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Tue, Januari 2011 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6 and Document 7

WikiLeaks: U.S. Concerns over Transfer of Weapons to Middle East Regimes and Islamist Groups

The US is fighting a constant battle to stem the flow of arms from eastern Europe to terrorist groups and unstable regimes in the Middle East, US embassy cables leaked tonight revealed.

US officials are shown attempting to intervene in more than a dozen international arms deals which involved countries including Ukraine, Bulgaria, Armenia and China selling weapons to customers in Iran, Iraq, Yemen and south Sudan.

The secret WikiLeaks documents record American officials confronting Washington’s growing concern at arms proliferation in the Middle East in often frank exchanges with governments in the former Soviet states.

Document 1: U.S. diplomats learn of ‘Serbian arms sale to Yemen’.

Document 2: U.S. fears Yemen arms purchases could end up on the black market.

Document 3: Bulgaria works with U.S. to make Yemen arms shipment traceable.

Document 4: U.S. requests access to Yemen airspace to monitor arms smugglers.

Document 5: Armenian defence minister rebuked over arms sales to Iran.

Document 6: U.S. concerns over Iran’s transfer of Chinese weapons to Iraqi extremists.

Document 7: Van Diepen complains about the sale of potential ballistic missile parts to Iran.

Read related article “US fights flow of arms from eastern Europe to its enemies” in the Guardian here.

Source: WikiLeaks

Monday, 14 December 2009, 05:39

S E C R E T SANAA 002208
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD
DEPT FOR PM/WRA LFREEMAN
EO 12958 DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS ETTC, ECON, MARR, MASS, MCAP, PREL, PGOV, YI, BU, CY,
UK, LI, UNSC, YM
SUBJECT: ALLEGED ILLICIT SERBIAN ARMS SALE TO YEMENI
MILITARY, POSSIBLE UNSCR 1521 VIOLATION
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) A front company for Serbian illicit arms dealer Slobodan Tesic (alt. Tezic), XXXXXXXXXXXX, signed a USD 78 million arms contract with the Yemeni Ministry of Defense in early October 2009, to be delivered by early January 2010, according to the Bulgarian Embassy in Sana’a. The 34-page contract, an alleged copy of which was provided to EconOff by XXXXXXXXXXXX on December 7 and subsequently forwarded to State NEA/ARP and Washington analysts, details a package of small arms ammunition, heavy artillery ammunition, sniper rifles, demolition equipment, antiaircraft guns, and howitzers. The Bulgarian Embassy claims that XXXXXXXXXXXX, both named in the contract, are linked to Slobodan Tesic, a Serbian national listed in the travel ban annex to UNSC Resolution 1521. Tesic has made frequent trips to Yemen in the past year in connection to this contract, according to the Bulgarian Embassy. (Note: Sensitive USG reporting corroborates the claim that XXXXXXXXXXXX is a Tesic front company. End Note.) The XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff he was passing on information of the upcoming arms transfer, obtained through a Yemeni source in the ROYG Ministry of Defense, in the hopes of having the U.S. Government stop the sale and thus provide opportunities for Bulgarian arms manufacturers to supply similar equipment to the ROYG. The Cyprus address of record for XXXXXXXXXXXX

2. (S/NF) Below is the text of a one-page document on Slobodan Tesic and XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Bulgarian Embassy claims was produced by the Bulgarian national intelligence service. (Note: Post has no information on the alleged local agent mentioned in the document, XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Note.)

Begin text:

XXXXXXXXXXXX ) Cyprus

Serbian Off Shore Co. ) Registered in Cyprus and owned by the person SLOBODAN TESIC/TEZIC/ – Serbian national.

XXXXXXXXXXXX There is large list of crimes connecting with this man, supplying weapons for Iraq, Liberia etc., terrorist regimes.

XXXXXXXXXXXX has a power of attorney for the A/M company. He signed the contracts as XXXXXXXXXXXX

He has also British passport but he has no any official authorization or license issues by UK for trade with military items.

Mr. SLOBODAN TESIC tried to enter Bulgaria during 2005 but he was returned back to Serbia as he is in the ban list of UN.

Local agent in Yemen: XXXXXXXXXXXX

End text. SECHE

Source: WikiLeaks

Tuesday, 22 December 2009, 22:24

S E C R E T STATE 130330
NOFORN
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 12/22/2019
TAGS MARR, MCAP, MOPS, PARM, PINR, PREL, PTER, MASS
SUBJECT: USG POLICY TOWARD YEMENI ARMS ACQUISITIONS
REF: SANAA 002208
Classified By: NEA/ARP Director Andrew W. Steinfeld for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 6-8.

2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: We have received reports of an arms deal between the Yemeni Ministry of Defense and what is believed to be a front company for Serbian arms dealer Slobodan Tesic. This individual is designated under the travel ban under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1521 (2003) and its subsequent extensions for his assistance in providing arms to Liberia in violation of the UN arms embargo. Washington seeks to verify this reporting with the government of Yemen, and strongly urges Yemen not to deal with individuals designated by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. End Summary.

———-

BACKGROUND

———-

3. (S/NF) Intelligence reporting indicates that in early October the Yemeni Ministry of Defense signed a weapons deal with

, for $95 million in early October 2009, to be delivered by early January 2010. The scheduled delivery will include small arms ammunition, heavy artillery ammunition, sniper rifles, demolition equipment, anti-aircraft guns, and howitzers. Reporting indicates that

, both named in the contract, are linked to Serbian arms broker Slobodan Tesic, and that Tesic has made frequent trips to Yemen in the past year in connection with this contract. Tesic is designated in the travel ban annex of UNSCR 1521 for his assistance in providing arms to Liberia in violation of the UN arms embargo.

(S/NF) We have learned through sensitive reporting that Yemen may be pursuing sizable arms deals with several other Eastern European countries for $30 million to $55 million each. It is currently unclear if the Yemeni government is merely shopping around, or if the country is actually attempting to purchase several hundred million dollars in small arms for use against Houthi rebels. If the latter is true, we have concerns about stockpile security and the potential for these weapons to be diverted to Yemen,s robust black market.

———-

OBJECTIVES

———-

4. (S) Posts should seek to:

–Ascertain whether the Yemen Government is dealing with Slobodan Tesic.

–Discourage Yemen from working with individuals designated by United Nations travel bans.

–Note USG concerns about a possible small arms buildup in Yemen.

——————————-

ACTION REQUEST / TALKING POINTS

——————————-

5. (S) Post is requested to demarche host governments at the highest appropriate level to convey the following points to all action addressees:

BEGIN TALKING POINTS

SECRET/REL YEMEN

— The United States understands that you might be using a Serbian arms broker connected to Slobodan Tesic to procure arms.

— If this is true, you should know that Tesic is designated under a travel ban under UNSCR 1521 for his assistance in providing arms to Liberia in violation of the UN arms embargo.

— We would discourage your government from working with this individual, due to his UN designation and history of disreputable arms deals.

— In addition, it has been our understanding that, since 2005, your government was no longer using arms brokers to procure weapons for your military.

–While we recognize your right to acquire arms for your legitimate defense needs, we have concerns that any arms in excess of your requirements may fall into the black market. We encourage your government to be vigilant in securing your weapons stockpiles and reiterate our offer for a visit by the Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to provide a technical assessment to assist you in this effort.

——————

END TALKING POINTS

——————

———————

REPORTING REQUIREMENT

———————

6. (U) Post is asked to report results of its efforts.

—————–

POINTS OF CONTACT

—————–

7. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are XXXXXXXXXXXX , ISN/CATR and XXXXXXXXXXXX , NEA/ARP.

8. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. Please slug all responses for ISN, NEA, and T. CLINTON

Source: WikiLeaks

Friday, 15 January 2010, 12:43

C O N F I D E N T I A L SOFIA 000031
SIPDIS
ISN/CATR FOR MARGARET MITCHELL
EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2020
TAGS ETTC, MCAP, MOPS, PARM, PINR, PREL, PTER, MASS, YM
SUBJECT: BULGARIA ENHANCES END-USE MONITORING MECHANISMS
FOR YEMEN ARMS DEAL
Classified By: CDA Susan Sutton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: Bulgaria has decided to approve the sale of arms from a private Bulgarian firm to the Government of Yemen. The deal, funded by the UAE and worth approximately USD 55 million, will send small arms, explosives, ammunition, and other weaponry to Yemen in the first half of 2010. In light of the increasingly unstable situation in Yemen, and in response to our proposal for greater end-use monitoring, the Bulgarian Export Commission agreed to take extra steps to ensure proper delivery, storage, and accountability for the shipments, which began on January 5. The Export Commission passed on identification numbers for all items and stated that Bulgaria will comply with a USG proposal for additional monitoring, as well as coordinated efforts with their embassy in Yemen to heighten safeguards for proper delivery. Although not mandatory, Bulgaria continues to consult with us on an informal basis on arms deals involving potentially controversial destinations. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) Bulgaria’s Export Commission notified us on November 7 that it was considering approval of a deal, financed by the UAE that would send over 30,000 assault rifles, 100,000 high-explosive charges, RPGs, and ammunition to Yemen from the Bulgarian consignee XXXXXXXXXXXX in the first part of 2010. At that time, we expressed our reservations about the deal, given the unstable situation in Yemen and the potential for proliferation of small arms. Although it accepted our concerns, the Export Commission decided to go ahead with the deal, noting that the difficult economic situation made the offer extremely attractive to domestic arms producers. Anticipating this, we proposed a set of measures to enhance end-use monitoring. The MOEE agreed to reduce the quantity of assualt rifles by 25 per cent and provide serial numbers, lot numbers, and production years for nearly all of the items. The Ministry of Energy and Economy also received a statement of compliance from the GoY regarding delivery, description of goods, and storage requirements. XXXXXXXXXXXX provided us with delivery schedule documents, including flight information for the XXXXXXXXXXXX scheduled air shipments between XXXXXXXXXXXX . This information was passed through intel channels. XXXXXXXXXXXX also gave us a CD containing lot numbers and serial numbers. Noting their good contacts on the ground in Yemen, XXXXXXXXXXXX informed us that Bulgaria’s Commercial Attache is expected to be present for all deliveries.

3. (C) COMMENT: The Bulgarian government continues to work closely with us to prevent arms proliferation. As a rule, they seek our advice on potentially controversial cases, even when our consultation is not mandatory. In the past, the GoB has denied arms deals to countries of concern, such as Eritrea, based on our objections. In this instance, the financial incentive was too great for them to refuse. But, they are committed to working with us on all possible end-use monitoring steps. Copies of the E.U.C. and the lot and serial numbers have been sent by SIPRnet to ISN/CATR Margaret Mitchell. SUTTON

Source: WikiLeaks

Friday, 10 July 2009, 23:27

S E C R E T STATE 072112
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/09/2024
TAGS PARM, MTCRE, PREL, TW, YM
SUBJECT: (S) ELICITING YEMENI COOPERATION FOR ARMS
SMUGGLING INTERDICTION EFFORTS
Classified By: Classified By: Senior Adviser Stephen Mull for REASONS 1.4 (B), (C) and (D).

1. (U) This cable is an action request. Please see paragraph five. Ambassador Seche is authorized to orally convey information in paragraphs 7-9 in delivering this demarche (but asked not to leave points in written form). Post may not/not provide these points in the form of a non-paper.

2. (S) OBJECTIVE:

(a) To obtain ROYG cooperation with CENTCOM efforts to interdict the smuggling of weapons into Gaza, including through authorization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and helicopter flights over Yemeni territorial waters.

(b) To elicit Yemeni agreement to receive an interagency delegation to discuss additional means of cooperation including on enhancement of Yemen’s own anti-smuggling capability.

3. (S) Background: On January 16, 2009, the USG signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Israel on the prevention of supply of arms and related materiel to terrorist groups. We are working on many fronts to implement this MOU, including through interdiction efforts by U.S. military assets in the region. CENTCOM has been tasked with responsibilities pertaining to military implementation of the MOU within its AOR.

4. (S//NF) We understand a significant volume of arms shipments to Hamas make the short 24-hour transit across the Red Sea from Yemen to Sudan. These shipments usually transit in small groups of flagged and unflagged dhows that use territorial waters, busy harbors, and mangroves to mask their routes and increase their likelihood of evading interception by U.S. or other forces. These intentional tactics, combined with the number of and similarity among vessels, make interdiction difficult once the vessels reach international waters. In a recent case, sparse intelligence and a dhow’s use of Yemeni territorial waters allowed a known shipment of arms probably bound for Gaza to transit undetected in international waters past a searching U.S. warship.

5. (S) Obtaining Yemeni permission to fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters over Yemeni territorial waters would greatly enhance CENTCOM’s ability to gain the intelligence required to identify and track the dhows as they enter international waters and increase the probability of successful interdiction. Accomplishing this would not/not require sending UAVs or helicopters into the airspace over Yemen’s land territory.

6. (S/REL ROYG) Action Request: To fully support DoD’s intent to disrupt and deter illicit arms smuggling, Embassy Sanaa is requested to approach ROYG at the highest appropriate level to request authorization for CENTCOM to fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters over Yemeni territorial waters in an effort to better track dhows and make successful intercepts once they reach international waters.

7. (S/REL ROYG) Post is also requested to emphasize the importance of the broader interdiction effort to the USG and propose that the ROYG receive an interagency delegation to discuss means to maximize bilateral cooperation in this regard, including on enhancement of Yemen’s own anti-smuggling capability.

8. (S//NF) Our arms interdiction efforts are focused on preventing shipments intended for Gaza. Nonetheless, Gaza-bound shipments represent only one aspect of the broader regional problem of arms smuggling from and through Yemen. The following points discuss several recipient groups and possible destinations (Gaza, Somalia) of arms smuggled from and through Yemen. Post may use its discretion in framing the scope of this conversation in order to maximize the prospects of a positive response. Post may not/not provide these points in the form of a non-paper.

9. (S/REL ROYG) Points for Oral Presentation: Arms Smuggling in Yemeni Coastal Waters

In the past, we have had extensive discussions with your government about the ability of terrorists and other sub-state actors to acquire small arms/light weapons (SALW) sourced from Yemeni black markets and use them to conduct attacks elsewhere. For example, the Strela-2 (SA-7 GRAIL) manportable air defense systems (MANPADS) used in the 2002 attacks on a civilian airliner in Kenya were sourced in Yemen, as were small arms used to attack the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 2004.

We welcome the steps your government has taken over the last several years to stem the influx of weapons to the Yemeni black market from external sources, to take illicit weapons off the streets, and to prevent terrorist access to lethal arms. However, we remain extremely concerned that arms smuggling activities originating in and/or transiting Yemen are still providing a destabilizing source of weapons for the region. The large quantities of black market weapons still available in Yemen are being exploited by regional smuggling networks to provide arms to various non-state actors, possibly including al-Qa’ida associated terrorist groups.

(S//REL TO USA, YEM) We have specific information that a weapons smuggling network originating in Yemen is supplying weapons to individuals in Africa who are delivering them to various entities there, potentially including al-Qa’ida associated terrorist groups.

(S//REL TO USA, YEM) According to recent information, an extremist associated with the al-Rashaydah tribe, Abu-Fu’ad al-Dindari, agreed to negotiate a weapons purchase between representatives of al-Rashaydah tribe in Sudan which is receiving weapons from Yemen through this network and Somalia-based al-Shabaab.

(S//REL TO USA, YEM) This network also provides arms that are smuggled into the Gaza Strip. The weapons are transported by boat across the Red Sea to landing points in Sudan. The vessels are met either on shore or a short distance off the coast. Once landed, we assess that the goods are transported north by car through Sudan.

(S//REL TO USA, YEM) We have been able to identify a number of the Yemeni members of this network, including several who are affiliated with XXXXXXXXXXXX owns at least one boat and may operate a fleet of small fishing vessels that are used to run money and weapons across the Red Sea between Yemen and Sudan.

(U) This particular network has smuggled a wide variety of weaponry out of Yemen, including rockets, handguns, anti-armor rocket-propelled grenades, and anti-aircraft guns.

(S) We have identified this network and some specific information on its activities. We believe, however, that other arms smuggling networks operating from and through Yemen may exist.

(U) Yemen’s geographical location and large black market weapons stocks, not to mention, the many armed groups active in the region that are seeking additional arms supplies, make it an inviting target for arms brokers and smugglers to exploit.

(U) In Yemen and elsewhere in the region, small, privately-owned boats that can be diverted from legitimate commercial trade for smuggling purposes are widely available. The availability of these means of transport makes maritime counter-smuggling operations a potentially key element of any effort to stem this flow of weapons.

(U) Such boats can easily transit the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf using the territorial waters of coastal states, including Yemen, in order to minimize the risks of interception in international waters. The large numbers of such boats that sail these waters adds to the challenges in identifying specific vessels engaged in illicit smuggling activities.

(S//REL TO USA, YEM) We have, for example, identified Shaqra, Balhar, Al-Mukalla, Ras al-Sharmah, and Al-Ghayda on Yemen’s south coast as possibly key smuggling havens or transit areas for weapons intended for Somalia and possibly elsewhere.

