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Mon, Feb 07, 2011 | WikiLeaks

Eleven people have appeared in court in the southern province of Gaziantep in a series of hearings regarding alleged Hizbullah members. Detainees include four people who are the heads of a variety of nongovernmental organizations. (Hurriyetdailynews; DHA photo)

WikiLeaks: Turkey, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism

Combating terrorism has long been a priority for the Government of Turkey (GOT). In its early and strong support of the coalition in the global war against terror and its subsequent taking-over of ISAF leadership, the GOT has reaffirmed its commitment to fighting domestic and international terrorism.

Source: WikiLeaks

2002-11-15 T12:40:00

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 008305

S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2012
TAGS: PTER, TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: 2002 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT
REF: STATE 201772

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM ROBERT S. DEUTSCH; REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)
.

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OVERVIEW

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2. (U) COMBATING TERRORISM HAS LONG BEEN A PRIORITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY (GOT). IN ITS EARLY AND STRONG SUPPORT OF THE COALITION IN THE GLOBAL WAR AGAINST TERROR AND ITS SUBSEQUENT TAKING-OVER OF ISAF LEADERSHIP, THE GOT HAS REAFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO FIGHTING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. DOMESTIC AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE TARGETED TURKS AND FOREIGNERS, OCCASIONALLY INCLUDING USG PERSONNEL, FOR OVER 40 YEARS. INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS OPERATING IN TURKEY INCLUDE MARXIST-LENINIST, RADICAL ISLAMIST, SEPARATIST, AND PRO-CHECHEN. IN RESPONSE TO THESE THREATS, GOT HAS DEVELOPED BOTH STRONG DETERMINATION AND THE CAPABILITY TO FIGHT TERRORISM. TURKEY CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE USG’S INTERNATIONAL, COORDINATED APPROACH.

3. (U) FOLLOWING SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, TURKEY’S INTERNAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ALTERED THEIR OPERATING PROCEDURES. WITH THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION STRONGLY AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE GLOBAL COALITION INCREASING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, THESE ORGANIZATIONS ENTERED INTO A PERIOD OF LITTLE OR NO ACTION. ACTING AS INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, MANY OF THESE GROUPS HAVE REVERTED TO RECRUITMENT OF SUPPORTERS AND STRATEGY PLANNING. U.S. DESIGNATED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

4. (U) ON OCTOBER 8, 1997, THE SECRETARY OF STATE NAMED THE SEPARATIST KURDISTAN WORKERS’ PARTY (PKK) AND THE MARXIST-LENINIST REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE’S PARTY/FRONT (DHKP/C, FORMERLY KNOWN AS REVOLUTIONARY LEFT, DEV-SOL), MAKING THEM SUBJECT TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996. ON OCTOBER 11, 2001, THE SECRETARY OF STATE RENEWED THOSE DESIGNATIONS FOR ANOTHER TWO YEARS. (THE PKK HAS SINCE CHANGED ITS NAME TO THE KURDISTAN FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY CONGRESS, KADEK.) MARXIST-LENINIST

5. (U) THE MAIN RADICAL-LEFT TERROR ORGANIZATION, DHKP/C, CONDUCTS SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS AGAINST TURKS AND FOREIGNERS ALIKE (ARMED ATTACKS ON UNIFORMED POLICE, SUICIDE AND OTHER BOMBINGS, ASSASSINATIONS). THIS ORGANIZATION HAS NOT CONDUCTED ANY MAJOR EVENTS WITHIN TURKEY IN 2002, ALTHOUGH IT CONTINUES TO ORGANIZE ITSELF, PREDOMINANTLY WITHIN EUROPE. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, DHKP/C COOPERATES WITH OTHER GROUPS IN EUROPE BY PROVIDING SUPPORT, SHELTER, AND ARMS TO EACH OTHER’S ORGANIZATIONS. TURKISH AUTHORITIES SEIZED DHKP/C WEAPONS FROM A CAR AT THE KAPIKULE BORDER IN SEPTEMBER 2002. THESE WEAPONS WERE SUPPOSED TO BE USED IN OPERATIONS CAUSING DISTURBANCES PRIOR TO THE TURKISH NATIONAL ELECTIONS HELD IN NOVEMBER 2002.

