA and implemented UN sanctions. Iran was

NEW DELHI 00000355 003 OF 004

“hopping mad” over India’s IAEA votes and Iranian Foreign Minister Moutakki “blew up” at former National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan during his last visit to Delhi. “It goes without saying,” according to Menon, that India would continue to implement any sanctions against Iran approved by the Security Council.

10. (C) India had a more complex relationship with Iran and was convinced that it could work with Iran on some issues. For instance, Menon asserted that Iran was more worried about the Taliban today than ISAF, which was not the case a year ago. The trouble was that the Iranian elite was divided, so the normal rules of Iranian politics no longer seemed to apply. Under these circumstances, Menon asked, “What effect will sanctions have?” “If you must impose sanctions, we will go along with it,” according to Menon, “but we should be aware that it could end up benefiting the regime.” He said any sanctions should be carefully targeted so they do not end up hurting the people rather than the elite. He concluded that the Iran situation was “very unsatisfactory from our point of view as well,” and that the United States had “a choice among unsatisfactory strategies.”

Trade Issues: Fighters, Export Controls, Civ Nuke, GM Foods

– – –

11. (C) Menon said he appreciated all that the India and the United States had been able to accomplish together, and said we needed to do more on defense cooperation. McCaskill remarked about the Boeing presence in St. Louis and inquired about the MMRCA fighter tender. Menon said the technical evaluations would wrap up in April and the tender would be awarded following a fair process. He added that the C-17 deal was almost done and only a few “loose ends” needed to be tied up.

12. (C) “In order to kick the relationship into a different gear,” according to Menon, we needed “to be seen to be sharing technology.” We both have complex legal and regulatory structures, some left over from the Cold War, “ancient stuff.” It could take years to change this, but we have to try. McCaskill agreed, suggesting the possibility of using the annual Defense Authorization Legislation, which moves through Congress annually “like clockwork,” to eliminate “legislative handcuffs.” Menon said he would ask the Indian Embassy in Washington to be in touch with McCaskill’s staff to walk them through India’s proposed changes.

13. (C) Merkley praised Menon’s role in helping to conclude the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and inquired about progress on implementation. Menon mentioned planned Reprocessing Consultations March 2-4 in Delhi, adding, “If we could accomplish the 123 Agreement, I don’t see how this can stop us.” Menon said unequivocally, “We’re introducing liability legislation to the next Parliament.”

14. (C) McCaskill noted that if there is one issue with regard to India that makes Americans “cranky” it is that India was stealing our manufacturing base. Pointing out that Monsanto was also located in Missouri, she conceded that genetically modified foods were controversial, but noted that the United States purchased Indian GM cotton. Menon said we were just catching “the peak of the wave” on this issue in India, noting that the papers were full of vigorous arguments on both sides. He thanked McCaskill for reminding him that in difficult economic times these issues had the potential to take on added proportion in the relationship.

15. (C) Codel McCaskill did not have the opportunity to clear this cable.

NEW DELHI 00000355 004 OF 004

ROEMER

WikiLeaks: Indian fears over reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan

Tuesday, 23 February 2010, 13:08

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000334
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/01/2020
TAGS PREL, IN, PK, AF, IR
SUBJECT: INDIAN VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN: EAGER FOR INCREASED
USG COORDINATION, WARY OF PAKISTANI SCHEMING, SKEPTICAL ON R/R
REF: NEW DELHI 225 (INDIAN ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN)
Classified By: Political Counselor Uzra Zeya for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ).

1. (C) Summary: In a February 22 meeting, YK Sinha — India’s A/S equivalent for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran — welcomed increased GOI-USG coordination “at all levels” on our respective assistance activities in Afghanistan. He warned the USG not to be drawn into what he characterized as a Pakistani “game” of enlisting American support to “drive India out of Afghanistan” by presenting “fabricated” evidence of alleged Indian misdeeds in Afghanistan or the border areas. Sinha praised the Secretary’s interventions regarding assistance to Afghan women during the January London Conference on Afghanistan, but expressed skepticism over reintegration/reconciliation efforts and claimed that Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian republics share similar doubts about the potential efficacy of such efforts. End Summary.

