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Dinsdag, 7 December 2010 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6, Document 7, Document 8, Document 9 | Bewerkt door Crethi Plethi

Volgens analisten heeft Hezbollah de beschikking over 40.000 raketten vergeleken met 3.000 in 2006. Deze 40.000 raketten zijn allen in staat om Israël op elke plek te treffen inclusief Tel Aviv.

WikiLeaks: Syrië en Iran Leverden Wapens Aan Terroristische Groepen

Uit een serie van gelekte geheime Amerikaanse documenten op WikiLeaks blijkt dat de VS aan het begin van dit jaar Syrië rechtstreeks beschuldigden van het leveren van geavanceerde wapens, waaronder SCUD-D raketten aan de sjiitische Hezbollah militie in Libanon. Deze wapenleveranties werden door de Syrische regering, ondanks de Amerikaanse protesten over de leveranties, hardnekkig ontkend.

Er werd achter de schermen discreet gewerkt door de VS om de levering van Iraanse en Syrische wapens aan de Palestijnse Hamas beweging en de Libanese Hezbollah militie te blokkeren. De VS oefende druk uit op Arabische landen om niet mee te werken aan deze wapentransporten. In veel gevallen waren de Amerikaanse verzoeken gebaseerd op geheime inlichtingen afkomstig van Israël.

In januari 2009 blijkt dat Soedan werd gewaarschuwd door de VS om niet mee te werken aan de levering van niet-nader-gespecificeerde Iraanse wapens aan de Hamas in de Gazastrook ten tijde van het Israëlische offensief tegen de Hamas terroristen in de Gazastrook (‘Operation Cast Lead’).

Amerikaanse diplomaten waren geïnstrueerd door Washington om “uitzonderlijke bezorgdheid” te uiten bij de Soedanese overheid over deze transporten. Saoedi-Arabië, de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten, Oman en Tsjaad werden in kennis gesteld van de vermeende Iraanse plannen en gewaarschuwd dat elke wapenleverantie in strijd zou zijn met de VN-resoluties die Iraanse wapenexporten verbieden.

De toenmalig minister van buitenlandse zaken van Soedan, Deng Alor, vertelde aan een Amerikaanse functionaris dat het formele antwoordt van zijn regering was dat het niet officieel de invoer van wapens uit Iran zou toelaten, waarop Alor te horen kreeg dat “een herhaling van de vorige weigering om medewerking te verlenen door Soedan jammer zou zijn.”

Maanden later verschenen er in de media berichten dat medio januari 2009 Israëlische vliegtuigen bombardementen hadden uitgevoerd op een konvooi met wapens in de Soedanese ‘Rode Zee’ provincie. De krant, Sharq al-Awsat, citeerde een Amerikaanse functionaris die zei dat Soedan van tevoren gewaarschuwd was over de wapenzending.

Uit documenten op WikiLeaks blijkt echter dat Khartoem de VS achter de schermen beschuldigde van de twee luchtaanvallen in het oosten van Soedan: één in januari 2009 met 43 doden en 17 voertuigen vernietigd en een andere op 20 februari met 45 doden en 14 voertuigen vernietigd. “We gaan ervan uit dat de vliegtuigen die ons aangevallen hebben van u zijn,” zei een hoge Soedanese functionaris. De Amerikaanse ambassade in Khartoem vroeg vervolgens opheldering aan Washington. “Mocht dit verhaal op één of andere manier weglekken naar de op sensatiebeluste Soedanese pers,” zei het memo, “zou het heel goed kunnen dat onze veiligheidssituatie hier van kwaad tot erger wordt.”

Het hoofd van de Soedanese inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdienst, Salah Ghosh, vertelde Amerikaanse diplomaten over de frustratie van zijn regering met betrekking tot de steun van Washington aan Israël tijdens de oorlog in Gaza. De Amerikaanse acties zouden een “rampzalige toename van de steun voor gewelddadig extremisme kunnen betekenen en Hamas in de richting van een alliantie met Iran kunnen duwen,” waarschuwde hij.

In maart 2009 werden Jordanië en Egypte door de VS op de hoogte gebracht van nieuwe Iraanse plannen om een lading met “militaire uitrusting” naar Syrië te brengen en het van daaruit verder te zenden naar Soedan en vervolgens naar Hamas. De Arabische landen werd gevraagd om vooraf inspecties te eisen van de lading van de vliegtuigen of geen toestemming te verlenen om over hun grondgebied te vliegen. Het is niet bekend of de leveringen door zijn gegaan.

In een document uit april wordt de Egyptische minister van Binnenlandse Zaken, generaal Habib al-Adly, beschreven als de man die ervoor zorgde dat een Hezbollah terroristennetwerk in de Sinaï ontmanteld werd evenals het nemen van “maatregelen om de doorstroming van door Iran geleverde wapens via Soedan en Egypte naar Gaza te verstoren.”

Aan het eind van die maand vertelde de Egyptische hoofd van de inlichtingendienst, generaal Omar Soleiman, aan Amerikaanse functionarissen dat Egypte er in geslaagd was te verhinderen dat Iran financiële steun aan Hamas kon doorsluisen. “Egypte heeft een duidelijke boodschap gestuurd aan Iran dat als zij zich bemoeien met Egypte, zal Egypte zich bemoeien met Iran, hieraan toevoegend dat de EGIS [Egyptische geheime dienst] reeds begonnen was met het ronselen van agenten in Irak en Syrië,” zei Soleiman.

En in juni vertelde Binyamin Netanyahu, premier van Israël, aan Amerikaanse functionarissen dat er “een gestage stroom van Iraanse wapens naar Gaza ging via Soedan of Syrië en vervolgens over zee”, maar dat de “Egyptische aanpak van de smokkeltunnels [in Gaza] verbeterd waren nadat Caïro begrepen had dat de Iraanse wapenleveranties aan Hamas ook een directe bedreiging voor Egypte was.” Een Mossad vertegenwoordiger vertelde een Amerikaanse delegatie eind 2009, “Iran is zeer creatief in het vinden van manieren om wapensystemen te leveren aan hun bondgenoten.” De pers besteedde in februari 2010 uitgebreid aandacht aan Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, een belangrijke Hamas-functionaris die in Dubai vermoord is (speculaties hierover gaan in de richting van Mossad agenten), waarin duidelijk werd dat hij de sleutelfiguur was in de wapenleveranties tussen de Palestijnse Hamas organisatie en Iran.

Slechts een enkele keer is er sprake van directe Israëlische verzoeken aan de VS om wapenleveranties te blokkeren, waarschijnlijk omdat deze verzoeken als zeer geheim zijn geclassificeerd. Maar tijdens een bijeenkomst in Tel Aviv in 2009 merkte een Amerikaanse hoge functionaris op dat “de meeste verzoeken aan derdewereldlanden om bepaalde wapentransporten over hun grondgebied te verbieden gebaseerd zijn op informatie van de Israëlische inlichtingendiensten. Aanvullende informatie van de regering van Israël zou tot meer samenwerking kunnen leiden.”

In februari 2010 waarschuwde de chef van de Israëlische militaire inlichtingendienst, Brigadier-Generaal Yossi Baidatz, de VS dat Syrië “binnenkort” Scud-D raketten aan Hezbollah “zou gaan leveren,” en waarschuwde dat deze nieuwe dreiging aan de noordelijke grens van Israël voor een “nieuw niveau van bezorgdheid” zou leiden indien de overdracht doorging. De Israëliërs vroegen aan de VS om Syrië, vóór aankomst van minister van defensie Ehud Barak in Washington, hierover te benaderen om de indruk te vermijden “dat de VS en Israël samenwerkten in het dwarsbomen van de wapenzending.” Drie dagen later waarschuwde de VS Syrië dat het een “strategische misrekening” was om de aan Iran gelieerde militie te voorzien van deze wapens.

Tijdens een bijeenkomst in februari benadrukte een hoge Amerikaanse diplomaat de Amerikaanse zorgen rechtstreeks bij de Syrische president Bashar Assad, “die botweg verklaarde dat hij niets wist van nieuwe wapensystemen voor de Hezbollah ondanks het verontrustende en duidelijke bewijs dat het tegendeel bewees.”

