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Donderdag, 2 December 2010 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5 | Bewerkt door Crethi Plethi

Pro-regering supporters demonstreren voor vreedzaam gebruik van nucleaire energie door Iran.

WikiLeaks: Israel en Arabische Staten Waren Eensgezind In Aanval Op Iran

Volgens verschillende Amerikaanse documenten, die op de WikiLeaks website gelekt zijn, hebben meerdere Arabische Staten net als Israel er bij de Amerikanen op aangedrongen om het Iraanse nucleaire programma met militaire middelen te stoppen.

Uit de documenten blijkt dat de Arabische leiders zich grote zorgen maken over Iraanse ambities om een nucleaire macht te worden. Hoewel de Iraanse regering bij monde van President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad er steeds op wijst dat Iran slechts vreedzame bedoelingen heeft en haar nucleaire installaties wil gebruiken voor het leveren van energie in Iran, vertrouwen de Arabische leiders net als de Israëlische regering, hem niet.

Hier blijkt ook uit dat de Arabische leiders, in tegenstelling tot wat de Westerse regeringsleiders en media ons willen doen geloven, niet het Israëlisch-Palestijns vraagstuk als het grootste probleem in het Midden Oosten beschouwen, maar wel de Iraanse nucleaire ambities. Een ander feit wat hieruit afgeleid kan worden is dat, en ook dit in tegenstelling tot wat de Westerse regeringsleiders en media ons vertellen, een onopgeloste Palestijnse kwestie niet de wereldvrede bedreigt. De Arabische leiders zijn hier duidelijk over: als Iran kernwapens bemachtigt, dan leidt dit tot een wapenwedloop in het Midden Oosten en zullen de Arabische Staten én Turkije ook nucleaire wapens ontwikkelen. Hoezeer de Israëlisch-Palestijnse kwestie ook om een oplossing vraagt, de Arabische Staten zullen dit niet gebruiken als excuus voor een wapenwedloop. Maar het is vragen om problemen als Iran toegestaan wordt om kernwapens te ontwikkelen, wetende dat de Iraanse regering het sinds de Islamitische Revolutie in 1979 als kerntaak ziet om het Shi’isme (Shia Islam) over de wereld te verspreiden. En de overwegend Sunni Islamitische staten zullen dit niet toestaan.

Ook de Amerikaanse President Obama houdt ons voor dat het essentieel is om de Palestijnse kwestie op te lossen. Hij blijft zo halsstarrig doorgaan met zijn toenaderingspolitiek in het Midden Oosten dat je je afvraagt in hoeverre hij in staat is om pragmatisch op veranderingen te reageren. De Midden Oosten politiek van Obama heeft een totaal averechtse uitwerking gehad. Zijn Chamberlain-achtige manier van verzoening en toenadering heeft er in het Midden Oosten slechts toe geleid dat militant Islamistische krachten hun programma versneld hebben met als gevolg dat Iran op het punt staat om een kernwapen in handen te krijgen, dat de Arabische leiders Obama zien als een zwakke president op wiens bescherming ze niet kunnen rekenen, dat Libanon weer in handen gevallen is van de machtsspelletjes van Syrië, Iran en de terroristische Hezbollah-beweging, en heeft het terroristische Hamas zelfs geld gekregen (en daarmee in feite legitimiteit verworven) om de Gazastrook te regeren, wat betekent dat ze door kunnen gaan met hun terroristische activiteiten tegen Israël. En daar komt nog bij dat Amerikaanse diplomaten heel goed weten dat Turkije een regering heeft die Turkije Islamiseert en zich in toenemende mate vijandig opstelt tegenover Westerse waarden en Israël, maar volgens Barack Obama is Turkije nog steeds een grote vriend van de Verenigde Staten.

De op WikiLeaks uitgelekte Amerikaanse memo’s laten zien dat:

• Koning Abdullah van Saoedi-Arabië heeft er bij de Verenigde Staten herhaaldelijk op aangedrongen om Iran aan te vallen en het Iraanse nucleaire programma te vernietigen. Ook beschrijven de gelekte memo’s hoe andere Arabische bondgenoten in het geheim hebben gepleit voor militaire actie tegen Teheran.
• Ambtenaren in Jordanië en Bahrein hebben openlijk opgeroepen tot het met alle middelen stoppen van het nucleaire programma van Iran, inclusief militaire middelen.
• Leiders in Saoedi-Arabië, de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten en Egypte gebruikten bewoordingen over Iran als “het kwaad”, een “existentiële bedreiging” en een macht die “ons naar oorlog leidt”.
• Robert Gates, de Amerikaanse minister van Defensie, waarschuwde in februari dat als diplomatieke inspanningen mislukken, “we het risico lopen van nucleaire proliferatie in het Midden-Oosten, oorlog als gevolg van een Israëlische aanval, of beide.”

Deze onthullingen komen uit geheime memo’s van Amerikaanse ambassades in het Midden-Oosten, waarmee het duidelijk wordt dat er achter de schermen veel druk werd uitgeoefend op de Verenigde Staten om Iran in bedwang te houden. De Amerikaanse regering, de Arabische staten en Israël vermoeden dat Iran dicht bij het verwerven van nucleaire wapens is. Een bombardement op Iraanse nucleaire installaties wordt tot nu toe gezien als een wanhopige laatste redmiddel met mogelijk een veel grotere oorlog als gevolg.

