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Donderdag, 16 December 2010 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6 | Bewerkt door Crethi Plethi

Ontmoeting tussen Jan Pieter Balkenende en Barack Obama in het Witte Huis, Washington op 14 juli, 2009. Volgens een document is Nederland een belangrijke strategische partner van de VS. (Foto: Pool/Getty Images)

WikiLeaks: Nederland Belangrijke Bondgenoot VS

Uit documenten die teruggaan tot 2004 blijkt dat de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag het beladen debat rondom de aanschaf van de Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) nauwgezet volgde. De JSF zijn de beoogde vervangers van de F-16 straaljagers en worden hoofdzakelijk ontwikkeld door het Amerikaanse bedrijf Lockheed Martin.

Naast een economisch belang hadden de Amerikanen ook een ander belang: een strategisch bondgenoot in Europa en het Caribische gebied. Volgens op WikiLeaks gepubliceerde Amerikaanse documenten blijkt dat de Verenigde Staten een groot belang hechten aan haar relatie met Nederland. In een document uit augustus 2005 lezen we: “met een verdeeld Europa en haar onzekere koers, dient Nederland als een vitale trans-Atlantisch anker in Europa.”

Daarnaast somt het document nog enkele punten op waarom de Amerikanen Nederland als belangrijke bondgenoot zien: Nederland was “samen met Engeland een blok tegenover Duits-Franse intiatieven om Europa van de ‘trans-Atlantische koers’ af te laten wijken” en de Nederlandse “actieve rol binnen de NAVO.” Daarnaast de voorname rol die Nederland speelt in initiatieven voor terrorismebestrijding en de goede betrekkingen van Nederland met zowel Israël als de Palestijnen. Tezamen met haar strategisch belang in het Caribische gebied, waarin Nederland een actievere rol zou kunnen spelen in het tegengaan van Venezolaanse bemoeienissen in de regio, maken Nederland tot een belangrijke strategische partner van de VS.

Het document gaat verder gaat met: “Het Nederlandse pragmatisme en onze vergelijkbare wereldvisie maakt Nederland een vruchtbare voedingsbodem voor initiatieven waar anderen in Europa, althans aanvankelijk, misschien terughoudend in zijn. Het kan enige moeite kosten om de Nederlanders voor de schijnwerpers te krijgen, maar de beloning is vorstelijk,” aldus het document.

Het debat rondom de JSF bleek echter een politieke splijtzwam. Na een parlementair debat in april vorig jaar werd er een compromis bereikt om één testvliegtuig te kopen en uitstel van de beslissing om operationele vliegtuigen te kopen tot 2012. Maar ook dat bleek al snel een wankel compromis. In september meldt de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag dat de Nederlandse minister van defensie bezorgd was over het schrappen van de ontwikkeling van een tweede motor voor de JSF (F-136) in de 2010 VS defensiebegroting. Het document wijst er op dat de Nederlandse industrie “dure” contracten heeft afgesloten voor participatie in deze tweede motor. Als deze contracten wegvallen zou dat kunnen betekenen dat “Nederland uit het JSF project stapt en er twijfels kunnen ontstaan over strategisch partnerschap nu we de [Nederlandse] regering vragen om de Nederlandse troepen in Afghanistan te houden.”

Een document van februari dit jaar gaat over de val van het kabinet vanwege het Afghanistan-debat. Verschillende conflicten binnen de CDA-PVDA coalitie, waaronder die van de JSF, hebben er uiteindelijk toe geleidt dat het kabinet geen overeenstemming kon bereiken over Afghanistan. Volgens het document is “de frustratie het afgelopen jaar toegenomen onder de ministers. In april [2009] viel het kabinet bijna over de vraag of het Joint Strike Fighter testtoestellen zou kopen.”

Uiteindelijk was de val van de coalitie het gevolg van “geneuzel” over Afghanistan, volgens het document. De stafchef van de Nederlandse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Marcel de Vink, vertelde aan Amerikaanse diplomaten dat de regering geen troepen in Uruzgan zou laten blijven na 2010.

“Er is geen enkele manier waarop Nederlandse militairen zullen blijven in Uruzgan … die deur is dicht,” citeerde het document hem.

Een ander document uit juli 2009 van de Amerikaanse ambassade uit Den Haag dient als voorbereiding voor Barack Obama die een ontmoeting zou hebben met de toenmalige Nederlandse premier, Jan Pieter Balkenende, waarin Obama ook te horen kreeg dat Geert Wilders een “doorn in het oog van de [CDA-PVDA] coalitie is.”

In verschillende documenten worden de zorgen geuit over de voorgenomen uitzending van de, door Geert Wilders gemaakte, film “Fitna.” In januari 2008 stuurde het Amerikaanse ministerie van buitenlandse zaken een adviserende [“geheime”] memo naar alle Amerikaanse diplomatieke en consulaire vertegenwoordigingen met een waarschuwing voor anti-Nederlandse demonstraties en de mogelijkheid dat de film ook “anti-Europese en anti-westerse protesten” teweeg kunnen brengen. In dat geval moesten de ambassades Amerikaanse burgers waarschuwen voor de demonstraties.

Een latere briefing aan Barack Obama over de Nederlandse politiek beschrijft de PVV als snelst groeiende partij van Nederland en Geert Wilders als “geen vriend van de VS,” vooral vanwege zijn oppositie tegen de Nederlandse militaire betrokkenheid in Afghanistan, zijn “tweespalt veroorzakende taalgebruik” omtrent immigranten en zijn “aversie tegen de Europese Unie.”

Bron: WikiLeaks

Saturday, 20 February 2010, 10:53

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000108
SENSITIVE
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/18/2020
TAGS PREL, NATO, AF, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: CABINET FALLS OVER AFGHANISTAN
ELECTIONEERING
REF: A. THE HAGUE 097 B. THE HAGUE 15 C. 09 THE HAGUE 758 D. 09 THE HAGUE 663 E. 09 THE HAGUE 271
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Edwin R. Nolan for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d)

1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: Following a marathon 15 hour Cabinet meeting, the Dutch Cabinet fell around 02:30 a.m., February 20 due to fundamental disagreements and Labor Party (PvdA) posturing ahead of local elections. Conflicts within the governing coalition have prompted several near Cabinet crises over the past several months, as the PvdA butted heads with coalition partner Christian Democrats (CDA) over the Joint Strike Fighter, decision-making during the 2003 Iraq conflict, and now the commitment of military forces to Afghanistan after 2010. PvdA has been trying to rally its base supporters by standing firm against a Netherlands deployment in Uruzgan after 2010. With PM Balkenende submitting his resignation to the Queen, the most likely outcome is new elections and months with a caretaker government. The immediate concern for U.S. interests is the future status of Dutch forces in Uruzgan. According to FM Verhagen’s staff Dutch forces will withdraw from Uruzgan in 2010, but it remains to be seen what a caretaker government could do on Afghanistan. Post will work to build support with the Dutch government on future deployment options that will meet Verhagen’s stated goal of a “significant Dutch contribution to the NATO mission.” END SUMMARY