Desondanks lag er een week later een dringende nota van de Amerikaanse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Hillary Clinton op de Amerikaanse ambassade in Damascus waarin ze zei dat de Verenigde Staten ontdekt hadden dat de Syriërs plannen hebben om Hezbollah SCUD-D raketten te leveren, wat de dreiging van Hezbollah op Israël zou vergroten.

Clinton schreef: “Ik moet benadrukken dat deze activiteiten van grote zorg zijn voor mijn regering en wij waarschuwen u (Syrië) ten zeerste tegen een dergelijk ernstige escalatie.” En om dit nog te versterken gaat het document verder met: “Uw belang bij het voorkomen van een oorlog zou er toe moeten leiden dat u de grootst mogelijke terughoudendheid moet betrachten met inbegrip van het intomen van Hezbollah en voorkomen dat de groep deze dodelijke wapens in handen krijgt.”

Binnen 24 uur had de hoogste Amerikaanse diplomaat in Damascus een ontmoeting met de vice-minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Faisal al-Miqdad, om Clinton’s boodschap over te brengen. Volgens de documenten was hij “duidelijk verrast” door de aantijgingen. Dit maakt hem of tot een buitengewoon goede acteur of hij is niet betrokken geweest bij de voorbereidingen van de geheime leverantie van SCUD-D raketten. Miqdad ontkende “ronduit elke Syrische betrokkenheid in de levering van wapens aan Hezbollah” en zei dat Damascus “de onafhankelijkheid van Libanon ondersteund.” En voegde er aan toe: “U hoort misschien over wapenleveranties aan de Hezbollah, maar ze komen absoluut niet via Syrië.”

Waarna hij de tegenaanval koos: “de VS is niet tot een [volwassen] positie gekomen [die het haar mogelijk] maakt om onderscheid te maken tussen zijn eigen belangen en die van Israël.” En tegen de Amerikaanse bondgenoten in het westen en de Arabische wereld werd botweg gezegd: “Dit zijn de zorgen van de VS. Wij gaan niet het ‘water’ van iemand anders dragen met betrekking tot deze kwestie,” wat een verwijzing naar Israël is. Ook vroeg Miqdad: “De meest geavanceerde wapens gaan naar Israël en tegen wie worden die gebruikt?”

De volgende dag lag er een ander document van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse zaken waarin aan Amerikaanse diplomaten gevraagd werd om steun te verwerven van bondgenoten voor het standpunt van Washington.

Het zei: “We willen dat Frankrijk, Groot-Brittannië, Turkije, Saoedi-Arabië, Jordanië en Qatar opnieuw onze zorgen overbrengen aan Syrië.” Onze bondgenoten moeten weten dat Washington gelooft dat “Syrië korte-afstandsraketten heeft geleverd of zal leveren aan Hezbollah die twee-derde van Israël kunnen bereiken, met inbegrip van Tel Aviv, vanaf plekken ten noorden van de Litani.” [De Litani is een rivier in het zuiden van Libanon]

“Onze informatie geeft ook aan dat Syrië geavanceerde luchtdoelraketsystemen beschikbaar heeft gesteld aan Hezbollah en waarschijnlijk ook een training heeft gegeven voor deze systemen aan Hezbollah militieleden.”

In april van dit jaar werd er door Israëlische ambtenaren op gewezen dat de overdracht van SCUD-D raketten aan Hezbollah gewoon was doorgegaan. De woordvoerder van het Amerikaans ministerie van buitenlandse zaken, PJ Crowley, zei: “Als dit daadwerkelijk gebeurd is, en we blijven dit probleem analyseren, betekent dit duidelijk een groot risico voor Libanon” [en Israël].

In geheime documenten uit juni 2006 blijkt al hoe de VS al eerder bezig was met het blokkeren van wapenleveringen aan Hezbollah en Hamas. De Jordaanse Algemene Inlichtingen chef, generaal Mohammed Dahabi, vertelde aan de functionaris van buitenlandse zaken, David Welch, dat hij onlangs een ontmoeting had gehad met het hoofd van de buitenlandse inlichtingendienst van Iran, die klaagde dat Jordanië publiciteit had gegeven aan de pogingen van Hamas om wapens te smokkelen via Jordanië naar de Westelijke Jordaanoever.

Dahabi vertelde later aan de Amerikanen dat Jordanië een Syrisch verzoek voor het over Jordaans grondgebied overvliegen van een wapenzending naar Hezbollah geweigerd had, wat weer geleidt had tot een boze reactie van Damascus. In juli 2007 vertelde Dahabi aan een Amerikaanse delegatie: “Syrië zijn de longen waardoor Al Qaida ademt.”

Syrië was één van de belangrijkste doorvoerhavens van wapens en terroristen voor Hamas, Hezbollah en de jihadisten in Iraq. In Syrië zelf maken terroristen tegen het Syrische bewind echter geen kans. Tijdens een bijeenkomst dit jaar in Damascus kwam het tot een verrassende ontmoeting tussen de Amerikaanse chef van terrorismebestrijding en het hoofd van één van de geheime diensten van Syrië waarbij deze zich bereid toonde om de Syrische methoden voor terrorismebestrijding te beschrijven.

Generaal Ali Mamlouk, directeur van de Algemene Inlichtingendienst, vertelde aan Daniel Benjamin dat Syrië meer succes had in het bestrijden van terrorisme dan de VS en andere landen, omdat “wij praktisch handelen en niet theoretisch zijn,” aldus een uitgelekt document.

De truc was volgens hem om terroristische groeperingen te infiltreren. “In principe vallen we ze niet onmiddellijk aan. Eerst infiltreren we in deze groepen en alleen op het juiste moment slaan we toe.” Volgens hem had dat als resultaat dat veel terroristen gearresteerd konden worden en werden er honderden gehinderd in hun pogingen om Irak binnen te komen, hoewel sommige nog steeds binnen glippen.

“We zullen met alle middelen doorgaan met onze terrorismebestrijding, maar als we gaan samenwerken zal dat leiden tot betere resultaten en kunnen we beter onze belangen verdedigen,” zei Mamlouk.

Het “praktische handelen” waar Mamlouk het over had is echter niet alleen het infiltreren van terroristische groeperingen, maar ook het voorbijgaan aan allerlei Internationale verdragen, rechten en wetten, waardoor de Syrische geheime dienst vrij spel heeft in het aanpakken van tegenstanders van het regime. Maar daar maken Westerse mensenrechtenorganisaties zich minder druk om dan wanneer het gaat om de aanpak van terrorismebestrijding door de VS en Israël.

Israël en de VS weten dat Hezbollah nu veel beter bewapend is dan het in 2006 was toen het een maand in oorlog was tegen Israël. Hezbollah heeft meer wapens, betere raketten, volle munitieopslagplaatsen en een breed netwerk van bunkers, geheime commandocentra en zelfs tunnels onder Israëls noordgrens. In november 2009 verwijst een document naar deze raketten en opslagplaatsen met de woorden: “Deze [militaire] capaciteit, indien volledig gebruikt, zou enorm veel meer materiële- en psychologische schade veroorzaken in het noorden van Israël dan de Hezbollah raketten deden tijdens de oorlog van 2006.”

Volgens analisten heeft Hezbollah zo’n 40.000 raketten op verschillende posities in Libanon ter beschikking alsmede een dozijn SCUD-D raketten die door Syrië aan de milities geleverd zijn. Volgens VN Resolutie 1701 had Hezbollah volledig ontwapend moeten worden na de oorlog in 2006, maar de UNIFIL-troepen die hier op hadden moeten toezien hebben zich volledig laten intimideren en commanderen door de Hezbollah milities. Is het verwonderlijk dat Israël geen vertrouwen heeft in de Internationale gemeenschap als het gaat om veilige grenzen en het aanpakken van regionaal extremisme?

Bron: WikiLeaks

Thursday, 22 January 2009, 01:05

S E C R E T STATE 005567
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 01/24/2034
TAGS PARM, PREL, ETTC, MASS, AE, MU, SA, YM, IR, SU
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP TO INFORMATION
REF: A. STATE 4162 B. STATE 3948 C. STATE 3521 D. STATE 2617 (NOTAL) E. STATE 2072 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ann Ganzer, ISN/CATR Office Director, Reason 1.4 (b), (c), (d).

1. (U) This is an action request to Embassies Abu Dhabi, Khartoum, Muscat, Riyadh, and Sanaa. Please deliver immediately. Please see paragraph 4.