6. (U) OTHER FAR-LEFT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS STILL ACTIVE INCLUDE THE TURKISH COMMUNIST PARTY/MARXIST-LENINIST (TKP/ML), THE TURKISH WORKERS’ AND PEASANTS LIBERATION ARMY (TIKKO), AND THE MARXIST-LENINIST COMMUNIST PARTY (MLKP). TKP/ML AND TIKKO PRIMARILY OPERATE IN THE AREAS OF ORDU, TOKAT, AND SAMSUN. MLKP CONDUCTS SMALL-SCALE TERRORIST OPERATIONS, USUALLY USING PIPE BOMBS, WITHIN METROPOLITAN AREAS. RADICAL ISLAMIST

7. (U) THE PRIME, RADICAL ISLAMIST TERROR GROUP OF TURKEY IS THE TURKISH HIZBULLAH. ALTHOUGH KNOWN TO FIGHT RIVALS, NAMELY THE PKK AND OTHER RIVAL ISLAMIC GROUPS, IN FAVOR OF CONFRONTATIONS WITH AUTHORITIES, TURKISH HIZBULLAH HAS NOT CARRIED OUT ANY MAJOR OPERATIONS IN 2002. IT STAGED A SPECTACULAR JANUARY 2001 AMBUSH IN DIYARBAKIR THAT TOOK THE LIFE OF DIYARBAKIR SECURITY DIRECTOR GAFFAR OKKAN AND FIVE OF HIS BODYGUARDS. TWO UNDERCOVER POLICE WERE KILLED IN ANOTHER HIZBULLAH ATTACK IN OCTOBER 2001. ACCORDING TO STATE AUTHORITIES, HIZBULLAH CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN ITS ACTIVITIES ON A THEORETICAL BASIS.

8. (U) OTHER ISLAMIC GROUPS INCLUDE THE GREAT EASTERN RAIDER’S FRONT (IBDA-C), FEDERAL ISLAMIC STATE OF ANATOLIA (KAPLANCILAR), SELAM GROUP, ISLAMIC MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION (IHO), THE JERUSALEM WARRIORS, SELEFILER, SOFULAR, AND BEYYIAT-I EL-IMAM. BOTH IBDA-C AND BEYYIAT-I EL-IMAM ARE KNOWN TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO AL QAIDA. SEPARATIST

9. (U) KADEK, FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE PKK, REPRESENTS THE LARGEST SEPARATIST ORGANIZATION GROUP IN TURKEY, THOUGH ITS CAPABILITY TO OPERATE HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED DUE TO VIGOROUS AND ON-GOING COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORTS OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES, JANDARMA, TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP), AND VILLAGE GUARDS (A PARAMILITARY GUARD FORCE RECRUITED FROM LOCAL VILLAGERS). THIS EFFORT ULTIMATELY LED TO THE ARREST AND CONVICTION OF PKK LEADER ABDULLAH OCALAN IN 1999. THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) DESIGNATED THE PKK A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN MAY 2002.

10. (U) IN APRIL 2002 THE GROUP UNDERWENT A RE-ORGANIZATION AND NAME CHANGE. RENAMED THE KURDISTAN FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY CONGRESS (KADEK), THE ORGANIZATION HAS EXPANDED ITS OPERATIONS BY FOCUSING UPON MORE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES. KADEK RETAINS THE SAME SYMBOL AND PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP OF THE PKK, THOUGH IT HAS EXPANDED THIS COUNCIL TO ELEVEN INSTEAD OF NINE MEMBERS. ACCORDING TO TURKISH GOVERNMENT EXPERTS AND NGOS, KADEK ALSO MAINTAINS APPROXIMATELY 500-ARMED MILITANTS IN TURKEY AND UP TO 5000 ARMED MILITANTS IN NORTHERN IRAQ. WHILE THE ORGANIZATION LARGELY CONTINUES TO FOLLOW THE PKK’S SELF-PROCLAIMED SEPTEMBER 1, 1999, CEASE-FIRE, IT HAS ISSUED WARNINGS VIA SUPPORTIVE NEWSPAPERS OF FUTURE ARMED ATTACKS IF CERTAIN ACTIONS ARE NOT TAKEN. SMALL CELLS AND SYMPATHIZERS REMAIN THROUGHOUT TURKEY, BUT THESE HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED TO THE POINT THAT LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, RATHER THAN THE MILITARY, OVERSEE MOST OPERATIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS. CHECHENS IN TURKEY

