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Vrijdag, 3 December 2010 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6, Document 7, Document 8 | Bewerkt door Crethi Plethi

WikiLeaks: ‘Israel Kan Het Zich Niet Veroorloven Om Iran Te Onderschatten’

De recent gelekte geheime memo’s van Amerikaanse ambassades geven ons een duidelijk beeld van de politieke realiteit en de krachtsverhoudingen in het Midden Oosten.

Er komen enkele steeds terugkerende elementen naar voren uit de verschillende memo’s die een verhelderende blik werpen op het Midden Oosten. Hoewel veel van deze feitelijkheden al wel bekend waren, werden ze helaas meestal genegeerd of door de media niet op waarde geschat. En dat heeft ook te maken met de overdreven aandacht voor alles wat met Israël te maken heeft (en dan vooral in negatieve zin), waardoor een heldere blik op hoe het Midden Oosten echt in elkaar steekt vertroebelt raakt. Maar dankzij de gepubliceerde memo’s kunnen we nu zeker weten hoe de regeringsleiders in het Midden Oosten denken en handelen in hun diplomatieke betrekkingen. We kunnen het volgende afleiden uit de memo’s zoals we ook in vorige artikelen over de WikiLeaks documenten al uitgelegd hebben:

• Israël staat niet alleen in het waarschuwen tegen het Iraans nucleaire programma. Ook de Arabische Staten zoals Saoedi-Arabië, Jordanië, Egypte en de kleinere Golfstaten waarschuwen nadrukkelijk tegen het Iran van Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
• Israël en de Arabische Staten vragen de Verenigde Staten nadrukkelijk om militair ingrijpen tegen Iran voordat het te laat is.
• De Arabische Staten zien niet het Israëlisch-Palestijns vraagstuk als het grootste probleem voor het Midden Oosten, maar een nucleair Iran. Het Israëlisch-Palestijns vraagstuk leidt niet tot een wapenwedloop in het Midden Oosten, waar een nucleair Iran de andere landen zal dwingen om ook zelf kernwapens te bemachtigen.
• De Arabische Staten uiten hun zorgen en bedreigingen richting Iran alleen in diplomatieke contacten met de VS, bang als ze zijn voor de binnenlandse publieke opinie. Dankzij WikiLeaks lezen we nu ook daadwerkelijk wat ze echt willen met Iran.
• De Amerikaanse diplomaten in het Midden Oosten zijn zich er van bewust dat Turkije Islamiseert en zijn blik naar het Oosten [Iran, Syrië] heeft gewend. De Turkse maatschappij is nog seculeer ingericht, maar het Neo-Ottomanisme van premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan is in een rap tempo bezig om hier verandering in te brengen. Barack Obama echter blijft volhouden dat Turkije trouw is aan democratische uitgangspunten en Amerika’s grootste bondgenoot is, naast Israël, in het Midden Oosten. Hieruit blijkt eens te meer dat Obama’s Midden Oosten strategie meer weg heeft van oogkleppen politiek dan het realistisch en pragmatisch aanpakken van de echte bedreigingen in het Midden Oosten. We komen in een later artikel nog op Turkije terug.
• De belangrijkste strijd die in het Midden Oosten wordt gevoerd is niet het Arabisch-Israëlisch Conflict. Dat is wat de media ons willen doen geloven en vooral ook de linkse media samen met hun Europees Islamitische bondgenoten (die radicaler zijn dan velen denken). De belangrijkste strijd in het Midden Oosten is die tussen de gematigde en de radicale Islam. Het is de radicale Islam die, geheel volgens de richtlijnen van het Islamisme (de politieke Islam), de hele wereld wil islamiseren. Al Qaeda streeft naar de vernietiging van het Christelijke Westen; De Taliban willen een Islamistische dictatuur vestigen in Afghanistan en Pakistan; Iran wil de wereld voorbereiden op de wederkomst van de 12e Imam (de Mahdi) en heeft zijn zinnen gezet op kernwapens; De Moslimbroederschap, Hamas en de Hezbollah-beweging streven naar een islamistisch Midden Oosten waarin geen plaats is voor een Joodse Staat of gematigde Arabische leiders; ook andere Islamistische bewegingen streven naar het omverwerpen van de gematigde regeringsleiders en koningshuizen in het Midden Oosten, Noord-Afrika, de VS en West-Europese landen.
• De gedachte dat een oplossing voor het Israëlisch-Palestijns vraagstuk vrede in het Midden Oosten zal brengen is een gedachte die vooral leeft bij Westerse regeringsleiders zoals Obama, Merkel en Sarkozy. De Arabische leiders weten dat het lot van hun voortbestaan niet afhankelijk is van een oplossing van het Israëlisch-Palestijns vraagstuk of van de vernietiging van de Joodse Staat, maar van de overwinning op de radicale Islamistische bewegingen die actief zijn in het Midden Oosten en in het ‘Vrije’ Westen.
• Een groot probleem is dat het Israëlisch-Palestijns vraagstuk langzaamaan verschuift van nationalistisch naar religieus. Islamistische radicale groepen als de Moslimbroederschap, Hezbollah, Hamas en andere Palestijnse terroristische organisaties hebben duidelijk een Islamitisch uitgangspunt in hun strijd tegen Israël, waar Fatah vooral een nationalistisch uitgangspunt heeft. Deze islamisering van het vraagstuk maakt een oplossing problematischer. Religieus fanatisme leidt in het Midden Oosten onherroepelijk tot oorlog.

Het is deze realiteit die Israël dwingt om steeds maar weer zijn nek uit te steken als het gaat om het verdedigen van democratische waarden tegen de radicale elementen in het Midden Oosten, terwijl de Arabische leiders met een dubbele tong praten. Naar buiten toe pleiten ze voor de Palestijnse zaak, maar intern voeren ze de strijd tegen dezelfde radicale elementen die hun en Israël willen vernietigen.

De gelekte memo’s op WikiLeaks geven Israëls positie in het Midden Oosten duidelijk weer. Israël kan het zich niet veroorloven om Iran (en de radicale Islam) te onderschatten. Het ‘Vrije’ Westen zou er goed aan doen om dat ook niet te doen.

Generaal-majoor Amos Yadlin, hoofd van de Israëlische militaire inlichtingendienst (Aman), waarschuwde vorig jaar volgens een geheime Amerikaanse memo: “Israël is niet in een positie om Iran te onderschatten en verrast te worden zoals de VS dat werd op 11 september 2001.” Yadlin was voor zijn promotie militair attaché in Washington en nam als officier deel aan de Israëlische luchtmacht actie [Operatie Opera] tegen de Iraakse Osirak kerncentrale in 1981.

Maar hoewel Amerika voldoende bondgenoten in het Midden Oosten heeft voor een aanval op Iraanse nucleaire installaties, zijn deze bondgenoten zelf duidelijk enthousiaster over een aanval op Iran dan Obama dat is. In een memo merkt een Amerikaanse diplomaat op hoe ambtenaren van de Saudische ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken gematigd waren in hun standpunten over Iran, “maar ze verschillen sterk van de meer oorlogszuchtige adviezen die wij hebben gekregen van de Saudische koninklijke familie.”

Maar in tegenstelling tot Israël, is geen enkele Arabische bondgenoot van de VS bereid om zelf militaire middelen te gebruiken tegen Iran. De consequenties van zo’n aanval is voor een Arabische land te groot zonder de hulp van Amerika en Israël. De Mossad zegt in een document dat de Arabische landen “willen dat een ander het werk voor hun doen.” En de Israëlische ambtenaren waarschuwen dat de tijd dringt. “Als de Iraniërs hun nucleaire installaties blijven beveiligen en de beveiliging uitbreiden zal het moeilijk worden om ze te treffen en te beschadigen”, vertelden Israëlische ambtenaren van het Ministerie van Defensie in november 2009 tegen de Amerikanen. Uit dezelfde documenten blijkt ook dat Israël de levering van GBU-28 bunker-busting bommen door Amerika aan Israël rustig wilde laten verlopen “om te voorkomen dat de Amerikaanse regering ervan beschuldigd zou worden dat het Israël hielp in de voorbereiding van een aanval op Iran.” Tegelijkertijd wilde Israël de verkoop van nieuwe Amerikaanse F-15 straaljagers aan Saoedi-Arabië verhinderen, waaruit blijkt dat Israël bezorgd was over het behouden van hun militaire overwicht tegenover mogelijke ‘vijanden’ in het Midden Oosten. Uit een document van 30 Juli 2009 blijkt dat Israël vreest dat als Iran een kernwapen heeft ontwikkelt en de Arabische staten de militaire voorsprong van Israël ingehaald hebben, enkele van deze gematigde staten zich als vijanden van Israël zullen gaan manifesteren.

Uit een ander gelekt document op WikiLeaks, waarin Condoleezza Rice werd voorbereid op haar ontmoeting met toenmalig Premier Ehud Olmert [13-15 januari, 2007], blijkt hoe Israël zich steeds weer moet aan passen aan de dagelijks veranderende realiteit van het Midden Oosten waar, zoals al eerder opgemerkt, het Westen nog iets van kan leren. In het document wordt onder andere gesproken over

• de voortdurende raketaanvallen van Hamas op Israël [wat uiteindelijk zou leiden tot de Gaza-oorlog in 2008/2009].
• De gebrekkige vooruitgang in de onderhandelingen over de vrijlating van de door Hamas ontvoerde Israëlische korporaal Gilad Shalit. Inmiddels zijn we weer drie jaar verder zonder resultaat.
• De onvriendelijke atmosfeer tijdens de Olmert-Mubarak [president van Egypte] ontmoeting van 4 januari 2007.
• Gebrek aan coördinatie tussen de militaire leiding in Israël en de Israëlische regering over militaire acties in de betwiste gebieden.
• Toenemende Israëlische zorgen over de afname van de bereidheid van gematigde Arabische landen om het embargo tegen Hamas te blijven steunen. Wat op zichzelf weer een bewijs is dat niet alleen Israël zich zorgen maakte over de radicale Hamas-beweging.
• Israëlische zorgen over het gebrek aan steun voor Fatah onder de Palestijnen om een tegenwicht te bieden aan Hamas in het uitoefenen van hun gezag in de Gazastrook of tijdens verkiezingen. Dit werd een half jaar later pijnlijk duidelijk toen Hamas in juni 2007 een gewelddadige coup lanceerde in de Gazastrook en Fatah verjoeg waarna Hamas de enige regerende macht werd.
• Het onderzoek van de Winograd Commissie die fouten, gemaakt tijdens de tweede Libanon-oorlog met Hezbollah in 2006, onderzocht en wat volgens het document “als een zwaard van Damocles” boven het hoofd van de Olmert-regering hing.
• De voortdurende Israëlische bezorgheid omtrent het Iraanse nucleaire programma waarbij Olmert duidelijk verklaarde dat Israël een nucleair Iran niet zal tolereren. Interessant is om te lezen dat er binnen Israël veel discussie was over wat de beste manier zou zijn om dit probleem aan te pakken, zoals het hoort in een democratie, waarbij het Israëlische leger een duidelijke voorkeur had voor een vroegtijdige militaire oplossing.
• Het Israëlische vermoeden dat Syrië onderhandelingen met Israël en de Verenigde Staten zou misbruiken en het een verlichting van de internationale diplomatieke druk op zou vatten als een mogelijkheid om hun grip op Libanon weer uit te bouwen met hulp van de Hezbollah-beweging. Deze zorgen werden gedeeld door hoofd van de Mossad, Meir Dagan, waarbij er tevens op gewezen werd dat de ontvoerde Israëlische soldaten nog steeds in Libanon werden vastgehouden. Helaas zijn ook deze zorgen inmiddels realiteit geworden. Syria heeft, net als voor de moordaanslag op toenmalig Premier van Libanon Rafik Hariri, wederom een ijzeren grip op de Libanese samenleving en politieke spectrum verworven. En dit is vooral te danken aan het feit dat Obama’s pogingen van toenadering tot Syrië door de regeringsleiders van Syrië uitgelegd worden als zwakte van Amerika.