Iran stelt dat zijn nucleaire programma is ontworpen om de krachtcentrales te bevoorraden, en niet voor kernkoppen. Maar uit WikiLeaks documenten is ook duidelijk geworden dat Noord-Korea raketten aan Iran heeft geleverd die uitgerust kunnen worden met kernkoppen. Waarom zulke raketten aanschaffen als je geen ambitie hebt om kernwapens te maken? En aldus gaat er na jaren van uitstellen een nieuwe gespreksronde van start met de G5+1 (de vijf permanente leden van de VN-Veiligheidsraad plus Duitsland) op 5 december.

In een vergadering met de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van Italië eerder dit jaar, zei Gates dat de tijd om in te grijpen bijna op was. “Als Iran een nucleair wapen ontwikkelt, zullen de VS en zijn bondgenoten binnen vier tot vijf jaar een andere wereld zien en een nucleaire wapenwedloop in het Midden-Oosten.” Koning Abdullah had de Amerikanen al gewaarschuwd dat, indien Iran kernwapens ontwikkeld “iedereen in de regio hetzelfde zou doen, waaronder Saoedi-Arabië.”

De Saoedische koning “spoorde de VS aan om Iran aan te vallen om een einde te maken aan zijn nucleaire wapenprogramma”, volgens een document. De Saoedische ambassadeur in Washington, Adel al-Jubeir, zei volgens een verslag over de vergadering die Abdullah had met de Amerikaanse generaal David Petraeus in april 2008: “Hij vertelde u om het hoofd van de slang [Iran] af te snijden.” Hij voegde hieraan toe dat het voor de Koning en zijn regering de hoogste prioriteit had om samen te werken met de Amerikanen om de Iraanse invloed in Iraq terug te dringen.

Koning Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa van Bahrein vroeg in een gesprek met een Amerikaanse diplomaat “met klem om actie te ondernemen om hun [Iran] nucleaire programma te beëindigen, ongeacht de middelen die daarvoor nodig zijn. Dat programma moet worden gestopt. Het gevaar van het door laten gaan is groter dan het gevaar van het stoppen.” Zeid Rifai, de toenmalige voorzitter van de Jordaanse senaat, vertelde een hoge Amerikaanse functionaris: “Bombardeer Iran of leef met de Iraanse bom. Sancties, beloningen of prikkels zullen niet helpen…”

Abu Dhabi kroonprins Sjeik Mohammed bin Zayed zei in gesprekken met Amerikaanse functionarissen dat hij voorstander was van actie tegen Iran, hoe eerder hoe beter. “Ik geloof dat deze man [Ahmadinejad] ons in oorlog brengt… Het is een kwestie van tijd. Persoonlijk kan ik het risico’s niet nemen met een vent als [president Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad. Hij is jong en agressief.”

In een ander gesprek waarschuwde een hoge Saoedische functionaris dat de Arabische Golfstaten hun eigen nucleaire wapens kunnen ontwikkelen of toestaan dat ze in hun landen gestationeerd worden als afschrikmiddel tegen de Iraanse dreiging.

De Israëlische premier, Benjamin Netanyahu, heeft in mei 2009 tegen Amerikaanse functionarissen gezegd dat hij en de Egyptische president Hosni Mubarak het er over eens waren dat een nucleair Iran er in de regio toe zou leiden dat anderen nucleaire wapens gaan ontwikkelen. Dat zal resulteren in “de grootste bedreiging voor de non-proliferatie inspanningen sinds de Cubaanse rakettencrisis.”

In de documenten lezen we ook vrijpostige, zelfs onbeleefde, opmerkingen over de Iraanse leiders, over hun betrouwbaarheid en over tactieken op internationale bijeenkomsten. Koning Abdullah zei tegen een andere Amerikaanse diplomaat: “De bottom line is dat je ze niet kan vertrouwen.” Mubarak zei tegen een Amerikaans congreslid: “Iran veroorzaakt altijd problemen.” Anderen leren weer van wat zij omschrijven als de Iraanse misleiding. “Ze liegen tegen ons en wij liegen tegen hun,” zei de minister-president van Qatar Hamad bin Jassim Jaber al-Thani.

Bron: WikiLeaks

Sunday, 20 April 2008, 08:47

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000649
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND S/I
SATTERFIELD
EO 12958 DECL: 04/19/2018
TAGS EAID, ECON, EFIN, IZ, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, SA, IR
SUBJECT: SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES ON SAUDI
POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (S) Summary: US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus met with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, General Presidency of Intelligence Chief Prince Muqrin bin Abd al-Aziz, and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz during their April 14-15 visit to Riyadh. The Saudi King and senior Princes reviewed Saudi policy toward Iraq in detail, all making essentially the same points. They said that the Kingdom will not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy until the King and senior Saudi officials are satisfied that the security situation has improved and the Iraqi government has implemented policies that benefit all Iraqis, reinforce Iraq’s Arab identity, and resist Iranian influence. The Saudis evinced somewhat greater flexibility regarding the issues of economic and humanitarian assistance for Iraq and debt forgiveness. In a conversation with the Charge’ on April 17, Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel al-Jubeir indicated that the King had been very impressed by the visit of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and al-Jubeir hinted that the Saudi government might announce changes to its Iraq policy before the President’s visit to Riyadh in mid-May. End Summary.