End Text. CLINTON

Source: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 14 January 2009, 15:56

S E C R E T YEREVAN 000020
NOFORN
SIPDIS
PASS TO EUR/PRA, ISN/CATR, INR/SPM
EO 12958 DECL: 01/13/2019
TAGS ETTC, PARM, PINR, AM
SUBJECT: (S/NF) CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS ON EXPORT CONTROL ISSUE
REF: A. 08 YEREVAN 1040 B. 08 YEREVAN 1051
Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

——————–

1. (S/NF) The separate meetings on January 14 with NSS Chairman Hakobian and President Sargsian regarding the Iran export control issue were both positive and constructive. Sargsian acknowledged the weapons purchase from Bulgaria, and neither he nor the NSS Chairman challenged our information that these weapons were then transferred to Iran/Iraq. Both men indicated that there would be an investigation into how the weapons went from Armenia to Iran/Iraq. Hakobian seemed to indicate that the blame most probably lay with the Bulgarians and perhaps unauthorized Armenians acting on their own. Probably in an attempt to minimize U.S. demands, they also noted that there have been significant reforms and personnel changes since the incident. The President reiterated that cooperation with the U.S., including on security and export control, was an Armenian priority, and that the GOAM, with the NSS as the lead, would discuss the proposed Memorandum of Understanding with the expert team on January 15.

2. (S/NF) Somewhat surprisingly, the President has reversed the mantra he has repeated for the last four months that the weapons transfer “did not happen and could not have happened.” It,s not clear what has prompted this abrupt climb down, but it is probably some combination of solid evidence, a compelling presentation, an understanding of the consequences non- cooperation could bring, a desire to get off on the right foot with the new administration — and a Soviet-style calculation that they can sign the MOU, but probably won,t really have to implement it. While there will no doubt be hard questions during the meeting on the MOU and actual implementation will pose even greater challenges, we are — unexpectedly — in the best place we could be going into discussions on the MOU. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

MEETING WITH NSS CHAIRMAN HAKOBIAN: BETTER THAN EXPECTED

——————————————— ———–

3. (S/NF) Ambassador Mahley and his delegation met with NSS Chairman Hakobian on January 14 to discuss Armenia,s role in an arms transfer to Iran, from which point they were later transferred onward to insurgents in Iraq. NSS Chairman Hakobian indicated that Armenia was ready to cooperate on this case and to have a dialogue with the U.S. Hakobian emphasized throughout the meeting that Armenia has undergone significant changes over the last several years and there are new people in the government since 2003, when this transfer occurred. Hakobian also highlighted that two Deputy Defense Ministers had been fired since the transfer happened. Mahley thanked Hakobian for his remarks and said he was here to discuss a tough issue, which reflected the good relationship between the U.S. and Armenia and that this type of discussion that friends have. Hakobian reiterated that Armenia values that relationship.

4. (S) Mahley, drawing from the points in paragraph 18, laid out the U.S. evidence for our assertion that Armenia facilitated Iran,s acquisition of RPG-22s and PKM machine guns, which have been recovered in arms caches of Iranian- sponsored insurgent groups in Iraq. This exchange, which was promised by Sectary Rice, included reviewing the documentary evidence. During the course of our investigation the markings on the weapons indicated that they originated in Bulgaria, and we were able to subsequently determine the lot numbers on the RPG-22s corresponded with the production of 1000 items, all of which were shipped to Armenia along with the PKM machine guns. In addition, we shared with Hakobian that in early January 2003, the Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX and the Armenian Ministry of Defense concluded a deal to purchase the RPG-22s and the PKM machine guns; the Armenian XXXXXXXXXXXX served as an intermediary in the transaction. INR analyst Stewart Eales then reviewed the documentary evidence that we had to support this conclusion. First, as part of this deal an end-user certificate from Armenia was signed by then- Defense Minister Sargsian. Hakobian acknowledged that the signature was that of Sargsian. In response to the presentation of the invoice for the transfer, Hakobian asked who from Armenia signed the document. Mahley said that we did not have that information. Eales then explained that the

financial document showed that the money for the deal came from an Iranian front company through an Armenian bank to Bulgaria.

POINTING THE FINGER AT BULGARIA

——————————-

5. (S/NF) Hakobian made clear that the information was “clear” and “without doubt.” He assured Mahley that he would launch an investigation and that the GOAM needed as much information as possible so that it could find the individuals responsible for the transfer. In response to the financial documents, Hakobian responded “so Bulgaria sold these items to Armenia knowing they were going to Iran?” Mahley and Eales explained that the Bulgarians were not aware of the involvement of an Iranian in the transaction.

6. (S/NF) Hakobian was also very concerned with how the goods were transferred to Armenia. In reviewing the invoice, he noted that the goods were to be flown to Yerevan airport and therefore there must be some documentation about this flight. Hakobian asked if the U.S. knew whether all of the goods were provided to Iran. He stated outright that he thought it was possible that the weapons were delivered to Armenia, but some of them were subsequently diverted in a scheme to make money. Hakobian said he needed to understand what was reported to the Ministry of Defense. He was particularly interested in raising an issue about whether the entire shipment went to Iran, or whether officials skimmed off part of the cargo. He noted that Armenia has done a lot of work since 1991 to prevent Iran from turning Armenia into a conduit for Russian arms transfers to Iran.

7. (S/NF) Mahley responded that it was the U.S. assessment that the documents clearly show a deal between the Armenian entity XXXXXXXXXXXX and Iran. There is no indication that the Bulgarian entities were aware of Iranian involvement; it is our assessment that this deal was done to hide the Iranian involvement from Bulgarian and any other non-Armenian sources. With regard to the issue of whether any of the goods were kept in Armenia, it was the U.S. assessment that the payment process showed the Iranian entity paid for the entire amount being acquired and that it knew the quantities it was paying to acquire. We have no shipping documentation from Armenia to Iran.

U.S. LAWS AND GOALS

——————-

8. (S/NF) Leaving aside Armenia,s intention to investigate, Mahley reviewed with Hakobian what the goals of the U.S. were for this situation. First, the transfer is impossible to reverse. Therefore, it is critical for the U.S. to have full confidence that GOAM cannot let this happen again. Second, this incident triggered two U.S. laws that could result in sanctions. Mahley emphasized that Armenian cooperation in this matter would be an important factor in our decision whether to waive sanctions.

9. (S/NF) After the presentation of the additional information on this case, Hakobian appeared to understand the consequences of this activity and there is potential for significant damage to Armenia. He said Armenia has a lot of problems and there is no desire to create more problems. Hakobian committed to use all available resources of the GOAM to fully investigate this transfer and share an official report with the USG.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SARGSIAN

——————————-

10. (S/NF) Later in the afternoon, President Sargsian received Ambassador Mahley. Sargsian opened the meeting by noting that building relations with the United States is of vital interest to Armenia and that security is an important component in the overall bilateral relationship. He said that he, personally, was proud of his contributions in this respect and recalled that he had signed the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement with DOD. Sargsian indicated that he had been briefed by the NSS on Mahley’s earlier meeting and invited Ambassador Mahley to begin. 11. (S/NF) Mahley noted the earlier constructive meeting with the NSS and said that he would like to brief the President directly on the export control case and how it came about. Following Mahley’s abbreviated presentation, the President stated there was such a contract with the Bulgarians and that he had signed the end user certificate in his capacity as Minister of Defense. He listened intently as Ambassador Mahley passed the three documents (invoice, end user document, and financial transaction statement) and nodded as he reviewed the documents.

12. (S/NF) Ambassador Mahley clarified that the information we were sharing was obtained by the USG using its own sources and methods. Earlier Chairman Hakobian had asked whether he could approach the Bulgarians; if he did so, it was possible that the Bulgarians would be unaware of the case, Mahley indicated.

13. (S/NF) Ambassador Mahley stated that the reason the team of experts is in Armenia is that the Administration wants to move forward to find a constructive resolution to the issue, and he was sure that the next Administration would be interested in doing so as well. Ambassador Mahley reviewed why the transaction was of such concern to the U.S. and stated that U.S. law requires us to sanction the entities of a country that facilitated such a transfer. While sanctions are mandatory, the President has the ability to waive sanctions on national security grounds. If Armenia makes the necessary changes to strengthen its export control system, there might no longer be a need to impose sanctions.

This was what Deputy Secretary Negroponte conveyed in his letter to Sargsian.

GOAM READY TO DISCUSS MOU

————————-

14. (S/NF) Mahley indicated that he was ready to discuss with the GOAM a proposed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with GOAM experts, which the U.S. believes would allow a constructive way forward for the two countries. Many of the items Armenia has already accomplished, he stated. There are

additional items that the MOU covers, including process and transparency, that still need to be implemented in the export control regime and that the MOU would cover. The USG sees the signing of an MOU “even without the particular export control case that triggered this discussion” to be a constructive step in the bilateral relationship, Mahley concluded.

15. (S/NF) Mahley shared that he had briefed Congress and that there was considerable interest in the case since the weapons had led to the death and injury of U.S. servicemembers in Iraq. Mahley added that the USG understands the sensitivity of this case and so worked hard to ensure that all the facts provided the GOAM were correct and in order; this took some time which delayed the briefing for the President.