Uit een geheim Amerikaans document uit 17 maart, 2005 blijkt

• dat Israël Iran als de allergrootste bedreiging in het Midden Oosten ziet. Toenmalig Premier Sharon noemde Iran “Israëls grootste bedreiging” en maakte er zich zorgen over dat sommige landen “gewend raakten” aan de vooruitzichten van een nucleair Iran. Hoofd van de Mossad, Meir Dagan, noemde Iran een “existentiële bedreiging” voor Israël, dat de strategische balans verandert in de regio.
• In een bijeenkomst met Amerikaanse Congresleden in december 2004, zei minister van Defensie Shaul Mofaz, dat als Iran uranium gaat verrijken het Iraanse nucleaire programma de “point of no return” heeft bereikt. Hoofd van de Mossad, Meir Dagan, ging een stap verder door te zeggen dat het Iraanse programma niet meer te stoppen is zodra zij niet langer hulp van buitenaf nodig hebben om het verrijkingsproces te voltooien.
• Ambtenaren van de Israëlische regering gaven duidelijk aan dat een aanval op Iraanse installaties lastiger zou zijn dan de aanval in 1981 op de Iraakse kernreactor vanwege de verspreiding van het aantal doelen waarbij sommige doelen in bewoonde gebieden liggen en dat niet alle precieze locaties bekend waren. Daarmee zou een aanval slechts tot vertraging leiden en niet tot het stoppen van het Iraans nucleaire programma.

De Mossad geloofde dat Iran slechts bezig was met tijd winnen en dat alle onderhandelingen van Iran over het nucleaire programma slechts bedoeld waren om sancties uit te stellen en de tijd te gebruiken om een kernwapen te ontwikkelen. Volgens de inschattingen van de Mossad [november 2009] zou Iran in 2010/2011 dit stadium bereikt hebben.

In de documenten spreekt Israël zich ook uit over de voortdurende bemoeienissen van Iran en Syrië met de Hezbollah en Hamas en het smokkelen van wapens door de Iraanse Revolutionaire Garde. Israël refereert zelfs aan Hizballahstan (Libanon) en Hamastan (Gazastrook), verwijzend naar de radicale Islamistische theologie van deze organisaties. Daarnaast wezen ze al in een eerder stadium op het ontstaan van een “Afghanistan-achtig scenario” in Yemen [de strijd tegen al Qaida-strijders in Yemen is in volle gang] en de toename van al Qaida activiteiten in wat Israël het Islamitische Maghreb (AQIM) noemt in de Sahara en Noord-Afrika.

Volgens de Mossad zaten Israël en de Amerikanen in 2005 nog op één lijn als het over Iran ging, maar dat veranderde nadat Barack Obama President van Amerika werd. Obama hanteerde vanaf het begin een toenaderingspolitiek richting de Islamitische landen in de hoop ze vriendelijk te stemmen. Zijn halfslachtige aanpak van Iran, waarbij zelfs de Europese Unie hardere sancties heeft opgelegd dan Amerika, hebben slechts geleid tot de door Iran zo gewenste uitstel van een militaire aanval.

De Mossad typeerde Qatar “als een groot probleem” en heeft Amerika voorgesteld [juli 2007] om zijn legerbasis uit Qatar weg te halen, omdat Sjeik Hamid onbetrouwbaar is en “iedereen irriteert.” Qatar bespeelt volgens de Mossad zowel Syrië, Iran als Hamas. Hiermee hopen ze veiligheid en onafhankelijkheid te garanderen voor de toekomst. Volgens de Mossad denken veel Arabische leiders er net zo over.

Eén van de oorzaken van de huidige situatie in Libanon is het gebrek aan politieke wil om de VN resolutie 1701 uit te voeren. Deze resolutie waarborgd de feitelijke wapenstilstand tussen Libanon/Hezbollah en Israël na de oorlog in 2006. Israël heeft aan alle voorwaarden in de resolutie voldaan, maar aan de belangrijkste voorwaarden voor Libanon is niet voldaan, nl. de totale ontwapening van Hezbollah milities en het verbod voor deze milities om zich beneden de Litani rivier (in Zuid-Libanon) te bevinden. Het UNIFIL heeft machteloos toegezien hoe Hezbollah doorgaat met zich te bewapenen, de Libanese regering is te onmachtig om zelf op te treden en Syrië en Iran gebruiken de Hezbollah als voorpost in hun strijd tegen Israël. Voeg daarbij het gebrek aan leiderschap van Obama in deze kwestie en u begrijpt dat Israël met een zorgelijke situatie zit aan hun noordgrens. In 2007 opperde de Mossad daarom om tot een strenger sanctie beleid te komen richting Syrië. Meir Dagan, zo blijkt uit de documenten, geloofde namelijk dat door middel van het uitvoeren van resolutie 1701 (ontwapening van Hezbollah) en door sancties op te leggen aan Syrië, deze zich zouden afscheiden van Iran en richting de Arabische staten zou opschuiven. Dit zou Iran meer isoleren en een belangrijke overwinning tegen het radicale terrorisme in het Midden Oosten zijn.

We weten allemaal dat de internationale gemeenschap met Amerika voorop dit plan niet heeft uitgevoerd met alle consequenties van dien. Israël kan niemand onderschatten in het Midden Oosten, dit in tegenstelling tot wat de wereld wel doet. Als iets uit de gelekte WikiLeaks documenten blijkt dan is dat wel dat Israël een realistisch beeld schetst van ontwikkelingen in het Midden Oosten en hierop pragmatisch reageert. Als de wereld wat vaker zou luisteren naar wat Israël te zeggen heeft zou het wel eens zo kunnen zijn dat vrede in het Midden Oosten, hoewel zwaar bevochten, eerder binnen handbereik ligt dan nu het geval is.

Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 13 May 2009, 12:20

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001060
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/13/2019
TAGS PREL, MPOS, KNNP, IR, IS
SUBJECT: REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH IDF INTELLIGENCE
CHIEF YADLIN
Classified By: DCM Luis G, Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

1. (S) Representative Robert Wexler (D, Florida), accompanied by Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Rogin and DCM Moreno, met with Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Chief, MG Amos Yadlin, on Sunday 10 May 2009. MG Yadlin focused his discussion on the preparations for the upcoming visit of Prime Minister Netanyahu to the United States and the Iranian nuclear program. MG Yadlin informed Rep. Wexler that the PM was preparing intensely for his upcoming visit to Washington. In addition to hours of policy review, the PM had been provided significant amounts of intelligence from the IDI and Mossad on Iran’s nuclear program. The intelligence presented included assessments of the current status of the Iranian program; timelines, effects of sanctions; views of the international community; and outcomes of engagement. The differences that exist between the intelligence community in interpretations of the Iranian nuclear program as well as the relationship between Iran and the Palestinians were also presented. MG Yadlin indicated that the IDF had presented its information last week, leaving the cabinet on Friday 08 May 2009 to consider policy options and how information will be presented during the upcoming visit to Washington. Although no direct feedback was provided, MG Yadlin opined that the PM appears determined on Iran.

2. (S) Rep. Wexler asked MG Yadlin to expand on the differences in the interpretations of the intelligence. MG Yadlin explained that until 2003, Iran had violated the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty by having a weaponization group and although Iran could show civilian uses for a missile program and a fissile program, there was no justification for a weaponization group. He went on to say that Iran halted its program in 2003 after the invasion of Iraq, but reinvigorated the program in 2005. He expressed that some in the US agree with this and others do not. He went on to explain that Israel is not in a position to underestimate Iran and be surprised like the US was on 11 September 2001.

3. (S) MG Yadlin explained that Israel tries to be more precise than the US in estimating Iran’s intentions and timeline for obtaining a nuclear bomb. Iran is in the position of wanting to pay only a minimum cost for its current program. It does not want to be North Korea or what Iraq was before 2003. Iran intends to keep resolutions and sanctions at a certain manageable level and continue to produce low enriched uranium until there is enough for several bombs. MG Yadlin stated that Iran could decide to produce a bomb by 2010, but Iran is waiting for the right time in the future and that there are some who will always doubt it despite the evidence.

4. (S) Rep. Wexler then asked about the prospect of engagement. MG Yadlin said he does not oppose engagement, and in fact gave a speech approximately six months ago expressing that Israel needed to find a way to find positives in engagement. He feels there needs to be an agreed upon deadline; a measure for success or failure; and a plan B if engagement does not work in order for engagement to have any chance. He also expressed strongly that engagement should have already started. MG Yadlin outlined four possible outcomes of engagement. Two good outcomes would be the Iranian nuclear program stopped or a failure of engagement that allows Russia and China to see the US made all efforts to prevent the program diplomatically and allows for greater cooperation in the future. Two bad outcomes would be Iran playing for time with no claim of failure on the part of engagement or a bad bargain that still allows Iran to obtain a nuclear bomb even if in a longer timeline. Rep. Wexler went on to discuss that there is a third good option in that the President may have better leverage with the American public to support action if engagement efforts are attempted and failed. Rep Wexler recommended that the Israeli people need to consider the US perspective and public opinion. MG Yadlin responded that he is not recommending the US enter a third front, but it has to be understood that Israel sees things differently and that Israel has to be ready and can not remove the military option from the table. Rep Wexler stated that he expected Israel would be pleasantly surprised by the President’s acceptance of all possible options in regards to Iran.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM

Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 18 November 2009, 14:30

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002500
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, EG, CH, IR, RU, SA, LE, TU, IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JOINT POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP: EXECUTIVE
SESSION (PART 1 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (S) Summary: During the Executive Session of the 40th Joint Political Military Group (JPMG), U.S. and Israeli counterparts continued discussion on the creation of four new Qualitative Military Edge (QME) working groups. GOI interlocutors continued to raise concerns regarding the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. Both sides agreed that continued pressure be applied to Iran, especially following the disclosure of the nuclear facility in Qom. GOI participants expressed concern regarding Chinese and Russian cooperation with respect to enhanced Iranian sanctions. The GOI also raised dual citizenship concerns with respect to access to sensitive technology, and noted from its perspective Turkey’s disturbing change of course toward Syria and Iran — and away from Israel. This is the first in four cables (septels) reporting on the JPMG. End summary.