Positive Signs in Iraq

2. (S) In all their meetings with the Saudi royals, both Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus conveyed the progress in Iraq and confirmed the negative role Iran is playing in Iraq. They characterized the recent ISF-led operations in Basra and Baghdad as having a striking effect against the Shia militias, most importantly turning Iraqi public opinion away from the militias. While Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s decision to take action against the militias was described as hasty and not well-planned, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus emphasized that any tactical shortfalls were overshadowed by the greater positive effect of unifying Iraq and demonstrating the GOI’s, and most specifically al-Maliki’s, determined resolve to take on the Shia militias, especially Jaysh al-Madhi. Concurrently, these operations unequivocally demonstrated Iran’s subversive activities in Iraq and its broader regional ambitions. Throughout all their discussions, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus stressed the importance and urgent need for the Saudis to join us in supporting Iraq.

The Saudi Embassy Issue

3. (S) King Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, and Prince Muqrin all stated that the Saudi government would not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy there in the near future, citing both security and political grounds in support of this position. The Foreign Minister stated that he had considered dispatching an ambassador and had sent Saudi diplomats to Baghdad to identify a site for the Saudi embassy. However, he said. “the King simply forbade us to go any farther.” King Abdullah confirmed this account in a separate meeting with Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. The King asserted that the security situation in Baghdad was too dangerous for him to risk sending a Saudi ambassador there. “He would immediately become a target for the terrorists and the militias,” he said.

4. (S) The King also rejected the suggestion that by sending a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad he could give essential political support to the Iraqi government as it struggles to resist Iranian influence and subversion. He expressed lingering doubt on the Iraqi government’s willingness to resist Iran. He also repeated his frequently voiced doubts about Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki himself by alluding to his “Iranian connections.” The Saudi monarch stated that he does not trust al-Maliki because the Iraqi Prime Minister had “lied” to him in the past by promising to take certain actions and then failing to do so. The King did not say precisely what these allegedly broken promises might have been. He repeated his oft heard view that al-Maliki rules Iraq on behalf of his Shiite sect instead of all Iraqis.

5. (S) However, in a potentially significant move, the King did not reject the idea of dispatching a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad completely. Instead, he said that he would consider

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doing so after the Iraqi provincial elections are held in the autumn. The conduct of these elections would indicate whether or not the Iraqi government is truly interested in ruling on behalf of all Iraqis or merely in support of the Shia, King Abdullah asserted.

Grudging Acknowledgment of Change in Iraq

6. (S) The Foreign Minister signaled another potential softening in Saudi policy by saying that the Kingdom’s problem was not with al-Maliki as a person but rather with the conduct of the Iraqi government. The King himself admitted that the Iraqi government’s performance has improved in recent months and grudgingly accepted the point that al-Maliki and his security forces have indeed been fighting extremists, specifically Shia extremists in both Basra and Baghdad and Sunni extremists and Al Qaeda in Mosul. However, the King and the senior Princes argued that more time would be required to judge whether the recent change in Iraqi behavior was lasting and sincere. The King suggested that much of the Iraqi government’s improved performance is attributable to US prodding rather than change in Iraqi attitudes.

7. (S) The Foreign Minister also suggested that the USG should prod Ayatollah Sistani to speak out in favor of a unified Iraq and national reconciliation among different Iraqi sects and groups. “You have paid a heavy price in blood and treasure, and Sistani and his people have benefited directly. You have every right to ask this of him,” Prince Saud al-Faisal said.

Possible Saudi Economic Assistance

8. (S) The King, Prince Muqrin, and the Foreign Minister all suggested that the Saudi government might be willing to consider the provision of economic and humanitarian assistance to Iraq. Prince Muqrin asked Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus to send him a list of the kinds of assistance that the US government would like to see the Kingdom provide Iraq. Al-Jubeir later told the Charge’ that this assistance would be separate from the USD 1 billion in aid that the Saudi government had promised at the Madrid Conference but still not delivered due to security worries. He said that the Madrid commitment consisted of $500 million in trade credits and $500 million in project assistance with strict conditionally, along the lines of what the World Bank would require. Al-Jubeir added that the assistance the Saudi government might provide via Prince Muqrin would initially be in the range of $75-$300 million.

Possible Debt Relief

9. (S) The King noted that Saudi debt relief for Iraq “will come at some point,” although he did not say when. Al-Jubeir told the Charge’ that debt relief is a real possibility. He also noted that the Saudi government might make changes to its Iraq policy, perhaps including both assistance and debt relief, prior to the President’s visit to Riyadh.

The Need to Resist Iran

10. (S) The King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needs to cooperate with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence and subversion in Iraq. The King was particularly adamant on this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well. Al-Jubeir recalled the King’s frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons program. “He told you to cut off the head of the snake,” he recalled to the Charge’, adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government.

11. (S) The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, called instead for much more severe US and international sanctions on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on bank lending. Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval. The Foreign Minister also stated that the use of military pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.