More Assistance Coordination

—————————-

2. (C) Sinha told PolCouns that India welcomes increased coordination with the USG “at all levels, here and in Kabul” regarding assistance activities in Afghanistan “so that our respective interests are not undermined by Pakistan.” He proposed a meeting in the near future between Foreign Secretary Rao and the Ambassador as a useful step in this direction. PolCouns affirmed our keen interest in such coordination, as Afghanistan remains a top priority issue for USG visitors to India. Sinha described Indian assistance efforts as driven largely by the Indian Embassy in Kabul (reftel): “Delhi sets the broad parameters and provides oversight, but the Embassy in Kabul implements most assistance.” He identified the Indian DCM in Kabul as the GOI point person for Afghan assistance and encouraged U.S. Mission staff in Afghanistan to coordinate more closely with him.

3. (C) Sinha reminded PolCouns that he had previously broached the topic by “thinking out loud” about increased Indian training of Afghan security personnel, and claimed that U.S.-based think tanks and editorial writers were now advocating a greater security training role for India. He added that he understood this remains a sensitive topic for the USG, and stressed that India was not trying to get out in front on the issue, nor had it received such training requests from the Afghan government. PolCouns agreed that the topic is indeed a point of sensitivity for the USG, noting that in our view the overall costs of increased Indian security training outweigh the benefits. In response to PolCouns’ encouraging focused Indian assistance on agriculture and education, Sinha noted India’s announcement at the London Conference of 300 scholarships per year for the next 5 years for Afghans studying agriculture.

Beware of Pakistan’s “Game”

—————————

4. (C) Sinha contended that “it is quite clear to India” that Pakistan views Afghanistan “as a zero sum game and they want India out of Afghanistan.” He stated that “we will not leave Afghanistan because we have strategic interests there.” Acknowledging that the USG “needs Pakistan for many things right now,” Sinha counseled that the USG beware of Pakistan’s “game” of enlisting American support to “drive India out of Afghanistan.” He suggested that Islamabad would likely present USG officials with “fabricated” evidence of alleged Indian misbehavior in Afghanistan or the border areas, namely the FATA.

Doubts About R/R

—————-

NEW DELHI 00000334 002 OF 002

5. (C) Sinha praised the Secretary’s interventions regarding assistance to Afghan women during the January London Conference on Afghanistan, characterizing her remarks as among the most significant made at the Conference and lamenting that they were overshadowed in media coverage by focus on security issues. While he conceded that some form of reconciliation is necessary for the successful resolution of any armed conflict, Sinha expressed skepticism over prospects for Afghan-led reintegration/reconciliation efforts. PolCouns outlined the distinctions between reintegration and reconciliation in the Afghan context. Sinha claimed that Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian republics share similar doubt about the potential efficacy of such efforts. Sinha closed the discussion on Afghanistan by asserting that a precipitate U.S. exit would embolden “fanatics” to feel they had defeated both the USSR and the U.S., “and the result will be very bad for the region.” ROEMER

WikiLeaks: Americans reassure India over Afghanistan

Wednesday, 24 February 2010, 13:55

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000351
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/23/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, PARM, SENV, PK, IN
SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY AND INDIAN FOREIGN SECRETARY RAO ON
INDO-PAKISTAN TALKS
Classified By: Ambassador Timothy Roemer. Reasons: 1.4(B, D).

1. (C) Summary: In a February 15 meeting with Senator Kerry, Indian Foreign Secretary Rao underlined that Indo-Pakistani talks slated for February 25 enjoy high-level support and were still on track. Rao stressed that the latest rounds of talk would not segue automatically into the formal Composite Dialogue and that a “climate of confidence” was needed to make the talks productive. In response to Senator Kerry’s question, Rao emphasized the bilateral nature of the talks, while inviting U.S. encouragement and support. On Afghanistan, the Foreign Secretary cited Indian interests and criticized Pakistani attempts to exclude New Delhi from regional discussions. Rao said the GOI was “refining” its legislation on civil nuclear liability and was committed to implementing the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. End Summary.

2. (SBU) Senator Kerry (D-MA) and Ambassador Roemer met with Indian Foreign Secretary Rao on February 15 for forty-five minutes for a wide-ranging discussion of upcoming Indo-Pakistan talks, Afghanistan, implementing the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement, defense sales and climate change. The Senator’s talks with Prime Minister Singh, National Security Advisor Menon and Defense Minister Antony will be reported septel. Senator Kerry was accompanied by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers Jonah Blank and Fatema Sumar and military escort LCDR Greg Kausner. MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) Gaitri Kumar joined the Foreign Secretary.