16. (S/NF) President Sargsian responded that he had understood two things from previous conversations on this subject: 1) information-sharing would precede any prescriptive measures that the U.S. would suggest, but perhaps he had misunderstood this; and 2) the weapons in question were missiles or rockets — not RPGs. He stated that the information about the contract with Bulgaria is correct and the GOAM needs to explore further how the weapons got to Iran or Iraq. “We know that we got the weapons. We will figure out how they were transferred and we will let you know,” the President assured Mahley.

17. (S/NF) President Sargsian said the GOAM wants to cooperate with the U.S. on export control and will examine the MOU. He said he had certain questions, and the NSS would take the lead in working with Ambassador Mahley and the experts group the following day. The President concluded that the GOAM did not have and had no interest in cooperating with Iran on weapons sales.

I.C.-CLEARED TALKING POINTS DELIVERED TO GOAM

——————————————-

18. (S/REL ARMENIA) — Between April 2006 and June 2008, Coalition forces in Iraq

recovered multiple RPG-22 antitank weapons and PKM machine guns.

— These weapons bore Bulgarian factory markings and were tracked through a sales arrangement that took the weapons through Armenia to Iran.

— We have information that in early January 2003 the Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX and the Armenian Ministry of Defense (MOD) completed a weapons sale that included these weapons recovered by Coalition forces in Iraq. The Armenian company XXXXXXXXXXXX served as intermediary for the deal. XXXXXXXXXXXX– According to the end-user certificate and sales invoice, the deal included 1000 RPG-22s produced by the Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX and 260 PKM machine guns produced by the Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX. We have

obtained documentation that includes production lot numbers for the RPG-22Ms and the serial numbers for the PKM machine guns sold to Armenia. The XXXXXXXXXXXX invoice was signed by XXXXXXXXXXXX. The end-user certificate was signed by former Armenian Minister of Defense (now President) Serzh Sargsian, which offered the Government of Armenia,s assurance that the weapons would remain within the possession of the Armenian Government.

— Financial records for the RPG-22 and PKM sale identify the

ordering customer as XXXXXXXXXXXX, someone known by the U.S. to be associated with Iranian arms acquisitions.

— An RPG-22 attack on a US armored vehicle in Iraq on January 31, 2008 killed one US soldier and wounded three. Factory markings on the recovered RPG-22 rocket debris indicate it was originally part of the shipment to Armenia by the Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX.

— US military personnel discovered an arms cache in Baghdad on February 15, 2008 that belonged to Hizballah Brigades — an Iranian-backed Iraqi militant group. Among the weapons recovered, most of which were Iranian in origin, were six Bulgarian RPG-22 anti-tank weapons. The production lot and serial numbers on all six indicated they were produced by the

Bulgarian firm XXXXXXXXXXXX and part of the sale to Armenia in January

2003.

— Two RPG-22 launch tubes were recovered following an attack

that wounded three US military personnel in Baghdad in mid- March 2008. The lot and serial numbers on the recovered tubes matched those originally sold to Armenia in January. Handwritten on both launchers was the Arabic message “Rejoice

– Islamic Resistance of Iraq – Hizballah Brigades” — the name of the same Iranian-backed Iraqi militant group. (SECRET//REL Armenia) YOVANOVITCH

Source: WikiLeaks

Tuesday, 13 May 2008, 15:28

S E C R E T STATE 050524
NOFORN
EO 12958 DECL: 05/05/2018
TAGS PARM, PREL
SUBJECT: CHINA CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO IRAN
REF: A. STATE 162318 B. STATE 109649 C. BEIJING 5237 D. STATE 071143 E. STATE 073601 F. BEIJING 5754 G. STATE 72896 H. BEIJING 5361 I. STATE 148514 J. BEIJING 6848 K. STATE 159388 L. BEIJING 7212 M. BEIJING 7387
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ISN ACTING DAS ELIOT KANG FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Beijing, please see paragraph 2.

————–

ACTION REQUEST

————–

2. (S/NF) Post is requested to draw on the points in para 4 below and to provide photographs in a demarche to the Government of China (GOC) on the issue of transfers of advanced conventional weapons such as MANPADS to Iran. NOTE THAT THE POINTS FLAGGED AS PROVIDED BY THE IC MUST BE USED VERBATIM.

———-

BACKGROUND

———-

3. (S/NF) In April 2008, Coalition forces recovered from a cache in Basra, Iraq at least two Chinese-produced Iranian-supplied QW-1 MANPADS that we assess were provided by Iran to Iraqi Shia militants. The date of production for the recovered QW-1 systems is 2003, but it is not known when these particular launchers were transferred by China to Iran or when the launchers entered Iraq. We have demarched China repeatedly on its conventional arms transfers to Iran, urging Beijing to stop these transfers due to unacceptably high risk that such weapons would be diverted to militants and terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere. Beijing has typically responded by asserting that its sales are in accordance with international law, that it requires end-users to sign agreements pledging not to retransfer the weapons, or — disingenuously in the judgment of USG technical experts — that it cannot confirm that the weapons recovered by Coalition forces in Iraq are actually Chinese in origin. This latest recovery of Chinese-origin weapons in Iraq gives us yet another opportunity to present the Chinese government with concrete evidence that Iran is illicitly diverting Chinese-origin weapons and to urge Beijing to take concrete steps to halt future diversions and investigate past transfers to Tehran.

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TALKING POINTS

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4. (S/REL CHINA) BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

TRANSFERS OF MANPADS TO IRAN

—————————–

— We have repeatedly raised with you our concerns regarding Iran,s retransfer of Chinese-produced weapons to extremists and terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere.

— We understand that you have provided Iran with QW-1 MANPADS in the past, and Iran has publicly asserted that it produces the Misagh-1, which is based on the Chinese QW-1.

— We previously raised with you the recovery in Iraq in 2004 of an Iranian-origin Misagh-1 MANPAD that had been fired at a civilian airliner.

— We have recently acquired additional information about Iranian diversions of Chinese-origin MANPADS that we would like to share with you.

BEGIN IC POINTS THAT MUST BE USED VERBATIM:

— Coalition forces recovered at least two Chinese QW-1 MANPADS missiles from a militant cache in Basra, Iraq in April 2008. The missiles had 2003 production markings, had not been fired, and were still intact in their launch tubes.

— We assess that these missiles were provided to Iraqi Shia militants by Iran.

END IC POINTS THAT MUST BE USED VERBATIM.

MANPADS TRANSFERS TO STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM

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— Iran is the world’s most active state sponsor of terrorism. We know that Iran has provided Chinese weapons to extremist groups in Iraq and Afghanistan that are using these weapons to kill Americans and Iraqis, something we take very seriously.

— Iran is not a responsible purchaser of military equipment. There is an unacceptably high risk that any military equipment sold to Iran, especially weapons like MANPADS, that are highly sought-after by terrorists, will be diverted to non-state actors who threaten U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as civilians across the region.

— It is for that reason UNSCR 1747 calls on states to exercise vigilance and restraint in the transfer of systems contained in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, such as MANPADS. Likewise, the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution A/62/391 encouraging state members to ban the transfer of MANPADS to non-state actors.

— We strongly urge you to:

terminate all weapons-related, including further MANPADS-related transfers and technical assistance to Iran, in accordance with UNSCR 1747;

insist that Iran cease any weapons-production related activities based on or including Chinese technology, to include MANPADS technology;

insist that Iran stop illicit retransfers of Chinese-origin weapons, or Iranian-produced weapons based on Chinese designs, to non-state actors;

insist that Iran provide an accounting of all Chinese-origin weapons; and institute thorough, regular inspections of Chinese-origin weapons already in Iranian stocks to determine how many may have been diverted and to prevent future diversions.

— We ask that you share with us the results of your investigations into this matter.

SERIAL NUMBERS OF WEAPONS SOLD TO IRAQ:

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— We have provided you with information on specific Chinese weapons systems that we have recovered in Iraq.

— Further information you can provide to us on your sales of these systems to Iran would help our investigators on the ground distinguish between weapons newly transferred to Shia militants and those transferred prior to the commencement of armed conflict in 2003. Serial numbers of equipment sold to Iran would be most helpful in this regard.