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12. (S) Comment: Saudi attitudes toward Iraq, from the King on down, remain marked by skepticism and suspicion. That said, the Saudis have noticed recent events in Iraq and are eager to work with the US to resist and reverse Iranian encroachment in Iraq. The King was impressed by Ambassador Crocker’s and General Petraeus’ visit, as were the Foreign Minister, GPI Chief, and Interior Minister. Cautious as ever, the Saudis may nevertheless be willing to consider new measures in the areas of assistance and debt relief, although further discussions will be required to make these ideas a reality. End Comment. 13. (U) This cable was reviewed and cleared by Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus. GFOELLER

Bron: WikiLeaks

Friday, 12 February 2010, 13:18

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000173
NOFORN
SIPDIS
SECDEF FOR USDP, ISA, ISA/EURNATO
EO 12958 DECL: 02/11/2020
TAGS PREL, MARR, MOPS, NATO, IT, AF, IR
SUBJECT: SECDEF MEETING WITH ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
FRANCO FRATTINI, FEBRUARY 8, 2010
ROME 00000173 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (SecDef) met with Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini during an official visit to Rome on February 8. On Afghanistan, Frattini was eager to move beyond the London Conference and work to produce practical results for the Afghan people. He proposed better civil-military coordination at senior levels in NATO, and raised the prospect of coordination on local projects across the Afghanistan-Iran border. SecDef thanked Frattini for Italy’s pledge of more troops for operations in Afghanistan and explained where gaps in civil-military cooperation existed. Frattini believed the international community was lining up against Iran, and encouraged better coordination with countries outside the P5-plus-1. SecDef warned that a nuclear Iran would lead to greater proliferation in the Middle East, war, or both. SecDef agreed with Frattini that a United Nations conference highlighting security challenges in the Horn of Africa was a good idea. END SUMMARY.

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Afghanistan

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2. (S/NF) Frattini opened by telling SecDef that the U.S. can count on Italy’s full support on Afghanistan, Iran and fighting terror. He had recently talked with General Jones and Secretary Clinton and relayed the same message. He expressed a desire to focus on the comprehensive approach in such a way to improve the daily lives of Afghans. He asserted a need to press President Karzai on delivering improved governance or risk losing support for the mission in coalition Parliaments. Frattini wanted to get beyond “just talking” — referencing the London conference — and noted concrete Italian projects to convert poppy cultivation to olive oil production and to create a national high school for public administration.

3. (S/NF) SecDef commended Rome’s efforts to increase Italian contributions, asking whether even more Carabinieri might be available for training the Afghan security forces. He observed that General McChrystal’s emphasis on protecting Afghan civilians has changed attitudes among Allied publics. SecDef said he is pushing the comprehensive approach, noting a need for all stakeholders in Afghanistan to share information effectively. He said he hoped that NATO’s new Senior Civilian Representative, Ambassador Mark Sedwill, could facilitate this. SecDef recommended a focus on better governance below the level of the national government — which would take decades to turn into a modern government ) taking advantage of traditional institutions and competent governors at the regional and sub-regional levels and leveraging them into local success stories. At the national level, however, our priority should be to develop those ministries most critical to our success, such as Defense, Interior, Finance, Agriculture, and Health. Noting Gen. McChrystal’s recent statement that the situation in Afghanistan is no longer deteriorating, SecDef said that much of the challenge is psychological — convincing Afghans that we can win and that we will not abandon them.

4. (S/NF) Frattini agreed that civilian-military integration is the weakest part of the Afghan strategy. He expressed frustration that NATO foreign ministers only discuss issues like agriculture and education while defense ministers only discuss security. The problem, Frattini suggested, is that they don’t talk to each other. He proposed a joint meeting of foreign and defense ministers, beginning with talks at the expert level. SecDef responded that Gen. McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry do civilian-military collaboration at the national level on the basis of a Joint Campaign Plan, as do local ground commanders with leaders of PRTs. What is missing is the level in between — the regional commands — and SecDef expressed a desire for Sedwill to appoint subordinates to address this in each RC, building on the

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example of the civ-mil cell in RC-South. The effect would be cascading civil-military coordination at the national, regional, and local levels. SecDef noted that similar efforts by UNSRSG Kai Eide had been hamstrung by resourcing and the UN’s aversion to working with the military. As a NATO representative, Sedwill should not have these problems.

5. (S/NF) Frattini also asked about practical cooperation across the Afghan-Iranian border. Local incentives for cooperation might undermine weapons and drug trafficking and help co-opt reconcilable Taliban. SecDef noted that Iran is playing both sides of the street — trying to be friendly with the Afghanistan government while trying to undermine ISAF efforts. He noted that intelligence indicated there was little lethal material crossing the Afghanistan-Iran border. SecDef suggested that trade route protection from Afghanistan into Eastern Iran, which is important for local economies on both sides of the border, might be a place to start. SecDef noted that any effort will need to be coordinated with Kabul. Frattini agreed this would be a good starting point.

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Iran

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6. (S/NF) Frattini supported recent public statements by SecDef raising the pressure on Iran. He declared that Ahmadinejad cannot be trusted, especially after contradicting recent constructive statements by his own government. Frattini, citing a recent conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, said he believed Russia would support the sanctions track. The challenge was to bring China on board; China and India, in Frattini’s view, were critical to the adoption of measures that would affect the government without hurting Iranian civil society. He also specifically proposed including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Brazil, Venezuela and Egypt in the conversation. He expressed particular frustration with Ankara’s “double game” of outreach to both Europe and Iran. Frattini proposed an informal meeting of Middle East countries, who were keen to be consulted on Iran, and noted that Secretary Clinton was in agreement.