2. (SBU) Israeli Participants:

— Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director General — Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military Chief — Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense Attache to the United States — Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York — Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs — COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5 — Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau — Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General

U.S. Participants:

— Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs — Luis Moreno, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv — Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense — Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff — Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian and Jordanian Affairs, NSC — Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs — COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv

Qualitative Military Edge

————————-

3. (S) The Executive Session continued discussion from the September 30 Qualitative Military Edge (QME) meeting in Washington. Both sides presented their primary points of contact for the four newly proposed working groups focusing on previous agreements, mitigation measures for the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, technical mitigation issues, and intelligence/policy. Agreement was reached to begin working on the details of each working group’s meeting schedule and timeline.

4. (S) The GOI continued to express concern over the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. U.S. participants noted that the USG is unable to provide more detailed information about the sale until Saudi Arabia officially sends a Letter of Request (LOR). The GOI expressed additional concerns about stationing these new aircraft at Tabuk airfield in the northwest corner of Saudi Arabia — close to the Israeli border. U.S. participants stated the USG understanding that this should not be an issue, as the Saudis are considering stationing new Typhoon aircraft at Tabuk. The GOI also raised AMRAAM sales to Jordan; U.S. participants explained that the new C-7 AMRAAM is an export version with capabilities similar to the C-5 version — and therefore provides little to no increase in capabilities.

Iran, China and Russia

———————-

5. (S) Both sides expressed concern over the recent revelation regarding Iran’s nuclear facility at Qom, and agreed that increased pressure should be applied directly and internationally against Iran in order to better determine Tehran’s motives and next steps. Both sides agreed that the facility at Qom should be inspected immediately. One member of the Israeli delegation expressed the opinion that some consideration be given to “shutting Qom operations down completely” to prevent further progress on obtaining a nuclear weapon. That said, the GOI argued that the international community not become bogged down on the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and Qom, thereby diverting focus from

TEL AVIV 00002500 002 OF 002

the bigger issue of Iran’s nuclear program.

6. (S) Several questions were raised about China’s position on Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. Both sides agreed that continued engagement with China and Russia is needed — as well as building a consensus in Europe. The USG speculated, and the GOI concurred, that China will follow Moscow’s lead. USG participants argued that China would seek to avoid an international confrontation over Iran. The GOI described 2010 as a critical year — if the Iranians continue to protect and harden their nuclear sites, it will be more difficult to target and damage them. Both sides then discussed the upcoming delivery of GBU-28 bunker busting bombs to Israel, noting that the transfer should be handled quietly to avoid any allegations that the USG is helping Israel prepare for a strike against Iran.

7. (S) The GOI made the case for “crippling sanctions”; cooperation between the United States, Europe, Russia and China will be necessary in order for these sanctions to be effective. U.S. participants stressed the USG position that any discussions with Iran on this subject be finite; the USG will continue to monitor whether negotiations are making progress. The GOI stated that it is not convinced the Iranians will negotiate in good faith unless there are visible and clear threats. U.S. delegation members described eight lanes of sanctions, and outlined a plan to “pivot to apply appropriate pressure” on those points and tracks that have the most impact. U.S. participants concurred that 2010 is a critical year — but the continued application of pressure is vital.

8. (S) Regarding Russia, the GOI was not confident that Moscow will be helpful in any Iranian sanctions effort — GOI participants opined that Russia is considered a “mystery” with respect to their views on Iran. The GOI raised the Russian S-300 sale to Iran, noting that the transfer is still pending. GOI participants argued that Moscow seeks a return to superpower status, but there are contradictory trends regarding Russia’s internal condition.

Dual Citizenship Issues

———————–

9. (S) The GOI raised the issue of dual citizenship within the context of access to sensitive technology. U.S. participants acknowledged Israeli concerns, noting that the issue is being worked at the highest levels of the USG to reach consensus on how to proceed. The GOI recommended obtaining a waiver similar to the relationship from which Canada or Australia benefit.

Turkey

——

10. (S) The GOI raised the current direction the Government of Turkey has taken toward Syria and Iran — and away from Israel. Israeli participants argued that Turkey has been supportive of Hamas in Gaza while pursuing a more “Islamic” direction with the goal of becoming a regional superpower. The GOI argued that the Turkish military is losing its ability to influence government decisions and strategic direction. After this past year, GOI participants said they have a “bad feeling” about Turkey. The GOI noted that the Israel Air Force (IAF) Commander in the past wanted to speak to the Turkish Air Force Commander, but his Turkish counterpart declined.

11. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable. CUNNINGHAM

Bron: WikiLeaks

Monday, 08 January 2007, 16:38

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000064
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, IS, KWBG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY’S JANUARY 13-15
VISIT TO ISRAEL
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

1. (S) Madam Secretary, internal tensions among GOI leaders have intensified since your last visit and have reached the point that there appears to be little coordination or even dialogue among the key decision makers. Therefore, we will need to be sensitive to perceptions that we are favoring one faction over another. The divisions at the top here are part of an increasingly gloomy public mood, with a new corruption allegations making headlines virtually daily, and a growing sense of political failure despite Israel’s strong economy and a sustained success rate in thwarting suicide attacks. Prime Minister Olmert’s approval ratings were only 23 percent in the latest poll, and Israeli interlocutors across the political spectrum are speaking openly of a crisis of public confidence in the country’s leadership at a time when Israelis feel an urgent need for strong leadership to face the threats from Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah.

OPTIMISM ERODING

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2. (S) The year 2007 has started off badly for Israelis. The good feeling generated by PM Olmert’s long-delayed December 23 summit meeting with Abu Mazen quickly dissipated under the weight of reports of a new settlement in the Jordan Valley (now suspended by Peretz), continued Qassam rocket attacks on Sderot and neighboring kibbutzim, foot-dragging on both sides in implementing the transfer of tax revenues, lack of progress on the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and the unpleasant atmospherics of the January 4 Olmert-Mubarak summit, which was overshadowed by a botched IDF daylight raid in the center of Ramallah in which four Palestinians were killed.

3. (S) The Ramallah operation, which was authorized by the IDF’s West Bank commander without informing the Minister of Defense, served as a stark reminder of the lack of coordination between Israel’s military and its civilian leadership. When it comes to Israel’s strategy for dealing with Palestinians, it increasingly seems that military is military, civilian is civilian and never the twain shall meet! Despite Olmert’s belated embrace of Abu Mazen as a peace partner, there is growing concern that moderate Arab willingness to maintain the embargo on Hamas may be eroding, and that Fatah may fail to muster the popular support it will need to depose Hamas, whether at the ballot box or in the streets. Meanwhile, the upcoming release of the results of the Winograd Commission’s investigation of the Lebanon war hangs like a sword of Damocles over the heads of Olmert, Defense Minister Peretz, and IDF Chief of General Staff Halutz. Peretz and Halutz have both publicly stated that they will resign if the Commission holds them responsible for serious errors in the conduct of the war, but Olmert has refrained from public comments. Olmert is also awaiting the results of several separate investigations involving corruption allegations, any one of which could further damage him severely, if not force his resignation.

4. (S) While Israeli anxiety over a possible dramatic shift of U.S. policy as a result of the Iraq Study Group’s report has been allayed by statements by you and the President, there continues to be deep uneasiness here that the Baker-Hamilton recommendations reflect the shape of things to come in U.S. policy. Israelis recognize that U.S. public support for the Iraq war is eroding and are following with interest the President’s upcoming articulation of the revamped policy, but they are deeply concerned that Israeli-Palestinian issues not become linked in American minds to creating a more propitious regional environment for whatever steps we decide to take to address the deteriorating situation in Iraq.

5. (S) Iran’s nuclear program continues to cause great anxiety in Israel. Given their history, Israelis across the political spectrum take very seriously Ahmadinejad’s threats to wipe Israel off the map. Olmert has been quite clear in his public comments that Israel cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran, a position stated even more emphatically by opposition leader Netanyahu, who compares today’s Iran to Nazi Germany in 1938. Despite the worst-case assessments of Israeli intelligence, however, there is a range of views about what action Israel should take. The MFA and some of the think tank Iran experts appear increasingly inclined to state that military action must be a last resort and are taking a new interests in other forms of pressure, including but not limited to sanctions, that could force Iran to abandon its military nuclear program. The IDF, however, srikes us as more inclined than ever to look toward a military strike, whether launched by Israel or by us, as the only way to destroy or even delay Iran’s plans. Thoughtful

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Israeli analysts point out that even if a nuclear-armed Iran did not immediately launch a strike on the Israeli heartland, the very fact that Iran possesses nuclear weapons would completely transform the Middle East strategic environment in ways that would make Israel’s long-term survival as a democratic Jewish state increasingly problematic. That concern is most intensively reflected in open talk by those who say they do not want their children and grandchildren growing up in an Israel threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran.

LIVNI RISING

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6. (C) FM Tzipi Livni is frustrated by Olmert’s continued refusal to coordinate closely, and — perhaps with an eye on polls showing her popularity at over double the level of the Prime Minister — suggested to a Ha’aretz interviewer in late December that she would challenge Olmert for the prime ministership if he continued not to give her his full backing. In the same interview, Livni provided an outline of her thinking, but not a detailed plan, on the way ahead with the Arabs, including negotiating an interim agreement with the Palestinians in which the separation barrier would serve as the border, and refusing to engage with Syria unless Asad takes steps to end support for terrorism and distances himself from Iran. Livni’s policy adviser has confirmed to us that she has engaged in her own discrete discussions with Palestinians, but very much in an exploratory mode. Livni told Senators Kerry and Dodd that she doubted that a final status agreement could be reached with Abu Mazen, and therefore the emphasis should be on reforming Fatah so that it could beat Hamas at the polls. MFA officials tell us that Livni is also focused on the need to keep Hamas isolated. She and her senior staff have repeatedly expressed concern that some EU member-states are wobbly on this point. Meanwhile, Livni is keenly aware that unlike Olmert, she has little to fear from the Winograd Commission report (nor is she tainted by the corruption allegations that dog Olmert). Her incipient bid to take Olmert’s place could become more serious once the report’s preliminary conclusions are released next month.