END TALKING POINTS. RICE

NNNN

End Cable Text

Source: WikiLeaks

Monday, 09 November 2009, 12:05

S E C R E T KYIV 001942
SIPDIS
NSC FOR JOYCE CONNERY
DOE FOR ANDREW BIENIAWSKI
EO 12958 DECL: 11/05/2019
TAGS PARM, PREL, KNUC, UP
SUBJECT: U.S.-UKRAINE NONPROLIFERATION MEETINGS SEPTEMBER
23-24, 2009
Classified By: Political Counselor Colin Cleary, Reason 1.4 (b, d)

1. (S) Summary: Highlights of this semi-annual U.S.-Ukraine nonproliferation dialogue include:

–Ukraine gave an inconsistent answer on the question of transferring HEU spent fuel to Russia. –Ukraine asked for additional security assurances beyond those provided in Budapest in 1994, and was interested in continued missile defense cooperation with the U.S. — Ukraine noted that the SCUD missile elimination Memorandum of Understanding had been approved by all the Ministries, was submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for final approval, and will soon be ready. — Ukraine requested U.S. support for additional elimination of melange liquid rocket propellant, but the U.S. said it would concentrate first on eliminating the SCUDs and associated melange before discussing any further elimination of melange. — Ukraine requested additional U.S. funding for SS-24 elimination, which the U.S. undertook to consider and respond to. — The U.S. made a formal request for more information on Ukraine’s planned transfer of MTCR Category I items to Saudi Arabia to allow for robust bilateral consultations on the margins of the MTCR Rio de Janeiro Plenary in November on the Saudi issue as well as the broader issue of Category I transfers. — Ukraine said it is no longer exporting weapons to Burma, and claimed not to have exported T-72 tanks to South Sudan despite U.S. satellite photos to the contrary. The U.S. noted it would have to consider whether to impose sanctions for the tank transfer, and that a factor in U.S. deliberations would be whether the GOU was being truthful. — Ukraine again undertook to look into specialty steel exports to Iran’s missile program, while the U.S. warned that if Ukraine could not solve this problem on its own, the U.S. may take action of its own against the entities involved. — After two years of negotiations, the U.S. and Ukraine signed a contract September 24 on the removal and storage of radioactive sources. — The U.S. also pressed Ukraine to agree to destroy more small arms under the NATO Partnership for Peace Small Arms/Light Weapons destruction project. End Summary

2. (S) In a one-on-one meeting prior to the formal meeting, Nykonenko welcomed Van Diepen to Kyiv. Nykonenko said that Ukraine was very familiar with Van Diepen’s strong nonproliferation bona fides and took this as more proof that the United States had confidence Ukraine could be a strong nonproliferation partner. The sides previewed the agenda and discussed security assurances, HEU spent fuel repatriation and downblending, NATO Partnership for Peace issues related to small arms and light weapons elimination, SCUD missile elimination, missile defense, Ukrainian specialty steel exports to Iran, and Ukrainian T-72 tank exports to South Sudan. Relevant portions of the one-on-one discussion are included in the following readout of the regular meeting agenda.

HEU

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3. (C) During the one-on-one meeting, Van Diepen said that it was particularly urgent for Ukraine to approve the shipment of the HEU spent fuel from the Kyiv Institute to Russia by the end of September. He explained that if the shipment is not approved by then, it could not take place until 2011 at the earliest, and Ukraine would continue to bear the costs and security risks of storing the material until then; that the spent fuel had no commercial value, but would be valuable to terrorists; and that, since Ukraine had been invited to the Nuclear Security Summit next year, it would be important for Ukraine to report progress in securing its nuclear materials. Nykonenko replied that Ukraine’s position of February 2008 had not changed, and thus we had to wait for the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences report in early 2010.

4. (C) In meetings the next day, Vladimir Ryabtsev from Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) explained that all of the technical issues had been resolved, and Ukraine had made the decision to ship the spent fuel. They had not shipped it because it had not been worked out who would pay Russia $800,000 for addressing the waste associated with reprocessing the spent fuel. There was not enough money in Ukraine’s budget to pay this expense. Wayne Leach, the DOE officer assigned to Embassy Kyiv, said that

the U.S. would send this new information back to Washington and provide an answer to Ukraine soon. (Comment: Other sources have indicated to DOE separately that the decision to repatriate this spent fuel still rests with the President and the NSDC and is still being addressed as a package along with the other Russian-origin HEU in Ukraine; in effect, that Ryabtsev may have been characterizing the debate somewhat inaccurately. The GOU has long been aware that DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative program does not have authority to pay for waste issues associated with such repatriation.)

Missile Defense

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5. (U) In the one-on-one meeting before the plenary, Nykonenko told Van Diepen that Ukraine had read with interest the new U.S. plan for missile defense in Europe. Nykonenko pointed out that Ukraine had missile defense expertise and was interested in continued missile defense cooperation, which could help reconfirm Ukraine’s role in the new European security architecture. It was ‘very important’ for Ukraine to receive positive signals from the U.S., he said. Van Diepen replied that the U.S. would be looking forward to discussing missile defense with Ukraine the following week during the meetings in Kyiv led by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Vershbow.

Security Assurances

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6. (S) The first item Nykonenko raised during the one-on-meeting was an appeal for additional security assurances for Ukraine, beyond those the U.S. had provided in the 1994 Budapest Declaration. He explained that Ukraine felt threatened, particularly after the Russian invasion of Georgia. Ukraine needed a security anchor to fill the vacuum until it could join NATO. Ukraine had received the August 2009 note from the U.S. reaffirming Budapest, but it wanted to discuss the issue in more detail. Ukraine was hoping that, with U.S. leadership, a new multilateral security assurance could be worked out. The GOU would be grateful to begin expert-level talks on this; the fact of such talks would send a good signal to Ukraine’s public*and neighbors. He passed a non-paper that proposed a new security assurance. Legally binding assurances were best, he concluded, but he said he understood this was very difficult.

7. (U) Van Diepen explained that the United States’ Budapest commitment endured and was not tied to the expiration of the START Treaty in December. See paragraphs 53-54 below for additional discussions on this topic and issues related to the START Follow-on Treaty.

SCUD Missile Elimination

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8. (S) Nykonenko introduced the SCUD agenda item by noting that this project is a priority for Ukraine. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense Economic Department Deputy Director Sergiy Novosyolov reiterated that point and stated that we successfully completed the first stage — the U.S. team inventory of the SCUDs and associated equipment in June-July 2009, the various documents and annexes from each of the sites, and U.S. agreement to eliminate a portion of the melange (liquid propellant for SCUD and other missiles). Novosyolov further explained that the SCUD Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) had been approved by all the Ministries and was submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers for final approval and will soon be ready. He also noted that a list of possible Ukrainian contractors had been sent to the U.S. Embassy and stated GOU readiness to discuss costs, timetables, volume of work, transporting the missiles to elimination sites, and other technical and logistical factors associated with implementation of the project.

9. (S) Alexander Dotsenko, from the National Security and Defense Council, added that there are several legal issues for the Cabinet of Ministers to consider before authorizing the MOD to sign the MOU. He stated that we should schedule an experts meeting to discuss the details of the elimination work, including the specific process for selecting the contractor, tax exemption issues, and a system to monitor the work of the contractor to ensure that all of the work is completed on time and in accordance with the other terms of the contract.

10. (S) Van Diepen expressed appreciation for the excellent cooperation received from the Ukraine Ministry of Defense in the conduct of the June-July 2009 site inventories. He noted U.S. interest in moving forward to the elimination

phase of the project and hoped that the MOU would be approved soon. Paul Van-Son, from ISN’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) office, expressed agreement in principle to the Ukraine-proposed technical discussions, but emphasized that the MOU must be signed first. He also explained that the U.S. understood the importance of additional melange elimination to Ukraine, but noted that we would concentrate first on eliminating the SCUDs and associated equipment and melange in accordance with the MOU before discussing any further U.S. role in the elimination of additional stocks of melange.

Melange Elimination

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11. (S) Nykonenko noted that Ukraine had a dramatic melange problem, with over 16,000 tons of the rocket fuel and the steady deterioration of the storage containers. While the U.S. had committed to eliminating 1440 tons as part of the SCUD elimination project and the OSCE agreed on September 16 to eliminate 3000 tons, Ukraine was interested in additional bilateral U.S. assistance to dispose of the remaining fuel. Alexander Nilov, a rocket fuel expert from the MOD, explained that the 3000 tons would be transported by rail to Russia, where a Russian contractor hired by the OSCE would eliminate the fuel. The first shipment of melange would leave Ukraine on November 1, and the work would be completed in a year. This export of a military product to Russia was in compliance with Ukraine’s export control laws, he added.

12. (S) Van-Son explained that NDF contractors are evaluating the technical capability/costs of using the Polish mobile plant that is on site at Radekhiv to eliminate the 1440 tons of SCUD oxidizer. He again emphasized that the MOU on SCUD elimination must be concluded before further discussions can take place on elimination of SCUD-associated melange. He concluded that the U.S. would like to evaluate the progress on the OSCE melange elimination project once it commences, as well as progress on the NDF SCUD project, before considering any further funding for any separate melange project in Ukraine.

13. (S) Dotsenko reminded the U.S. of his request to consider eliminating additional melange as part of the SCUD project and stated that Ukraine had met its obligation to eliminate half of its missiles and associated equipment by 2005 as it agreed to do in 1998. (NOTE: While Ukraine currently has 54 SCUD TELs, Dotsenko maintains that Ukraine possessed 117 SCUD TELs when the 1998 U.S.-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding was signed. According to Dotsenko, Ukraine eliminated half of its SCUD force prior to 2005 using its own funds, and the U.S. should therefore consider eliminating more melange based on the 1998 numbers.) Dotsenko asked the U.S. to consider additional melange elimination projects, pointing out that Ukraine would have 13,000 tons remaining even after the OSCE project is completed. He also requested that melange elimination be included on the agenda for the next meeting.