7. (S/NF) SecDef emphasized that a UNSC resolution was important because it would give the European Union and nations a legal platform on which to impose even harsher sanctions against Iran. SecDef pointedly warned that urgent action is required. Without progress in the next few months, we risk nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, war prompted by an Israeli strike, or both. SecDef predicted “a different world” in 4-5 years if Iran developed nuclear weapons. SecDef stated that he recently delivered the same warning to PM Erdogan, and he agreed with Frattini’s assessment on Saudi Arabia and China, noting that Saudi Arabia is more important to both Beijing and Moscow than Iran.

8. (S/NF) SecDef urged Frattini to reconsider a planned visit to Italy by a prominent Iranian Parliamentarian in the wake of recent executions of students in opposition to the government. At the same time, we needed to ensure we did not discredit the opposition by creating the impression that they are the tools of foreign partners.

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Horn of Africa

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9. (C) Frattini expressed concern about deteriorating conditions in Somalia and Yemen. He noted a recent conversation with President Sharif of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), in which Sharif said that he would be unable to pay his security forces by the end of February. Frattini said that Italy was encouraging the EU Presidency to focus on Somalia and Yemen, and had proposed a United Nations conference addressing Horn of Africa security issues. Italy was providing funding to the TFG’s national budget. SecDef concurred that the region deserved more focus.

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10. (U) SecDef has cleared this cable. Drafted by OSD staff. DIBBLE

Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 04 November 2009, 06:44

S E C R E T MANAMA 000642
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 11/04/2019
TAGS PREL, MARR, ENRG, BA”>BA, AF, IZ, IR, NATO
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS WITH KING HAMAD: IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, NATO AWACS, ENERGY
Classified By: Ambassador Adam Ereli, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: In an hour-long meeting on November 1 with CENTCOM Commander General Petraeus, Bahrain’s King Hamad said Arab states need to do more to engage Iraq, discussed Afghanistan and the positive role India could play, urged action to stop Iran’s nuclear program, and reviewed regional plans for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. END SUMMARY.

2.(C) IRAQ: King Hamad fully endorsed General Petraeus’s point that increased Arab engagement and influence would help frustrate Iranian designs in Iraq. He added that the Arabs need Egyptian and Saudi leadership in this matter and that he had tried to make this point to the Saudi government, but with little effect.

3.(C) AFGHANISTAN: General Petraeus praised Bahrain’s commitment of a police company for internal security at FOB Leatherneck. King Hamad confirmed that he would personally see the force off at the airport on December 16. This date will be the 10th anniversary of the King’s assuming the throne, and General Petraeus said that U.S. air assets would be available on the 16th to transport the company to Afghanistan. King Hamad inquired about the extent of India’s involvement in Afghanistan and noted that Bahrain saw India as very positive force in the region. “It’s a new era,” he said. “They can be of great help.”

4.(C) IRAN: King Hamad pointed to Iran as the source of much of the trouble in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He argued forcefully for taking action to terminate their nuclear program, by whatever means necessary. “That program must be stopped,” he said. “The danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping it.” King Hamad added that in light of these regional developments, Bahrain was working to strengthen GCC coordination and its relations with allies and international organizations. He specifically mentioned NATO and confirmed that Bahrain had agreed to the Alliance’s request to use Isa Airbase for AWACS missions, although the detail on numbers and timing have yet to be discussed.

5.(S/NF) BAHRAIN AIR SHOW AND NUCLEAR ENERGY: King Hamad asked General Petraeus for his help in encouraging U.S. aircraft manufacturers to participate in the inaugural Bahrain Air Show, scheduled for January 2010. He said that France was pushing the Rafale and would be there in force, although he agreed with Petraeus that the French fighter was yesterday’s technology. Warming to the subject of French commercial diplomacy and referring to President Sarkozy, King Hamad said, “The UAE will give him a hard time soon,” over France’s proposed deal for nuclear reactors. “They’re not happy with the project he’s offered them.” King Hamad also mentioned that Bahrain was studying options for using nuclear power to generate electricity. He said he had asked the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Public Works to present him recommendations and invited the Ambassador to discuss with them possible U.S. involvement. Post will do so.

ERELI

Bron: WikiLeaks

Monday, 10 April 2006, 14:23

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 001401
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, INR/NESA, AND S/CT – H. CRUMPTON
NSC FOR FRAN TOWNSEND, JUAN ZARATE, MIKE TAYLOR, NICOLE
SHAMPAINE, NIK RAMCHAND, ELLIOTT ABRAMS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/09/2016
TAGS PTER, PINS, ASEC, EPET, MCAP, KPAL, AE, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISOR TOWNSEND’S VISIT TO THE UAE
REF: A. 05 ABU DHABI 3243 B. 05 ABU DHABI 3565 C. ABU DHABI 409 D. ABU DHABI 779 E. ABU DHABI 1228 F. ABU DHABI 248 (NOTAL) G. ABU DHABI 176 H. ABU DHABI 605 I. USDEL 00007 J. ABU DHABI 1123 K. ABU DHABI 909 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S) Summary. Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to welcoming you to the UAE on April 23. In the aftermath of the controversy of the Dubai Ports World acquisition of P&O, your assurances to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), your host for the visit, that the USG values the UAE as an ally and friend will be well received. While you should commend the UAE for its assistance and cooperation, you should take advantage of your luncheon with MbZ and his brother, State Security Director Sheikh Hazza, to push the UAE on several areas of interest to the USG: counterterrorism, counter terror finance, Iran, Hamas, Iraq, and ideological extremism (each is covered in the scenesetter). The UAE remains a committed partner in the global war on terror, but it continues to take an ad hoc approach to countering terrorism that “solves” the problem for the UAE locally, but fails to contribute on a transnational basis. In January, the U.S. and the UAE held the first meeting of the Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC), but the discussions were not as detailed or as robust as the U.S. delegation anticipated. Treasury U/S Levey will return to the UAE to hold a second meeting April 30 that will focus on cash couriers and charities.