11. (U) IN APRIL 2002, MUSTAFA YILMAZ SEIZED THE MARMARA HOTEL IN ISTANBUL AND HELD 13 HOSTAGES FOR APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MINUTES UNTIL HE SURRENDERED WITHOUT INCIDENT. YILMAZ, WHO IS OF CHECHEN ORIGIN, IS BELIEVED TO HAVE STAGED THE RAID TO PROTEST RUSSIAN ACTIONS IN CHECHNYA. HE IS PRESENTLY IN CUSTODY AND ON TRIAL IN THE ISTANBUL BEYOGLU SECOND HEAVY CRIMINAL COURT UNDER A VARIETY OF CHARGES, ALTHOUGH NOT UNDER TURKEY’S TOUGH ANTI-TERROR LAW. THIS FOLLOWS AN APRIL 22, 2001, SEIZURE OF ISTANBUL’S SWISS HOTEL BY 13 PRO-CHECHEN TURKISH CITIZENS WHO HELD 150 HOSTAGES, INCLUDING 37 AMERICANS, FOR APPROXIMATELY 12 HOURS. LARGE NUMBERS OF TURKS, MANY WITH ROOTS IN THE CAUCASUS, ARE SYMPATHETIC TO CHECHEN AMBITIONS.

12. (U) THE CAPITALIZED TITLES BELOW CORRESPOND TO REFTEL QUESTIONS.

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GOT ACTIONS SUPPORTING THE GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM (A)

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13. (U) TURKISH SUPPORT FOLLOWING THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11 CEMENTED GOT’S COMMITTED POLICY ON FIGHTING TERROR. GOT ISSUED STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE ATTACKS. IN THE FACE OF STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION, PARLIAMENT, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PM ECEVIT, PASSED A RESOLUTION ALLOWING THE GOVERNMENT TO SEND TURKISH TROOPS ABROAD AND TO PERMIT THE STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON TURKISH SOIL IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). TURKEY WAS ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO ISAF AND ASSUMED THE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN JUNE 2002.

14. (U) THE ARREST OF THREE AL QAIDA SUSPECTS IN THE SOUTHEASTERN CITY OF VAN IN FEBRUARY 2002 AND ONE IN ISTANBUL IN AUGUST 2002 HIGHLIGHT TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM. FIRAS SULEYMAN, YUSUF SALIM HUSAYN, AND AHMAD MAHMUD WERE ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH ENTERING TURKEY ILLEGALLY VIA IRAN IN FEBRUARY 2002. MEMBERS OF BAYT AL-IMAM, A JORDANIAN GROUP WITH CLOSE TIES TO AL QAIDA, THE THREE MEN WERE FOUND TO HAVE MET AND RECEIVED MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM USAMA BIN LADEN AND HAD BEEN PLANNING BOMBING ATTACKS ON ISRAELI AND US TARGETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THESE MEN WERE RETURNED TO JORDAN IN SEPTEMBER 2002. AHMET ABDULLAH WAS ARRESTED IN ISTANBUL IN AUGUST 2002 AFTER AN OPERATION CONDUCTED BY THE ISTANBUL SECURITY FORCES BECAUSE OF HIS LINKS TO BAYT AL-IMAM.

15. (U) TURKEY HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH UN SECURITY RESOLUTION 1373, RATIFYING ALL UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON COMBATING TERRORISM. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAVE FROZEN THE ASSETS OF THOSE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, PERSONS, AND ENTITIES FOUND ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY ISSUING A DECREE TO FREEZE ALL FUNDS AND RELATED ASSETS. THE INITIAL DECREE, NO. 2001/2483, DATED DECEMBER 22, 2001, HAS BEEN UPDATED BY NO. 2002/3873, DATED MARCH 21, 2002, AND NO. 2002/4206, DATED MAY 16, 2002.

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RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM (B)

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16. (U) STATE SECURITY COURTS (DGM) IN EIGHT PROVINCES, WITH JURISDICTION FOR ALL CRIMES THAT FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE ANTI-TERROR LAW, TAKE A VIGOROUS APPROACH TOWARDS PROSECUTING TERROR-RELATED CRIMES. AVERAGE TRIAL TIMES RUN MORE THAN A YEAR, AND DEFENDANTS ARE USUALLY INCARCERATED DURING THEIR TRIALS.

17. (U) ABDULLAH OCALAN, THE LEADER OF THE PKK CONVICTED OF TREASON IN JUNE 1999 AND SENTENCED TO DEATH. FOLLOWING THE EU REFORM PACKAGE PASSED BY THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL PARLIAMENT IN AUGUST 2002 OUTLAWING THE DEATH PENALTY, OCALAN’S SENTENCE WAS CONVERTED TO LIFE IN PRISON.