Removal of SS-24 Solid Rocket Fuel and Elimination of Motor Cases

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14. (S) Nykonenko explained that, because of Ukraine’s budget crisis, the water wash-out removal of SS-24 rocket fuel from the motor cases had been significantly delayed. Ukraine was continuing to adhere to the “black box” elimination method, under which the USG paid Ukraine a given amount of money for each eliminated motor case, regardless of how Ukraine removed the propellant. As in previous meetings, Ukraine requested additional U.S. funding for SS-24 elimination ($250,000 per rocket motor to remove the fuel in an environmentally safe manner and an additional $15,000 per empty rocket case). Nykonenko highlighted a letter sent to the U.S. Congress from the Ukrainian Rada requesting additional U.S. assistance under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to perform this work.

15. (S) Neil Couch, from the VCI Bureau’s START Treaty office, said that the U.S. remains committed to economically feasible, technologically sound propellant removal and motor case elimination as part of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. He continued that the Department of Defense is committed to the SS-24 elimination program regardless of the end of START in December 2009, but will not pay Ukraine more than it pays Russia for the elimination of the exact same missile system.

16. (S) Sergei Birin, from the National Space Agency of Ukraine, explained that Ukraine had begun this work with 10

rocket motors. It needed $250,000 to remove the fuel from each case plus an additional $15,000 per empty rocket case for expenses related to the operation of the facility where the motors were located. Birin said that Ukraine needed an additional $6 million to complete this work, and Ukraine was waiting for the U.S. answer to its request. Ukraine had allocated $50 million to speed up the implementation of rocket fuel wash-out, but this sum was not sufficient to continue the work*operations at the Pavlohrad missile facility had been suspended. Nykonenko noted that Russia’s costs were lower because it used a method that Ukraine did not regard as environmentally safe*burning the fuel out of the motors. Ukraine cannot use this method because it is located in the center of Europe and the rocket facilities where this work is done are near large population centers. He added the U.S.-Ukraine 1993 CTR Agreement stated that elimination would be completed in an environmentally safe manner.

17. (S) Couch recalled that Ukraine had agreed after four years of intensive negotiations in the START Treaty Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) to cut four 80-millimeter holes in the motor cases so they could not be used again as rockets, but could be used for other commercial purposes after the fuel was eliminated. Ukraine also could have crushed the motor cases or cut them in two. Birin said that Ukraine had already eliminated the fuel from four of the ten rocket motor cases in the test batch it was using to refine its wash-out technique. In the first motor case there was some residual fuel remaining that Ukraine burned out. This burn-out left big holes in the motor case such that there was no need to cut the smaller holes as agreed in the JCIC. With each successive wash-out, the amount of residual fuel remaining had been less, so Ukraine was confident it would come up with an effective technique to wash out the fuel.

18. (S) Van Diepen noted that Ukraine was having detailed technical discussions on these SS-24 elimination issues with DTRA this week. He said he would get a detailed debriefing from DTRA and forward Ukraine’s remarks to the political level, which would consider Ukraine’s new requests for assistance. He promised to provide Ukraine a response.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC)

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19. (C) Couch said that for several weeks the NRRC link between the U.S. and Ukraine had been out of service. The U.S. had determined that the link between Washington and Kyiv was ok, and that the problem was between the MOD and the Ukraine ground station. Nykonenko replied that Ukraine appreciated U.S. assistance to upgrade the link, and that Ukraine had completed this work. He said that Ukrainian engineers were working on the current problem and hoped to have the link back in service soon.

Wassenaar Arrangement

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20. (C) Nykonenko said that Ukraine had amended its list of military items subject to export control restrictions. In addition, it had revised the list of dual use items; that list is awaiting interagency approval. Finally, Ukraine is working to enhance the control of lathes and other items, including training, that are not on the Wassenaar or MTCR lists, but are on the EU list. Ukraine is using best practices guides for approval of exports. Van Diepen emphasized it is very important to pass national legislation to implement the export control regimes effectively.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

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21. (S) Tetyana Vidzigovska, State Service of Export Control of Ukraine, stated that Ukraine had implemented the changes to the MTCR Annex agreed to at the 2008 Canberra Plenary, noting that the GOU approved these changes on September 19, 2009. She also explained that the GOU is paying close attention to items not controlled by the MTCR and is considering enhancing controls over training and intangible technologies, and adopting additional controls on items going to Iran in accordance with the European Union list. Van Diepen thanked Ukraine for the update and noted that the U.S. undergoes a similar interagency process in implementing changes to the MTCR Annex.

22. (S) Boris Atamanenko, National Space Agency of Ukraine, stated that Ukraine had transferred MTCR Category I items to the U.S., Russia, Germany, and Saudi Arabia, and Category II

items to the U.S., Russia, Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea, China, and India during the past year. In accordance with its MTCR commitments, he noted that Ukraine had informed MTCR Partners in April 2009 (POC Document 86) of the intended Category I transfer to Saudi Arabia, and none of the Partners had objected or made an official request for further information. Van Diepen attempted to confirm that Ukraine had actually transferred Category I items to Saudi Arabia., not just notified its intention to transfer, but Atamanenko’s response created confusion on this point.

23. (S) Van Diepen then said that the United States was extremely disappointed by this unwelcome news of an MTCR Category I transfer to Saudi Arabia. By definition, MTCR Category I systems are inherently capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and the MTCR Guidelines clearly state that such transfers should only be made on rare occasions. A principal purpose of the MTCR is to prevent the transfer of MTCR Category I items to non-MTCR countries. Van Diepen further noted that he understood that Ukraine had previously notified MTCR Partners of an MTCR Category I transfer to India, to which the U.S. objected but Ukraine transferred the items anyway. He stated that the India case was the first time that an MTCR Partner had gone ahead with a transfer when objections were made by another Partner. If Ukraine were to transfer Category I items to Saudi Arabia, that would be yet another unfortunate precedent. Van Diepen added that the U.S. would object to such a transfer, as it is our right to do as an MTCR Partner, but he said he would reserve further commentary until we get more information on what is actually being contemplated for transfer or has been transferred to Saudi Arabia.

24. (S) Van Diepen said that Ukraine should consider this discussion a formal request for more information on the Category I transfer to Saudi Arabia. He also asked that this information be provided to the U.S. well in advance of the MTCR Rio de Janeiro Plenary in November. This would allow for bilateral consultations on the margins of the MTCR Plenary on the Saudi issue as well as the broader philosophy on MTCR Category I transfers. Given the confusion over whether or not a transfer had already taken place, Van Diepen requested further clarification from Ukraine on Day 2 of the talks.

25. (C) On Day 2, Atamanenko clarified that no MTCR Category I items had yet been transferred to Saudi Arabia, but a project had been started that will result in a Category I transfer. Ukraine will not transfer any technology that would create any missile systems. Atamanenko also noted that the U.S. (ISN Director Durham) and UK had approached the GOU at the MTCR RPOC meeting in Paris in April, that they had requested further information about the sale, and had not raised concerns about the potential transfer. However, Ukraine had not received a formal written request from the U.S. or the UK for this information. Van Diepen then reiterated his ‘formal’ request for further information on the equipment/technology to be transferred in preparation for a robust discussion of this issue on the margins of the upcoming MTCR Plenary. (Embassy Kyiv subsequently followed up with a written request and raised the request in further meetings with MFA.)

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

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26. (S) Nykonenko said that Ukraine had participated in the ATT’s Open-Ended Working Group meetings in 2009 and was looking forward to the February 2010 meetings. Ukraine supported the development of the ATT as long as it did not restrict self-defense and the legitimate production of military items. Ukraine was optimistic that an ATT could capture countries outside of the export control regimes. He said that Russia did not agree with Ukraine’s position, so we needed a common strategy to deal with Russia. Nykonenko added that any Treaty negotiated without the participation of the U.S., Russia, and China would be of limited utility.

27. (S) Van Diepen said that the United States supports greater responsibility in arms transfers, reducing the destabilizing trade in illicit arms, and ensuring that all states have national systems and internal controls that meet the highest standards. In working towards these goals, we will continue to oppose lowering of international standards on the transfer of conventional arms and ensure that there is no infringement on domestic ownership of firearms. He continued that work on the ATT must be done on a consensus basis in order to ensure these objectives are met. The UK

needs to get back tQconsensus decision-making; the UK planned to introduce a resolution during the UN First Committee*the U.S. needed Ukraine’s help to ensure that consensus decision-making is part of any resolution passed. Nykonenko supported the U.S. position on the feasibility of an ATT and that the two countries (along with Russia and China) needed to develop a common strategy.