2. (C) AFGHANISTAN THE LATEST IN A STRING OF IRRITANTS FOR DUTCH CABINET: Frustration among government ministers has been building for the past year (reftel A). In April, the Cabinet almost fell over a dispute over whether to purchase the Joint Strike Fighter test aircraft (reftel E). In the fall of 2009, the governing coalition parties split over a parliamentary resolution asking the Cabinet to pull troops out of Uruzgan in 2010 (reftel D). And in January coalition members bitterly disputed the results of the “Davids Committee Report” on the Dutch government’s decision in 2002-2003 to give political support to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (reftel B). Many of the disputes were prompted by public statements by members of the Cabinet characterizing internal negotiations between the parties. Resolution of the disputes required painstaking negotiations. In the JSF dispute, as well as debates over increasing the retirement age and approving the Lisbon Treaty, PvdA leader (and Deputy PM) Wouter Bos has been portrayed as backing down from his previous positions. These tensions and Bos’s weak position set the stage for a showdown on Afghanistan.

3. (C) POSTURING OVER AFGHANISTAN BROUGHT DOWN GOVERNMENT: During the past several weeks, Bos, motivated by perceptions of a weak defense of PvdA positions, has repeatedly and categorically claimed he would stand firm on PvdA’s pledge to end the Uruzgan mission in 2010. He has stuck with this pledge even as major newspapers editorialized against moving Dutch troops out of Uruzgan and questioned the logic of his position. In the last two days, newspaper headlines have trumpeted the Afghanistan controversy as a crisis for the government. However, the dispute was prompted more by Bos’s electioneering than the virtues of the mission. For example, during an eight-hour parliamentary debate on the evening of Qduring an eight-hour parliamentary debate on the evening of February 18, opposition parties pummeled the coalition government over contradictory statements in early February by D/PM Bos (PvdA) and FM Verhagen (CDA) over whether the entire coalition had discussed and approved a request to NATO for a letter on ISAF’s needs in Afghanistan. (Bos had originally denied he had been consulted.) Rather than addressing the needs of Afghanistan, the debate was a dissection of the coalition’s decision-making and public statements. Firebrand parliamentarians Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders called Bos a liar. More moderate Alexander Pechtold described the proceedings as akin to watching a divorce. Pechtold’s description proved apt as PM Balkenende today announced he would give Queen Beatrix his resignation, which if accepted will be followed by new elections in 1-2 months (see paragraph 5). The coalition-member PvdA insisted on the Cabinet making an immediate decision on the post-2010 Dutch deployment in Afghanistan. PM Balkenende’s Christian Democrats (CDA) refused, insisting on more time to weigh options to assist NATO allies. PM Balkenende stated, “We explored today whether trust could be restored–efforts to restore trust between the parties have failed–given the challenges facing the Netherlands, what is needed is strength, not the easy way out.”

4. (U) LIKELY OUTCOME: LONG PERIOD OF CARETAKER GOVERNMENT WITH LIMITED AUTHORITY: With the Cabinet’s announcement, the PM will submit his resignation along with that of the PvdA Ministers to the Queen. Most likely is that the Queen accepts the resignations, and the government falls. The remaining coalition parties of CDA and CU become a minority caretaker government with limited ability to pursue action on new issues and dependent on ad hoc parliamentary majorities for each proposed law/act. Elections would take place in 1-2 months. The caretaker government continues until the next government is formed, which requires several months of negotiations after the elections. If the Queen refuses the resignations she could appoint an outsider to work with the existing coalition parties to reach an agreement on how to continue to govern through the next scheduled elections in May 2011.

5. (C/NF) IMMEDIATE CONCERN FOR U.S. INTERESTS — DUTCH FUTURE STATUS IN URUZGAN: FM Verhagen’s Chief of Staff Marcel de Vink told us earlier Friday that the Dutch government will be unable to retain troops in Uruzgan after 2010. There’s “no way the Dutch forces will stay in Uruzgan . . . that door is locked”. Asked about whether the Netherlands would provide force protection for the Uruzgan PRT, De Vink responded that even a minimal level of troops would be hard given the Labor Party’s stubborn position. Now, a caretaker government, even without the PvdA, will find it difficult, if not impossible to do anything in Uruzgan other than follow the set policy of withdrawal in 2010.

6. (C/NF) COMMENT: With the building tensions in the Cabinet, the government’s fall had become almost certain. Our efforts now turn to supporting FM Verhagen’s search for a future Dutch mission in Afghanistan that will make a significant contribution to NATO requirements. END COMMENT. LEVIN

Bron: WikiLeaks

Monday, 21 September 2009, 07:38

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000568
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS MARR, MOPS, NATO, PINS, PREL, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/JSF: CONCERN ABOUT SECOND ENGINE
REF: A. THE HAGUE 271 B. THE HAGUE 264 C. THE HAGUE 543
Classified By: POLECON Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons 1.5(b,d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: The Netherlands Minister of Defense (MOD) has expressed concern over the JSF second engine (F-136) being omitted from the U.S. 2010 Defense Budget. Dutch industry has high-value contracts supporting the development of the F-136 engine. The MOD has struggled to retain the necessary support for the JSF program in what has become a politically charged battle. Cancelling the F-136 program could scuttle Dutch participation in JSF and raise doubts about American defense partnerships as we ask the Dutch to stay the course with us in Afghanistan. END SUMMARY.

Background:

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2. (U) The concept of having two competing engines for the JSF dates back to the “Great Engine War,” when Congress funded the development of a second engine in 1979 for the Air Force’s fighter aircraft. The Air Force and Congress cite the competition as a huge success, yielding both cost savings and a better product. This “standard” of competition drove a two engine solution (F-135 and F-136) for the JSF program. Participating countries in the JSF Program are allowed to choose the F-135, F-136, or both when they issue their procurement request per the JSF Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on Development MOU. The GONL believes based on the MOU they have an engine choice, and are currently in a study with Norway and Italy to compare both engines before a placing their orders to the JSF Program.

Dutch Industry Support on the F-136:

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3. (SBU) Two companies in the Netherlands are responsible for the co-design and production of critical components on the F-136. (Netherlands industry is not participating in the development of the F-135, but is seeking maintenance contracts with Pratt & Whitney, the manufacturer.) The F-136 contractors (General Electric/Rolls-Royce) list potential F-136 business with the Netherlands — across the life of the program — at over one billion dollars. Dutch labor unions and local governments are currently applying pressure to the Labor Party (PvdA), which has the pivotal vote to keep the JSF alive in the Netherlands by approving the purchase of the second test jet. The MOD is currently working with Parliament to obtain approval for the purchase the second test aircraft by December 2009. (Note: Post has ensured both the F-135 and F-136 have been equally represented during this process. End Note.)