———-

Background

———-

2. (S/NF) Ref A asked Sudan to stop flights from Sudan which we believed are carrying lethal military equipment. Earlier Washington advised Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Yemen in Ref B with updated information that additional flights may be planned for , which we are concerned could also be used to transfer arms from Iran to Sudan. Ref C advised that Washington had received information that the UAE firm requested overflight permission from the Civil Aviation Authority in Yemen for to conduct flights on between Iran and Sudan. Ref D advised Egyptian authorities that may be involved in the transfer of arms to Hamas. Ref E informed that Iran intended to conduct arms shipments to Hamas via Sudan and that the arms were expected to be transferred via aerial routes using cargo planes.

———-

Objectives

———-

3. (S/NF) Posts should seek to:

— Inform host governments of this new information regarding flights and that we have reason to believe the flight will be transporting lethal military equipment.

— Inform the host government additional flights may be planned for .

— Ask host nation to stop the flights.

— Ask to be provided information that is regularly required for overflight requests.

— Emphasize that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, states Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms of related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.

— Stress to Sudan the United States considers this activity exceptionally concerning, particularly as our two countries are working together towards critical issues of UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment, resolution of the situation in Darfur, and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

————–

Action Request

————–

4. (S) Posts are requested to immediately approach host governments to inform them of the flights and request their assistance to stop the flights, in Sudan’s case, or deny overflight or require the planes to land for inspection.

Begin Talking Points:

SECRET/REL SUDAN

— We have information that, as of cargo flights were operating between Iran and Sudan.

— FM Alor stated that he strongly supported stopping these flights. We appreciate FM Alor’s concern regarding these flights and would like to follow-up with additional information.

—

— We have additional information that a Sudanese official, having failed to receive overflight permission for has approached a second company to attempt the transfer.

— Additional flights may be planned for .

— We continue to believe these flights are transporting lethal military equipment.

— As you are aware, there is information that is regularly required for overflight requests. We would like to know what information was provided to you. The regularly required info is: Flight purpose, aircraft operator, type, registration, nationality, type and amount of cargo, origin, destination, date/time, entry/departure points.

— We continue to urge you to maintain vigilance to these flights.

— UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, para. 5 states that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms or related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.

— Any supply or transfer outside Iran of arms and related materiel violates Iran’s obligations under UNSCR 1747.

— The United States considers this activity exceptionally concerning, particularly as our two countries are working together towards critical issues of UN/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment, resolution of the situation in Darfur, and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

— In the spirit of this resolution, we request you deny overflight permission for these flights or request that the aircraft land for inspection as a condition for overflight permission.

SECRET/REL UAE, YEMEN, OMAN, AND SAUDI ARABIA

— We appreciate any assistance you can provide regarding the military-related flights between Iran and Sudan that operated on and request that you remain vigilant on denying additional flights.

— We have information that a Sudanese official, having failed to receive overflight permission for flights, has approached a Sudanese company to attempt th transfer.

— Additional flight may be planned for .

— As you are aware, there is information that is regularly required for overflight requests. We would like to know what information was provided to you. The regularly required info is: Flight purpose, aircraft operator, type, registration, nationality, type and amount of cargo, origin, destination, date/time, entry/departure points.

— Additionally, all overflights require fees to be paid. Countries can deny overflight permissions because overflight- or other flight-related fees by the parties involved with operating th flights are in arrears. We request that you look into this avenue as an additional means to refuse future overflights.

— UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, para. 5 states that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms or related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.

— Any supply or transfer outside Iran of arms and related materiel violates Iran’s obligations under UNSCR 1747.

— In the spirit of this resolution, we request you deny overflight permission for these flights or request that the aircraft land for inspection as a condition for overflight permission.

SECRET/REL UAE ONLY

— According to the

End Talking Points

CLINTON

Bron: WikiLeaks

Tuesday, 24 February 2009, 10:54

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 000249
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A A/S CARTER, AF/SPG, NEA/IPA, ISN/CATR,
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND CHUDSON
EO 12958 DECL: 02/24/2019
TAGS ETTC, MASS, PARM, PGOV, PREL, SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN COMPLAINS OF “PROBABLY AMERICAN” BOMBING
ATTACKS IN EASTERN SUDAN
REF: A. KHARTOUM 120 B. KHARTOUM 107 C. KHARTOUM 82 D. KHARTOUM 59
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S) CDA Fernandez was summoned to the Foreign Ministry on the morning of February 24 by Americas Department head Ambassador Nasreddin Wali. Wali said that he had sensitive and worrisome information to relate to the Charge. Reading from hand-written notes in Arabic and referring to a large dog-eared map brought in for the occasion, Wali said that there had been two air attacks on Eastern Sudan in January and February. In the January attack, 43 people were killed and 17 vehicles destroyed. This occurred near Magd, in the Gebeit region of Red Sea state, “the Northern part of an area known as Oku” (phonetic). It is roughly at the latitude of 17 degrees and longitude of 33.5, according to Wali.

2. (S) The second attack occurred on February 20 at Bir al-Mansurab (latitude of 17 degrees and longitude of 34, according to Wali). The second attack was 15 kilometers from the site of the January attack. In the February attack, 45 Sudanese were kalled and 14 vehicles destroyed. Both attacks occurred 150 kilometers deep inside Sudan, not near any international border.

3. (S) Wali said that “we assume that the planes that attacked us are your planes.” He said that Sudan has had “tight cooperation” with the United States on security matters and any concerns that the USG has about security related issues can be raised within the context of bilateral diplomatic and intelligence relations between the two countries. He added that “Sudan would like to have clarification about this matter. We protest this act and we condemn it. Sudan reserves the right to respond appropriately, at the right time, in a legal manner consistent with protecting its sovereignty.”

4. (S) Comment: This complaint by Sudan comes on the heels of the Embassy being tasked by Washington to demarche Khartoum on weapons smuggling issues possibly involving Iran and Hamas (reftels a-c). So it is easy for the regime to assume that the demarches and these kinetic incidents are somehow connected. The initial attack is already the object of gossip by elements of Sudan’s political elite, even outside the tight confines of the regime’s inner circle (reftel d). CDA had already scheduled an Emergency Action Committee meeting on February 24 to discuss the Embassy’s security posture in the runup to the March 4 ICC announcement and this latest news is an additional concern in a very volatile political environment. Embassy requests Washington guidance on what – if any – formal response should be given to the Sudanese. And should this potentially explosive story somehow leak to the sensationalistic Sudanese press, it could very well turn our security situation here from bad to worse. End comment.

FERNANDEZ

Bron: WikiLeaks

Tuesday, 17 March 2009, 00:29

S E C R E T STATE 024945
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 03/13/2034
TAGS PARM, PREL, ETTC, MASS, AE, MU, SA, YM, IR, SU
SUBJECT: (S) NEW INFORMATION ON IRANIAN ARMS TRANFERS TO
SYRIA AND HAMAS.
REF: A. STATE 5567 B. STATE 4162 C. STATE 3948 D. STATE 3521 E. STATE 2617 (NOTAL) F. STATE 2072 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ann Ganzer, ISN Acting DAS, Reasons: 1.4 (b), (c), and (d).

1. (U) This is an urgent action request to Embassies Amman and Cairo. Please deliver as soon as possible. Please see paragraphs 4 and 5.

———-

Background

———-

2. (S/NF) We have received information that Iran intends to ship a cargo of lethal military equipment to Syria with onward transfer to Sudan. Our information indicates the equipment may then be transferred to Hamas. Per REFTELS, Iran has been attempting to transfer military equipment via Sudan for the past two months. We believe these current flights may begin in the very near future. Any arms export by Iran would be a violation of UNSCR 1747, regardless of the recipient.

———-

Objectives

———-

3. (S/NF) Posts should seek to:

— Inform host governments that Iran intends to continue delivering lethal military equipment to

— Inform the host government that additional flights are expected to depart in the very near future.

— Ask host nation to require the flights to land for inspection or deny overflight.

— Emphasize that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, states Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms of related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.

————–

Action Request

————–

4. (S) Posts are requested to approach appropriate host government officials as soon as possible, using the points in para 5 to approach host governments to inform them of the flights and request their assistance to deny overflight or require the planes to land for inspection.

5. (SECRET/REL JORDAN and EGYPT) Begin Talking Points:

–We have recently received information that Iran intends to transship military equipment from Syria to Sudan, to be transferred to Hamas. We believe the flights will be conducted using cargo aircraft and will begin in the very near future.

