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Sun, May 08, 2011 | WikiLeaks: Part 1 and Part 2

WikiLeaks: The Muslim Brothers in Syria: Could They Win an Election here?

Part 1: This is the first of two cables that assess the potential political influence of the Muslim Brothers in Syria.

In the wake of former VP Khaddam’s flirtation with the Muslim Brotherhood’s exiled leadership in January, and Hamas’s recent electoral victory in the Palestinian territories, many observers of the Syrian political scene are asking themselves what kind of political power (or potential) the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist elements have here in Syria. While there has been a rise in Islamism (with some fundamentalism) in Syria in the past 20 years, we assess that the potential political influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria has been exaggerated. Putting aside likely continued SARG opposition, the most striking constraint on the potential appeal of any repackaged Muslim Brotherhood grouping is the heavy minority make-up (35 percent) of the Syrian population that is generally opposed to any Islamist domination.

Part 2: This is the second of two cables that assess the potential power of the Muslim Brothers in Syria.

Most estimates of potential Muslim Brother support range between ten and thirty percent of the Syrian population, with many contacts insisting that even these estimates are inflated. Nonetheless, a non-MB, moderate Islamist political bloc, possibly allied with Syrian businessmen, which combines “the power of money” and “the Islamic street,” could do very well in any free elections in Syria (although current conditions indicate that the likelihood of such a scenario is fairly remote). Contacts insist that the Asad regime — highly unlikely to allow such elections — has contributed in a variety of ways to the perception of exaggerated potential influence of the Muslim Brothers in Syria.

Source: WikiLeaks

Part 1: Difficulties in Assessing Muslim Brotherhood Power; Constraints on MB Influence.

Reference ID: 06DAMASCUS517
Created: 2006-02-08 15:47
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Damascus

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KISL KDEM SY
SUBJECT: THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN SYRIA; PART I: COULD THEY WIN AN ELECTION HERE?

REF: 05 DAMASCUS 1377

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.

¶1. (U) This is the first of two cables that assess the potential political influence of the Muslim Brothers in Syria.

¶2. (U) PART I. DIFFICULTIES IN ASSESSING MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD POWER; CONSTRAINTS ON MB INFLUENCE

¶3. (C) Summary: In the wake of former VP Khaddam’s flirtation with the Muslim Brotherhood’s exiled leadership in January, and Hamas’s recent electoral victory in the Palestinian territories, many observers of the Syrian political scene are asking themselves what kind of political power (or potential) the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist elements have here in Syria. While there has been a rise in Islamism (with some fundamentalism) in Syria in the past 20 years, we assess that the potential political influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria has been exaggerated. Putting aside likely continued SARG opposition, the most striking constraint on the potential appeal of any repackaged Muslim Brotherhood grouping is the heavy minority make-up (35 percent) of the Syrian population that is generally opposed to any Islamist domination. End Summary.

¶4. (C) TALKING ONLY THEORETICALLY:
It is difficult to assess clearly the potential power of the Muslim Brothers at a time when the Asad regime has destroyed the movement and engages in ongoing repression (and reinforcement of the exiled status of the MB’s leadership) to ensure they are not able to rebuild. It is also difficult to assess their potential support relative to other political currents in Syria, such as pan-Arabism, Syrian nationalism, and Ba’athism, given the current lack of free and fair elections. When asked about the power of the Muslim Brothers, interlocutors often inquire whether one is considering a situation “of full democracy” or one in which the regime still controls elections and the political environment. In free and fair elections, some type of Islamist political current would almost certainly play a major role in Syria, although it is doubtful that the Muslim Brothers could reconstitute themselves to assume that role, given present conditions.

¶5. (C) VARIOUS SCENARIOS TO CONSIDER:
Observers assert that if the regime were still in control of the electoral process but wanted to make a show of free elections, it would manipulate the situation, as in Egypt, to win and to show that their chief rivals were extremist MB-type Islamists. Some note, in addition, that a sudden collapse of the Asad regime, possibly caused by outside intervention, might remove some of the natural restraints on an MB resurgence. The result could be a sudden spike in MB/radical Islamist power, which would likely be nourished by the group’s takeover — from discredited collaborationist Islamic clerics — of the extensive network of mosques and other Islamic institutions present in Syria. The more likely scenario for the 2007 elections is that the regime allows new political parties but prohibits any based on religion (or ethnic factors), preventing an Islamist bloc from forming, whether a conservative, MB-dominated one or a more moderate Islamic bloc exluding the MB (and possibly allied with some Sunni businessmen).