Indo-Pakistan Talks Still On

———-

3. (C) After expressing his condolences over the February 13 terrorist bombing in Pune, Senator Kerry focused on the proposed talks between Foreign Secretary Rao and her Pakistani counterpart, now scheduled for February 25. Kerry stressed U.S. interest in and support for the talks and noted that there was a long history of distrust to overcome. He noted he would be meeting with the Pakistani leadership later on February 15 and pressed Rao for her sense of where the talks were heading.

4. (C) FS Rao underlined that support for moving ahead with the talks came from Prime Minister Singh and that he remained strongly committed to dialogue with Pakistan despite incidents such as the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. She explained that the PM had to take public opinion into account, which had worn thin after Mumbai, so there had been a pause in talks for the past 15 months. Responding to Kerry’s question about what the GOP needed to do to make such talks productive, Rao said that a helpful environment could be created if Pakistan took steps to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. She recognized there had been progress through some arrests and through the Pakistani trial of seven accused in the Mumbai attacks, although the trial would move forward slowly because of Pakistan’s complicated domestic problems. At the same time, terrorist camps still remained open; infiltration over the Line of Control had seen an unseasonable increase during the winter; LeT and JuD leaders like Hafiz Saeed had threatened India with jihaad at large public rallies; and GOP rhetoric against India was on the rise. India wanted to see concrete steps to dismantle these structures.

5. (C) FS Rao was careful to note that it would take some time to move from the latest round of talks to the formal Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan that had been paused following Mumbai. Such talks “can’t just be switched on” and India needed “a climate of confidence” in order to proceed to a resumption of the full dialogue. She speculated that Pakistani COAS General Kayani was likely to tell the Senator that India’s military doctrine continued to pose a threat to Pakistan and observed that the Pakistani military was “hypnotically obsessed” with India’s military posture

NEW DELHI 00000351 002 OF 003

despite constant reassurances from India about its intentions.

No U.S. Help Needed on Peace Talk Process

———-

6. (C) Senator Kerry asked if there were ways the United States could engage differently that would support the talks, perhaps through a regional approach that offered security guarantees with other interested states that would promote stability. Rao urged that the U.S. use it “enormous power” to encourage Pakistan to move forward in a productive way to create a positive climate for discussions. On process, Rao assured Kerry that India and Pakistan had established bilateral processes that should be used. As to Kerry’s suggestion of a regional approach that also involved outside powers, Rao said her instinctive reaction was that India and Pakistan needed to engage more effectively to create a level of trust that would support bilateral talks first.

Afghanistan

———-

7. (C) Senator Kerry stressed that the U.S. was serious about its commitment to the region and that there were different possibilities for success than there had been even six months ago. He assured Rao that the July 2011 date to begin withdrawal of combat forces from Afghanistan would not end U.S. commitment in Afghanistan. The date was intended to bring leverage to bear on Afghan officials to make necessary reforms. On the Pakistani side of the border, a change was needed in the dynamics of how a fragile Pakistani civilian government and its strong military interacted with groups such as the Quetta Shura and Haqqani. Rao stressed India’s commitment to its reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. She criticized Pakistani attempts to try to exclude India from regional discussions of Afghanistan and dismissed GOP criticism of India’s presence in consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar, noting the consultates had originally been established in the fifties and were carrying out normal consular responsibilities.

Civil Nuclear Agreement, Clean Energy, Climate Change

———-

8. (SBU) Senator Kerry urged that the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement be fully implemented, noting that there had been questions raised in Washington about delays in moving forward. Rao assured him that the GOI recognized the necessity of coming to closure and said that nuclear liability legislation was being “further refined” and it would be ready for the next session of Parliament which opens on February 22. Kerry stressed that the U.S. and India could work together and become leaders in the field of alternative energy and Rao pointed to a bilateral MOU signed in November 2009 as supporting such cooperative efforts.