Comment / Risk of Cancelling JSF in the Netherlands:

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4. (C) COMMENT: The JSF debate in the Netherlands remains politically charged, with the Parliament nearly scuttling Dutch participation in JSF (reftels A, B). The Dutch MOD is using the successes of the JSF in Dutch industry as an argument to keep the JSF in the Netherlands. The Dutch are aware that the U.S. defense budget has excluded the F-136 every year since 2006, but to date Congress has overturned that decision and maintained support for the F-136. However, if the second engine does not survive the budget process, significant U.S. effort will be required to keep the Dutch as a partner in the program. Opponents of the JSF, including the Labor Party (in the three-party governing coalition), would likely argue the U.S. had changed the terms of the Qwould likely argue the U.S. had changed the terms of the agreement upon which Dutch participation was based and we are unreliable. Prospects for winning continued Dutch support of the JSF are dim without continuation of the F-136 program (the two engine option). Furthermore, we are engaged in an delicate effort to keep the Dutch in Afghanistan after 2010. The Labor Party has the pivotal role on this issue as well. When we are asking the Dutch Cabinet and Parliament to make a difficult decision to stay with us as partners in Afghanistan, being perceived as an unreliable partner on JSF could prove to be a large hurdle to overcome. END COMMENT. LEVIN

Bron: WikiLeaks

Monday, 22 August 2005, 17:01

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 THE HAGUE 002309
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 08/18/2025
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, ECON, EAID, NL, EUN, USUN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S PARTING THOUGHTS ON TAKING THE DUTCH
TO THE NEXT LEVEL
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1. (S) SUMMARY: With the EU divided and its direction uncertain, the Dutch serve as a vital transatlantic anchor in Europe. As one of the original six EU members, the Dutch ally with the British to counter Franco-German efforts to steer Europe off a transatlantic course. The Netherlands’ solid European and international credentials create a powerful “multiplier” effect. In Iraq, Dutch forces provided the physical and political cover for Japan to deploy and the Dutch are using their NATO Training Mission commitment to push others to do more. In Afghanistan, the Dutch drove much of the Phase III planning for ISAF and deployed Dutch troops in combat operations for the first time in more than 30 years. The Dutch have led Europe in launching pilot projects to strengthen international counterterrorism cooperation, and initiated the U.S.-EU dialogue on terrorist financing which laid the groundwork for a proposed major international Terrorism Financing Conference in 2006.

2. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The Dutch are expanding their leadership beyond Europe. Dutch strategic interests in the Caribbean make them logical partners to counter Venezuelan meddling in the region. They are expanding their military involvement in Africa, in part to provide a secure environment for their robust development assistance program, and in part to add “eyes and ears” on the ground. In the Middle East, the Dutch enjoy good relations with Israel and the Palestinians and would welcome a more active role; they quickly promised funds for an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO) and might, under the right circumstances, commit troops. Even in areas where we disagree, such as drugs and trafficking in persons, Dutch views may be shifting. As the headquarters for major international legal institutions, the Netherlands offers a unique opportunity for advancing foreign policy goals far beyond Dutch borders.

3. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The coalition government, headed by PM Balkenende, is naturally inclined to work closely with the U.S. The balance could shift toward Brussels, however, if a center-left government comes to power in 2007 (or earlier), as predicted by most polls. The nearly one million Muslim immigrants are largely non-integrated, which is forcing the Dutch to question long-standing assumptions about Dutch “tolerance” and “identity.” The murder of Theo van Gogh focused attention on Islamic extremism, and the Dutch feel they are ahead of much of Europe in addressing this growing problem. Strengthening U.S.-Dutch ties across the political spectrum is necessary to ensure that the Dutch continue to enlist others to pursue interests in line with the U.S., especially in the political-military sphere. Early and active consultations are the key to harnessing Dutch energies in enhanced pursuit of U.S. interests. END SUMMARY.

LEADERS IN EUROPE

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4. (S) Along with the British, the Dutch form a strong, reliable transatlantic anchor in Europe. As a founding member of NATO, one of the original six members of the EU, and Britain’s strongest ally on continent, the Dutch are an influential voice in Europe despite having a population of just under 16 million. Prime Minister Balkenende states often that the Dutch “take their responsibilities seriously” and therefore expect to be heard. While the Dutch “no” to the EU’s constitutional treaty embarrassed Balkenende, the vote revealed that the search for EU integration and consensus has its limits, capping a trend that started in the 90’s with then Liberal Party leader (and later EU Commissioner) Fritz Bolkestein’s proposals to redefine the scope of European integration to protect Dutch national interests.

5. (S) With the French-German engine of European integration stalled, German elections pending, and the EU unable to agree on finances, leadership opportunities for the Dutch are growing. This trend is enhanced by the gravitation of EU decision making to smaller groups, as Dutch participation can make or break internal groupings. The Dutch and Italian refusal to attend a “group of six” meeting recently proposed by Schroeder, for example, effectively squelched his initiative. The British Ambassador here recently confided that Blair sees the Dutch as essential to pursuing his European objectives and ensuring that transatlantic relations remain high on the European agenda. The leaders of the Netherlands, UK, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden already meet quietly several times a year to coordinate positions prior to EU Council and other high-level EU meetings.

6. (S) Dutch leadership within the EU does not weaken their commitment to NATO, where they are “go-to guys” for resolving potential EU-NATO conflicts. Their active, if often behind the scenes, support for NATO SYG (and former Dutch Foreign Minister) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as well as their commitment to the NRF (and SRF, ISAF, and NTM-I), have helped push back efforts, such as Tervuren, which might otherwise create tensions between the NRF and EU battlegroups or other emerging ESDP capabilities. Foreign Minister Bot recently proposed restructuring NATO’s decision-making and funding mechanisms to make them more effective. The appointment of Herman Schaper, the former deputy director general of political affairs at the Dutch MFA and a good friend of the U.S., as the new Dutch permrep to NATO should create more opportunities for productive cooperation.

POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION BEYOND THE EU

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7. (S) The Dutch are increasingly aware that strategic interests outside Europe warrant their attention and leadership, especially in the political-military sphere. For example:

– Venezuela: The Dutch have strategic interests in the Caribbean (i.e., the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba) and are deeply concerned about Chavez’ meddling in the region. As a Caribbean power, the Dutch have good reasons to lead an effort to balance traditional Spanish dominance on Latin American issues in the EU, but the U.S. and others will need to push them to take this role. The Dutch are active partners in regional drug enforcement efforts, and recently demonstrated their ability to deploy military forces (F-16’s) on short notice. Persuading the Dutch to counter Chavez’s destabilization efforts more actively would give us a reliable European partner in the region.

– Afghanistan: According to CENTCOM, the Dutch took a strong lead in organizing and soliciting forces to staff ISAF Phase III, and are now preparing to deploy up to 1,400 personnel in conjunction with British, Canadian, and possibly Australian forces. Separately, the Dutch deployment of Special Forces in a combat role represents a major shift in Dutch priorities away from peace-keeping to combat missions for the first time since the 1960’s. The Dutch remain a strong supporter in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. We should encourage them both to continue to make significant contributions, and to push others to do more.