–These flights will likely be conducted by . However, we cannot rule out that Iran may use other cargo planes and/or airlines.

— UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, para. 5 states that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly any arms or related materiel, whether or not originating in Iran.

— Any supply or transfer outside Iran of arms and related materiel violates Iran’s obligations under UNSCR 1747.

–We are passing this information to you in an effort to highlight a transfer of proliferation concern and to ensure that Iran does not make use of your territory to transfer items proscribed by UN Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803.

–We request that your government look into these flights and either consider denying overflight permission or require the flights to land for inspection.

End Talking Points

Bron: WikiLeaks

Thursday, 30 April 2009, 15:00

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000746
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/26/2019
TAGS PREL, MASS, MOPS, PARM, KPAL, IS, IR, SO, EG, SU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL MULLEN’S MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF SOLIMAN
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. Key Points:

– (S/NF) During an April 21 meeting with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, Egyptian General Intelligence Service Chief Omar Soliman explained that his overarching regional goal was combating radicalism, especially in Gaza, Iran, and Sudan.

– (S/NF) On Gaza, Soliman said Egypt must “confront” Iranian attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and “stop” arms smuggling through Egyptian territory.

– (S/NF) Soliman shared his vision on Palestinian reconciliation and bringing the Palestinian Authority back to Gaza, saying “a Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be calm.”

– (S/NF) On Iran, Soliman said Egypt was “succeeding” in preventing Iran from funneling financial support to Hamas through Egypt. Soliman hoped that the U.S. could encourage Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions and stop interfering in regional affairs, but cautioned that Iran “must pay a price” for its actions.

– (S/NF) Egypt is “very concerned” with stability in Sudan, Soliman said, and was focusing efforts on convincing the Chadean and Sudanese presidents to stop supporting each others’ insurgencies, supporting negotiations between factions in Darfur, and implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). “Egypt does not want a divided Sudan,” Soliman stressed.

—-

Gaza

—-

2. (S/NF) Soliman said radicalism was the “backbone” of regional security threats, adding that radicalism in Gaza posed a particularly serious threat to Egyptian national security. Soliman said Egypt must “confront” Iranian attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and stop arms smuggling through Egyptian territory. “Egypt is circled by radicalism,” he continued, expressing concern over instability in Sudan and Somalia as well. Egypt’s own successful campaign against radicalism in the 1990s provided a useful lesson in how to counteract extremist groups by reducing their ability to operate and raise funds, in additional to educating people on the dangers of extremism. Soliman noted that only the Muslim Brotherhood remained and the Egyptian government continued to “make it difficult” for them to operate.

3. (S/NF) “We do not want incidents like Gaza to inflame public anger,” Soliman said, adding that the Gaza conflict put “moderate (Arab) regimes” in a corner. To prevent another outbreak of violence, Egypt is focusing on Palestinian reconciliation and a durable cease-fire between Hamas and Israel. On reconciliation, Soliman explained, the ultimate goal was to return the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, as “Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be calm.” The problem, however, is that the PA cannot return to Gaza without Hamas’ acquiescence. Soliman said the PA must return before the January 2010 Palestinian elections, or else Gazans would be afraid to vote for moderates.

4. (S/NF) Stability in Gaza also depends on giving people a more “normal” life, Soliman continued, saying Israel must be convinced to regularly open the border crossings for legitimate commercial activity. The current system – where Egypt informs Israel of a humanitarian shipment and Israel waits two days before accepting or rejecting the shipment for transfer to Gaza – does not adequately meet people’s needs.

5. (S/NF) On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman said he expected the factions to return to Egypt on April 26 to discuss his proposal on establishing a high committee comprised of the various factions. The committee would be responsible for preparing for the January 2010 elections, monitoring reconstruction, and reforming the security services in Gaza. On reconstruction, the committee would issue licenses for companies eligible to participate on projects, but the PA would decide who receives the money for private and government contracts. Arab governments would assist with reforming the security services and could base security assistance out of Egypt. Soliman doubted that Hamas would agree to the high committee, but said it was important

CAIRO 00000746 002 OF 002

to keep Hamas and Fatah talking, so they would not resort to violence.

———————–

Iran, Counter Smuggling

———————–

6. (S/NF) Iran is “very active in Egypt,” Soliman said. Iranian financial support to Hamas amounted to $25 million a month, but he said Egypt was “succeeding” in preventing financial support from entering Gaza through Egypt. Iran has tried several times to pay the salaries for the al-Qassam Battalions, but Egypt had succeeded in preventing the money from reaching Gaza. Soliman said the Egyptian government had arrested a “big Hezbollah cell,” which was Hezbollah’s first attempt to stand up a cell within Egypt. Iran was also trying to recruit support from the Sinai Bedouins, he claimed, in order to facilitate arms smuggling to Gaza. So far, he continued, Egypt had successfully stopped Hamas from rearming. Soliman noted that in six months, MOD will have completed the construction of a subterranean steel wall along the Egypt-Gaza border to prevent smuggling. He warned, however, that people will find an alternative to the tunnels to smuggle arms, goods, people, and money. Admiral Mullen expressed appreciation for Egypt’s efforts to combat smuggling, adding that he hoped Egypt felt comfortable enough to ask for additional border security assistance at any time.

7. (S/NF) Egypt has “started a confrontation with Hezbollah and Iran,” Soliman stressed, and “we will not allow Iran to operate in Egypt.” Soliman said Egypt had sent a clear message to Iran that if they interfere in Egypt, Egypt will interfere in Iran, adding that EGIS had already begun recruiting agents in Iraq and Syria. Soliman hoped the U.S. would “not walk the same track as the Europeans” in regards to negotiating with Iran and warned against only focusing on one issue at time, like Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Iran must “pay the price” for its actions and not be allowed to interfere in regional affairs. “If you want Egypt to cooperate with you on Iran, we will,” Soliman added, “it would take a big burden off our shoulders.”

—–

Sudan

—–

8. (S/NF) Egypt is very concerned with stability in Sudan, Soliman said, but asked for the U.S. to be “patient” with the Sudanese government and give Egypt time to help the Sudanese government deal with its problems. He applauded the appointment of Special Envoy Gration and recent U.S. statements on Sudan. Soliman said Egypt was focused on three areas for promoting stability in Sudan: 1) repairing the relationship between Chadean President Deby and Sudanese President Bashir and stopping their support for each others’ insurgencies 2) supporting negotiations between the various factions in Darfur, and 3) implementing the CPA. Soliman encouraged a larger role for French President Sarkozy in mediating between Chad and Sudan. He said that Southern Sudan “feels no benefits from unity,” and Egypt is trying to bridge the “physiological gap” between north and south itself by providing humanitarian assistance. “Egypt does not want a divided Sudan,” he stressed. Admiral Mullen replied that Egypt’s leadership on Sudan was critical and looked forward to increased cooperation between Egypt and Special Envoy Gration.

——————

Piracy and Somalia

——————

9. (S/NF) Admiral Mullen stressed that piracy was an international crime that needed an international solution, especially on support for trying captured pirates. The U.S. did not want Somalia to become the next safe haven for al-Qaeda after Pakistan, he stressed. Soliman replied that there were not enough ships in the region to provide adequate security against pirate attacks and recommended that the international community, through the UN Security Council, focus counter piracy efforts on the Somali shore.

10. (U) Admiral Mullen did not have the opportunity to clear before his departure. SCOBEY

Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 18 November 2009, 14:34

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002502
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, PTER, KWBG, EG, IR, SA, LE, IS
SUBJECT: 40TH JPMG: NEA REGIONAL DISCUSSION (PART 3 OF 4)
Classified By: A/DCM Marc Sievers, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

[Excerpt from the cable]
….Mossad believes Iran wants to become a regional hegemon, and is dictating its agenda by using Hamas and Hizballah as force multipliers. In that respect, Iran is very creative in finding ways to transfer weapons systems to its proxies. Mossad said Tehran also understands the effort to split Syria from Iran’s influence, and is working hard to deepen its relationship with Syria as a result….