9. (SBU) Referring to the Copenhagen Summit, FS Rao said it was positive that agreement had been reached, but noted that the Accord was not a legally binding agreement. She expressed concern that pending climate change legislation in the U.S. Congress might include trade-related provisions. Senator Kerry reassured her that there was no intention to act in a unilateral or punitive fashion, but noted that an agreement among the largest emitters could not be sustained if there was no enforcement mechanism. Legislation in Congress needed to address that possibility in order to be politically sustainable.

Military Sales and Export Controls

———–

10. (SBU) The Senator encouraged India to consider bids by Boeing and Lockheed Martin in the competition to award a contract for fighter aircraft purchases. Rao assured Kerry that India was open-minded and was using open and transparent procedures. She hailed the increase in defense cooperation

NEW DELHI 00000351 003 OF 003

as measured by increased U.S. defense sales, while noting that liberalization of export controls was a necessity if both sides wanted the relationship to grow further.

11. (U) This message has been cleared by Codel Kerry. ROEMER

WikiLeaks: India accuses Pakistan of supporting Taliban

Friday, 02 March 2007, 14:42

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 001051
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/01/2017
TAGS PREL, PGOV, EFIN, PINR, MOPS, KDEM, KISL, IN
SUBJECT: INDIANS OFFER BLEAK ASSESSMENT OF AFGHANISTAN AND
SOUTH ASIAN REGION DURING CTJWG
NEW DELHI 00001051 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: DCM Geoffrey Pyatt, Reason 1.4 (B, D)

1. (S) Summary: During the February 28, 2007 session of the U.S.-India Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG), the Indian delegation gave a tour d’horizon of developments in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal to help set the stage for the day’s discussions (reported Septel). Indian interlocutors presented a bleak assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan. The Taliban insurgency was gaining strength, according to the Indians, while the central government in Kabul remains weak and divided. The delegation offered an open, but doubting attitude about whether Pakistan had made a permanent policy decision to uproot terrorist infrastructure on its territory. The Indians noted, however, that New Delhi remained committed to working through the Indo-Pakistani Joint Counterterrorism Mechanism, which holds its first meeting March 6. Indian officials were concerned about the first hints of Islamic extremism taking root in Sri Lanka, and were cautiously optimistic about prospects for the peace process currently unfolding in Nepal. End Summary.

Afghanistan: Internal Situation Deteriorating

——————————————— –

2. (S) At the request of Ambassador K.C. Singh, head of the Indian delegation to the CTJWG, Sharad Kumar, Joint Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, provided India’s assessment of Afghanistan. Kumar noted he had a rather grim view of the near- and mid-term prospects for stability in the country. The death toll was mounting from various insurgency attacks, and both the scale and scope of these attacks were on the rise. While there had been some coalition successes in neutralizing the influence of key members of the Talib Shura, the insurgency itself was still moving further into the provinces. The Taliban had now set up seven operational councils within Afghanistan and were pursuing effective operations in each region. Even more worrisome, Kumar stated, was the fact that key Taliban leaders had recruited a large number of suicide bombers who were now ready for attacks.

3. (S) There were also signs of increasing ties between the Taliban and Al-Qa’ida elements on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, a fact which is of major significance for stability in both countries. From the debriefings of Dr. Mohammed Hanif, a key Taliban spokesman arrested on January 15, Kumar stated that “we now know that Mullah Omar is under Pakistani protection.” India had also learned that the former chief of Pakistan’s ISI was directly involved in assistance to the Taliban.

4. (S) Meanwhile, the central government in Kabul had been largely unable to expand its influence outside of the capital. The country, Kumar observed, was falling further into the clutches of tribalism and warlordism. President Karzai was in a “feeble” political position; there was severe bickering within his team and it was unclear that he would be able to implement much through either the tribal jirga or the Wolesi jirga. Karzai was walking a very delicate line, according to Kumar, and not advancing the cause of peace and stability that much.

5. (S) In India’s view, NATO and ISAF were not on the same wavelength; their unwillingness to engage in direct combat

NEW DELHI 00001051 002.2 OF 005

was the wrong approach for the current situation in Afghanistan. Any agreement with the tribes would provide temporary relief, at best. Talks with the various leaders, moreover, were also unlikely to be successful. In addition to speaking with more moderate leaders, NATO and ISAF were speaking with the hardliners, a fact which sent the wrong message to these leaders about their status and ability to influence the situation in Afghanistan.