– Africa: Senior Dutch military officials say they are considering expanding their military presence in Africa to include Burundi, Rwanda, Eastern Congo, Botswana, Zambia, and Ivory Coast, adding new “eyes and ears” on the ground. The Dutch have requested embedding a cell at EUCOM (similar to that already operating in CENTCOM) to coordinate their actions with the U.S. and other allies. One objective of the Dutch military deployments is to provide a secure environment for what is already one of the most ambitious assistance programs in the world. The Dutch are the fourth largest provider of assistance to Africa world-wide. In 2005 they established a 110 million Euro Stability Fund for security sector reform in the African Great Lakes Region and Sudan (as well as Afghanistan and Iraq.) Dutch deployments in Africa have solid support in Parliament, while the focus on security as an aspect of development provides an attractive justification for potential European partners. We should not only encourage the Dutch to increase their direct involvement in Africa, but also explore whether the Dutch could act as a “clearinghouse” for other interested parties. – Iraq: The Dutch were instrumental in providing early logistic support to U.S. forces in Iraq (including permitting transshipments through Rotterdam when other ports in Europe would not.) The Dutch deployed 1,200 troops directly to the southern province of al-Muthanna for 20 months, including two controversial extensions. Although the Dutch have since withdrawn from al-Muthanna, their presence provided the political and military cover necessary for Japan to commit forces. The Dutch provided 25 trainers for the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, and have offered to provide up to 100 if other countries would make comparable contributions. We should urge the Dutch to continue to push their EU and NATO partners to do more in Iraq.

– Middle East: The Dutch enjoy a reputation for “balance” almost unique in Europe, as they are strong supporters of Israel, yet trusted by Arabs. Given Foreign Minister Bot’s expressed willingness to take a more active regional role. We should look for opportunities to harness Dutch interest through participation in the Forum for the Future and other initiatives. The Dutch have already promised to make a financial contribution to an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO) if asked, and, under the right circumstances, might be prepared to send peace-keepers to the region as well.

8. (S) These commitments demonstrate how the Dutch “take their responsibilities seriously” in practice by committing real resources — money, troops, hardware, and political capital — to tackle real problems, as well as their “multiplier” effect in the political-military realm. The fact that the Dutch are providing the head (Peter Feith) and observers to the EU’s new monitoring mission in Aceh is the latest example of their assuming leadership of an important international mission in a region where they feel special ties (as witnessed by FM Bot’s historic decision this year to attend the commemoration of Indonesian independence, the first such visit by a senior Dutch official since Indonesian independence).

9. (S) The Dutch have one of the largest, most geographically diverse deployments of military forces in the world, with more troops deployed as a percentage of their total forces than any other ally. Defense Minister Kamp and CHOD Berlijn recently restructured the Dutch military to eliminate layers of bureaucracy, including independent service chiefs, thereby creating a leaner, more deployable force. Kamp and Berlijn believe firmly in the “use or lose” principle, and have accordingly sought increasingly challenging operations — such as the Special Forces deployment to Afghanistan and potential operations in sub-Saharan Africa. Their desire to maximize the military’s capabilities and their preference for U.S. equipment, even when alternative European suppliers exist, make the Dutch strong supporters of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The Dutch are one of only two countries (Italy is the other) whose financial contributions merit Tier II status in JSF development. Berlijn is pushing to lock in an early commitment for 50 planes (out of a total of 85) to prevent JSF from becoming an issue in the 2007 elections. The Dutch are also seeking Tactical Tomahawks for Dutch frigates, additional lift capacity (CH-47, C-130, KDC-10), and are continuing to update their remaining hardware (AH-64D, F-16’s, Patriot Missile System, etc.) all of which are focused on meeting their Prague Capability Commitment objectives as well as their ability to sustain extended expeditionary operations outside the European theater.

COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

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10. (S) Faced with growing threats in their own country, as witnessed by the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004, the Dutch believe they are in the forefront of Europe with regard to counterterrorism, arguing that legislation and other steps earlier adopted by the Dutch are only now being considered in countries like the UK and Italy. Led by Justice Minister Donner and Finance Minister Zalm, the Dutch were the first in Europe to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI), Radiological Gates, DOE’s Megaports program, U.S. Customs’ Green Lane Program, and, soon, Trusted Flyers. China has engaged the Dutch on next generation protocols and standards for transport security, includng RFID technology. It will be important to monitor and work with the Dutch as they work with China. The Dutch have also expressed an interest to participate in DHS’s “Centers of Excellence.” While the EU was arguing with us and itself over releasing personal records to airlines, the Dutch allowed U.S. immigration teams (IAP) to operate at Schipol airport. The Dutch were instrumental in pushing the EU in 2003 to designate Hamas in its entirety as a terrorist entity; an EU-wide designation of the Dutch branch of the Al-Aqsa followed. During their EU Presidency the Dutch hosted an EU-wide seminar to raise awareness of terrorist financing issues and have offered to host a major international conference on the same subject in 2006. The Dutch continue to push for EU designation of Hizballah in its entirety and to strengthen the EU’s “Clearinghouse” designation process. Given their record, we should continue to look to the Dutch to launch joint pilot programs in Europe, and, more generally, to push counterterrorism issues to the top of the European agenda more generally.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

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11. (S) The Netherlands is among the world’s leading aid donors, having budgeted USD 4.2 billion (0.74 percent of GDP, with a target of raising it to 0.8 percent) in assistance in 2004. It is a top donor of unearmarked assistance to UN humanitarian programs. In 2003, the Netherlands introduced a more focused aid strategy, which phased out smaller aid programs in wealthier countries. Dutch bilateral aid is now directed to 36 partner countries, including 18 in Africa. In 2003, President Bush and Prime Minister Balkenende signed an MOU to coordinate HIV/AIDS programs in Ghana, Zambia, Rwanda and Ethiopia that emphasizes public-private partnerships. Balkenende recently expressed interest in using the Millennium Challenge Corporation as a model for promoting public-private partnerships world-wide. USAID’s involvement with a Heineken AIDS treatment and education program in Rwanda has been particularly successful, and the World Bank has adopted it as a model. Dutch creativity and credibility in development makes them good potential partners for future joint initiatives with the U.S. We should also take advantage of their experience and insights to help shift global aid efforts in the direction of sustainable long-term development.

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

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12. (S) With the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other international legal institutions all located in The Hague, our ability to have an impact in the Netherlands on international issues ranging from Iraq to the Balkans is unique. With a historical interest in international law dating back to Grotius, the Dutch view themselves as natural defenders of international legal norms and practices. This tradition made them the perfect hosts for a conference of Iraqi judges in The Hague in 2004, and has pushed them to the forefront of international efforts to train a new generation of Iraqi jurists. While their legalistic approach can be frustrating, they are flexible. Their concerns about U.S. interpretations of the Geneva Protocols have not prevented their Special Forces from deploying in Afghanistan. The Dutch also helped sway the EU to vote against the Cuban-sponsored resolution on Guantanamo at the Human Rights Commission last year despite concerns about the treatment of detainees. But, as Foreign Minister Bot told Deputy Secretary Zoellick recently, over the long run Dutch human rights concerns must be addressed to ensure that public and parliamentary support does not erode; we and the Dutch need to work together to resolve this concern. Finally, the Dutch combination of seeking pragmatic solutions while remaining true to their legal principles could make the Dutch an important asset in resolving our differences with the EU over the ICC and article 98 agreements under the right circumstances.