SHIFTING VIEWS ON SYRIA

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7. (S) Olmert and Livni agree that negotiations with Syria would be a trap that Damascus would use to end the international pressure on it and to gain a freer hand in Lebanon. While they see public relations downsides to dismissing Syrian peace overtures out of hand, they continue to insist that no negotiations will be possible until Syria reduces its support for terrorism and/or takes direct steps to secure the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas and Hizballah. Olmert and Livni are supported in that view by Mossad chief Dagan, who takes a dim view of Syrian intentions. A significant part of the security establishment, however, appears to be reaching the conclusion that it is in Israel’s interest to test Asad’s intentions — possibly through the use of a back channel contact — and to seek to wean him away from Tehran. They are joined in that view by Defense Minister Peretz, much of the Labor Party and the Israeli left, who argue that Israel cannot afford to refuse to at least explore Asad’s offer to negotiate, often comparing that stance to Golda Meir’s much-criticized decision to spurn Sadat’s offer to negotiate, which then led to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Press reports January 5 stated that the defense establishment had recommended to Olmert that he open an exploratory channel to Damascus in two months, a timeline reportedly linked to the completion of reviews of U.S. policy toward Iraq and the Middle East, as well as to clearer indications of Abu Mazen’s intentions and capabilities vis a vis Hamas.

PERETZ-OLMERT TENSIONS

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8. (C) According to leaks from a recent Labor Party leadership meeting, Amir Peretz said that he feels completely disconnected from Olmert. Ever since Peretz’ telephone conversation with Abu Mazen which infuriated Olmert, the two reportedly barely speak to each other. Television news reports on January 4 trumpeted rumors that Olmert had decided to remove Peretz as Defense Minister and replace him with former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has already announced plans to challenge Peretz for the Labor Party’s leadership in late May primaries. Even though the Prime Minister’s Office almost immediately denied the reports, there is little doubt here that someone in the PMO was behind them. While much of the Labor Party feels that Peretz has been a failure, both as Defense Minister and as Party Secretary General, and Peretz’ popularity with the general public has hit rock bottom, Labor

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members widely condemned the media trial balloon, which they saw as an unacceptable attempt by Olmert’s advisers to intervene in their party’s leadership contest. In any event, the incident is yet another indication of the intense degree of personal rancor and dysfunction prevailing at the top of the GOI.

PERETZ AND SNEH OUR AMA PARTNERS

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9. (C) Notwithstanding the GOI’s internal discord, there is some good news in our efforts to nudge the GOI toward improvements in Palestinian quality of life issues. Despite his political woes, Peretz has proven himself a serious partner in our efforts to implement the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) and more generally in a slow but steady push by the MOD to force a reluctant IDF to accept steps to reduce barriers to Palestinian movement and to revive the Palestinian economy. Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh, who will likely accompany Peretz to your meeting, has emerged as the point man for these efforts. Sneh shares Peretz’ conviction that Israel’s security stranglehold on the Palestinians is “winning the battle but losing the war,” but Sneh, who in a decades-long career served as a military governor of the West Bank, commanded an elite combat unit, and took part in the famed Entebbe raid, also has both an intimate knowledge of the Palestinians and a combat commander’s credibility with the IDF that Peretz sorely lacks. Your meeting with Peretz provides an opportunity to express appreciation for his and Sneh’s efforts and to encourage them in their struggle to bring recalcitrant elements in the IDF to heel. The more progress we can achieve with them on AMA implementation now, the easier it will be to achieve meaningful results with both parties in the coming year.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department’s Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES

Bron: WikiLeaks

Thursday, 17 March 2005, 14:58

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001593
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/14/2015
TAGS PARM, PREL, MNUC, KNNP, EU, IR, IS, GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: C-NE4-01083: ISRAELI INTENTIONS REGARDING THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM
REF: STATE 26053
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer; Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D).

1. (S) SUMMARY: Israel sees Iran as the primary threat to its security and sees the enrichment cycle as the “point of no return” for Tehran’s nuclear weapons program. The GOI believes that diplomatic pressure with teeth, such as sanctions, can affect Iranian behavior, and is lobbying the EU-3 and IAEA on details of a permanent suspension agreement. The Israelis support a unified international front but are concerned that the USG may move toward the EU position. Despite the GOI’s focus on the diplomatic track, public and private speculation about possible Israeli air strikes continues. In weighing the military options, the GOI is aware of significant differences from its successful strike against Iraq’s nuclear program in 1981, including an uncertain and dispersed target set, the presence of coalition forces in Iraq and the Gulf, Iranian capabilities to retaliate through Hizballah and terrorism, and the changed strategic environment. END SUMMARY.

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The Iranian Threat, “Point of No Return,” and Timelines

——————————————— ———-

2. (S) PM Sharon calls Iran “the main threat to Israel” and has recently expressed concern that some states are “getting used to” the idea of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. Other senior Israeli officials echo this, cautioning that Tehran’s nuclear weapons program poses what Mossad Chief Meir Dagan calls an “existential threat” that alters the strategic balance in the region.

3. (C) In a meeting with congressional visitors in December, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz described operation of the enrichment cycle as the “point of no return” for the Iranian program, a view shared by many senior GOI officials. Mossad Chief Dagan went a step further, saying that the Iranian program will be unstoppable once it no longer requires outside assistance to complete the enrichment process. At the technical level, the director for external affairs at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) told poloff that the critical step would be Iran’s operation of a centrifuge enrichment cascade.

4. (S) GOI officials have given different timelines for when they believe Iran will have full enrichment capability. In February, PM Sharon told the Secretary that he believes there is still time remaining to pressure Iran, but that the window of opportunity is closing quickly. DefMin Mofaz cautioned that Iran is “less than one year away,” while the head of research in military intelligence estimated that Iran would reach this point by early 2007. Technical experts at the IAEC predicted that Iran would have enrichment capability within six months of the end of the suspension agreement. A few GOI officials admitted informally that these estimates need to be taken with caution. The head of the MFA’s strategic affairs division recalled that GOI assessments from 1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998 at the latest.

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Focus on Diplomacy and Concern with the EU-3

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5. (S) In the near term, Israel is focused on maintaining diplomatic pressure on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and EU-3. Sharon defines diplomatic pressure to include UNSC sanctions, e.g. on Iran’s airlines and trade, as noted below. President Katsav has said that Tehran is “very conscious of international opinion.” Other MFA and NSC officials point to the current suspension and to Iranian reaction to the Mykonos case as proof that diplomatic pressure can affect decision-making in Tehran.

6. (S) The Israelis often express disappointment with EU-3 efforts, but see no real alternative at this time. PM Sharon told reporters on March 10 that Iran uses the negotiations to “play for time.” In private, Sharon, his Cabinet, and military leaders have all complained that the Europeans are “too soft.” Similarly, President Katsav has cautioned that Iran will “cheat” on any commitments it makes. MFA staff told poloff that they do not believe that the EU-3 effort will be successful in obtaining a permanent suspension or that the Europeans will support effective sanctions against Iran.

7. (C) GOI technical experts said they have been lobbying the Europeans and IAEA on several issues. First, the GOI would like a clearer and more detailed listing of all activities covered by the suspension, along with timelines for each step. Second, they want more robust verification measures and greater focus on Iran’s denial of access to IAEA inspectors. Third, the Israelis insist that any final agreement must be endorsed by the UNSC to ensure that noncompliance will be dealt with at an appropriate level. Fourth, Israel is pushing the EU-3 to define benchmarks that would signal a failure of the process, and to identify the concrete consequences of such failure.

8. (C) According to the IAEC, the GOI has urged the Europeans to examine bilateral or EU sanctions with small, but noticeable, economic impacts. After telling the press on March 10 that “it would probably not be advisable to impose an oil embargo on Iran,” PM Sharon advocated trade and flight restrictions. Lower-level GOI officials said these steps could include restrictions on Iranians studying in Europe, limitations on travel by Iranian scientific personnel, and suspension of landing privileges for Iranian airlines within the EU. The goal, according to the deputy NSA for foreign affairs, is unified pressure from the EU, Russia, and U.S. for a “complete, full, verifiable cessation of the fuel cycle program.” In the short term, this means a full suspension of all enrichment, reprocessing, heavy-water-reactor construction, and related R&D activities.

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Israeli Preference for USG and UNSC Involvement

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9. (C) In light of their uneasiness with EU-3 efforts, the Israelis are hoping for robust U.S. involvement and action by the UNSC. PM Sharon has urged the EU-3 to continue its efforts, but also stressed the importance of preparing to take Iran to the UNSC. In a meeting with a CoDel on December 12, DefMin Mofaz pushed for the U.S. to take the lead with the Europeans and pursue all diplomatic solutions, including sanctions. President Katsav asked the Secretary not to “wait for the Europeans.”

10. (C) This desire for U.S. activity is amplified by the extremely limited options open to Israel on the diplomatic front. The IAEC’s director for non-proliferation admitted that the GOI sees “little we can do” to increase pressure on Iran as long as Tehran abides by the suspension agreement. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states said that Israel would maintain its low-profile diplomatic activities, such as supplying IAEA members with intelligence material related to the Iranian program. She said the MFA believes that any overt Israeli pressure would backfire, leading to a surge of Arab support for Iran and focusing attention on Israel’s own nuclear activities.

11. (C) Following the recent announcements on Iran by the President and the Secretary, several Israeli officials asked if the USG is shifting its policy on Iran. The deputy NSA for foreign affairs acknowledged that the U.S. move is probably necessary to build international consensus for taking Iran to the UNSC. At the same time, he expressed concern that the USG would be influenced by what he called the EU’s habit of granting concessions to Iran prior to full compliance. Mid-level staffers at the NSC and IAEC were also disquieted by U.S. press reports claiming that the USG is re-examining its position on Hizballah.

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The Military Option: Bushehr is not Osirak

——————————————

12. (S) Despite frustrations with diplomatic efforts, Israeli officials are understandably reluctant to discuss possible military options. In public, PM Sharon has stressed the importance of the “political and economic” track. During a recent discussion with a visiting USG official, IDF Deputy Chief of Staff (and CoS-designate) Major General Dani Haloutz similarly said “we don’t want to go there.” In February, President Katsav told the Secretary that “the military option is not necessary — bring the issue to the Security Council.”

13. (S) Public speculation about possible military strikes usually focuses on the differences from the Israeli Air Force’s attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981. In private, GOI officials have acknowledged that several factors would make any attack against Iran a much more difficult mission. A senior military intelligence official told the Embassy that the GOI does not know where all of the targets are located and said that any attack would only delay, not end, the Iranian program. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states noted that potential target sites are well dispersed throughout the country, with several located in built-up civilian areas. The IAEC stressed the importance of Russian assistance in restraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions and said that any attack on Bushehr would likely result in Russian casualties and endanger Moscow’s cooperation.