India Committed to Assisting the Afghan Economy, Preventing the Development of a Narco-State

——————————

6. (S) India had committed $750 million in assistance to Afghanistan, the goal of which was to help the country develop an economy that was no longer dependent on drug monies. Through efforts such as key road construction projects, India hoped to help “today’s smugglers become tomorrow’s businessmen.” Indian interests — both commercial and official — had been targeted, even as New Delhi attempted to assist Afghanistan with its transition to a more stable economy. The road construction crews had been rocketed and bombed; there had been kidnappings and other personal attacks on Indians. Physical attacks were not the only obstacle, however. Kumar stated that India was hampered in its desire to open up natural and historic trade links with Afghanistan by the lack of overland transit through Pakistan. If India could transit humanitarian goods through Pakistan, savings could be ploughed back into Afghan development.

7. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX remarked that India was specifically looking at improving controls on Indian precursor chemicals as a means to limit and degrade Afghanistan’s opium/heroin production. New Delhi had met with counterparts from China, Iran, Pakistan and the UAE recently to enhance regional efforts to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals to Afghanistan. India was also sharing information directly with Pakistan, since there was ample evidence that opium and heroin were leaving Afghanistan and entering India via Pakistan. Jammu and Kashmir and the Punjab were the primary land routes.

U.S. Side Shares Concerns About Afghanistan’s Future, But Less Pessimistic

—————————–

8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that the U.S. shared some of India’s concerns, but did not share in the overall bleak assessment. The U.S. was actively engaged in programs to mitigate the risk of Afghanistan becoming a narco-state; America’s own experience in dealing with countries such as Colombia had given U.S. policymakers a very clear idea of the problems for regional stability that are associated with a nation falling into this void. Deputy Chief of Mission Geoff Pyatt hailed U.S.-India counternarcotics cooperation as the “gold standard” by which the U.S. and India should seek to emulate in other areas of CT collaboration. Our ability to share sensitive evidence bilaterally, our joint capabilities to conduct surveillance and operations to wrap up narcotics rings demonstrated both nations’ resolve to tackle this issue in the region.

NEW DELHI 00001051 003.2 OF 005

9. (S) Continuing with his response, XXXXXXXXXXXX added threats from corruption within Afghanistan as yet another problem to be monitored and fought. Drawing on the news that new suicide bombers had been trained and were poised to attack, the U.S. side also discussed the international dimension of this jihadist activity. Extremists could travel to Afghanistan from many regions — North Africa, Chechnya, Central Asia — and receive training in terrorist camps in Afghanistan. Even if/when international partners were finally able to stabilize this country, the terrorists would be able to take their skills and knowledge to a different part of the world, and to a new zone of conflict. The capabilities become part of a global terrorist knowledge base.

10. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX outlined some of the successes in the country and noted that the Karzai government had been able to increase stability and return to greater normalcy. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted India’s request for land access to Afghanistan through Pakistan and said he would relay the request and register it in Washington.

India Open but Cautious about U.S. CT Cooperation with Pakistan

————–

11. (S) In a very measured assessment of Pakistan, Ambassador Singh acknowledged U.S. reasons for pursuing CT cooperation with Pakistan, but stated that India, itself, maintained a certain skepticism about whether Islamabad had truly made a sea-change in its approach to this issue. New Delhi had seen evidence of at least tactical decisions to dismantle camps and terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan, but the Indians still receive a great deal of intelligence that shows that Islamabad may not intend to uproot this capability permanently. Pakistani authorities appear to have a desire to keep at least some assets intact in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. India’s “nightmare scenario” is that this ad hoc set of actions results in a long-term trend in which terrorist groups are able to find permanent sanctuary in Afghanistan. “We do not want another century of instability,” Singh stated.

12. (S) The GOI currently saw a decline in the number of infiltrations across the Line of Control (LOC), said Singh, but it was too early to tell whether this was permanent or, indeed, whether this fact mattered that much in terms of overall terrorist infiltration rates into India. Singh outlined three facts that are influencing this short-term trend.