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EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS (C/D)

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18. (U) IN 2002, THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY DID NOT SEEK THE EXTRADITION OF ANY SUSPECTS FROM THE UNITED STATES ON TERROR-RELATED CHARGES, NOR DID THE UNITED STATES SEEK THE EXTRADITION OF SUCH SUSPECTS FROM TURKEY. THERE ARE NO IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.

19. (U) IN THE PAST, TURKEY HAS FACED DIFFICULTY IN EXTRADITING TERROR-RELATED SUSPECTS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. ACCORDING TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, TURKEY HAS REQUESTED THE EXTRADITION OF 245 HIGH LEVEL ADMINISTRATORS FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1991. SYMPATHY WITH KURDISH POLITICAL AND CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS IN SOME EUROPEAN STATES, ALLEGATIONS OF TORTURE BY TURKISH OFFICIALS, AND TURKEY’S LEGAL PROVISION FOR THE DEATH PENALTY HAVE ALL PROVED IMPEDIMENTS TO SUCH EXTRADITIONS. HOWEVER, IN AUGUST 2002, AS A PART OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REFORM PACKAGE, THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT PASSED A LAW BANNING THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY.

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RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION (E)

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20. (U) TURKS SEE THEMSELVES TO BE AMONG THE WORLD’S PRIMARY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM. THEY CITE THE 15-YEAR INSURGENCY OF THE KURDISTAN WORKERS’ PARTY (PKK), AND THE WORLDWIDE ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TURKISH DIPLOMATS AND THEIR FAMILIES BY ARMENIAN ACTIVISTS OF THE 1970S AND 1980S. THEY HAVE LONG COMPLAINED ABOUT LIBERAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES’ HARBORING KURDISH (PKK), LEFTIST (DHKP-C) AND ISLAMIST (HIZBOLLAH, KAPLANISTS) “TERRORISTS.” THEY FEEL OTHER NATIONS DO NOT APPRECIATE TURKEY’S SUFFERING AT THE HANDS OF THESE PARTIES. THUS, THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT AND MEDIA WERE QUICK TO RESPOND TO THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11. AT ALL LEVELS, THERE WAS AN OUTPOURING OF SYMPATHY AND SOLIDARITY. BUT THERE WAS ALWAYS THE CONSTANT REMINDER THAT NOW OTHERS WERE BEGINNING TO EXPERIENCE WHAT TURKS HAD LIVED WITH FOR YEARS. TURKEY’S PRE-9/11 HISTORIC COOPERATION WITH THE US IN LAW ENFORCEMENT, MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS ONLY INCREASED IN THE LAST YEAR WITH PUBLIC COMMITMENTS OF SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM FROM THE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE MILITARY. THERE HAS BEEN VERY VISIBLE SUPPORT FOR THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS AT OUR MISSION’S BUILDINGS BY LOCAL POLICE. AS THE STORM BROKE ON THE NOVEMBER 17 ARRESTS IN GREECE, THERE WAS INTENSE COVERAGE WITH A NEW “I TOLD YOU SO” IMPLICATION IN THE GOVERNMENT PRINT MEDIA.

21. (U) THE TURKISH STAND ON TERRORISM HAS BEEN “SOFTER” IN THE CASE OF THE CHECHENS. CHECHENS ARE, OF COURSE, MUSLIMS AND THERE ARE CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN TURKS AND CHECHENS AND LONG TIME RIVALRY WITH RUSSIA. THE ARMED, BUT NOT VIOLENT, TAKEOVERS OF A FERRYBOAT IN 1996 AND A HOTEL IN 2001 IN ISTANBUL WERE TREATED MORE LIKE PROTESTS THAN LIKE TERRORIST ATTACKS BY THE MEDIA. THAT CHANGED WITH THE OCTOBER 23, 2002 CAPTURE OF A THEATER IN MOSCOW WITH OVER ONE HUNDRED DEAD. TURKEY DID CONDEMN THE HOSTAGE-TAKING, BUT WITH THE MEDIA STILL ADDRESSING THE SUFFERING OF THE CHECHEN PEOPLE.

22. (U) TURKEY HAS A FREE PRESS. IN THE LEFTIST AND ISLAMIC FRINGE PRESS, CHECHEN REBELS, PALESTINIAN SUICIDE BOMBERS AND EVEN AL QAIDA MEMBERS CAN BE PORTRAYED AS “FREEDOM FIGHTERS.” TERRORISM HAS LONG BEEN AN INTEREST OF ACADEMICS AND WRITERS IN TURKEY. IN RECENT YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL CONFERENCES ON THE TOPIC. THOSE ORGANIZED BY INSTITUTIONS OF THE STATE HAVE BEEN SEEN AS TOOLS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM. PRIVATELY-FUNDED ACADEMIC PROGRAMS HAVE BECOME MORE FOCUSED ON ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM.