Transfer Cases

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28. (S) Van Diepen said that there are two types of cases the U.S. wanted to discuss on the second day of the consultations: 1) transfers to Burma and South Sudan in which there were deliberate Ukrainian government actions that are contrary to U.S. philosophy on exports; and 2) other transfers by Ukrainian entities, presumably not authorized by the Ukrainian government. The U.S. wants to work cooperatively with Ukraine to stop this second category of illicit transfers.

Burma

—–

29. (S) Nykonenko said that Ukraine had received the U.S. demarche and was no longer exporting weapons to Burma. Ukraine was just wrapping up existing contracts, and had been reducing its exports to Burma since 2005. In 2008 Ukrainian exports to Burma were ‘as good as zero’ in part due to previous U.S. warnings, and Ukraine had not signed any new contracts with Burma in the last two and one half years. Current exports were just spare parts. The remaining business was so small that the company involved had recalled all of its workers from Burma.

30. (S) ISN/CATR Deputy Director Brian Bachman thanked Nykonenko for the information. He said that the U.S. was still concerned about the exports to Burma, but was pleased to hear that Ukraine was now only exporting a small number of spare parts and was no longer exported completed weapons, as reports had indicated.

South Sudan

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31. (S) Van Diepen recalled that when the U.S. had raised with Ukraine in July 2008 that an additional shipment of T-72 tanks, BM-1 GRAD armored vehicles, small arms, and other military equipment planned for a late June or early July shipment to Kenya was being purchased by the Kenyan Ministry of State Defense for South Sudan, Ukraine had assured us the arms were for the Government of Kenya. Ukraine had informed the U.S. that it had received an end-user certificate from the Kenyan government and receipts acknowledging the arrival of the earlier tank shipment in Kenya. Subsequent to our discussions, the M/V Faina, which was carrying another weapons shipment from Ukraine, was hijacked, and it became clear that cargo was also intended for South Sudan. Van Diepen asked if the GOU had investigated.

32. (S) Valeriy Lysenko, from Ukraine’s Export Control Service, said that the T-72 tank shipment was intended for Kenya. He said Ukraine had not transferred any military equipment to South Sudan. All of Ukraine’s contracts were checked.

33. (S) Van Diepen gave the Ukrainian side a copy of the contract that clearly lists the GOSS, and asked if the GOU side maintained that the export was for Kenya. Lysenko held to this line, questioned the authenticity of the contract, and asked if the U.S. had any better evidence. Van Diepen, regretting that the GOU had forced him to do so, showed the Ukrainians cleared satellite imagery of T-72 tanks unloaded in Kenya, transferred to railyards for onward shipment, and finally in South Sudan. This led to a commotion on the Ukrainian side.

34. (S) Van Diepen continued that he appreciated the sides could have different export control policies, as was their sovereign right. But not being told the truth was something the United States did not expect from a strategic partner. There was nothing for Ukraine to gain from lying and a lot to lose, he cautioned. Since South Sudan is on the U.S. terrorism list, the U.S. would have to consider whether to impose sanctions over the transfer; a factor in U.S. deliberations would be whether the GOU the truth.

35. (S) Lysenko said that Ukraine would study the U.S. information and he asserted that Ukraine only had a relationship with Kenya, and did not have a relationship with

South Sudan. Ukraine could not be held responsible for the actions of a third country. This matter was a common problem for the U.S. and Ukraine to resolve. He said Ukraine’s special agencies might need to get involved to find out what had happened. Nykonenko said that Ukraine would study this situation in the light of a partner relationship so hat the U.S. would know that Ukraine is a reliable partner.

Ukraine’s Exports of Specialty Metals for Iran’s Ballistic Missiles

—————————————

36. (S) Van Diepen said that, contrary to Ukraine’s export control policy, Ukrainian entities, including XXXXXXXXXXXX, were engaged in providing the Iranian ballistic missile program with specialty metals and other sensitive items such as ball bearings used in liquid propellant missile systems. It is possible that these activities were taking place without the knowledge of the Ukrainian government. The U.S. remains deeply concerned that, given the high quality of steel that can be purchased from Ukrainian manufacturers, Iran’s ballistic missile program continues to seek items from Ukrainian entities, including XXXXXXXXXXXX. Van Diepen continued that such steels have long been difficult for Iran to produce indigenously. Van Diepen provided the following points/non-paper:

— The United States and Ukraine have discussed in the past the supply by Ukrainian firms of sensitive materials to Iran’s ballistic missile program.

— Specifically, between 2002 and 2007, we repeatedly raised concerns that Ukraine’s XXXXXXXXXXXX was engaged in providing the Iranian ballistic missile program with specialty metals and other sensitive items such as ball bearings used in liquid propellant missile systems.

— In September 2004, the United States imposed sanctions against XXXXXXXXXXXX for transferring items controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to Iran.

— Subsequently, in May 2006, we advised you of XXXXXXXXXXXX’s continued efforts to supply Iran’s ballistic missile program with additional materials, including MTCR-controlled 08X22HGT titanium stabilized duplex stainless steel, which is used in the production of Scud and NoDong propellant tanks, as well as CR18NI10TI, a type of stainless steel that is not MTCR-controlled, but is used in the production of a variety of Scud engine parts.

— We remain deeply concerned that, given the high-quality of steel that can be purchased from Ukrainian manufacturers, Iran’s ballistic missile program continues to seek items from Ukrainian entities, including XXXXXXXXXXXX.

— Such steels have long been difficult for Iran to produce indigenously. As you will recall, in late 2006 we shared with all MTCR Partners information indicating that a key choke point for Iran’s missile programs is the ability to acquire advanced materials such as AISI 4340 and AISI 4130 steels.

— Both of these steels are used by Iran’s solid-fueled ballistic missile program in the production of motor cases.

— We therefore urge you to exercise vigilance in your export control processes, and to take all appropriate measures to ensure that Ukrainian firms are not acting as sources of specialty metals to Iranian ballistic missile entities.

37. (S) Nykonenko said that Ukraine would look into the matter and provide detailed information to the U.S. Van Diepen said that if Ukraine could not solve this problem on its own, the U.S. would consider taking action by sanctioning the entities involved, including the steel companies, and by taking other measures. Iran’s missiles threatened U.S. and allied troops stationed in the Middle East, so for self-defense reasons, the U.S. had to act to stop these exports. Ukraine’s steel companies have benefited from trade with the West, but they could not have it both ways– it was not in their interest to risk large profits from the West for small illicit profits from rogue states like Iran.

Ukrainian Training to Iran’s Malek-Ashtar University of Technology

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38. (S) Van Diepen said that we recently shared with the GOU information indicating that as of early 2009, Iran’s Malek-Ashtar University of Technology (MUT), as in years past, was continuing to sponsor international scientists, including from Ukraine, to provide training in Iran. Malek-Ashtar University of Technology is subordinate to Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), and provides instruction to representatives of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) as well as the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO). The U.S. urged Ukraine to ensure that Ukrainian individuals and institutions are not providing sensitive technology, training, and/or other support to Malek-Ashtar University of Technology or other Iranian entities affiliated with Iran’s missile program, and asked for the status of Ukraine’s actions. Nykonenko said that Ukraine had recently received the U.S. information and was reviewing it.

Prohres-Pakistan

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39. (S) Van Diepen noted that we recently provided information to Ukraine noting the interest in Pakistan’s National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) in procuring gyrotheodolites from Ukraine’s Prohres. He urged Ukraine to investigate this activity and take actions to prevent any transfer of this missile-related equipment. Nykonenko said that Ukraine had recently received the U.S. information and was reviewing it.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

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40. (S) Van Diepen said that there is a long history to this case and requested an update from Ukraine. He also provided additional information on this case:

— We now have new information indicating that in August 2009, XXXXXXXXXXXX was working with representatives of China’s Changda Corporation to establish a partnership related to the production of gyrotheodolites with China’s Shaanxi Cangsong Machinery Plant.

— The Shannxi Cangsong Machinery Plant is subordinate to the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation Tenth Academy and manufactures inertial guidance systems for Chinese ballistic missiles.

— Given the possible missile-related end-use of these items, as well as the identity of XXXXXXXXXXXX’s potential Chinese partner, we are concerned that this cooperation could be used to support China’s MTCR Category I missile programs.

— We therefore strongly urge you to conduct further inquiries into XXXXXXXXXXXX’s dealings with Chinese missile-related entities, and take all appropriate measures to ensure that XXXXXXXXXXXX is not serving as a source of goods or technologies for China’s MTCR Category I programs.

41. Nykonenko said that Ukraine is still reviewing the U.S. information on these matters. (NOTE: Ukraine provide a written update on this case at the end of the talks: “XXXXXXXXXXXX did negotiate with China Great Wall and received licensing approval to repair a previously provided UGT-S gyrotheodolite. However, XXXXXXXXXXXX did not negotiate with the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology to transfer MTCR-controlled DOZ stellar sensors.” END NOTE.)