Bron: WikiLeaks

Monday, 22 February 2010, 14:45

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 000414
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2025
TAGS PREL, PTER, MASS, SY, LE, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI OFFICIALS REQUEST USG DEMARCHE SYRIA ON
POSSIBLE MISSILE TRANSFER TO HIZBALLAH
REF: IIR 6-849-9075-10
Classified By: Luis G. Moreno for reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S/NF) On February 22, 2010, BG”>BG Yossi Baidatz, Israel Defense Intelligence (IDI) Chief of Production and Analysis, advised Embassy Tel Aviv officers that IDI had information suggesting Syria intended to imminently transfer SCUD-D missiles to Hizballah in Lebanon. Baidatz explained that IDI viewed completion of such a transfer as creating a “new level of concern” along Israel’s northern border, and he requested that the USG demarche the Syrian government in an attempt to dissuade them from transferring the missiles. Baidatz requested that any demarche be delivered prior to the February 25 arrival in Washington of Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak. Baidatz was concerned that a demarche following Barak’s meeting in Washington would lead the Syrians to believe that the U.S. and Israel collaborated to uncover and thwart the transfer.

2. (S/NF) Embassy Tel Aviv’s Office of Regional Analysis is sending additional details separately. Cunningham

Bron: WikiLeaks

Thursday, 25 February 2010, 13:43

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000168
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
LONDON FOR LORD
PARIS FOR NOBLES
EO 12958 DECL: 02/25/2019
TAGS PTER, PREF, PREL, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: V/FM MIQDAD DENIES SUPPLYING BALLISTIC MISSILES TO
HIZBALLAH, DIRECTS U.S. DEMARCHE TO ISRAEL
REF: A. STATE 17307 B. TEL AVIV 404
Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter, for reasons 1.4 b,d.

1. (S) Summary: Responding to Ref A demarche, Syrian Vice Foreign Minister (V/FM) Miqdad expressed surprise the U.S. was sharing such a strong message in the wake of Under Secretary (U/S) William Burns’ positive February 17 visit. He argued Israel represented the major threat to stability in the region and that the U.S. should be directing its message toward Israeli officials. Syria, he claimed, wanted peace and was working with Turkey and the U.S. toward that end. Flatly denying any Syrian role in the supply of weapons to Hizballah, The most sophisticated weapons Damascus supported Lebanese independence while Israel violated Lebanese sovereignty on a daily basis. Miqdad argued Syria wanted to preserve the positive results of U/S Burns’ recent visit and promised to convey the message. He also pledged to review our request for assisting the Center for Victims of Torture and agreed to follow up Charge’s request for official written notification of the government’s decision to allow the Damascus Community School (DCS) to reopen. End Summary

————————————–

Miqdad: Direct Your Message to Israel

————————————–

2. (S) Charge and Pol/Econ Chief delivered Ref A demarche to Syrian Vice Foreign Minister (V/FM) Faisal al-Miqdad on February 25. A clearly surprised Miqdad listened attentively and took detailed notes, interrupting twice to confirm whether the demarche concerned the transfer of ballistic missiles and to clarify whether the message represented a U.S. or an Israeli “warning.” Charge explained the message reflected Washington concerns that SEMEP Mitchell and U/S Burns had shared previously with President Asad. Addressing the substance of the demarche, Miqdad argued that Israel itself could not have sent a stronger warning. The message, he continued, “shows the U.S. has not come to a mature position (that would enable it) to differentiate between its own interests and Israel’s.” Syria was “of course” not in the mood to increase tensions or escalate, “because we believe in peace.” Toward that end, Syria was doing its best with Turkey and the U.S. to achieve peace. Syria was not taking steps to escalate. Unless Israel had plans to escalate against Syria or Lebanon, “there’s no need to worry,” said Miqdad.

3. (S) Referring to Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s February 16 speech, Miqdad emphasized that Hizballah was responding to Israeli threats and clearly conveyed Hizballah’s intent to respond only if Israel attacked first. Syria believed in and supported the role of UNIFIL, and was using its contacts with the Lebanese Government to “insist” on Lebanon’s full cooperation with UNIFIL. Miqdad insisted Israel, not Syria or Lebanon, was issuing provocative threats and using Hizballah as a pretext. The Syrian government had been pleased to hear Lebanese PM Hariri’s remarks expressing concerns about Israeli provocation, including the violation of Lebanese airspace and assassinations. The U.S. message, summed up Miqdad, “should be directed to Israel not to escalate.”

—————————————-

Denial of Supply of Weapons to Hizballah

—————————————-

4. (S) Charge replied that the U.S. message had come in the context of improving bilateral relations, which depended on a frank and candid exchange of assessments of regional developments. The U.S. was issuing neither threats nor

ultimatums, but rather it sought to convey what it believed to be a shared interest in avoiding conflict. Miqdad commented that it was “strange” the U.S. had chosen to deliver “harsh words while we’re trying to build better relations.” He promised to convey the message to his superiors but reiterated Syria’s desire to avoid escalation. “You may hear about weapons going to Hizballah,” he claimed, “but they are absolutely not coming through Syria.” The real threat to stability was coming from Israeli officials who had threatened recently to attack Damascus and to change the Syrian regime. “Please convey to Washington, while we take note of your demarche, this message should be directed at Israel,” he said.

5. (S) Charge replied that, as U/S Burns had conveyed to President Asad, the U.S. was urging all parties in the region, including Israel, to exercise restraint and support Lebanese independence. “This is our commitment,” Miqdad responded, “we shall not interfere (in Lebanon).” The Lebanese should be allowed to decide for themselves on how to resolve their own issues; those who would interfere want to disturb the peace after Lebanon successfully conducted national elections and formed a consensus government. “We’re confident the Lebanese can deal with their own situation,” he said. Charge rejoined that the military capabilities of a non-state actor like Hizballah represented a major concern because Hizballah responded only to its own leadership and not to government authorities.

6. (S) Miqdad said this issue should be discussed in the overall framework of the situation. He then contended the provision of U.S. weapons to the region represented a destabilizing factor. “The most sophisticated weapons are coming to Israel, to be used against whom?” he asked. When the U.S. pressed Israel to stop threatening its neighbors, the situation would stabilize. “We want peace. It’s the only solution. We are the ones who are threatened,” he declared. Charge replied the whole region was threatened. Miqdad said the U.S. and Syria needed to worked toward peace. “You should address your message to the people who don’t want peace,” he added, noting the results of U/S Burns’ visit should be preserved and continued to improve relations. Syria had responded positively to U/S Burns’ message because it felt more confident of Washington’s desire to move forward.

———————

CVT and DCS Follow-Up

———————

7. (C) Charge affirmed the U.S. shared this intent and wanted to maximize the opportunity by staying in close contact. In that context, he raised PRM’s pending request to Miqdad to assist the Center for the Victims of Torture to receive approval to begin a proposed project in Syria; Miqdad agreed to look at the matter and requested Embassy follow-up. Likewise, on the issue of visas for the next group of DHS circuit riders, Miqdad asked that the circuit riders not apply for visas until he had had a chance to intervene. (Note: Embassy will provide Miqdad with a list of the circuit riders.)

8. (C) Charge also asked Miqdad for advice on how to proceed regarding Damascus Community School (DCS). FM Muallim had instructed the Embassy to “start hiring teachers,” but the MFA had not yet provided any written notification of President Asad’s decision to allow the school to re-open. There also remained the issue of whether Syrian students would be allowed to enroll. Miqdad agreed that this matter required a response and advised the Charge to follow up with him in the coming week. (Note: Miqdad reported he would be traveling to Libya for two days to discuss bilateral

relations.)

——-

Comment

——-

9. (S) In the midst of hosting a quick-notice visit by Iranian President Ahmedinejad (who openly criticized the Secretary’s Congressional testimony expressing concern about Syria and Hizballah), the SARG might interpret our demarche as an attempt to divert the spotlight from the show of mutual support between Tehran and Damascus. Miqdad’s surprise that we would raise this issue so forcefully on the heels of U/S Burns’ visit may have been genuine, but the abject denial of any Syrian role in supplying arms to Hizballah and the verbal counter-attack against Israeli provocation were standard (if disingenuous) responses. Yet even a seasoned diplomat like Miqdad could not restrain a raised eyebrow at our mention of the transfer of ballistic missiles to Hizballah. We expect the specificity of this concern could well prompt further discussions among Syrian officials, Hizballah, and the visiting Iranian delegation.