2. (S) Although the UAE regards Iran as one of its most serious threats to national security, UAE officials are reluctant to take actions that could anger their neighbor and compromise their extensive trading relationship. At the same time, we are seeing more of a willingness on the part of the UAE to support USG initiatives without the full approval of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). As tensions escalate between Iran and the international community, the UAE is growing increasingly nervous. The UAE leadership–which has told us they consider Hamas a terrorist organization–plans to uphold its previous commitments of humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people. The UAE has taken an active role in encouraging Sunni participation in the Iraqi political process and it continues to condemn the sectarian violence that is preventing stabilization of the country. In the face of growing ideological extremism in the Gulf, the UAE leadership is politically determined not to allow Islamist extremists to gain a foothold on UAE soil. End Summary.

Counterterrorism Efforts

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3. (S) The UAE is concerned about the terrorist threat to the UAE, but lacks a comprehensive implementation strategy for reducing its vulnerability (ref A). The UAE considers homeland security one of its top priorities, but rather than prioritizing national security projects, its efforts have focused on contracting risk assessments, forming committees, and procuring equipment. The UAE has also aggressively tried to prevent the radicalization of UAE nationals and Arab/South Asian expatriates. UAE officials publicly and strongly condemn extremism and terrorist attacks, anti-extremism has been the focus of government-approved Friday sermons in the mosques, and the UAE ministry of Education has modernized the Islamic studies curriculum in its schools.

4. (S) The UAEG government reacts quickly when presented with evidence of a terrorist presence inside the UAE, but does not approach the problem from a transnational manner. The UAE’s immediate response when terrorists pose a risk is to deport them. UAE agencies do not investigate fully to see how far the problem goes or whether there is an international network involved. Although the U.S./UAE counterterrorism cooperation is strong (with the UAE working closely with the USG on specific cases), Emiratis do not consistently share lead information found in the possession of individuals in their custody with each other or with the U.S. Government. These tactics limit law enforcement and intelligence services’ ability to use intelligence to disrupt extremist cells and planned attacks. The UAE’s insistence on deportation as a solution does not protect the country long-term or truly address the nature and scope of the problem. The UAEG must be willing to take action against Emirati nationals, it must investigate fully, and it must share information with other Gulf countries and with the USG.

5. (S) The only way to generate significant change in the UAE on the issue of counterterrorism is to convince the senior leadership that it needs to continue to display political will and commitment in tackling the terror challenge with a transnational approach. MbZ is the person most able to elicit this type of change. Embassy recommends you have a frank and forthright discussion during your meeting with MbZ and his younger brother, Hazza, to encourage this type of change. Although you should commend them for the UAE’s CT efforts and cooperation, you should also encourage them to be personally involved in developing a more effective and fully cooperative counterterrorism posture.

Counterterrorism Finance

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6. (S) The UAE has made significant strides in regulating the financial sector against money laundering and terrorist financing (ref B). Although the UAE now has a strong legal framework in place, it must turn its efforts to enforcement. It is imperative that UAE authorities investigate and prosecute violators of terror finance/anti-money laundering, cash courier, and charity laws and regulations. To date, investigation and prosecution has been weak. In an effort to increase U.S. and UAE cooperation on terrorist financing, the first meeting of the U.S/UAE Joint Terrorist Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) was held in Abu Dhabi on January 24, 2005 (ref C). The UAE team had representatives from the Central Bank, State Security, Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. However, no one participated from Dubai. In order for the JTFCC to be an effective committee, Dubai’s Police, State Security, Customs, and the Department of Islamic Affairs and Charities must participate. Embassy is coordinating a second meeting April 30 that will focus on cash couriers and charity regulations.

Iran

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7. (S/NF) UAE leaders are very concerned about escalating tensions between Iran and the international community. The UAE feels vulnerable–as evidenced by the fact that its leaders frequently note that Iran is “very near” the UAE. Commercial ties between Dubai and Iran are significant (Dubai is Iran’s largest non-oil trading partner), and as a result the UAEG walks a fine line between maintaining and encouraging this trade and working to prevent suspected Iranian proliferation activities. Although the UAEG is worried about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its short-term policy decisions regarding Iran center on not provoking its neighbor. The USG has approached the UAEG four times since January, asking it to interdict and inspect cargo suspected of going to Iran’s nuclear and/or missile programs. None of those instances have resulted in a successful interdiction. In the first two instances UAE officials simply refused to take action (refs F and G). The Director of Dubai’s State Security Organization explained during the 11 February U.S./UAE Counterproliferation Task Force meeting that the decision to not inspect the containers had been a political decision based on the UAE’s concern that Iran might retaliate (ref H). In the two later instances (ref K), ships that had been scheduled to arrive in Dubai went directly to Bandar Abbas.