G8 Global Partnership/Combating Nuclear Smuggling

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42. (U) Viktor Ryazantsev of the State Committee for Nuclear Regulation, Mykola Proskura of the Ministry for Emergency Situations, and Oleksandr Panchenko of the State Border Guard Service provided detailed reports on the progress made on the range of anti-nuclear smuggling assistance projects developed with the GOU by the U.S. Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) in January 2006. Each reported extensive progress on these projects and expressed deep appreciation for U.S. assistance in facilitating both project implementation and participation by other donors.

43. (U) NSOI Coordinator Mike Stafford agreed with them that the two sides had made remarkable progress on these projects and added that their degree of cooperation provided a model for NSOI’s engagement with other governments. Stafford also noted that, in addition to progress on the assistance projects, it was important to monitor progress in implementing the agreed steps in the joint action plan that the sides had also agreed upon in January 2006 and whose

implementation the assistance projects were designed to facilitate. Stafford noted that the USG had just received from the Ukrainian Embassy earlier in the week an updated matrix indicating that 27 of the 30 steps in the joint action plan were either complete or in progress. He congratulated the GOU on this progress and secured Nykonenko’s agreement to keep the U.S. side updated as implementation proceeds. Stafford also announced that NSOI had allocated $935,000 from its FY09 budget to assist monitoring on Ukraine’s green border with Russia, proposed on behalf of the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program a workshop to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to respond to nuclear smuggling incidents, and agreed to a Ukrainian request to query the Government of Finland on when a proposed mobile radiation monitoring van might be provided. (The Finnish regulatory authority subsequently reported that they hoped to provide it in December.)

44. (U) On behalf of ISN/CTR, Stafford expressed U.S. appreciation for the provision of a temporary location for the Science and Technology Center Ukraine (STCU) and requested periodic updates on construction of the permanent headquarters. Nykonenko emphasized three additional assistance projects that had been suggested by Ukraine at the most recent Global Partnership (GP) Working Group meeting, and reiterated a request that contributions by GP members to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund not be credited against their commitments to the GP. Stafford said he had investigated the latter matter after the original Ukrainian request and had learned the USG and several other GP members were counting these contributions within their GP commitments. The USG was not inclined to change this practice and thus would not ask others to change, either, especially since how to account for assistance was a sovereign decision.

Electron

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45. (U) Proskura said that, after two years of negotiations, the U.S. and Ukraine had signed a contract September 24 on the removal and storage of radioactive sources from the Electron Gaz Plant.and the Kavetskiy Institute. Ukraine had selected the contractor, and he saw no reason why Ukraine’s nuclear regulatory body would intervene to stop the work.

46. (C) Leach said that this contract demonstrated Ukraine’s strong commitment to nonproliferation. The sides would begin be securing the sources at the two facilities and then would work on removing the material beginning with one-of-a-kind sources at the Institute of Physics in Kyiv. The sides would work out a way to deal with the different sources and more difficult conditions at Electron Gaz. The sides would need to work closely and cooperatively to resolve all of the problems as the project moved forward, he concluded.

NATO Partnership for Peace Destruction Project

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47. (U) PM/WRA Deputy Director Steven Costner noted that the sides would have detailed technical discussions the next day on this topic, but he wanted to summarize the state of play in front of the larger group. While the original Phase I of the project planned for the destruction of 15,000 tons of munitions and 400,000 small arms/light weapons (SA/LW), revised plans by NATO and the USG (as Lead Nation) was for the project to terminate when current funding ran out (around the end of March 2010), due to the GOU deciding not to destroy all of the SA/LW. This revised plan would cover 6000 tons of munitions. The good news was that munitions destruction finally had commenced, with approximately 600 tons destroyed to date, and that the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency had determined that an extra 2000 tons of munitions could be destroyed (i.e., 8000 tons total) due to interest accrued in the account. The other donors would need to approve the use of the interest for this purpose, but that was expected to be a formality. Additionally, construction on the explosive waste incinerator would begin in October. As for SA/LW destruction, over 134,000 had been destroyed to date, with the GOU recently committing to destroy another 54,000 after over a year and a half suspension of such destruction. This would bring the total destroyed to approximately 190,000 SA/LW, but would leave the project approximately 210,000 weapons short of the original goal.

48. (U) Costner emphasized that the USG had committed to engage the GOU on its proposal to convert the balance of the SA/LW into replicas for sale to see if this could be done in a way that would satisfy USG requirements that the weapons no longer function as such. If agreement was reached, the USG and NATO would commit to continuing the destruction project

and destroying the balance of the 15,000 tons of munitions as originally envisioned. However, he emphasized that U.S. laws were stringent in this regard and that experts may not reach agreement the next day. In this case, the sides would be faced with two options: 1) Ukraine would need to destroy the weapons as originally agreed; or 2) the project would be shut down, as noted above.

49. (U) Nykonenko expressed appreciation for the good news that the munitions total would be increased to 8000 tons, and expressed confidence that the experts would find a solution the following day that would allow destruction assistance to continue. (Note: The following day Ukrainian experts stated that they have recommended to the Cabinet of Ministers that the GOU agree to destroy the balance of weapons consistent with their original commitment, instead of converting them to replicas. If Cabinet of Ministers approval is attained, this will allow the project to continue. See septel for details. End Note.)

Biological Threat Reduction Initiative

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50. (U) Ludmilla Muherska from the Ministry of Health gave a detailed presentation on Ukraine’s efforts to upgrade 18 regional medical laboratories. The Ministry of Health is also working with the MOD and the other security services to upgrade security at the laboratories. Ukraine would require additional assistance to reduce the biological threat and to complete all of this work

51. (U) Van Diepen urged Ukraine to identify expeditiously a new location for a Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) that meets DoD/CTR’s conditions and he emphasized that Ukraine needs to consolidate all especially dangerous pathogens in the CRL, once completed.

52. (U) Muherska said that Ukraine is working on this complex issue and was considering several sites for the CRL. Some of the sites were located on MOD-owned property, so if selected, the site would need to be transferred to the Ministry of Health. Ukraine is hoping that it would be able to select a site soon.

Side Conversation — Security Assurances and START Follow-On

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53. (S) On the margins of the Nonproliferation talks, Nykonenko had three conversations with VCI/SI Deputy Director Neil Couch to clarify Ukraine’s desire to participate in the START Follow-on Treaty and Kiev’s security concerns. Nykonenko stated that he has been appointed as the Ukrainian Representative to the START Follow-on negotiations and, in that capacity, he wants to consult with the U.S. negotiator. He added that, despite a rocky relationship with Russia, he has met with Ambassador Antonov on four occasions and he doesn’t understand why the United States has not offered similar consultations. He is willing to meet with A/S Gottemoeller at any time or place. Nykonenko reiterated his offer for Ukraine to play a mediating role between the United States and Russia in START Follow-on, citing past examples in which Ukraine had played such a role in START. Finally, Nykonenko asked that the START Follow-on Treaty contain a preambular statement that singled-out Ukraine’s contribution to START implementation specifically and to nuclear non-proliferation in general. He added that it was unfair to include Ukraine in the same category as Belarus and Kazakhstan since they are members of the CIS and only do what Russia tells them to do.

54. (S) Couch asked Nykonenko to explain why Ukraine needed additional, legally binding security assurances, recalling that the 1994 Budapest security assurances provided by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation did not expire with the START Treaty in December of 2009; that the 2008 United States-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership was still in force; and that Vice President Biden”s recent speech in Kyiv had confirmed the United States’ commitment to Ukrainian security. With all of these assurances, what else did Ukraine need? Nykonenko responded that Ukraine had no doubts about the commitment of the United States; however, Ukraine had serious concerns about Russia’s commitment. Citing the Russian-Georgian conflict and the large ethnic Russian population in Ukraine, Nykonenko explained that if the United States would agree to new security assurances with Ukraine, then Russia would likely agree to join in the document. That is Ukraine’s real desire; it views an agreement with the United States as a vehicle to bring Russia along. Nykonenko added that such an

agreement would also satisfy the two halves of Ukraine society, the westward-leaning half and the Russian-leaning half, and help quell internal tension. He also raised the issue of the Russian Black Sea Navy Base at Sevastopol, stating that Ukraine has no way of knowing how many soldiers Russia had on the base and that he believed Russia has exceeded its number of personnel allowed under the Navy Base lease. This was especially urgent for Ukraine given Russia’s suspension of its CFE commitments. Nykonenko was clearly concerned that the Russians could use the Black Sea Base as jumping-off point for military action in Ukraine. (Note: A subsequent initial check with analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency indicates no visible build-up of Russian forces at the Black Sea Navy Base. DIA is currently conducting a more thorough review of available information. End note.)

55. (U) Participants:

United States:

ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Vann Van Diepen XXXXXXXXXXXX

56. ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Van Diepen cleared this cable. PETTIT