10. (S) Miqdad notably did not respond to our concern about a possible Hizballah revenge operation for the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh. While Miqdad and Syrian officials might take some comfort in UNIFIL’s role in preventing the spillover of recent tensions in south Lebanon, a Hizballah operation against Israeli targets could easily result in a situation in which UNIFIL found itself unable to contain rising escalation. One point we might stress in the future: Syria’s desire for a deterrent against Israeli military action — presumably a motivation for the transfer of ballistic missiles to Hizballah — will not increase stability because there are no mechanisms or rules of the road to prevent and/or manage unanticipated escalation. Not having control over Hizballah’s missiles or influence over Hizballah’s military plans to avenge Mughniyeh increases this danger. Our demarche might resonate more fully here if we can persuade other key countries, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, France, and others, to underscore their concerns about regional instability, to which Syria’s supply of ballistic missiles to Hizballah is directly contributing.

11. (S) Leaving aside the substance of Miqdad’s response to the demarche, his agreement to meet us on two hours’ notice on a Syrian holiday (the Prophet’s birthday) and during the Ahmedinejad visit is worth noting. Miqdad’s Chief of Staff is typically the recipient of Embassy demarches; CDA’s only other meeting with Miqdad apart from appointments involving Washington visitors was to discuss the Vice Minister’s trip to the U.S. last September. His future willingness to meet directly with us — which FM Muallim instructed him to do to follow up on DCS issues — will serve as one more barometer of the SARG commitment to engagement in the weeks and months ahead. HUNTER

Bron: WikiLeaks

Friday, 26 February 2010, 00:36

S E C R E T STATE 017894
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 02/25/2020
TAGS PREL, PGOV, PTER, MASS, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: CONTINUED CONCERN OVER SYRIAN SUPPORT
TO HIZBALLAH
REF: A) 2009 STATE 129636
Classified By: NEA A/S Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph four.

Summary

——-

2. (S) We previously demarched Britain, France, and Turkey on our increasing concerns over Syria’s continued provision of advanced weapons to Hizballah (Ref A). In London, Paris and Ankara the demarches were taken seriously and all governments pledged to raise their concern with Syrian officials. French diplomats noted that they routinely deliver the same message to the Syrians, but that Damascus denies involvement. This issue now needs to be reinforced with these governments and brought to the attention of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar. Under Secretary Burns visited Damascus on February 17 and stressed U.S. concerns about weapons transfers to Hizballah directly with Syrian President Bashar Asad, who bluntly stated that he knew of no new weapons systems going to Hizballah. In light of disturbing and weighty evidence to the contrary — that Syria currently provides Hizballah with advanced ballistic missiles and other weaponry — we want France, Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar to make a renewed push to echo our concerns with Syria, given that Syria continues to ignore warnings that its transfers of advanced surface-to-surface and surface-to-air weapons to Hizballah could jeopardize prospects for an agreement with Israel or spark a conflict significantly more destructive than the 2006 Israel-Hizballah war. Syria’s actions clearly jeopardize regional stability and could risk drawing Damascus into any future war between Israel and Hizballah.

3. (S) The Syrian leadership views military support to Hizballah as integral to Syria’s security and as a bargaining chip in its negotiations with Israel over the return of the Golan Heights, as well as a possible stick to bring the Israelis back to the table. While our commitment to principled engagement with Syria — as demonstrated by Under Secretary Burns’ recent visit — remains strong, we must enlist additional French, British, Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian, and Qatari support to help dissuade Syria from expanding its ties to Hizballah any further, especially via the transfer of additional sophisticated weaponry.

Objectives

———-

4. (S/REL FRANCE, BRITAIN, TURKEY, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, AND QATAR) Drawing on paragraphs 2 and 3 for context, we request that Embassies in Paris, London, Ankara, Riyadh, Amman, and Doha pursue the following objectives with senior French, British, Turkish, Saudi, Jordanian, and Qatari officials at the highest appropriate levels.

— Highlight that Under Secretary Burns visited Damascus on February 17 as part of our ongoing engagement with Syria. Reiterate our commitment to sustained, principled engagement with Syria. We plan to continue our dialogue with Syria and look forward to the arrival of our new ambassador in Damascus once the confirmation process is complete.

— Stress that in addition to discussing bilateral issues of mutual interest, Under Secretary Burns conveyed to President Asad a number of our priority concerns with Syria, specifically cross-border weapons smuggling into Lebanon destined for Hizballah.

— Note that in response, Asad claimed that Syria could not be Israel’s policeman and that he knew of no new weapons systems being smuggled from Syria to Hizballah.

— Underscore that, contrary to President Asad’s statements, we are aware of current Syrian efforts to supply ballistic missiles to Hizballah.

— We also note President Asad’s recent comments — during a February 25 joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart — that support for Hizballah was a “moral and legal duty.”

— Express deep concern that Syria’s expanding military ties to Hizballah, including the supply of ballistic missiles to Hizballah, jeopardize regional prospects for peace and stability. Specifically, Syrian transfers of increasingly sophisticated weaponry risk renewed conflict between Israel and Hizballah that may expand, unlike in 2006, into Syria.

— Convey that arms shipments to Hizballah — especially ballistic missiles — increasingly undermine Israel’s confidence in Syria’s willingness and ability to deliver peace and diminish the value of an eventual Syrian-Israeli accord, as Hizballah will not return the weapons it has already received.

— Underscore that the next report on Security Council resolution 1701 will be discussed on March 12. Full implementation of Security Council resolution 1701, including the arms embargo and weapons-free zone, remains a priority for the United States. In light of the upcoming report, it is especially important to stress that Syria’s actions constitute serious violations of Security Council resolution 1701 — which will be taken seriously by the international community — and belie its claims to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty.

— Express our appreciation for your host government’s support on the critical issue of Syrian weapons transfers to Hizballah and note that we hope to continue our cooperation to prevent serious miscalculations by the Syrian government.

— Share the following S/REL FRANCE, BRITAIN, TURKEY, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, QATAR text verbatim:

(Begin releasable text.)

We would like to convey to you that we have information indicating that Syria is providing increasingly sophisticated weapons to Hizballah, including from its own military stocks.

For example, we assess that Syria has provided or will provided guided short range ballistic missiles to Hizballah that could target two-thirds of Israel, including Tel Aviv, from launch sites north of the Litani.

Our information also indicates that Syria has made advanced surface to air missile systems available to Hizballah and has probably provided training on these systems to Hizballah personnel.

(End releasable text.)

— Urge France, Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Qatar to raise these concerns once again in their dialogue with senior Syrian officials. We do not want to undermine our collective outreach to Syria. However, we are increasingly concerned that the Syrian government is making a strategic miscalculation by incorrectly assuming that increasing Hizballah’s military capability concomitantly bolsters Syria’s security and strength at the negotiating table with Israel, when the opposite is more likely to be true.

— Syria’s desire for a deterrent against Israeli military action — presumably a motivation for the transfer of ballistic missiles to Hizballah — is not producing a stable deterrent because there are no mechanisms to prevent unanticipated escalation. Not having control over Hizballah’s missiles increases the risk of this danger.

— Emphasize that Syria’s actions risk derailing our common efforts to bring peace to the region.

— Note that we are raising our concerns with Syrian officials in Damascus and with the Syrian Ambassador here in Washington.

— Also note our continuing strong commitment and support to the full implementation of resolutions 1747 and 1701, encouraging France, Britain, and Turkey to stress their continuing support for the full implementation of resolution 1701 — in its entirety (including the arms embargo and weapons free zone) — with senior Syrian officials.

— These are U.S. concerns. We are not carrying somebody else’s “water” on this issue.

— (For Turkey) Express that we greatly appreciate Turkey’s continued efforts to combat weapons smuggling. As conveyed by Under Secretary Burns when he was in Ankara on February 18, we urge Turkey to use its close ties with Damascus to underscore the repercussions that Syria’s continued provision of weapons to Hizballah has for regional stability and the broader goal of Middle East peace. We hope that Turkey will leverage its influence with Syria on this crucial issue.