ECONOMICS AND TRADE

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13. (S) Balkenende shares our interest in promoting an open international trading system and has been an ally in U.S.-EU trade disputes such as Boeing-Airbus and the Foreign Sales Corporation Tax. The Dutch share with the British a vision of a market-friendly Europe driven by free trade. They are the third largest investor in the U.S. and the fourth largest recipient of U.S. investment world-wide. Their efforts to shift the Lisbon agenda in a more cooperative direction and to promote innovation and competition are creating additional opportunities for U.S. investors in Europe. Because the Netherlands has one of the highest broadband penetrations in Europe, emerging research efforts in the areas of nanotechnology, life sciences, and other IT-related areas, and a new tax treaty, the country offers U.S. companies an important gateway into Europe. If consulted early and regularly, the Netherlands can also be an important ally in navigating the EU’s regulatory environment and removing obstacles.

DRUGS AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

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14. (S) Narcotics and trafficking in persons remain areas of difficulty. Despite fundamental differences regarding “soft drugs” and legalized prostitution, the Balkenende government has worked to prevent these differences from defining our relationship. There are also signs that Dutch attitudes may be shifting. The Dutch remain a major producer of synthetic drugs. On the other hand, Dutch Health Minister Hoogevorst recently signed a precedent-setting MOU with the U.S. to share information on the health risks of new strains of marijuana with higher concentrations of THC, which may convince the Dutch to rethink their approach to “soft drugs” in general. The Dutch are addressing drug tourism — a recent proposal to restrict the sale of marijuana to Dutch passport holders in Maastricht, for example, could cut down on cross-border smuggling and other drug-related crime. We should support such initiatives actively.

BALKENENDE SOLID INTERNATIONALLY…

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15. (S) We are fortunate to have in the Balkenende government an outward-looking partner for whom working with the U.S. and the U.K. comes naturally. Balkenende and FM Bot take pride in building bridges between the U.S. and Europe. Nowhere was this more evident than during the Dutch presidency of the EU. On two issues of great importance to the U.S. — the China Arms Embargo and accession talks for Turkey — the Dutch moved, with our active urging, from following an EU “consensus” set by others to redefining the issue on their, and our, terms. In both cases, Bot and Balkenende overcame initial skepticism and concluded that Dutch and U.S. interests coincided — a pattern we have seen repeated on other less important issues. FM Bot began the EU presidency telling us that lifting the Arms Embargo was a “done deal.” Later, however, he actively intervened to prevent a lift on “his” watch, saying that he did not want the blame for causing a rift between the U.S. and EU. Despite Balkenende’s personal skepticism about bringing Turkey into the EU, he and Bot (a former Ambassador to Turkey) worked hard to ensure that Turkey got its date to start accession talks with the EU during the Dutch presidency, and want to see the agreement they helped negotiate successfully implemented. We will want the Dutch to continue to draw on the relationships they developed during the presidency to coax both sides to move in the right direction as October 3 approaches.

16. (S) Specific U.S. policies provoke squalls of anger and frustration here, but President Bush’s visit to the Netherlands in 2005 to commemorate V-E day at the WWII Dutch American Cemetery at Margraten was met with universal acclaim and provoked remarkably little protest. Even Dutch opposed to U.S. policies warmly welcomed the visit as a reminder of enduring, shared values forged in the crucibles of World War II and the Cold War. This mission has pursued an ambitious program of outreach to future Dutch leaders to ensure that these emotions are passed to the next generation. In this effort, the President’s youth roundtable in Maastricht and former Secretary of State Powell’s town hall meeting with young leaders in The Hague were notable successes, which can serve as models for future efforts. Given the disproportionate influence wielded by the Dutch in international fora, we should expand our active exchange programs (including the Fulbright and International Visitor Leadership Programs) to help shape the successor generation.

…BUT FACES DOMESTIC CHALLENGES

——————————–

17. (S) Unfortunately, the outward-looking, transatlantic orientation of the Balkenende cabinet is offset domestically by strong strains of Euro-centralism and Dutch-provincialism. This division will become more pronounced as the parties prepare for local elections in March 2006, and national elections in May 2007. Current polls show that Balkenende’s center-right coalition (his second government) is falling in the polls, while the main, center-left opposition Labor party (PvdA) and fringes on the right and left are gaining. Balkenende is gambling that his economic reform agenda will pay dividends in time for the 2007 elections, but that is uncertain. There is a strong chance that a center-left government dominated by the PvdA will come to power in 2007 — or earlier if the 2006 local election results prompt national elections.

18. (S) Although U.S.-Dutch relations should remain fundamentally sound despite a shift to the center-left, a PvdA-led government would present new challenges. PvdA leader Wouter Bos has made clear his tendency to look to Brussels first in setting Dutch international priorities. He sees the Netherlands less as a transatlantic “bridge builder” than as a follower of EU consensus. As with Schroeder in Germany, Bos might also find it tempting to adopt a critical attitude toward the U.S. during elections to lock in his left flank. The PvdA is already raising allegations of U.S. abuses to challenge the rationale for Dutch deployments in Afghanistan, and does not support the JSF program. It is in our interest both to support the current government’s transatlantic orientation and to engage actively with the opposition to shift them in a favorable direction.

THE ISLAMIC FACTOR

——————

19. (S) A new, but potentially serious factor in Dutch domestic politics is its large, poorly integrated Muslim population, currently numbering just under 1 million, or 5.8 percent of the population. USG-sponsored polls show that 83 percent of Dutch Muslims identify much more strongly with their religion than with their host country, while 51 percent have little or no faith in the Dutch government as an institution. While the problems of Dutch integration captured international headlines following the van Gogh murder, the Dutch believe they have an early start on the rest of Europe in seeking creative ways to address these concerns. Their strong interest in sharing and soliciting ideas has opened up opportunities for Embassy and USG outreach and consultations throughout Dutch society, providing insights into a growing problem throughout Europe. We expect our experiences here will provide good indications of broader European trends as well as opportunities to influence their direction.

CONCLUSIONS

———–

20. (S) The Netherlands is a complicated, multi-layered society. Prevailing myths about the Dutch — e.g., they are homogenous, universally tolerant, pacifist, etc.– do not accurately gauge differences within society or reflect Dutch potential to influence international events. While the Dutch prefer to see themselves as “balancing” between Europe and the U.S., this balance can shift due to domestic and international factors.

21. (S) The key to maximizing Dutch effectiveness is to involve them early through high-level consultations and exchanges. Dutch pragmatism and our similar world-views make the Netherlands fertile ground for initiatives others in Europe might be reluctant, at least initially, to embrace.