14. (C) MFA contacts said that the distance to the targets and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the Gulf raise additional complications. An Israeli assault would necessitate prior coordination with coalition forces in Iraq, they maintained, leaving the USG open to retaliation throughout the Islamic world, especially in Iraq. MFA and NSC officials acknowledged that any attack would also elicit a strong response from Arab states and the Palestinians, effectively freezing the peace process.

15. (C) The Israelis realize that Iran would use any military strike as an excuse to cease cooperation with the EU-3 and the IAEA. In addition, the GOI is acutely aware of Iran’s ability to retaliate, both militarily and through attacks by its regional surrogates. PM Sharon has claimed that Hizballah has 11,000 rockets (and possibly UAVs) capable of reaching Israel from launching sites in Lebanon. The MFA’s office director for the Gulf states said that she believed that Iran would retaliate by inciting terrorist groups in Israel and the Occupied Territories.

16. (C) Current USG, EU-3, and IAEA focus on Iran also creates a situation that differs from 1981, when the Israelis felt that the international community was ignoring the Iraqi threat. Israelis hope that the others will solve the Iranian problem for them, or as Vice PM Shimon Peres has said, “I do not think that the matter of Iran needs to be turned into an Israeli problem — it is a matter of concern for the whole world.”

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Comment: Diplomatic Solution Preferred, but …

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17. (S) COMMENT: The Israelis are focusing on diplomatic channels in the IAEA and EU-3, and appear to have very real concerns about the feasibility of military strikes against the Iranian nuclear program. Nevertheless, the GOI has shown time and again that it will act militarily if it believes that its security is threatened, and the IDF is most certainly keeping contingency plans up to date. The Israeli press reported that in February PM Sharon’s Security Cabinet had given “initial authorization” for an attack on Iran. The press reports cited an unnamed “Israeli security source,” who claimed that the USG would “authorize” an Israeli attack. Post notes that it may not be possible to detect preparations for any military strike. Air defense operations would pose nearly perfect cover for civil defense and Air Force activities preceding any attack. Due to both the extreme sensitivity of the issue and the GOI’s near inability to prevent leaks, any attack order would be closely held, probably even from many members of PM Sharon’s Cabinet.

18. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The GOI knows that we share its interest in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we should expect continued Israeli lobbying at the highest levels urging the USG to ensure that the EU-3 effort is on track and backed by a solid international front. We will also hear Israeli concerns that the U.S. position may move toward the EU stance. At the same time, we should recognize that Israeli intelligence briefings will understandably focus on worst-case scenarios and may not match current USG assessments.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department’s Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER

Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 18 November 2009, 14:34

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002502
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, KWBG, EG, IR, SA, LE, IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S) Summary: As part of the 40th Joint Political Military Group (JPMG), U.S. and GOI counterparts discussed security issues in the Near East region. GOI officials expressed support for the P5 plus 1 engagement process with Iran, but doubted the process would lead to any change in Iranian behavior — Iran will use the engagement process as an opportunity to continue its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro stressed that engagement with Tehran was not “open ended”; the United States is preparing sanctions in the event engagement does not prove successful. GOI interlocutors continued to express concerns regarding U.S. support of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); U.S. participants reiterated U.S. support of the LAF as a counterweight to Hizballah. A/S Shapiro noted NEA, with PM participation and support, plans to brief the GOI on the U.S. policy regarding Lebanon in the near future. In a continuation from the JPMG Executive Session, GOI interlocutors made the argument that U.S. arms transfers in the region could potentially arm future enemies of Israel. GOI officials expressed frustration over the Goldstone Report; U.S. officials advocated sharing lessons learned regarding confronting terrorists in civilian-populated areas. GOI officials noted improved counter-smuggling efforts from Egypt regarding arms transfers to Gaza via the Sinai. However, they argued that Egypt can and should do more to prevent the flow of arms. U.S. delegation members also briefed on U.S. policy in Iraq, and expressed concerns about the current situation in Yemen. This is the third of four cables (septels) reporting on the JPMG. End summary.

2. (SBU) Main Israeli Participants:

— Brigadier General (res) Pinchas Buchris, MOD Director General — Major General (ret) Amos Gilad, MOD Political-Military Chief — Brigadier General Ronen Dan, acting Israeli Defense Attache to the United States — Gad Dovev, Director, MOD Mission, New York — Alon Bar, MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs — COL Shimon Arad, IDF J5 — Rami Yungman, MOD Political-Military Bureau — Schmuel Royter, Assistant to the MOD Director General

Main U.S. Participants:

— Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs — James Hursch, Director, DTSA — Dr. Colin Kahl, International Security Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense — Brigadier General Jefforey Smith, Joint Staff — Beth McCormick, Deputy Director, DSCA — Prem Kumar, Director for Israeli, Palestinian, Egyptian and Jordanian Affairs, NSC — Tom Goldberger, Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs — COL Richard Burgess, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv — Robert Maggi, PM Coordinator for Counter Piracy — Kevin Maloney, Licensing Director, PM/DTCL

Plenary

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3. (S) MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris began the plenary, stating this was “perhaps the most important JPMG to date.” He pointed to the threat of a nuclear Iran, and expressed hope that U.S. leadership will find a way to stop Iran. Otherwise, a nuclear-armed Iran will “impact the stability of the world,” Buchris said. A/S Shapiro described this 40th JPMG as a key forum and the primary mechanism in the political-military dialogue between the United States and Israel. He said the United States wants to “re-energize” the JPMG, with the goal to “bring back strategic elements” into the discussion. A/S Shapiro highlighted the importance of mutual understanding and transparent dialogue.

Iran

—-

4. (S) MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad presented a strategic overview. He began with Iran, reciting President Obama’s statement made during a visit to Israel prior to becoming president that the United States would not tolerate a nuclear Iran. Gilad said Israel concurs, and described current dialogue with Iran as the “most sensitive stage” and Iran’s “last chance.” He said Iran remains determined to

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reach the “nuclear option,” which he described as “intolerable.” He quoted former President and Ahmadinejad opponent Rafsanjani as saying Iran “only needs one bomb for Israel,” implying that Iran will continue to threaten Israel regardless of its leadership.

5. (S) A/S Shapiro noted that the United States shares Israel’s concerns that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program. He said that the United States is beginning with engagement, but at the same time is preparing tougher measures should engagement fail. A/S Shapiro stressed that engagement was not “open ended” — the United States needs to see concrete steps and tangible results from the P5 1 talks. He noted concerns over the Qom facility; if Iran does not respond to engagement, then the United States will move toward stronger steps such as sanctions. DASD Kahl reiterated that it is not our intention to allow Iran to “run out the clock,” and noted that engagement also serves to build international consensus on sanctions. MFA Deputy Director for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar argued that the United States must present a clearer message to the Europeans on what is expected of them regarding sanctions.

6. (S) A representative from Mossad said Tehran understands that by reacting positively to engagement, Iran can continue to “play for time” and avoid sanctions while pursuing its strategic objective to obtain a military nuclear capability. From Mossad’s perspective, there is no reason to believe Iran will do anything but use negotiations to stall for time so that by 2010-2011, Iran will have the technological capability to build a nuclear weapon — essentially reducing the question of weaponizing to a political decision. Mossad said Iran’s main crisis is in the political sphere — the current regime is weaker than prior to the elections, but does not face significant risk as its security apparatus remains loyal, while the opposition lacks a charismatic leader. The goal of the regime, therefore, is to calm down the domestic political environment — Khamenei realizes the frustration demonstrated following the elections has not disappeared. BG”>BG Smith asked if Khamenei’s death might change the political landscape; Mossad noted no information to suggest a change in Khamenei’s health, while those surrounding him appear more loyal than ever.

7. (S) Mossad believes Iran wants to become a regional hegemon, and is dictating its agenda by using Hamas and Hizballah as force multipliers. In that respect, Iran is very creative in finding ways to transfer weapons systems to its proxies. Mossad said Tehran also understands the effort to split Syria from Iran’s influence, and is working hard to deepen its relationship with Syria as a result. DASD Kahl argued that Iran is weaker regionally today than in recent years. He noted progress in Iraq, the results of the recent Lebanese elections, and outreach to Syria as signs of a weaker Iran. DASD Kahl also noted increased U.S. credibility in the Muslim world, while the crackdown following the Iranian elections exposed the current regime as brutal to the region and in Europe.

Hizballah/Lebanon/Syria

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8. (S) Gilad addressed threats posed by “Hizballahstan” and “Hamastan,” noting that Hizballah/Hamas-Syria-Iran cooperation has strengthened. He noted that rockets from Lebanon can now cover the entire territory of Israel, while ballistic missiles — although not new — remain Israel’s most serious threat with adversaries having the capability to target Israeli citizens and major cities. IDF J5 Col Shimon Arad noted four main trends in Lebanon: 1) internal political deadlock since the elections; 2) Hizballah’s growing military capabilities; 3) Lebanon as a volatile military arena; and 4) Lebanon’s susceptibility to outside influences, including Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. He recommended improved US.-Israel coordination, and called for an exchange of views. Arad also recommended creating Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deconfliction measures, demanding improved LAF performance, and exerting greater pressure on Syria and smuggling. Finally, he called for sanctions on the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC), trilateral meetings with the Lebanese and UNIFIL to deter Hizballah, and bolstering UNIFIL by extending Gen. Graziano’s tour for an additional six months.

9. (S) A/S Shapiro acknowledged the GOI’s desire for specifics regarding U.S. policy on Lebanon, and hoped to invite GOI representatives to Washington in the near future for a full brief led by NEA, with PM participation and support. He cited the need to provide an alternative to Hizballah, which explains U.S. goals to strengthen the LAF as a counterweight. DASD Kahl argued that any LAF cooperation

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with Hizballah is pragmatic given the LAF’s current weakness. He noted that U.S. assistance has been temporarily put on hold since there is still no Lebanese government. Kahl also argued that prospects for better relations with Damascus depend on Syrian desires for better relations with the United States and the return of the Golan Heights. Arad argued that more must be done to weaken radicals and cease smuggling. Gilad said the GOI cannot envision a government in Lebanon without Hizballah, and said the LAF will come to the defense of Hizballah if attacked by Israel — thus, a strengthened LAF hurts Israel.