¶6. (C) MB PARTY ORGANIZATION COMPLETELY DESTROYED:
The influence of the Muslim Brothers is limited nowadays because they are weak on the ground in Syria. The SARG destroyed their political organization in the early 1980’s and they have not recovered because of ongoing SARG repression. An entire network of competing Islamic institutions and personalities now exists in Syria, which would oppose any reasserting of Muslim Brother influence, noted moderate Islamist and MP XXXXXXXXXXXX (although many in this network, including XXXXXXXXXXXX, support allowing the MB to return to Syria). In addition, the efforts of Muslim Brother leaders in exile to moderate their positions to make them more politically attractive in Syria (and less threatening to minorities and to the regime) has reinforced a perception that they are opportunistic, cannot be trusted, and will say anything to augment their influence. Their recent flirtation with former Syrian VP Khaddam has reinforced this widely shared perception of their opportunism.

¶7. (C) OTHER CONSTRAINING FACTORS:
In addition to SARG repression, there are some natural constraints on the ability of Islamist groups like the MB to dominate Syrian politics. There is a developed tradition of nationalist politics in Syria, some of it pan-Syrian, some of it pan-Arab, some of it practiced by former communists. Much of it has been dominated in the past by, for example, Christian political figures and intellectuals. Hence, there is a tradition of minority politicians attracting Sunni Arab voters, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, a Christian MP from Damascus who depends on Sunni Arab voters for some of his mandate. (Note: He belongs to an offshoot of the secular Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party.) Political dissident XXXXXXXXXXXX put it somewhat differently to PolChief, noting that “our society is predominantly Islamic, but our politics have always been diverse. I am a Sunni, but a Communist.”

¶8. (C) THIRD OF POPULATION ANTI-ISLAMIST MINORITIES:
Most observers assess that the potential power of the Muslim Brothers (and other similarly inclined Islamist political groups) in Syria will also be constrained because of Syria’s population mosaic. They note that minorities constitute at least 35 percent of the Syrian population. Although 75 percent of the population is Sunni, ten percent of that total is Kurdish, rather than Arab. The Kurdish population, in general, identifies more with strains of Kurdish nationalism than with Sunni politics and considers itself part of the minority population of Syria, along with Christians (ten percent), Druze (three percent), Alawites (12 percent), and smaller groups, including Shiites, Ismailis, Yazidis, and others. In greater Damascus alone there are some one million Christians, representing 20 percent of that important population center.

¶9. C) Although some of these minorities are Muslim, all oppose Sunni Arab domination and would not support any conservative Islamist political current dominated by a group like the Muslim Brotherhood. (Note: In the Palestinian territories, by point of contrast, where Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brothers, recently won an overwhelming political victory, Sunni Arabs make up some 97 percent of the Palestinian population.)

¶10. (C) CLEAVAGES IN ANY ISLAMIST BLOC?:
Politicians and other observers disagree about the potential level of support for an Islamist bloc. Some, such as MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, posit relatively high overall potential support for overtly Islamic political alternatives (up to 50 percent of potential voters), while others, like former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, provide lower assessments of the size of any potential Islamic current. Nonetheless, many point to significant cleavages within this potential bloc of (largely Sunni Arab) voters. XXXXXXXXXXXX points to divisions between conservative Muslims, reform-oriented Muslims, secular Sunnis, and a tiny segment (one percent or less) of fundamentalists (with only a minority of them advocating violence). Others like XXXXXXXXXXXX (and former political prisoner) XXXXXXXXXXXX say that fundamentalists probably represent a larger group, perhaps as much as ten percent of the total, but concur that significant cleavages exist and that elections would compel competition among these groups for Muslim voters.

¶11. (C) MUSLIM-MINORITY COALITIONS CREATING SPLITS?:
There is also a long tradition in Syrian politics of Sunni politicians straddling cleavages between these different Muslim tendencies, for individual political gain, and a related tradition of these politicians building individual coalitions with non-Muslim voting blocs (who would oppose any Sunni Islamist domination). These traditions, according to former MP XXXXXXXXXXXX (a Sunni politician well-practiced in both traditions), could exacerbate existing cleavages in any potential Islamist bloc.