22. (S) As multipliers, the Dutch should be encouraged to play an increasingly prominent role on the global stage. Coaxing the Dutch into the spotlight can take effort, but pays off royally. Dutch credentials, credibility, and capabilities make them effective leaders across a wide range of geographic regions and substantive issues.

23. (S) The Dutch are actively and favorably involved in Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caribbean, Indonesia, and elsewhere. They are our best partner in developing pilot projects in the counterterrorism area, and are world leaders in development, free trade, international law and human rights. In pursuit of U.S. interests in all these areas of interest and leadership, we should build upon our successes to date to take the Dutch to the “next level.” SOBEL

Bron: WikiLeaks

Monday, 06 July 2009, 12:08

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000395
SIPDIS
STATE PLEASE PASS TO WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT
EO 12958 DECL: 07/06/2019
TAGS PREL, OVIP”>OVIP, ECON, EFIN, PINR, MOPS, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: OVERVIEW FOR THE PRESIDENT’S JULY 14
MEETING WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER BALKENENDE
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Michael F. Gallagher for reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d).

Mr. President:

1. (C) Your July 14 meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Jan Pieter Balkenende provides an opportunity for us to urge the Dutch to continue as part of NATO in Afghanistan and to enlist PM Balkenende in solving Guantanamo issues. For his part, Balkenende will seek to continue the Dutch role in the G20 and to find a common ground to work with us on climate change and the Middle East.

2. (C) Balkenende, in office through four coalitions since 2002, is a cunning politician who does not impose his vision on coalition partners, but maneuvers effectively to achieve the intended goal. At first, he was dismissed as a lightweight “Harry Potter” look-alike, but he has consistently and skillfully delivered Cabinet support for U.S. policy objectives while balancing fragile parliamentary majorities. Balkenende,s current center-left coalition government (“Balkenende IV”) is held together more by fear of early elections than any unity of vision. The financial crisis has plunged the Netherlands into a recession likely to last through 2010, and the Cabinet must continually defend its three relatively modest stimulus packages against calls to do more to spur recovery. Balkenende is also under pressure from a skeptical public to withdraw the Netherlands, 1,800 troops from Afghanistan in 2010. His main coalition partner, the Labor Party, is in decline, having fared poorly in the 2006 national election and the 2009 European Parliament election, and believes rejecting a continuing role in Afghanistan will please its base and may win back supporters.

3. (S) The Wilders Factor: Golden-pompadoured, maverick parliamentarian Geert Wilders, anti-Islam, nationalist Freedom Party remains a thorn in the coalition’s side, capitalizing on the social stresses resulting from the failure to fully integrate almost a million Dutch Muslims, mostly of Moroccan or Turkish descent. In existence only since 2006, the Freedom Party, tightly controlled by Wilders, has grown to be the Netherlands second largest, and fastest growing, party. Recent polls suggest it could even replace Balkenende,s Christian Democrats as the top party in 2011 parliamentary elections. Wilders is no friend of the U.S.: he opposes Dutch military involvement in Afghanistan; he believes development assistance is money wasted; he opposes NATO missions outside “allied” territory; he is against most EU initiatives; and, most troubling, he forments fear and hatred of immigrants.

4. (C) As a result of these currents, Balkenende,s coalition finds itself in a precarious position and could fall within a year (most likely after municipal elections in March 2010). The Prime Minister is aware we want him to deliver continued Dutch boots on the ground in Afghanistan after 2010 and help with Guantanamo detainees. He knows there are high risks/expectations involved in his meeting with you, but we understand he is coming to offer as much as he thinks he can deliver at this time.

5. (S) Balkenende, a long-time champion of U.S.-Dutch relations, seeks to establish a strong relationship with you and capitalize on your popularity. The Dutch public overwhelmingly supported your election in November, and you remain hugely popular here as a beacon of change. Balkenende Qremain hugely popular here as a beacon of change. Balkenende will encourage you to view the long arc of the U.S.-Dutch relationship, not just current bumps in the road (e.g. the likely drawdown of Dutch forces in Afghanistan after 2010). He wants you to see the Netherlands as America,s friend and partner, with significant Dutch contributions to our shared foreign policy priorities: Dutch military presence in Afghanistan and support for NATO; support for U.S. intervention in Iraq; active participation in the EU, NATO, and other multilateral institutions; substantial and sustained foreign development assistance; and a long-standing commitment to promoting human rights, tolerance, and the rule of law. And, he will ask you for a seat at the G-20 table in Pittsburgh as well as for a meeting at the White House in September for the Crown Prince.

6. (C) Balkenende will use your private, one-on-one session to highlight your shared personal values and experiences. He believes social organizations are more effective in promoting change than government. His philosophy is that we must treat

THE HAGUE 00000395 002 OF 002

one another with dignity and respect as we live and work together. Your Father,s Day call for fathers to accept more responsibility in the rearing of their children resonated with him. Balkenende will also likely use the one-on-one session to pinpoint the political difficulties of the deliverables we are seeking. Rather than cover a laundry list of topics, the Dutch want the larger meeting to focus on 1) Afghanistan/Pakistan, 2) the future of the global economic system (including the role of the G20 and how to help developing countries), 3) the Middle East Peace Process/Iran, and 4) climate change. The Prime Minister is anticipating other key foreign policy issues (e.g. human rights, Russia, NATO, non-proliferation, energy security, 400th anniversary of Henry Hudson,s voyage to Manhattan – NY400) can be covered by staff or only briefly mentioned to stay focused on the major issues. Two cables will follow which will expand on these topics.

GALLAGHER

Bron: WikiLeaks

Tuesday, 29 January 2008, 17:30

S E C R E T STATE 008993
SIPDIS
FOR COM AND RSO FROM ACTING DS ASSISTANT SECRETARY GREG STARR
EO 12958 DECL: 01/23/28
TAGS ASEC, PTER, CASC
SUBJECT: SECURITY ADVISORY – FORTHCOMING RELEASE OF GEERT WILDERS FILM

1. (U) Classified by Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security Gregory B. Starr for E.O. 12958 reasons 1.4 (c) and (d).

2. (SBU) This cable contains an action request for all posts. Please see paragraph six.

3. (S) The following is an information/action cable advising posts of the possibility of anti-Dutch demonstrations and incidents following the potential release of a short film funded by Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders that is anticipated to be inflammatory towards Muslims. There is also the possibility that the film could generate anti-European/anti-Western protests if it is perceived as part of a worldwide campaign against Islam. There are no specific threats against U.S. interests related to this particular issue at this time, although the Dutch government has instructed its diplomatic facilities to engage host nations on this issue if deemed prudent.

4. (SBU) While Wilders has refused to discuss the content of the film, open source reporting has indicated that the film is likely to be inflammatory and may include scenes of the Koran being burned or torn. At this time, there is no release date for the film, but it is expected to be screened sometime at the end of January or beginning of February. Recent open source information indicates that Wilders has decided to postpone the release of the film for approximately two weeks. It is unknown if the film will be broadcast on television, the internet, or some other medium.