8. (S) In recent meetings with senior USG officials, MbZ has expressed clear support for U.S. initiatives against Iran. MbZ and UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid agreed with Secretary Rice February 23 about the need to counter Iran’s growing influence in the region and its nuclear ambitions, although they specified that any sanctions should target the key Iranian leadership, not the Iranian people (ref I). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that he did not think it was necessary to wait for all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to agree before proceeding with any plans against Iran (ref E). “Whoever is interested in getting on board ship should be encouraged,” he said. “I don’t think it’s logical or smart to wait for everyone to get involved so we can sail. … If another GCC member believes it’s not right, that’s his choice.” In the Arab region, MbZ specifically identified Bahrain and Jordan as two countries that also view Iran as a threat and that are “capable to work with us.” He told A/S Welch that the UAE would prepare a paper responding to USG concerns about Iran and mechanisms for addressing the challenge posed by Iran. In a March 27 meeting with CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid, MbZ spoke about the Iranian threat with a greater sense of urgency. He was strongly in favor of taking action against Iran and its president sooner rather than later. “I believe this guy is going to take us to war. … It’s a matter of time,” MbZ warned, adding that action against Iran and President Ahmedinejad should be taken this year or next year. MbZ said he was unwilling to wait much longer. “Personally, I cannot risk it with a guy like Ahmedinejad. He is young and aggressive.”

9. (S/NF) SSD Director Hazza told A/S Welch March 29 that the Ayatollah Ali Khameini had once issued a fatwa prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons by Iran, but noted that this should not be considered a guarantee. Hazza assessed that Iran is also a threat due to its ties to international terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, as well as their financial support to Hamas. He added that the relationship between Iran and Syria, and their links to Hizballah, was also of concern, as was Iran’s attempts to expand its influence in Iraq and elsewhere in the world. MbZ also expressed to A/S Welch March 28 the concern that Hizballah was supporting Hamas. During your meeting, you should explain the graduated approach to addressing Iran in the United Nations Security Council and encourage the UAE to isolate Iran–regardless of potential economic backlash. You should also explain the importance of the UAE working closely with the USG on interdiction requests. This meeting will be a good follow-on to the discussion U/S Joseph had with Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan (AbZ) on April 8, where Joseph outlined the USG’s policy priorities for Iran (septel). (Note: While AbZ, like MbZ, expressed support for U.S. initiatives against Iran, he stated that the USG should come to the UAE as a “very last resort. … If you can solve something without involving the UAE, please do so.” End Note.)

Palestinian Territories/Hamas

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10. (S) UAE leaders have told us that they consider Hamas a terrorist organization and that they would not fund Hamas unless they denounce violence (refs D and E). However, after Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal visited Abu Dhabi on March 22 and met with UAE Minister of Presidential Affairs Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al-Nahyan and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohammed al-Sha’ali, Meshaal publicly claimed that the UAEG had pledged to continue to provide financial assistance to the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (ref J). MbZ told A/S Welch March 28 that the UAEG allowed Meshaal to come, but that “officially, we don’t recognize Khaled Meshaal.” MbZ said that once a new Palestinian Prime Minister is selected, UAEG officials will travel to the Palestinian territories to ascertain that UAEG assistance is “going to the right people.” UAE Vice President and Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid sounded a note of optimism when he told Secretary Rice February 23 that Hamas, “with some pressure,” would understand the need to respect the will of the international community.

11. (S) The UAE has historically provided significant financial assistance to the Palestinian people. Typically, the UAE sends aid to the Palestinian territories through charity organizations, or by projectized assistance; but the UAEG has also provided financial assistance directly to the Palestinian Authority, most recently $20 million in March 2006 to Mahmoud Abbas for salaries. In the wake of the Hamas electoral victory, UAE leaders told us they intend to honor their previous commitments of humanitarian assistance (including the $100 million Sheikh Khalifa housing complex that was announced last year).

12. (S/NF) In his meeting with A/S Welch March 29, SSD Director Hazza assessed that there was both a positive and a negative side to the Hamas election win. On the negative side, he cited Hamas’ position with regard to Israel, and their violent agenda. On the positive side, Hazza noted the fact that Hamas was now in power and was accountable to the international community. He spoke to A/S Welch of the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. Hazza also asked A/S Welch how the USG would react to those countries that did support the Hamas government, and whether they would run afoul of U.S. laws restricting support to terrorist organizations. A/S Welch replied that that would be a problem, emphasizing that no money should go to the government unless Hamas renounced violence and accepted Israel. A/S Welch also told Hazza that it was not the responsibility of the U.S. or other Arab countries to pay the salaries of the new Hamas government, underscoring the need for Hamas to show accountability. MbZ told A/S Welch that Hamas benefited from “official and private contributions” from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar. MbZ said it was “easy to take $1 million in a suitcase” to Lebanon, alluding to cash couriers.