¶12. (C) SYRIAN POLITICAL TRADITION ALSO A LIMITING FACTOR:
Modern Syrian political history and tradition also point away from any MB/radical Islamist takeover in future elections. While the MB or their forerunners have been around in Syria since the 1920’s, they have never been very successful in Syrian politics, and certainly have never come close to attaining a majority in any election, note observers such as historian XXXXXXXXXXXX and dissident XXXXXXXXXXXX. Also, Sunni political and business elites, who tend to have community influence through their employment power and prestige far beyond their actual numbers, have no tradition of supporting calls for the full implementation of Sharia law or the formation of an Islamic state. Finally, there is no history of a decades-long foreign military occupation of the type endured by Palestinians that would radicalize the Syrian population, added XXXXXXXXXXXX.

¶13. (C) AS IS DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAM IN SYRIA:
In addition, Islam in modern Syria (unlike in neighboring Turkey, with its decades-long Kemalist tradition in the early 20th century of official suppression of Islam) has been allowed to flourish and develop at its own pace, notes xxxxxxxx. This has allowed moderate, dissident, and skeptical tendencies within the Islamic community to develop and provide buffers against radical Islamic doctrine. There have also been no violent societal upheavals, of the kind that Iraq has recently witnessed, that would encourage frightened, mass lurches towards more extreme Islamic tendencies, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.

SECHE

Source: WikiLeaks

Part 2: Reasons for the Exaggerated Estimates of Muslim Brotherhood Influence.

Reference ID: 06DAMASCUS531
Created: 2006-02-09 16:06
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Damascus

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SUBJECT: THE MUSLIM BROTHERS IN SYRIA, PART II: COULD THEY WIN AN ELECTION HERE?

REF: A) DAMASCUS 0517 B) 05 DAMASCUS 1231 C) 05 DAMASCUS 1286 D) 05 DAMASCUS 1377

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.

¶1. (U) This is the second of two cables that assess the potential power of the Muslim Brothers in Syria.

¶2. (U) PART II. REASONS FOR THE EXAGGERATED ESTIMATES OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD INFLUENCE

¶3. (C) Summary: Most estimates of potential Muslim Brother support range between ten and thirty percent of the Syrian population, with many contacts insisting that even these estimates are inflated. Nonetheless, a non-MB, moderate Islamist political bloc, possibly allied with Syrian businessmen, which combines “the power of money” and “the Islamic street,” could do very well in any free elections in Syria (although current conditions indicate that the
likelihood of such a scenario is fairly remote). Contacts insist that the Asad regime — highly unlikely to allow such elections — has contributed in a variety of ways to the perception of exaggerated potential influence of the Muslim Brothers in Syria. End Summary.

¶4. (C) MB/SIMILAR-GROUPING SEEN TAKING 10-30 PERCENT:
Taking into account minority demographics (35 percent of the Syrian population), Islamist cleavages, and other details (see Ref A), most observers here assess that the Muslim Brothers, or another Islamist group representing them, could attract a maximum of 30 percent support in Syria. Many, like recently released Damascus Spring detainee XXXXXXXXXXXX (who had a dalliance with the MB for a year in the mid 1960’s and knows them well) argue that an MB-oriented political grouping in Syria would get no more than ten percent.

¶5. (C) MINORITY VOTE COULD BLOCK EXTREMISTS:
While most agree that Syria’s compact minorities could and would prevent any MB or other radical Islamist electoral takeover (assuming free elections), there is less consensus about the impact of this minority vote if a more moderate Islamic bloc, led by the current Islamic establishment, allied itself politically with merchant/business elites in the major cities. Political observers as diverse as XXXXXXXXXXXX, a influential Sunni sheikh at the XXXXXXXXXXXX institute, and XXXXXXXXXXXX, a Christian Ba’athist reformer, insist that a moderate Islamist-businessmen bloc (not including the MB or other radicals) would be unbeatable in any free elections because of the combination of money and “the Islamic street.” That Islamic street would be controlled by the Islamic network of mosques and institutes run by people like XXXXXXXXXXXX and establishment Sunni sheikhs. XXXXXXXXXXXX insists that while that the Christians, for example, would not vote for “the Islamists,” they would, under the influence of money and advertising, vote for “the merchants.” (Comment: We have received no indication from our business contacts that such a political coalition is viewed as viable at the present time.)

¶6. (C) EXAGGERATION OF MB POWER CONTINUES:
Despite the constraining factors, the potential electoralappeal of the Muslim Brotherhood (or some repackaged party resembling it) continues to elicit fear and exaggerated assessments of what would happen in any democratic scenario in Syria. One generally well-informed contact insisted that MB support in any free elections “would be massive.” These assessments have been buttressed by alarmist scenarios that fundamentalism is somehow “taking over” in Syria. Much of the exaggeration has been unintentional, while some of it (from quarters sympathetic to the SARG) has been deliberate.