Reporting Deadline

——————

5. (SBU) Embassies are requested to report the results of this demarche to Syria desk officer Andrew Abell and Lebanon desk officer John Duchak by March 3, 2010. CLINTON

Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 24 February 2010, 14:08

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000159
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR P, NEA, S/CT
EO 12958 DECL: 02/24/2020
TAGS PTER, PREL, PGOV, SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ATTENDS CT DIALOGUE WITH
S/CT BENJAMIN
Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: In a surprise appearance, Syrian General Intelligence Director (GID) General Ali Mamlouk attended a February 18 meeting between Vice Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad and a U.S. delegation led by S/CT Coordinator Daniel Benjamin. Miqdad explained Mamlouk had joined the meeting at the request of President Bashar al-Asad as a gesture following a positive meeting between U/S William Burns and the Syrian president the previous day. Stressing the meeting did not signal the commencement of security and intelligence cooperation between Syria and the United States, the Syrian side said the discussion could be a starting point for a blueprint regarding possible cooperation in the future. Calling Coordinator Benjamin’s description of terrorist groups operating in the region “valid,” Mamlouk emphasized the linkage between progress on political issues in U.S.-Syrian relations and possible security and intelligence cooperation. He identified Syrian-Iraqi border security as an area where Syria could cooperate with the U.S., but only after Iraqi legislative elections in March. Mamlouk added cooperation on Syrian-Iraqi border security could lead to security cooperation in other areas.

2. (S/NF) Mamlouk, Miqdad, and Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustapha were attentive during Benjamin’s presentation on al-Qaeda, foreign fighters, and other common threats, and reacted positively to his warnings that these issues presented challenges to both the U.S. and Syria. Mamlouk and Miqdad emphasized three points regarding possible security and intelligence cooperation with the U.S.: (1) Syria must be able to take the lead in any regional actions; (2) politics are an integral part of combating terrorism, and a “political umbrella” of improved U.S.-Syrian bilateral relations should facilitate cooperation against terrorism; and (3) in order to convince the Syrian people that cooperation with the U.S. was benefiting them, progress must be made on issues related to economic sanctions against Syria including spare parts for airplanes and a plane for President Asad. “In summary, President Asad wants cooperation, we should take the lead on that cooperation, and don’t put us on your lists,” Miqdad declared. END SUMMARY.

SURPRISE GUEST AT MIQDAD MEETING

3. (S/NF) GID Director General Ali Mamlouk was the surprise guest at a February 18 meeting at the MFA hosted by Vice Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad with S/CT Coordinator Daniel Benjamin, DHS A/S David Heyman, and NEA DAS Maura Connelly. Miqdad said Mamlouk’s participation in the meeting had come at the direction of President Asad following what Miqdad termed a positive meeting between Asad and U/S Burns on February 17. Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustapha, who translated for Mamlouk during the meeting, stated that Mamlouk’s attendance at meetings with foreign delegations was extraordinary and did not occur “even with friendly countries like Britain and France.” Mustapha explained President Asad instructed Mamlouk to attend the meeting as a personal gesture.

4. (S/NF) Benjamin, stressing that cooperation on counter-terrorism efforts was an essential part of the roadmap for improved bilateral relations, noted that there were issues on which we had clear differences, such as Syrian support for Hamas and Hizballah. The U.S., he continued, still viewed these groups as undermining stability and the prospects for peace in the region. Nonetheless, the two countries should still work to cooperate on immediate threats facing both the U.S. and Syria, including the proliferation of takfiri groups in the region, such as al-Qaeda, and stopping the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. The Coordinator provided Mamlouk an overview of the threats posed by terrorist groups operating in the region from North Africa to Iraq to Yemen. Benjamin noted the challenge that these

groups posed to Syria as well, illustrated by the September 2008 attack on a Syrian intelligence building. He explained the U.S. is concerned about the long-term implications of arms smuggling to Lebanon and Iraq through Syria, and observed that the disarray among the Palestinians could ultimately create an opening for groups with an al-Qaeda orientation, citing the case of Junjalat, a radical faction in Gaza.

5. (S/NF) Mamlouk pointed to Syria’s 30 years of experience in battling radical groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood as evidence of Syria’s commitment to the fight against terrorism. Mamlouk termed Benjamin’s description of the challenges posed by terrorist groups in the region as “valid, despite the reasons that gave rise to them.” Mamlouk repeatedly stressed his attendance at the meeting did not signal the commencement of security and intelligence cooperation between Syria and the U.S., but could be a starting point for “a blueprint for that which is not yet started.” Echoing Miqdad, Mamlouk said progress on political issues in the Syrian-U.S. bilateral relationship was “closely connected” to progress on possible cooperation on security and intelligence.

MAMLOUK DESCRIBES GID’S METHODS

6. (S/NF) The GID Director said Syria had been more successful than the U.S. and other countries in the region in fighting terrorist groups because “we are practical and not theoretical.” He stated Syria’s success is due to its penetration of terrorist groups. “In principle, we don’t attack or kill them immediately. Instead, we embed ourselves in them and only at the opportune moment do we move.” Describing the process of planting embeds in terrorist organizations as “complex,” Mamlouk said the result had yielded been the detention of scores of terrorists, stamping out terror cells, and stopping hundreds of terrorists from entering Iraq. Mamlouk acknowledged some terrorists were still slipping into Iraq from Syria. “By all means we will continue to do all this, but if we start cooperation with you it will lead to better results and we can better protect our interests,” he concluded.

7. (S/NF) According to Mamlouk, Syria’s previous experience in cooperating with the U.S. on intelligence “was not a happy one.” He stated Syria hoped any future cooperation would be “on an equal basis.” Mamlouk specified this meant Syria should be allowed to “take the lead” on anti-terrorism efforts. Alluding to the “wealth of information” Syria has obtained while penetrating terrorist groups, Mamlouk declared “we have a lot of experience and know these groups. This is our area, and we know it. We are on the ground, and so we should take the lead.”

POSSIBLE COOPERATION ON IRAQ

8. (S/NF) Mamlouk identified Iraqi border security as an area where Syria and the U.S. could cooperate. He described Syria as ready to move forward on tripartite border security talks, but added “we are at a freezing point until after the Iraqi elections” scheduled for March. Mamlouk added that cooperation on Iraqi border security could lead to cooperation in other areas.

9. (S/NF) Benjamin, noting the importance of achieving a secure and stable Iraq, stated an important measure of progress on this subject is further success on reducing the flow of foreign fighters and cracking down on their facilitators. Mamlouk said the foreign fighters come from a large number of Arab and Muslim countries and that the Syrians detain “large numbers plus their local facilitators.” As an example, Mamlouk said he handed over 23 Saudis detained in Syria to Saudi Prince Muqrin last year. Benjamin commended Mamlouk on reducing the flow of foreign fighters,

while encouraging further progress. Miqdad interjected that the issue of foreign fighters using Syrian soil is a matter of national security for Syria. “We have zero tolerance,” he said. Miqdad said Syria needs the cooperation of other countries, namely those from which the terrorists are coming. “If we can close this circle – with us, you, and other countries – we will succeed,” he concluded.

10. (S/NF) Miqdad added that Syrian/Lebanese border security is also a subject on which the SARG is making progress. Stating “the past is behind us,” Miqdad said Syria is attempting to assist the Lebanese on security at ports and at the border without interfering in internal Lebanese affairs.

UPDATE ON TERRORIST NAMES PROVIDED BY USG

11. (S/NF) Alluding to previous USG requests for assistance on tracking down terrorists thought to be in Syria, the Syrian side stressed that intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and Syria should not be solely based on receiving names of terrorist suspects from the USG and checking up on those individuals. However, Mamlouk confirmed that Syria could verify the specific whereabouts of several individuals who had been discussed in previous meetings with SARG officials.

MIQDAD WANTS POLITICAL UMBRELLA TO GUIDE SECURITY COOPERATION

12. (S/NF) Following Mamlouk’s statements regarding possible security and intelligence cooperation, Miqdad stated he wanted to emphasize three points. First, Miqdad said that because of Syria’s “wealth of information” on following 30 years of facing security threats from takfiri groups, Syria must be able to take the lead in any joint efforts. Second, the Vice Foreign Minister said politics are an integral part of combating terrorism and warned that listing Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism and including Syria on the list of 14 countries for enhanced screening by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) created a “contradiction” when the U.S. subsequently requested cooperation with Syria against terrorism. Miqdad stressed a “political umbrella” of improved U.S.-Syrian bilateral relations should facilitate counterterrorism cooperation.