–Both sides had stepped up policing activities on the border; –It was still winter in the border regions; one could only get a real sense as to infiltration numbers once the spring thaw arrived, and; -There is a disturbing new trend of terrorist groups using India’s long, unmonitored borders with Nepal and Bangladesh to move terrorists into the Indian heartland.

Both the Bangalore and Hyderabad plots, Singh stated, were masterminded by terrorists who had come across the border with Bangladesh.

13. (S) India remained open and committed to the Counterterrorism Joint Mechanism with Pakistan. If dialogue

NEW DELHI 00001051 004.2 OF 005

is to succeed, Singh remarked, then India had to put Pakistan’s willingness to engage to a legitimate test. Indian resolve will come under public scrutiny, of course, since the press is asking — perhaps rightly — why it has taken six months for the mechanism to hold its first full-scale meeting, and whether this lag demonstrates that Islamabad actually has no real desire to see this process succeed.

14. (S) The potential worth of the mechanism had already been proven just this month, as both sides were able to insulate the bilateral relationship from a potential downturn after the Samjhuauta train attack by agreeing immediately to discussions of this tragedy in the Joint Mechanism meeting on March 6. Nevertheless, Singh said, the Indians had received real push-back from Islamabad about establishing a regularized schedule for these talks. Singh mused that both sides had to accept the fact that extremists would probably try to disrupt any dialogue process — periodic or permanent — through attacks timed around the next round. That said, it would not be productive for the two sides only to meet if and when there had been some sort of attack.

15. (S) For this round, India will be presenting its evidence on the July 2006 Mumbai blasts. Singh noted it was unclear whether the Indian interagency process was prepared at this time to put evidence and information about the Panipat attack before the Pakistanis. Pakistan, he thought, would probably table concerns about alleged Indian activities in Afghanistan which Islamabad perceived as against its interests. The real issue, he said, is to get the dialogue away from the public–and political– platforms and into a channel in which issues can be thoroughly vetted.

Sri Lanka Now More At Risk from Islamic Jihadist Activity?

—————-

16. (S) Turning to Sri Lanka, Ambassador Singh briefly recounted the historic reasons behind India’s decision to adopt its current cautious position towards the conflict in that country. The peace agreement with the LTTE was more honored in the breach at this juncture; that said, New Delhi supported Colombo’s current approach. Sudden or direct campaigns that resulted in massive refugee movements or displacement of the population were in nobody’s interest. The most worrisome new trend in Sri Lanka was the onset of some Islamic jihadist activity. The Indians had fragmentary information at this stage. There were open questions about whether Pakistan had a role in this new development, if only at the tactical level. Irrespective of this fact, however, India still remained concerned. If Islamic extremism were to take hold in Sri Lanka, yet another port of call in the larger Indian Ocean region could become a threat to India.

Nepal: Next Few Months are Crucial to Creating Stability

———–

17. (S) The Indian side closed its presentation with a brief overview of the peace process in Nepal. Ambassador Singh reviewed the Indian calculus that had led New Delhi to support the current peace process. It was important, he stated, for the Nepalese army to remain engaged and not to become demoralized. The UN would play a useful role in providing civilian policing and in overseeing the

NEW DELHI 00001051 005.2 OF 005

demilitarization of the Maoists. The key thing to ensure success was to shorten the transition period between the current situation and the election of the constituent assembly. With the onset shortly of the monsoon season, and the Dussehra festivities this fall, there was actually only a short window of opportunity to move the process along.

18. (S) Finding the right tools for border management was a key issue for India at this stage. Singh noted the “mushrooming” of the number of madrassas in the Terai belt and underscored India’s concern that this region — which forms an open and essentially unmonitored border with India — become stable and peaceful. New Delhi was placing great emphasis on creating both rail and road links as a way to open up and stabilize the economy in the region. “We cannot fence the border,” Singh observed, “so we need successful communities on both sides of the border as the best preventative measure” to ward off any further radicalization of the population. Singh presented this as a new Indian strategy for combating terrorism along India’s borders. Softening the border actually contributes to India’s ability to prevent terrorism, he explained, because a happier local population is less likely to allow terrorists the safe haven and support necessary for their activity. (Comment: Singh seemed to be implying that this was part of India’s broader strategy against terrorism in other border states, including Kashmir and Bangladesh. End comment.)

19. (U) This cable was cleared by XXXXXXXXXXXX. MULFORD