Iraq

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13. (S/NF) A partner in the war on terror, the UAE continues to provide U.S. forces access, overflight clearances, and other critical logistical assistance to Operation Iraqi Freedom (and Operation Enduring Freedom). The UAE has also been a helpful supporter of Iraq’s burgeoning political process. It has worked with Iraqi political and religious figures to encourage greater Sunni integration, and it has consulted with Ambassador Khalilzad on a number of occasions about the need to stem sectarianism in Iraq. The UAE has publicly condemned acts of sectarian and terrorist violence in Iraq, most recently, the February 22 bombing of the al-Askariya Shrine. MbZ and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid expressed their concerns about Iran’s interference in Iraq’s internal affairs to Secretary Rice during her visit to Abu Dhabi February 23. MbZ further told General Abizaid that discontent with Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’afari was creating volunteers for al-Qaida. He pledged the UAE’s support to the fight against al-Qaida. In his meeting with A/S Welch, MbZ advocated using the Arabic language media to tell Iraqis the truth about how many of their own people are dying at the hands of the insurgents. If Iraqis were to see the figures, he opined, they would conclude that support of the insurgency is “not worth it.”

Ideological Extremism

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14. (S) MbZ and his brothers continue to be outspoken on the issue of Muslim extremists and the threat they pose to the region. MbZ underscored for A/S Welch the UAE’s preferred approach of denying extremists a foothold rather than allowing them to play a role in the political process. Although he warns of the dangers of free elections in countries with a well-organized Muslim Brotherhood presence, he tells USG guests that the UAE will go ahead with elections. The Emirati leadership has told us that they will not allow Islamists to participate in elections. (Note: The UAE has announced that half of the members of the Federal National Council would be elected while half would continue to be appointed by the rulers of the various emirates. Despite this announcement, the UAE still lags behind other Gulf states in terms of democratization. End Note.) MbZ also sees extremist ideology threatening the educational system, where he and his brothers are spending considerable resources to modernize the curriculum and the teaching corps. SISON

Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 28 January 2009, 15:50

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000181
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/27/2019
TAGS PARM, PREL, MARR, MNUC, IR, SA, RU
SUBJECT: SAUDI EXCHANGE WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR ON IRAN’S
NUCLEAR PLANS
Classified By: P/M COUNSELOR SCOTT MCGEHEE REASONS 1.4 (b) (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY & COMMENT: Netherlands Ambassador Ron Strikker, Russian Ambassador Victor Gibinvish, and Embassy Riyadh Pol/Mil Counselor Scott McGehee met on January 25 with Dr. Prince Turki Al-Kabeer, Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to deliver a joint demarche on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The meeting evolved into a pointed exchange between the Russian Ambassador and Dr. Prince Turki on Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Prince Turki warned that if Iran tried to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians. Turki then pointedly demanded that the US keep Saudi officials informed about US plans for Iran.

2. (C) Dr. Prince Turki is not a decision-maker, but he is a reliable transmitter of official Saudi thinking. Most of what he said is not new, although this is the most explicit mention we have heard of Saudi willingness to see nuclear weapons deployed in the GCC as a deterrent to Iran. His concern that the United States will negotiate a “grand bargain” with Iran without consulting Saudi Arabia is a concern we have heard often in recent weeks. End summary & comment.

3. (C) After hearing a brief verbal demarche from Ambassador Strikker on the upcoming June Plenary of the GICNT, Dr. Turki turned to Ambassador Gibinvish, saying, “On this issue, what concerns us most is how to get our neighbor to change its policy on enrichment.” Iran needs to be convinced to enter a dialogue on this matter, he continued, noting that Saudi Arabia is also concerned about the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr. A leakage from a plant at that location could bring an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out that it is located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi shores, across open water.

4. (C) Ambassador Gibinvish was able to say only “Sure, I agree!” before Prince continued, “The location is so dangerous! Not just to us, but to the world economy!” He urged that Russia use its influence to have the reactor moved north, suggesting that a location on the shore of the Caspian Sea would be much better, where there is water available for reactor cooling, and where mountains rise behind to contain any possible leakage from moving south. Perhaps more troubling, he said, is Iran’s pursuit of nuclear enrichment. He explained that if Iran tries to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians.

5. (C) Amb. Gibinvish responded that Iran’s desire to enrich uranium reflected its fears that it will someday be attacked by Israel or the United States and also a sign of Iran’s desire to establish its “supremacy” in the region. Prince Turki interjected: “And we cannot accept Iranian supremacy in the region. We are okay with nuclear electrical power and desalination, but not with enrichment.” He said that the prospect of Iranian enrichment raises troubling questions about their motivations for doing so: “they do not need it!”

6. (S) Amb. Gibinvish noted that “some experts in Russia believe that Iran will have a bomb in 10 to 15 years.” Russia, he said, is concerned about this matter as well, and has “put forward initiatives” with Iran. Russia hopes to discuss this further with Saudi Arabia in the near future, and he said that an “important delegation” would be coming to Riyadh in about two months to discuss this with the Saudi leadership. Prince Turki said that the Russian delegation would be welcomed, stressing that “we must work together to get them to abandon their effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Israel too, he said, must be convinced to surrender its nuclear arsenal. But you deal with them, you have influence, that is why I raise this with you.” Amb. Gibinvish pledged that “we will do what we can. But the Iranians are difficult partners.” At this point, Prince Turki turned to Pol/Mil Counselor who had momentarily stopped taking notes. Prince Turki said “Please write this down. Whatever is discussed with the Iranians, we must be kept informed! Any

RIYADH 00000181 002 OF 002

negotiations with the Iranians must take into account the interests of Saudi Arabia, otherwise, we will not accept it! We should be told — in advance! — of what you plan to say.”

RUNDELL