5. (SBU) Previous releases of media characterized as offensive to Islam have generated a spectrum of responses – from isolated attacks against individuals to widespread, violent protests that have targeted diplomatic facilities. The release of the Dutch film will likely serve to raise the profile of the Netherlands in particular, although reactions to the film have the potential to reverberate internationally and inflame broader anti-Western sentiment. Previous events of significance include:

— The publication of Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad in September 2005 stimulated two weeks of protests in at least 25 countries throughout the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Europe. It is of note that large-scale protests did not commence until February 2006, four months after the cartoons surfaced. — In February 2006, protesters attacked and damaged Western diplomatic facilities in Beirut, Lebanon, and Damascus, Syria. Vehicles identified as Western were also stoned in other related protest activity. — In contrast to the Danish cartoon protests, the mid-August 2007 publication of Swedish cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad’s head on the body of the dog received minimal reaction, although it did provide Islamic extremist groups with propaganda fodder. — In November 2004, Islamic extremists murdered Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh following the release of the 12-minute documentary “Submission,” which is critical of Islam.

6. (S) We are aware that posts are already operating at a heightened state of alert. However, in light of any potential violent reaction or negative security activity that this video statement may precipitate, please consider convening an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting as necessary to ensure that your security posture and transportation procedures are commensurate with your current security environment and appropriate to counter any potential backlash.

7. (U) Following the release of the Wilders film, if the need exists to issue a Warden Message or SMS Message to private American citizen communities, please use language in existing consular information program documents, specifically the Worldwide Caution. If posts also wish to alert American citizens to demonstrations in response to the film, they may use the following pre-cleared Warden Message and/or SMS Message below:

Warden Message: The U.S. (Embassy/Consulate) has learned of the release of a short film funded by Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders that is inflammatory towards Muslims. The release of the film has sparked (use if appropriate: anti-European/anti- Western) demonstrations across (city/country/region). (Insert the specifics of known planned demonstrations as fitting)

We remind American citizens that even demonstrations intended to be peaceful can turn confrontational and possibly escalate into violence. American citizens are, therefore, urged to avoid the areas of demonstrations if possible and to exercise caution if within the vicinity of any demonstrations. American citizens should stay current with media coverage of local events and be aware of their surroundings at all times. Information regarding demonstrations in (Country) can be found on the U.S. Embassy (Post) website at (website).

Americans living or traveling in (Country) are encouraged to register with the U.S. Embassy (Consulate) through the State Department’s travel registration website, https://Travelregistration.state.gov so that they can obtain updated information on travel and security within (Country). Americans without Internet access may register directly with the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate.

For the latest security information, Americans traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department’s Internet website at http://travelregistration.state.gov, where the current Worldwide Caution, (Country)-specific information, travel warnings, and other travel alerts can be found. Up-to-date information on security can also be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the United States and Canada or for callers outside the United States and Canada, a regular toll line at 1-202-501-4444. These numbers are available from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, Monday through Friday (except U.S. federal holidays).

SMS Message: (Embassy/Consulate) Message: Demonstrations in response to Dutch Anti-Muslim film. Violence possible. Avoid (insert location).

8. (U) If posts issue Warden Messages/SMS Messages that are outside the scope of existing public documents and the pre- cleared text above, they should be cleared prior to release through CA/OCS (available 24/7 through the Operations Center) in accordance with 7 FAM 050.

9. (SBU) Please report the results of EAC meetings convened on this subject in a front channel cable to DS, D, P, M, CA, S/CT, INR, and your respective geographic bureau. The Department will continue to ensure that you are immediately informed of any new developments or threat information associated with this controversial issue as soon as it is received.

10. (U) Minimize considered. RICE

Bron: WikiLeaks

Thursday, 17 January 2008, 17:31

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000061
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TAGS AND SIGNER)
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE, S/CT, INR
DEPARTMENT FOR CA/OCS/EUR
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/EUR
EO 12958 DECL: 01/17/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, KINF, KISL, PINR, NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH PREPARED TO BE PROACTIVE ON RELEASE OF
WILDERS FILM ON THE KORAN
REF: A. THE HAGUE 58
B. 11/29/07 GARRO – SMITH E-MAIL C. 07 THE HAGUE 314

THE HAGUE 00000061 001.3 OF 004

1. (C) Summary. The Dutch government and major municipalities are preparing contingency plans to respond to the anticipated release in early February of a short film expected to be critical of the Koran and of Islam made by Dutch Parliamentarian Geert Wilders. Extensive Dutch and international press reporting on the film has indicated that the film is likely to be inflammatory, and possibly include comparisons between the Koran and Mein Kampf, as well as scenes of the Koran being burned or ripped up. Wilders, whose right-wing populist Freedom Party (PVV) has an anti-immigration platform, has made statements in the past year that the Koran is a “fascist and violent” book that should be banned in the Netherlands. Officials from the MFA and Office of the National Counter Terrorism Coordinator have told Emboffs that the Dutch government is concerned about the potential for violent reaction to the film, especially in the Muslim world, and will be proactive in addressing the film, both to disassociate the government from Wilders’ views and to ensure public safety at home. The city governments of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, which have large Dutch Muslim populations, are actively engaged in planning to act swiftly to prevent, and if necessary, suppress violence following the film’s release. End Summary.

—————- —————————–

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APPLYING THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DANISH CARTOON CRISIS

———————–

————————————–

———————————— ———–

2. (C) Andre van Wiggen, Deputy Director of the MFA’s Terrorism and New Threats Department, told Emboffs January 16 that the Dutch government has been discussing strategies for responding to an event similar to the release of the Wilders film “since the Danish cartoon crisis.” He said that the interagency security steering group established to ensure that the Dutch government would be adequately prepared to respond to threats to Dutch interests at home or abroad had been meeting “intensively” since the government first got word in mid-October of Wilders’ intent to make a film on the Koran. Van Wiggen said that Wilders had told National Counter Terrorism Coordinator (NCTb) Tjibbe Joustra that he would not release the film before early February, and had committed to notifying NCTb 24 hours in advance of its release. Separately, a contact at NCTb confirmed to RSO that Wilders had commited to providing NCTb 24 hours notice, and an opportunity to review the tape, prior to release. Van Wiggen expressed confidence that Wilders would abide by this commitment. He requested that this information be kept very close hold within the USG. The security steering group is chaired by the Deputy National Counter Terrorism Coordinator and includes representatives from the Interior, Justice, and Foreign Ministries and the AIVD intelligence service.