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MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS BY THE GOT (F)

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23. (U) THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY CONTINUED ITS AGGRESSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN 2002. FOR EXAMPLE, IN A JOINT OPERATION, THE TURKISH CUSTOMS GUARD AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (MIT) SEIZED NINE KALASHINIKOV RIFLES AND ONE SCORPION ASSASSINATION PISTOL WITH SILENCER FROM A CAR AT THE KAPIKULE BORDER GATE IN SEPTEMBER 2002. THESE WEAPONS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO BE DELIVERED TO THE DHKP/C TO BE USED IN SUPPOSED OPERATIONS TO CREATE DISTURBANCES PRIOR TO THE TURKISH GENERAL ELECTIONS HELD IN NOVEMBER 2002.

24. (U) ADDITIONALLY, THE GOT APPREHENDED THREE SUSPECTED AL QAIDA OPERATIVES NEAR THE IRANIAN BORDER (NEAR VAN). THE GOT FOLLOWED UP BY ARRESTING DOCUMENT FORGERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE THREE, NEAR BURSA IN NORTHWESTERN TURKEY.

25. (U) THE GOT CONTINUES ITS ACTIVE SUPPRESSION OF THE PKK/KADEK, THOUGH ITS SECURITY OPERATIONS TEMPO HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED IN LINE WITH A REDUCTION IN THE CONFLICT. IT CONTINUES TO MONITOR THE ORGANIZATION’S POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN AN EFFORT TO STEM ANY POTENTIAL DISTURBANCES.

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GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (G)

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26. (U) THE GOT CONSISTENTLY AND STRONGLY OPPOSES BOTH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. TURKEY DOES NOT VIEW ITS MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC/COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, SUDAN, AND SYRIA AS CONSTITUTING SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

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SUPPORT STATEMENTS FOR TERRORIST COUNTRIES (H)

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27. (U) TURKEY SHARES BORDERS WITH, AND HAS BEEN AN HISTORIC TRADING PARTNER OF SYRIA, IRAN AND IRAQ. IT BALANCES A CONDEMNATION OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THOSE COUNTRIES (INCLUDING PROVIDING HAVENS FOR THE PKK) WITH THE NEED TO ACCESS HISTORIC TRADE ROUTES. THUS TURKEY WILL PROVIDE BASES FOR OPERATION NORTHERN WATCH WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SENDING LARGE TRADE DELEGATIONS TO BAGHDAD AND TEHRAN. PUBLIC STATEMENTS AGAINST STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM ARE CLEAR.

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SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN ATTITUDES TOWARDS TERRORISM (I)

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28. (U) SINCE THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, THE GOT HAS TAKEN AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE WORLDWIDE OPPOSITION AGAINST TERRORISM. IN MAY 2002 THE EUROPEAN UNION PLACED THE PKK AND DHKP/C ON ITS LIST OF TERRORIST GROUPS AFTER AN INTENSIVE PUSH BY THE GOT FOR THE EU TO ADOPT TOUGHER MEASURES AGAINST TURKISH TERROR GROUPS OPERATING IN EUROPE. IT CONTINUES TO PRESS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO RECOGNIZE KADEK AS THE SUCCESSOR OF THE PKK AND THUS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.

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USG COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH GOT (J)

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29. (U) TURKEY REMAINS A STAUNCH ALLY IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM. IN THE FACE OF STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION, PARLIAMENT, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF PM ECEVIT, PASSED A RESOLUTION ALLOWING THE GOVERNMENT TO SEND TURKISH TROOPS ABROAD AND TO PERMIT THE STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON TURKISH SOIL TO SUPPORT OEF. AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE RESOLUTION, TURKEY OFFERED A 90-MAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT FOR DUTY IN AFGHANISTAN. THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE (TNP) CONTINUE TO PROVIDE EXCELLENT PROTECTION OF US DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY FACILITIES THROUGHOUT TURKEY.

30. (U) IN 2002, TURKEY RATIFIED THE UN CONVENTION ON SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST FINANCING. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS CONVENTION, TURKEY ADDS TO ITS DOMESTIC ASSET FREEZE LIST ALL NAMES ADDED TO THE ASSET FREEZE LIST MAINTAINED BY THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE UNDER UNSCRS 1267 AND 1373.