¶7. (C) EXAGGERATION FED BY RISE OF ISLAMISM:
A critical element leading to this exaggeration has been the Islamist revival that has occurred in Syria, as it has throughout much of the Arab world over the past few decades. A small part of that growth in religious feeling, as reflected in Syria, has been fundamentalist in nature, fed by SARG despotism, economic despair, the conflict in Palestine, revulsion at regime cronyism and corruption, and other factors including, more recently, the war in Iraq and the sense among some in the Muslim community that the U.S.-led war against terror represents part of a “crusade against Islam.” Some fundamentalist groups have taken up arms in Syria (usually as a part of efforts to join the insurgency in Iraq) and in the past year, have been exposed to episodic, violent SARG crackdowns. (Note: The most recent incident occurred in early February, on the outskirts of Damascus, with SARG security forces reportedly killing one armed fundamentalist and confiscating weapons and explosives.)

¶8. (C) However, most of that Islamist wave in Syria has not been violent or even fundamentalist. It is true that the number of people attending Friday prayers seems to have risen substantially, that the number of young women wearing the Islamic scarf (hijab) continues to increase at a similar rate, and that Islam in general is a more powerful force in public life in Syria than it was 40 years ago (for a review of this rise in Islamist sentiment in Syria, see refs A, B, and C.)

¶9. (C) MB POWER EXAGGERATED BY LACK OF FREEDOM:
There are other factors that have also contributed to the exaggerated sense of potential political power of the Muslim Brothers. Many argue that over forty years of authoritarian Ba’athist rule have contributed to this exaggerated sense of how powerful the Muslim Brothers must be. According to Christian MP XXXXXXXXXXXX, Syrian political players do not fear the Islamists. If there were freedom and elections, their real weaknesses would show. In XXXXXXXXXXXX’s view, academics and journalists, among others, have misread the Syrian political scene in making their assessments of the MB’s power. Dissident XXXXXXXXXXXX concurs, noting that “in the shadow of freedom, they are weak. They can’t really do politics. They have no political program,” as opposed to a religious agenda, he insisted. According to human rights activist XXXXXXXXXXXX, if the MB were as powerful as many think, they would not have repeatedly altered their political program towards less extreme positions to try to make themselves more palatable to Syrians.

¶10. (C) Contacts assert that the maximalist projections of MB potential power are based on current assessments of the appeal of Islam in Syrian society today and are inevitably inflated because the SARG has systematically suppressed any secular political or cultural organizing. As XXXXXXXXXXXX notes, “there are 10,000 mosques in Syria where Muslims can gather at will to discuss issues. If I get together with five secular people in my home, the government breaks it up and threatens to arrest people.” According to this view, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic trends in Syria have profited from a situation of tolerance for “anything Islamic” in society (except overt political organizing) and intolerance for anything secular. Even the assessment that the Muslim Brotherhood — or some repackaged grouping that would include them — could get as much as 30 percent of the vote in any free election held is false, argue many, caused by the media, by the government, and by the “forced absence” of secular forces. Recently released Damascus Spring detainee XXXXXXXXXXXX, with a background in pan-Arabist politics, assessed that whatever vote total the Muslim Brotherhood received in any initial free elections (he posited 20-25 percent), that support would drop by 50 percent in subsequent elections, in the face of democratization and political competition from secular groups once again able to organize on a level playing field.

¶11. (C) REGIME ALSO CONTRIBUTING:
While most observers would agree that political despotism has quietly nourished conservative Islamist political tendencies, others see a more active SARG hand, led by the security services, manipulating the internal scene to encourage the perception that only the secular Asad regime stands between a takeover by the Islamist hordes. Most observers point out that the rise in Islamism in Syria has occurred under a secular government that is carefully manipulating Islamist tendencies — as it did in the run-up to the February 4 riots in Damascus — to send the message to the West that the Asad regime is a bulwark against a fundamentalist takeover. While the SARG is focused and relatively aggressive in its efforts to suppress armed fundamentalists in Syria, some contacts insist that the security services regularly meet separately with different groups, encouraging fundamentalist tendencies on the one hand, for example (while suppressing them — even violently — on the other), or pressing religious leaders to push a certain message in the mosques (while SARG officials position themselves to appear as secularists struggling to counter a surge of religious conservatism).

SECHE