QME

—

10. (S) Turning to U.S. regional arms transfers, Gilad suggested Qualitative Military Edge (QME) as a “codename” for potential threats against Israel. Israel currently enjoys peace with regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates — but the future is uncertain, and each of these regimes faces the potential for change, he argued. U.S. weapons — “the best in the world” — level the playing field by reducing the need for training — and could ultimately aid a future enemy of Israel, Gilad said. A/S Shapiro stressed the importance of transparency — while there may be differences between Israel and the United States in terms of a regional assessment, the key is to ensure that there are no surprises, he said.

Peace Process

————-

11. (S) Gilad described the Middle East peace process as a “pillar” of Israeli security. He quoted PM Netanyahu and President Peres that Israel remains sincerely committed to peace. Gilad noted however, that the re-launching of negotiations is complicated by the split in Palestinian leadership. He said a weak and corrupt PA had lost Gaza despite Israeli warnings. Gilad said 2010 will prove pivotal with Palestinian elections looming and Egyptian mediation efforts to broker reconciliation between Hamas and the PA having failed. That said, he noted that Israeli-PA security and economic cooperation in the West Bank continues to improve as Jenin and Nablus flourish, and described Palestinian security forces as the “good guys.” NEA/IPA Director Tom Goldberger said Special Envoy Sen. Mitchell continues his mission, and noted that Egyptian reconciliation efforts were meant to strengthen the PA, not weaken it.

Goldstone Report

—————-

12. (S) Gilad addressed Israel’s immediate neighbors within the context of the Goldstone Report. He said Israel has checked “all the details” of the report, and have concluded that the report’s accusations are “baseless.” Buchris said the report sets a bad precedent for countries trying to protect its citizens from terrorists; he noted 300,000 phone calls from the IDF to houses in Gaza ahead of strikes in the effort to prevent civilian casualties — “no other country has taken such steps,” Buchris argued. A/S Shapiro highlighted strong U.S. opposition to the report’s referral to the UN Security Council, noting the report’s biased mandate.

13. (S) Gilad said Israel only entered Gaza after Hamas violated the ceasefire or “tahdiya,” which many Israelis felt was “humiliating” and left Defense Minister Barak open to criticism. Gilad characterized Operation Cast Lead as a success that accounted for humanitarian issues; the IDF showed restraint in the operation because Israel did not want to re-occupy Gaza. DASD Kahl advocated sharing perspectives and lessons learned on strategic communication to more effectively confront terrorists in civilian-populated areas. NSC Director for Israel and Palestinian Affairs Prem Kumar noted continued UNSC interest in the Goldstone Report, and asked Israel to inform the United States on any additional efforts or investigations the GOI was taking to help deflect any further damage from the report.

Egypt/Counter-Smuggling

———————–

14. (S) Gilad said Israel was frustrated by its Arab neighbors — including specifically Egypt — for supporting the Goldstone Report, which complicates the peace process. Israel continues to benefit from good security cooperation with Jordan, he said. Gilad argued that Egypt could stop smuggling into Gaza “completely,” and questioned whether Egypt should be judged by its efforts or results. Gilad

TEL AVIV 00002502 004 OF 004

stressed the latter, and argued Egypt can do more on counter-smuggling. Finally, he noted Israeli concerns that Egypt continues to prepare for a potential future military confrontation with Israel, while no Egyptian military officers visit Israel.

15. (S) A/S Shapiro outlined U.S. military assistance to strengthen Egyptian border security, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and civil defense efforts. He said the United States is working with Egypt to improve regional security efforts, such as counter-smuggling. Regarding the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, A/S Shapiro stressed efforts to improve energy security and counter-terrorism, while bolstering the capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the face of the Iranian threat. Finally, he noted U.S. withdrawal from the Anatolian Eagle exercise following the Turkish decision to suspend the IDF’s participation. A/S Shapiro said the United States has been delivering the message that Turkey must improve its relationship with Israel.

16. (S) PM Counter-Piracy Coordinator Maggi briefed on the counter smuggling technical discussion meeting (septel). He cited the importance of working with Israel’s neighbors — including especially Egypt and Turkey — to prevent Iranian weapons from entering Gaza. Maggi said more pressure should be applied in the EU and UN to gain more latitude — and possibly further action from the EU. He said tracking cash flows, and increasing prosecutions and incarcerations were important, with the ultimate goal of increasing cooperation and momentum. Goldberger said Egypt sees Hamas as a national security threat, and added that Egypt had closed 200 tunnels since the beginning of 2009.

17. (S) Goldberger noted Egyptian domestic political sensitivities, and questioned whether more commercial and humanitarian goods could be allowed through the Gaza border crossings. Gilad strongly stated that there were no limits on commercial goods through the border crossings. Goldberger asked about construction materiel like cement; Gilad said the GOI would not allow Hamas to build bunkers — goods such as cement or iron would not be allowed because of their military applications. He also argued that smuggling is a lucrative business for all involved, including the Egyptian government, and said the best way to stop the smuggling was to increase arrests and incarcerations. Goldberger mentioned U.S. economic and development assistance efforts in Sinai. He noted that most requests to third countries to deny arms transfer overflights are based on Israeli intelligence; additional information/intelligence from the GOI would ensure greater cooperation. Bar raised prosecuting shipping companies complicit in arms transfers to Gaza; A/S Shapiro said he would take that back to Washington for further consideration.

Iraq/Yemen

———-

18. (S) On Iraq, DASD Kahl noted there are currently 125,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq, which will be reduced to 50,000 soldiers by September 1, 2010 with complete U.S. troop withdrawal by the end of 2011. He noted the U.S. goal of establishing a long-term strategic relationship with a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. A/S Shapiro and DASD Kahl briefed the GOI on U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi military to complete its counterinsurgency force, transition the military to a force that can defend its borders, and align the Iraqi military more closely to the United States.

19. (S) DASD Kahl pointed to the growing threat (al Qaida, al Houthi insurgency, and southern secessionists) in Yemen. He said the United States is attempting to prevent Yemen from heading toward an “Afghanistan-type scenario” with general lawlessness and increased ungoverned spaces. BG”>BG Smith noted that al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to fester in North and sub-Saharan Africa. He said Egypt is actively involved in countering AQIM with 3,800 soldiers in Sudan — this should be encouraged and expanded.

20. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared on this cable.

CUNNINGHAM

Bron: WikiLeaks

Thursday, 17 March 2005, 10:32

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001580
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/15/2010
TAGS PGOV, PREL, KWBG, IR, IS, COUNTERTERRORISM, GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: MOSSAD CHIEF TO CODEL CORZINE: SOME FOREIGN
FIGHTERS BEGINNING TO LEAVE IRAQ
Classified By: Pol/C Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer for reasons 1.4(b) an d (d).

1. (S) Summary: Mossad Chief Meir Dagan told CODEL Corzine March 13 that Israeli and U.S. thinking on Iran largely tracks, adding that he believes the EU dialogue with Iran will ultimately fail. Dagan said that Israel has evidence that some foreign fighters have returned home from Iraq, perhaps indicating that the tide may be starting to turn in the U.S. battle against the insurgency there. He worried however, that these militants’ countries of origin — in particular Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria and Sudan — are ill-equipped to control the returning jihadis, who might then pose a threat to stability in the region and, ultimately, to Israel. End Summary.

—-

Iran

—-

2. (C) Senator Jon Corzine, accompanied by Senate staff member Evan Gottesman, the Ambassador, Pol/Res and Poloff (notetaker), met with Mossad Chief Meir Dagan March 13. Acknowledging that there are at times differences in analysis of the facts, Dagan stressed that it is similarities rather than differences that are at the heart of the GOI-U.S. intelligence relationship, particularly on Iran. The facts themselves are not in dispute, Dagan continued, adding that the U.S. and Israeli assessments of Iran’s intentions and plans are largely in accord. Iran has decided to go nuclear, Dagan said, and nothing will stop it. Dagan predicted that the EU dialogue with Iran will not succeed and that the issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions would eventually go to the UN Security Council.

————————————-

Iraq – Foreign Fighters Heading Home?

————————————-

3. (S) In response to the Senator’s question, Dagan said that the tide may be starting to turn in Iraq with regard to foreign militant activity. Dagan said Israel has evidence that foreign fighters originating from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria and Yemen have arrived back in their home countries, and he assumes that some had returned to Saudi Arabia as well. Dagan predicted that, as with men who fought in Afghanistan during the 80’s and 90’s, these returning militants would stay in touch with each other, forming a network based on their common experiences in Iraq.

4. (S) Stressing that Israel has no assets in Iraq other than a friendly relationship with the Kurds, Dagan said that Israel’s interest is more in the impact the jihadis from, for example, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, will have once they return to their countries of origin. Although he predicts Egypt and Jordan will “do all right,” Dagan said he is less confident that governments in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, and Sudan are sufficiently well-equipped to face down the domestic challenge these returning militants will pose. The combination of their military training and the absence of strong governments willing and able to confront these men could have a devastating impact on Israel by causing chaos in their home countries, he added. Dagan predicted that these jihadis will have less of a direct impact on Palestinians, because Palestinians are already well aware of militant views and opinions via Internet chat rooms. Furthermore, Dagan said he feels that most Palestinians are not searching for “foreign flags,” such as al-Qaeda, under which to rally, because those inclined to do so are already being well-mobilized under existing groups in the West Bank and Gaza.

——-

Lebanon

——-

5. (C) Dagan opined that Hizballah will never make the transition to a purely political party in Lebanon, since the organization remains very dependent on its jihadi orientation. Noting that even the recent Hizaballah-sponsored march in Beirut has not deterred the Lebanese from pressing for a full Syrian withdrawal, Dagan advised the U.S. to remain firm in its demand for a complete pullout, and attributed the willingness of the Lebanese people to rise up to U.S. action in Iraq.

——————————————— ————-

Essential to Use All Assets in the Fight Against Terrorism

——————————————— ————-

6. (C) Dagan said it is essential to combine all types of intelligence assets, rather than relying exclusively on human intelligence or signal intercepts, to counter terrorist threats. Terrorist organizations have been seeking to obtain WMD as a matter of course and, unlike countries that wish to acquire these weapons as a deterrent, non-state actors would be more inclined to actually use them, in Dagan’s opinion. Asked about the relationship between illicit activities such as narcotic or arms trafficking and terrorism, Dagan confirmed that terrorist organizations try to fund their activities by criminal means, adding that credit card fraud and counterfeiting are also methods favored by these groups. Weapons originating from Yemen and Sudan are smuggled into the territories through Egypt for sale, as well as for use by militants, Dagan said.