31. (U) TURKEY IS ALSO AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN THE DEPARTMENT’S ANTI-TERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. SINCE 1999, THE TURKS ACCEPTED ELEVEN ATA COURSES, TO INCLUDE A SENIOR LEVEL FINANCIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF TERRORISM SEMINAR AND A FOLLOW-ON FINANCIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF TERRORISM SEMINAR FOR INVESTIGATORS. (INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT’S CLASSIFIED ANNEX)

32. (S) THE TURKISH MILITARY HAS ALSO OFFERED THE USE OF AN ADDITIONAL AIRBASE TO LIGHTEN THE LOAD ON INCIRLIK AFB AND EASED FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS TO EASE US SUPPORT OF FORCES OPERATING IN AFGHANISTAN. OTHER TURKISH ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF OEF INCLUDE: – ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO AUTHORIZE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS ABROAD AND STATIONING OF ADDITIONAL FOREIGN TROOPS IN TURKEY IN SUPPORT OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM; – ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES TO OFFER SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (OFFER OF 90) – ALLOWED THE US TO USE INCIRLIK AIR BASE AS THE KEY TRANSIT POINT FOR HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE (INCLUDING LETHAL MUNITIONS) TO THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND US SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN; – OFFERED THE USE OF ADDITIONAL AIR BASES IN TURKEY FOR OEF-RELATED OPERATIONS; – AUTHORIZED THE US TO USE INCIRLIK AIR BASE TO TRANSIT TALIBAN AND AL-QAIDA DETAINEES FROM AFGHANISTAN TO GTMO; – STREAMLINED CUSTOM PROCEDURES AND GRANTED BLANKET OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCES FOR US OEF-RELATED AIRCRAFT (OVER 5,000 FLIGHTS TO DATE); – PROVIDES KC-135 TANKER SUPPORT AND BASING FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM. TURKEY ALREADY HAS CONTRIBUTED CLOSE TO 80 KC-135 OEF-RELATED MISSIONS FROM TURKEY.

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COOPERATION-INVESTIGATION/PROSECUTION (K/1)

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(INFORMATION FOR THE REPORT’S CLASSIFIED ANNEX)

33. (C) THE MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TURKEY, WHICH ENTERED INTO FORCE IN JANUARY 1981, GOVERNS INVESTIGATIVE COOPERATION. THE GOT HAS PROCESSED REQUESTS FOR INVESTIGATIVE ACCESS TO EVIDENCE UNDER THIS TREATY. HOWEVER, IN SOME CASES THE GOT HAS LEFT REQUESTS UNANSWERED FOR OVER THREE YEARS. CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONTINUE IN AN EFFORT TO STREAMLINE THE PROCESS.

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COOPERATION-PREVENTION (K/2)

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34. (U) THE GOT COORDINATES CLOSELY WITH THE USG ON ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING INITIATIVES. IN RESPONSE TO USG REQUESTS TO FREEZE TERRORIST-RELATED FINANCIAL ASSETS, THE GOT HAS ADDED TO ITS DOMESTIC ASSET FREEZE LIST ALL NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS AND FIRMS RELATED TO UNSCRS 1267 AND 1373 (NAMES RELATED TO FINANCING OF TALIBAN AND AL-QAIDA.) THE GOT ALSO INVESTIGATES THESE NAMES AND FREEZES ASSETS FOUND IN TURKEY. TO DATE, THESE EFFORTS HAVE RESULTED IN FREEZING ABOUT USD 2 MILLION IN FINANCIAL ASSETS OWNED BY AN INDIVIDUAL ON AN USG EXECUTIVE ORDER FREEZE LIST. THE GOT IS REVIEWING THE POSSIBILITY OF AMENDING ITS LEGAL PROCESS FOR FREEZING FINANCIAL ASSETS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE QUICK REACTION TO NEW INFORMATION.

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COOPERATION DURING PAST FIVE YEARS- PREVENTION (L)

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35. (U) OVERALL, IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, THE GOT HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE USG IN THE APPREHENSION, CONVICTION, AND PUNISHMENT OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORIST ATTACKS IN TURKEY. GOT RESPONSE IS ALWAYS IMMEDIATE AND SUBSTANTIAL WHEN ALERTED TO THREAT OR INCIDENT INVOLVING US INTERESTS.

PEARSON