13. (S/NF) Third, Miqdad stated convincing the Syrian people to support cooperation with the U.S. would hinge on progress on economic sanctions against Syria, including spare parts for airplanes and a plane for President Asad. The Vice Foreign Minister said the Syrians wanted these efforts “accelerated.” Miqdad specifically requested the USG reach out to Lufthansa Technik and “assure them of no negative consequences” if they cooperate with Syrian requests to have the purchase of spare aircraft parts approved. In response, Benjamin said the Obama administration viewed counterterrorism as a vital concern but, unlike its predecessor, it did not see counterterrorism as something that was separate from the rest of U.S. foreign policy or the sole driver of U.S. foreign policy. Rather, it was part of the fabric of policy, and the administration recognized that progress in bilateral relations would involve coordinated moves in a number of areas. Benjamin added the U.S. expected that the Syrian people would see the benefits of closer relations.

14. (S/NF) Miqdad also encouraged the U.S. to reconsider including Syria on the TSA’s list for enhanced screening, and praised U/S Burns for informing the SARG that the U.S. was prepared to lift its block on Syrian accession to the World Trade Organization. “In summary, President Asad wants cooperation, we should take the lead on that cooperation, and don’t put us on your lists,” Miqdad declared.

DHS BRIEFING

15. (S/NF) Benjamin and Heyman underscored that the TSA’s enhanced screening requirements protected travelers of all nationalities, and that the TSA does not target Syrians but applies to all travelers, including American citizens, coming to the U.S. from or through the listed countries.

16. (S/NF) A/S Heyman provided the Syrians with a brief overview of DHS’s mission and activities, focusing in particular on its expertise in the management of ports, airports, and land borders. He noted DHS could explore with the SARG ways to meet international security standards at ports. This, in turn, could lead to enhanced trade and travel between the two countries, and reduce obstacles to shipping between the U.S. and Syria. Heyman said the Coast Guard was prepared to send a team to Syria to work on port security with their Syrian counterparts. This type of activity could lead to measures that reduced costs and lowered barriers to shipping. General Mamlouk said the SARG would study the proposed Coast Guard visit.

UPCOMING VISITS

17. (S/NF) Highlighting the importance of continued U.S.-Syrian dialogue on bilateral issues, Benjamin proposed a mid-March visit to Damascus by NEA A/S Feltman and NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Daniel Shapiro. Benjamin invited Miqdad to a subsequent visit to Washington in April. Miqdad spoke at length about his fondness for A/S Feltman, and thanked Benjamin for the invitation to visit Washington. Benjamin added he was ready to return to Damascus at the appropriate time. Mamlouk asked Benjamin what the agenda of his next visit would be, and Benjamin explained that it would depend on the outcome of the upcoming visits.

18. (C) U.S. participants: S/CT Coordinator Daniel Benjamin CDA Charles Hunter DHS A/S David Heyman NEA DAS Maura Connelly NSC Director for Lebanon and Syria Meaghen McDermott S/CT Staff Patrick Worman POL/ECON Jay Munir, notetaker

19. (C) Syrian participants: Vice Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad GID Director General Ali Mamlouk Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Mustapha MFA Americas’ Director Muhammad Khafif Miqdad Chief of Staff Husam Al’aa

20. (U) S/CT Benjamin cleared this message.

HUNTER

— WAARSCHUWING —

Sinds afgelopen weekend is een dubieuze mirror-site actief die zich voordoet als pro-Israël met een christelijk sausje. Deze website kwamen wij op het spoor, omdat zij onze artikelen publiceren zonder acht te geven op onze voorwaarden waaronder onze artikelen op andere sites gepubliceerd mogen worden. Omdat zij onze voorwaarden niet respecteren overtreden zij de copyright van onze artikelen. Ook imiteren zij de uitstraling van onze website op één van hun sites. Het doel hiervan is om over te komen als een betrouwbare en deskundige site, maar dan wel om zo snel mogelijk geld te verdienen aan hun mirror-sites door middel van bedrog.

Zij publiceren artikelen van onze website, CrethiPlethi.com, waar ons auteursrecht op rust, maar presenteren zichzelf als de auteur van het artikel en als de website waar het artikel als eerste is gepubliceerd. En in ieder geval wekken ze deze indruk bij de lezers, omdat ze niet volgens de regels linken naar het originele artikel en de originele auteur van het artikel niet noemen. Daarnaast mogen onze artikelen niet opnieuw gepubliceerd worden op websites die commerciële belangen nastreven, omdat wij een niet-commerciële organisatie zijn.

Vanwege dit feit en vanwege het feit dat er geen reactie komt op onze emails met verzoeken om te voldoen aan onze voorwaarden, zijn wij wat dieper in deze zaak gedoken. Uit bronnen op internet blijkt dat de mensen achter deze site mogelijk in verband kunnen worden gebracht met spammers en met fondswerving en met andere dubieuze sites waarmee grof geld verdiend kan worden. Er zijn tal van waarschuwingen tegen deze sites, bijvoorbeeld: “De spammers achter onzestem zijn ook berucht voor hun kinderkleertjes en pr0nsitesspam.” (Nujij.nl en zie ook deze en deze). Deze spammers lijken eerder te horen bij anti-Israëlische netwerken en geldklopperij-sites dan met pro-Israëlische netwerken. De aard van de websites komen overeen met snel geld verdienen (spammen en fondsen werven), dit met smoesjes over gecrashte servers, de kosten van het onderhouden van een website en een christelijk vernisje erover heen. Kenmerken van hun websites: beperkte tijd actief, veel reclame en vragen om donaties, weinig openheid, zeer beperkte contact mogelijkheden, anonieme uitstraling, weinig eigen werk op hun sites, geen reactie op emails).

onzestem com (geregistreerd op 11-Aug-2010 door Erich Brink in Spanje; IP: 91.199.120.9; IP Location: Madrid, Spain).
onzestem eu (IP: 193.202.110.107; IP Location: Kiev, Ukraine en Kopenhagen, Denmark)
onzestem blogspot com

Volgens het profiel op blogspot hebben ze nog meer sites:

numberonepromos blogspot com (Number One Music)
no1entertainment xtreemhost com (Number one entertainment met reclame en vooral vragen om geld)

Of google maar eens op:

no1tube xtreemhost com

Wij hebben enkele email-adressen te pakken gekregen. Daarnaast presenteert iemand zich als vertegenwoordiger van één van deze sites met de naam ‘Erlise’:

info@onzestem.com
info@onzestem.eu
numberonelifestyle@gmail.com (email op naam van Erich Brink). Wij nodigen u uit hen te emailen en naar hun ‘geloofsbrieven’ te vragen.

Wij willen benadrukken dat wij niet bij deze sites betrokken zijn en dat wij dit initiatief op geen enkele manier ondersteunen of hier iets mee te maken hebben. Omdat wij weinig behoefte hebben om veel reclame te maken voor deze websites, noemen wij ze slechts een enkele keer (en ongelinkt) en zult u verder uw eigen onderzoek moeten verrichten op internet.

Wij raden u aan om voorzichtig te zijn in het gebruik van deze sites, zowel in het bezoeken van de sites als ook in het doneren van geld en in het geven van informatie. U weet namelijk niet zeker wie of wat er schuil gaat achter dit initiatief. In dit verband willen we er op wijzen dat alle bovenstaande drie sites geen contact-formulier en geen email-contact aanbieden (Update: op de donatie-pagina (hoe kan het ook anders) van één van de sites wordt een email genoemd).

Wij hebben de ons beschikbare informatie doorgegeven aan betrouwbare websites en personen binnen ons netwerk. Er wordt op deze manier openbaarheid gegeven aan deze zaak en daarnaast bundelen we onze informatie en kan verder onderzoek plaatsvinden. Daarnaast zullen we de autoriteiten inlichten over eventuele strafbare feiten.

En wij gaan gewoon door op de ingeslagen weg. Wij zijn sinds 9 oktober 2009 bezig in het ontwikkelen en verfijnen van onze netwerken en diensten en wij blijven u via onze website en organisatie voorzien van kwalitatief goede artikelen met achtergrond informatie over het Midden Oosten zoals u dat van ons gewend bent.

Dit bericht is gepubliceerd op maandag 6 december 2010 (en geupdate op dinsdag 7 december) en de gegevens in dit bericht zijn actueel totdat wij dit bericht verwijderen of aanpassen. Als u wilt reageren op dit bericht dan gaarne via ons contact-formulier. Als u meer informatie hebt over de personen achter deze sites, ontvangen wij die graag. Uw informatie zal vertrouwelijk behandeld worden.