7. (U) CODEL Corzine did not have an opportunity to clear this message.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department’s Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** KURTZER

Bron: WikiLeaks

Thursday, 30 July 2009, 10:23

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001688
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/30/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, EG, CH, IR, SA, LE, IS
SUBJECT: PM A/S SHAPIRO’S JULY 22-23 VISIT TO ISRAEL
REF: GRUBB-MILLER 07/22/09 E-MAIL
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S) Summary: Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro met with a number of GOI officials on July 22-23 to stress the importance of the U.S.-Israeli political-military relationship, and to discuss among other issues Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME). GOI interlocutors continued to press for the opportunity to review the QME report prior to its submission to Congress, and presented an official response to a U.S. non-paper on potential arms transfers to Arab countries. In that respect, the MOD proposed technical discussions in Washington on August 3 to further discuss GOI concerns over the potential F-15SA transfer to Saudi Arabia. GOI officials continued to express reservations regarding U.S. arms transfers to Lebanon, and requested the opportunity to further discuss U.S. strategy and intentions with respect to the Lebanese Armed Forces. GOI interlocutors raised continued concerns over the Iranian nuclear weapons program, noting that any policy of engagement be done in conjunction with tougher sanctions and for a finite period of time before turning to other “options on the table.” Other issues raised by GOI officials included the Peace Process, Israel’s export control system, and potential Israeli exports to China. Both sides agreed in principle to the next session of the Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) in October or early November in Israel. End summary.

2. (SBU) On July 22, A/S Shapiro met with MOD Director General Pinchas Buchris, MOD Political-Military Director Amos Gilad, Defense Export Control Directorate Chief Eli Pincu, and participated in a roundtable discussion led by J5 Strategic Division Chief Brigadier General Yossi Heymann. At the MFA on July 23, A/S Shapiro met with Director General Yossi Gal and participated in a roundtable discussion led by Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar and Export Control Director Roey Gilad. A/S Shapiro also participated in a strategic tour of Israel, and visited Israeli defense company Plasan-Sasa.

U.S.-Israeli Relationship

————————-

3. (SBU) A/S Shapiro stressed the importance of the U.S-Israeli political-military relationship, noting the significance of visiting Israel on his first overseas trip in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for the Political-Military Affairs Bureau. GOI interlocutors appreciated the opportunity to resume dialogue on this important aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. MOD DG Buchris noted the two still relatively new administrations in the United States and Israel, and the importance of limiting the number of misunderstandings in the future.

Qualitative Military Edge

————————-

4. (S) GOI officials reiterated the importance of maintaining Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME). They said that Israel understands U.S. policy intentions to arm moderate Arab states in the region to counter the Iranian threat, and prefers such sales originate from the United States instead of other countries like Russia or China. However, Israel continues to stress the importance of identifying potential risks that may become future threats or adversaries, and for this reason maintains several objections as indicated in the official GOI response to the QME non-paper on potential U.S. arms sales to the region (ref e-mail to PM/RSAT separately).

5. (S) GOI officials also expressed continued interest in reviewing the QME report prior to its submission to Congress. A/S Shapiro reiterated that the report was based on an assessment from the intelligence community, and therefore not releasable to the GOI. He referenced previous points made to the Israeli embassy in Washington regarding the report, and welcomed any comments the GOI might have — although such comments should be delivered as soon as possible as the report is already overdue. Israeli interlocutors appreciated the classified nature of the report, but also made clear it was difficult to comment on the report’s results without reviewing its content or intelligence assessment. In that respect, Buchris and other GOI officials requested that the QME process be reviewed in light of future QME reports.

6. (S) GOI interlocutors attempted to make the argument that moderate Arab countries could in the future become adversaries — and that this should be taken into account in the QME process. During a roundtable discussion led by the MFA’s Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar, the MFA’s Center for Policy Research gave intelligence briefs on Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Lebanon to further support the argument that these countries could become future foes. Policy Research Center interlocutors reviewed succession concerns in both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Bar argued that a perceived closure in the capability gap between Israel and Arab states, coupled with a nuclear-armed Iran, could compel moderate Arab states to reassess the notion that Israel was a fixture in the region.

7. (S) Typically frank, MOD Political-Military Chief Amos Gilad was not certain how much longer Egyptian President Mubarak would live, and questioned whether his son Gamal was ready to assume command. Gilad said the Egyptian military led by Defense Minister Tantawi continues to train and exercise as if “Israel was its only enemy.” He added that there were disturbing signs on the Egyptian streets, as women are dressed more conservatively, and that peace with Israel “is too thin, too superficial.” On Saudi Arabia, Gilad said that King Abdullah does not hate Israel, but his chief priority is the survival of the regime.

8. (S) The GOI official response to the arms transfer non-paper includes several objections, such as the potential transfer of systems for the F-15SA to Saudi Arabia, including the Enhanced Paveway II, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System, and AESA radar. Buchris said the GOI is ready to establish a working group to discuss the F-15SA transfer, and proposed an Israeli technical team accompany BG”>BG Heymann to Washington (in town for a missile defense meeting) on August 3 to discuss the issue further. Buchris said the sale of the F-15SA was not the problem, but rather the weapons systems included on the planes and the location of the planes in Saudi Arabia.

Lebanon

——-

9. (S) The GOI remains concerned about U.S. arms transfers to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and has requested the opportunity to discuss further U.S. intentions regarding the LAF. A/S Shapiro said the results of the Lebanese elections represented a turning point, and rejection of Hizballah and its Iranian sponsors. The need to build up Lebanese institutions, including the army, was now more important than ever, he argued. A/S Shapiro said the LAF has thus far demonstrated a solid record of accounting for U.S. systems transferred to Lebanon.

10. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the elections in Lebanon were positive, but countered that Hizballah’s influence remains strong. He argued that items such as the Cessna Caravan and the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) lack sufficient mitigation measures, which creates the potential for an incident along the Israel-Lebanese border. Amos Gilad said the GOI does not believe the LAF will attack Israel. However, given the ties between Hizballah and the LAF, he was certain the IDF would eventually face the LAF in any conflict with Hizballah.

11. (S) Analysts from the MFA’s Center for Policy Research argued there has been no dramatic change in the political arena despite the March 14 coalition’s significant victory in the elections. They said the fragile political situation in Lebanon is currently stable, but Hizballah still possesses an unofficial veto over policy. Long term prospects will be tested by the Hariri Tribunal and Hizballah’s desire for a reprisal to the 2008 Mughniyeh assassination. MFA Policy Research analysts further argued that the LAF faces tremendous pressure following the recent explosion of a Hizballah arms cache near the Lebanese-Israeli border. MFA DG Yossi Gal noted that UNIFIL had been prevented from investigating the explosion, and raised the recent crossing by Lebanese citizens into Israeli territory to plant Lebanese and Hizballah flags. He said French and Italian delegations had praised the GOI’s restraint in these cases.

12. (S) A/S Shapiro asked if the election results might be the result in part of a backlash in the Christian community against Hizballah; the Policy Research analysts countered that the results were indicative of several factors, including the influx of Saudi money and an unstable opposition camp. They agreed that Hizballah leader Nasrallah might be a bit chastened following the elections, as suggested by A/S Shapiro, but that Hizballah continues to try and undermine the March 14 coalition.

13. (S) During the MOD roundtable discussion, BG”>BG Heymann also acknowledged the positive results of the elections. However, he feared the outcome did not represent the real power of the Shi’ites in Lebanon. He agreed that moderates and the LAF must be strengthened, but expressed deep concerns about ongoing cooperation between Hizballah and the LAF. He also said that such aid to Lebanon be paired with efforts to halt smuggling and directly weaken Hizballah.

14. (S) BG”>BG Heymann also cited concerns regarding mitigation measures for the Caravan and Raven in order to prevent an “accidental engagement” by the IAF. Overall, he was skeptical that these systems would benefit the LAF, and said the GOI would appreciate a more in-depth conversation regarding U.S. intentions and overarching strategy with respect to the LAF. Heymann suggested further talks to coincide with the August 3rd F-15 technical discussion in Washington; MFA DDG Bar echoed this request. A/S Shapiro offered to take that back to Washington for review. If it proved too difficult on short notice to bring together interagency experts to discuss US intentions with the LAF, A/S Shapiro suggested it be included in the Joint Political Military Group talks later in the fall.

Iran

—-

15. (S) Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons remains the GOI’s primary focus. Buchris stated bluntly that it was not clear to him where U.S. policy was heading with regard to Iran. In separate meetings, Buchris and Amos Gilad said that Israel’s preeminent priority is to prevent Iran’s nuclear weapons program, which if realized would cause a nuclear arms race across the Middle East as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt pursue similar programs in response. Gilad was skeptical

that engagement would work, noting Iranian desires to “establish a new empire” and pointing to Iranian support for Hizballah and “Hamastan.” Buchris added that the United States’ desire to engage with Iran should be accompanied by tough sanctions, and only pursued for a finite period of time; MFA DG Gal concurred. Alluding to a potential military strike, Buchris said “all options must remain on the table,” and acknowledged that part of his job was insuring Israel was ready to employ such an option, no matter how undesirable it may be.

16. (S) A/S Shapiro made clear that a nuclear armed Iran was unacceptable to the United States. He referenced Secretary Clinton’s July 15 foreign policy address at the Council on Foreign Relations, noting the offer of engagement with Iran — but reinforcing that such an offer is not indefinite. A/S Shapiro argued that an Iranian rejection of our offer to engage will only help bolster international support for increased sanctions. He also pointed to the uncertain situation following the Iranian elections — it was unclear at this point how the regime in Tehran will react to our offer of engagement. That said, he repeated that the engagement offer was not unlimited, noting that the United States will reassess its engagement strategy with Iran later this fall.

17. (S) A/S Shapiro cited a commonality of interests with the Gulf States, which also view Iran as the preeminent threat — we should take advantage of this commonality, he said. During the J5 roundtable discussion, IDF interlocutors expressed skepticism that proposed military assistance to the Gulf would help against Iran, as some of the systems slated for delivery are not designed to counter the threats, nuclear and asymmetrical, posed by Iran. A/S Shapiro agreed that assistance to Gulf states should not diminish Israel’s QME, but argued that it sends a signal to those countries (as well as Iran) that they have strong allies in the West. It also helps convince these regimes that their best interests lie with the moderate camp rather than with Iran.

18. (S) Buchris said the lack of an appointed U.S. special envoy focusing on Iran suggested the United States did not believe Iran was a priority. A/S Shapiro reassured Buchris that Iran was a top priority as President Obama and Secretary Clinton are intensely focused on Iran. The fact that Tehran has not responded to our offer of engagement makes a special envoy responsible for negotiations not as important, A/S Shapiro said — in any case, much of the discussion will be behind the scenes.

19. (S) Buchris referenced a press report from Secretary Clinton’s trip to Jakarta in which she said the United States would consider providing a defense umbrella for moderate Arab countries in the Middle East should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon. Buchris argued that such a statement already conceded the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran. MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs Alon Bar also raised the Secretary’s Jakarta statement; A/S Shapiro stated that the Secretary’s comments did not indicate a new policy approach, but were meant as a deterrent factor toward Iran’s nuclear weapons ambitions — not as a concession — and that journalists covering the trip attempted to make more out of the statement than was intended.