3. (C) Van Wiggen stated that the government was prepared to be proactive in responding to the film and reactions to it once it was released, but did not provide specifics. He said that the planning group had an idea of the film’s content, and anticipated the film would cite certain verses from the Koran and end with a “symbolic act.” He did not indicate whether government officials had seen any portion of the film. He said the GONL anticipated a “stronger” reaction to the film abroad, in particular in the Muslim world, than in the Netherlands, where he said many were already displaying “Wilders fatigue,” which might blunt violent reactions. He said the security group’s scenarios predicted that reactions abroad could be more widespread and violent than the reactions to the Danish cartoons. He did not rule out the potential for violent protests in the Netherlands, adding that a police and public safety coordinating group had also been established to develop contingency plans for maintaining public order, especially in the four largest cities. Ensuring adequate protection for foreign missions in The Netherlands, he said, was an essential component of the group’s planning process. An official in NCTb’s Surveilance and Protection Department told RSO in a separate conversation that NCTb and The Hague police meet at least bi-weekly to review security measures in the city, in particular with regard to high value buildings, including the U.S. Embassy.

4. (C) Van Wiggen stressed that while the government was prepared to be proactive, they also wanted to ensure that they took “the right measures at the right time.” In particular, he said, it was critical to avoid a self-fulfilling prophesy by overreacting, or appearing to predict violence, especially before the film was released. He also stated it was critical to avoid the appearance that the Dutch government would try to censor the film. He said that the Foreign Minister as well as both the Justice and Interior Ministers had met with Wilders in November to caution him about the potential negative repercussions of releasing the film, but had no intention of censoring it. He said that FM Verhagen had met in Madrid on the margins of the Alliance for Civilizations meeting with the Chair of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) to discuss the situation. The meeting was at the request of the OIC, which had contacted MFA to ask the government to take steps to suppress the film. The Foreign Minister, he said, had explained that any attempt to violate Wilders’ freedom of expression was out of the question; the government could not prevent the film from being made or released. Van Wiggen added that subsequent to its release, the content of the film would be evaluated to determine if it violated any criminal statutes in the Netherlands.

5. (C) Asked whether the government had reached out to governments or religious leaders in the Muslim world or to Western allies to request information on anticipated reactions among local populations or support in constraining violence in the wake of the film’s release, van Wiggen said no. This was due to Dutch government reluctance to involve other countries in what was still a domestic issue. He said that the MFA had alerted Dutch embassies abroad to the potential for violent reactions to the film, but had not sent specific instructions for approaching host governments or elevating their security posture. It was up to each embassy to ensure that its security contingency plans were adequate and up to date. Van Wiggen noted that the MFA and embassies had received a large number of information requests about the situation from other governments, to which they were trying to be responsive. He noted that the government would welcome any information the USG might gather through its channels about potential reactions abroad to the film’s release.

6. (C) Van Wiggen’s comments track closely with Counter Terrorism Coordinator Joustra’s comments to Representative Peter Hoekstra (R-MI) during his November 29 visit to The Hague (Ref B). Joustra indicated then that the Dutch government had serious concerns about the potential for a violent reaction to the film, at home and abroad. He said the Dutch had learned from the Danish cartoon crisis, and that it would have a proactive communications strategy in place to disassociate the government from the views which he anticipated would be expressed in the film. At the same time, Joustra said, they did not want to elevate the potential negative impact of the film by overreacting. He noted that the Dutch were more exposed in many Middle Eastern capitals than the Danes, due to their high-visibility fixed investments in the region. Joustra told Hoekstra that NCTb would closely monitor developments in the run-up to the release of the film (which at that time was believed to be mid-January) to determine whether it would be appropriate to raise the national threat assessment level, which is currently set at “limited.” He added that Wilders has repeatedly made inflammatory comments about Islam and the Koran in the past year, attributing the relatively mild reactions from Dutch Muslims to the fact that they are becoming accustomed to “outrageous statements” from Wilders (Ref C).

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PREPARING TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC SECURITY

———————–

——————————————–

AT THE NATIONAL….

——————————-

7. (C) A contact from the Dutch National Police (KLPD) Counter Terrorism squad (UCTA) confirmed to Legatt Ofice January 16 the anticipated early February release date. He said it was their understanding is that the film has not yet been completed. He said that UCTA was preparing a summary of national and local law enforcement preparations for the release of the film; that summary is expected to be completed and shared with foreign police liaison officers through the KLPD’s International Police Liaison Office (DINPOL) by January 18.

… AND LOCAL LEVELS

———————————–

8. (SBU) A senior Amsterdam regional police official told the Consul General January 16 that the police force has plans in place to respond effectively to any incidents of violence in the wake of the film’s release. He acknowledged the possibility that there could be “opportunistic” or spontaneous outbreaks of violence in the city, but stressed that the municipal government would not tolerate any violence or criminal acts. He said that the police Community Liaison Officers had been in close touch with community groups and imams, to assess possible reactions and to urge calm. He noted that imams at several mosques in the city had already begun to call in their Friday sermons for calm in response to press reports about the film’s anticipated content. He assured the CG that the police would be prepared to provide adequate protection to the Consulate General should any demonstrations approach the vicinity of the consulate. Similarly, an official from The Hague regional police assured RSO that they have plans in place to respond should violent incidents take place in the vicinity of the Embassy, which is two blocks from the Parliament buildings.

9. (U) Over the January 12-13 weekend, the Amsterdam police detained eight anti-Wilders protesters associated with the International Socialists who displayed placards with a photo of Wilders above a caption stating, “Extremist – can seriously damage you and society” in a take-off of health warnings on cigarette packets. Wilders stated that the protesters’ allegation that he was an extremist was “too disgusting for words,” but defended their right to protest since they did not make threats against him. He said the police should have “let them get on with it.” Amsterdam Mayor Job Cohen also expressed surprise, and requested an explanation of why the police had detained the protestors.

10. (SBU) The director of the Rotterdam municipal government anti radicalization program told a visiting staff delegation from the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs committee on January 10 that the city’s public security department was concerned about the potential for violence in the city following release of the Wilders film. He said that the city would work closely with community liaison officers to monitor community responses and to urge calm. In a separate conversation, a policy officer for the Platform for Islamic Organizations in the Rijnmond Region (SPIOR), an umbrella organization of 60 Islamic associations in the Rotterdam area, told the staffdel that SPIOR is working closely with its membership and the city to urge calm when the film is released. She said that the potential for violent reactions could not be ruled out, adding that there was a sense among many younger Muslims in particular that Islam has been repeatedly denigrated and the Wilders film would be a “step too far.” She expressed appreciation for the open communication between her group and the city government.

11. (U) According to press reports, Interior Minister Ter Horst, who overseas the national police and the domestic intelligence service, wrote to every mayor in the Netherlands in November to request that they be alert to tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims upon release of the Wilders film. The Ministry offered assistance, which several towns reportedly have accepted, in preparing contingency plans. The Minister’s letter was leaked to the press on January 16.

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COMMENT

—————–

12. (C) The Dutch at the national and local levels have been open with us in acknowledging their concerns about the prospect for violence at home and abroad in the wake of the release of Wilder’s film. The government appears prepared to respond swiftly to get out a message that will stress the importance of respect for freedom of expression while disassociating the Dutch government from Wilder’s views on the Koran and calling for calm among key population groups at home and abroad. Mission elements will maintain close contact with national and local public safety officials to ensure mission security posture is appropriate. Results of January 16 EAC meeting reported Ref A. Gallagher