20. (S) Amos Gilad referenced Russia’s potential sale of the S-300 missile system to Iran, noting that Russian interlocutors initially denied the S-300 contract with Iran, and then later admitted it had been signed but added that the system would not be delivered for political reasons. However, Gilad said the Russians would reassess this political calculation should the United States continue to pursue missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech Republic. He speculated that the Iranians would continue to put pressure on Russia to sell the system rather than pursue alternative Chinese systems. He said the Russians appear committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but he personally had doubts about their intelligence capabilities following their lack of knowledge regarding the Syrian nuclear project.

Peace Process

————-

21. (S) Buchris acknowledged that the Palestinian Authority was doing a “good job” in the West Bank, noting respect for Palestinian Security Forces (PASF) as they take more control of security — giving them the chance to succeed was important, Buchris said. He also commended the work of United States Security Coordinator Gen. Dayton in training the PASF. That said, Buchris argued the way ahead would be difficult, given the divide between Hamas and Fatah. Reconciliation talks between the two have stalled — Amos Gilad said both sides are “more interested in swallowing one another” than negotiating. Behind the scenes discussions with Hamas by European countries and even U.S. visitors have not helped the situation, Buchris said. A/S Shapiro deferred to Special Envoy Sen. George Mitchell’s efforts, but noted Secretary Clinton’s point that a stronger PA will offer an alternative to Hamas. He also stressed Secretary Clinton’s remarks during her July 15 speech that the United States will not engage with Hamas unless it has accepted the Quartet principles.

Export Control

————–

22. (C) MOD Defense Export Control Directorate (DECD) Chief Eli Pincu reviewed the export control system, emphasizing an improved process, but also acknowledging the potential for improvement. He gave a brief presentation regarding Israeli export controls, including enhanced legislation, cross-ministry coordination, enhanced enforcement, and increased industry outreach and training. He noted 780 registered exporters in Israel; for 2009, 31,373 marketing licenses had thus far been issued, with 1,198 denials and 219 returned without action. MFA Export Control Director Roey Gilad stressed the partnership between the MOD and MFA on export licenses, and explained the system’s dispute resolution mechanism in the event the MFA and MOD disagree on a particular case.

23. (C) Both Pincu and Roey Gilad noted that the GOI continues to seek assistance in closing export control loopholes, including brokering. Pincu noted that brokering had been included in the Defense Export Control Act, but that accompanying implementation legislation had not yet entered in to force. Pincu said the GOI had consulted with Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan on its brokering laws, and planned to raise it during the annual defense export control working group to be held in Washington in October. Roey Gilad and other DECD officials also hope to travel to Washington in the near future to further discuss brokering issues.

China

—–

24. (C) MFA Export Control Director Roey Gilad reiterated that the GOI in no way desires to compromise U.S. national interests with respect to exports to China. He noted, however, that the U.S. Department of Commerce created in 2007 a list of exemptions for certain items if sent to validated end users in China. Gilad questioned whether the same exemptions might be possible for Israel. As it currently stands, the GOI must pursue any export to China through the bilateral statement of understanding with the United States. While the statement calls for expeditious resolution of any requests to export to China, it often takes up to 80 days to obtain approval. By that time, Gilad said, China has often found the item through another supplier. Moreover, the Israeli export control system requires a 20-working day turn-around on all export license requests — which is not possible, given the length of time required to obtain an answer from the United States. A/S Shapiro offered to raise the issue in Washington.

JPMG

—-

25. (SBU) A/S Shapiro suggested the next session of the Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) convene shortly after the Jewish holidays, most likely in October or early November. GOI officials agreed in principle, and will look at the calendar and propose dates.

26. (U) A/S Shapiro has cleared this cable.

********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv’s Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv ********************************************* ******************** CUNNINGHAM

Bron: WikiLeaks

Thursday, 26 July 2007, 13:52

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002280
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT TOWNSEND.
EO 12958 DECL: 07/13/2017
TAGS PTER, PREL, KNNP, KWBG, EFIN, IR, IS
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND TAKES STOCK OF BMENA REGION WITH
MOSSAD DIRECTOR DAGAN
Classified By: Charge d’affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (B/D).

1. (S) SUMMARY: Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (AFHSC), met Mossad Director Meir Dagan on July 12 for a general discussion of regional security threats. On the Iranian nuclear program, Dagan proved surprisingly optimistic about the effects of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and their impact on Iranian elites. On most other fronts, however, Dagan expressed deep skepticism regarding any near-term solutions. Dagan believes that the Syrians were emboldened by the Second Lebanon War, and argued for a concerted international effort to enforce UNSC resolutions in Lebanon as a means of removing Syria from Iranian influence. In Dagan’s personal opinion, present attempts to prop up the government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad will fail, and “an entirely new approach” with the Palestinians is required. Dagan and Townsend surveyed political developments in North Africa, Turkey, and the Gulf, and shared concerns about Pakistan’s ability to withstand the challenge of Islamic radicals. END SUMMARY.

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Financial Sanctions Offer Hope on Iran

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2. (S) Mossad Director Meir Dagan began his two-hour meeting with Townsend by expressing satisfaction with sanctions against Iran. Dagan said UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747 caught the Iranians off-guard, and were having an impact on the Iranian elite and financial community. The resolutions had been particularly successful through their indirect consequences, explained Dagan, by stigmatizing Iranian businesses and discouraging risk-averse Europeans from being connected with Iran. Dagan praised ongoing GOI-USG cooperation on this front, and added that domestic economic problems were creating additional pressure on the regime.

3. (S) With regard to their nuclear program, Dagan said the Iranians are attempting to convey a “false presentation” that they have mastered the uranium enrichment process. The reality is that they are not there yet, said Dagan, and they are paying a heavy political price (sanctions) for something they have yet to achieve. Dagan noted growing antipathy in Russia towards Iran and its nuclear program, and said the Iranians were shocked by Russian statements accusing them of supporting terrorism against the United States. In Dagan’s view, there is no ideological conflict within the Iranian leadership (all wish to see the destruction of Israel), but there is a growing divide on tactics with some supporting a retaliatory position against the West and others favoring new policies of moderation. Recognizing the growing strength of the moderate camp, Dagan said that the militant followers of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are now trying to target supporters of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as spies.

——————————————— –

Gulf States Await Action (From Others) on Iran

——————————————— –

4. (S) According to Dagan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States all fear Iran, but want someone else “to do the job for them.” Townsend and Dagan discussed the current state of affairs in the Saudi royal court, where the Mossad Chief accused Foreign Minister Saud bin Faysal of playing a “very negative role.” He also pointed to the recent visit of the Saudi King Abdullah to Jordan as a historical first and turning point for relations between the two countries. Townsend agreed, and said that the Saudi king has a sense of urgency on the political front. Dagan characterized Qatar as “a real problem,” and accused Sheikh Hamid of “annoying everyone.” In his view, Qatar is trying to play all sides — Syria, Iran, Hamas — in an effort to achieve security and some degree of independence. “I think you should remove your bases from there…seriously,” said Dagan. “They have confidence only because of the U.S. presence.” Dagan predicted, with some humor, that al-Jazeera would be the next cause of war in the Middle East as some Arab leaders (specifically Saudi Arabia) are willing to take drastic steps to shut down the channel, and hold Sheikh Hamid personally responsible for its provocations.

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Syria Taking Dangerous Risks

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TEL AVIV 00002280 002 OF 003

5. (S) Dagan echoed other reports that Syria expects an Israeli attack this summer, and has raised its level of readiness. Despite the fact that Israel has no intention of attacking, said Dagan, the Syrians are likely to retaliate over even the smallest incident, which could lead to quick escalation. Dagan believes that Syria’s strategic alliance with Iran and Hizballah has not changed, and that Assad views these policies as both “successful and just.” There is a tendency to assume that Syria can be separated from Iran, said Dagan, and that this offers the key to weakening Hizballah. Dagan argued that the opposite is true: by enforcing UN resolutions on Lebanon and increasing efforts to disarm Hizballah, the international community can remove the glue that binds Iran and Syria. Enforcing the resolutions would put additional pressure on Assad, who fears being tried for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri above all else. The advantage of such an approach, continued Dagan, is that the legal ground is already in place for action by the UNSC. This credible threat could sufficiently frighten Syria away from Iran and towards more natural allies in the Arab League.

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Deep Pessimism on Relations With Palestinians

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6. (S) Departing from official GOI policy, Dagan expressed his personal opinion that after more than a decade of trying to reach a final status agreement with the Palestinians, “nothing will be achieved.” Only Israeli military operations against Hamas in the West Bank prevent them from expanding control beyond Gaza, lamented Dagan, without which Fatah would fall within one month and Abbas would join his “mysteriously wealthy” son in Qatar. Offering what he believed to be a conservative estimate, Dagan said that USD 6 billion had been invested in the Palestinian Authority since 1994. “What did it accomplish, other than adding a few more people to the Fortune 500?” asked Dagan. Although he expressed his personal faith in Salam Fayyad, Dagan said that the Palestinian Prime Minister had no power base. Fatah as a party would have to completely reorganize itself in order to regain credibility, argued Dagan, but instead they have turned once again to the “old guard.” The Mossad Chief suggested that a completely new approach was required, but did not provide Townsend any additional details.

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Pakistan…and Other Regional Concerns

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7. (S) Townsend and Dagan then embarked on an informal tour of the region, comparing notes on countries critical to combating terrorism. Dagan characterized a Pakistan ruled by radical Islamists with a nuclear arsenal at their disposal as his biggest nightmare. Al-Qaeda and other “Global Jihad” groups could not be relied upon to behave rationally once in possession of nuclear weapons, said Dagan, as they do not care about the well being of states or their image in the media. “We have to keep (President Pervez) Musharaf in power,” said Dagan. In North Africa, Dagan contended that Qaddafi needs to be pushed more in order to put Libya on the right track. Qaddafi faces little domestic pressure, said Dagan, but has traditionally responded to outside threats and runs foreign policy based on his emotions. The only reason Qaddafi moderated his position to begin with, said Dagan, was that he feared that he was “in the crosshairs” for regime change. Dagan viewed the situation in Algeria as more serious, with the south of the country becoming increasingly dangerous and the leadership uncertain as it faces radical Islamic forces. Morocco is coping better with these issues “in spite of the king,” said Dagan, who appears to take little interest in governing. In Turkey, Dagan said that Islamists there are not of the same cloth as others in the region, but he does fear that they are slowly breaking down the secular character of the state and could become more radical over time. Dagan argued that if the Turkish military received more direct support from the United States, it would be better able to prevent the rise of Islamists.

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