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Dinsdag, 18 Januari 2011 | Bewerkt door Crethi Plethi

WikiLeaks: Van Middelkoop Uit Zijn Zorgen over Uitsluiting JSF F-136 Programma door VS

Document: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over de bezorgdheid van Minister van Defensie Van Middelkoop over de ontwikkelingen rond de tweede (concurrerende) motor voor de JSF en de uitsluiting van de F-136 motor in het Amerikaanse 2010 defensie budget. Dit is belangrijk voor de tegenorders bij de Nederlandse industrie.

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

226083,

9/21/2009 7:38,

09THEHAGUE568,

“Embassy The Hague”,

CONFIDENTIAL,

09THEHAGUE264|09THEHAGUE271|09THEHAGUE543,

“VZCZCXRO0146
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INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY”,”C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000568

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, NATO, PINS, PREL, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/JSF: CONCERN ABOUT SECOND ENGINE
REF: A. THE HAGUE 271
B. THE HAGUE 264
C. THE HAGUE 543

Classified By: POLECON Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons 1.5(b,d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: The Netherlands Minister of Defense (MOD)
has expressed concern over the JSF second engine (F-136)
being omitted from the U.S. 2010 Defense Budget. Dutch
industry has high-value contracts supporting the development
of the F-136 engine. The MOD has struggled to retain the
necessary support for the JSF program in what has become a
politically charged battle. Cancelling the F-136 program
could scuttle Dutch participation in JSF and raise doubts
about American defense partnerships as we ask the Dutch to
stay the course with us in Afghanistan.
END SUMMARY.

Background:
———–

2. (U) The concept of having two competing engines for the
JSF dates back to the “”Great Engine War,”” when Congress
funded the development of a second engine in 1979 for the Air
Force’s fighter aircraft. The Air Force and Congress cite
the competition as a huge success, yielding both cost savings
and a better product. This “”standard”” of competition drove a
two engine solution (F-135 and F-136) for the JSF program.
Participating countries in the JSF Program are allowed to
choose the F-135, F-136, or both when they issue their
procurement request per the JSF Production, Sustainment, and
Follow-on Development MOU. The GONL believes based on the
MOU they have an engine choice, and are currently in a study
with Norway and Italy to compare both engines before a
placing their orders to the JSF Program.

Dutch Industry Support on the F-136:
————————————

3. (SBU) Two companies in the Netherlands are responsible for
the co-design and production of critical components on the
F-136. (Netherlands industry is not participating in the
development of the F-135, but is seeking maintenance
contracts with Pratt & Whitney, the manufacturer.) The F-136
contractors (General Electric/Rolls-Royce) list potential
F-136 business with the Netherlands — across the life of the
program — at over one billion dollars. Dutch labor unions
and local governments are currently applying pressure to the
Labor Party (PvdA), which has the pivotal vote to keep the
JSF alive in the Netherlands by approving the purchase of the
second test jet. The MOD is currently working with
Parliament to obtain approval for the purchase the second
test aircraft by December 2009. (Note: Post has ensured both
the F-135 and F-136 have been equally represented during this
process. End Note.)

Comment / Risk of Cancelling JSF in the Netherlands:
——————————————— ——-

4. (C) COMMENT: The JSF debate in the Netherlands remains
politically charged, with the Parliament nearly scuttling
Dutch participation in JSF (reftels A, B). The Dutch MOD is
using the successes of the JSF in Dutch industry as an
argument to keep the JSF in the Netherlands. The Dutch are
aware that the U.S. defense budget has excluded the F-136
every year since 2006, but to date Congress has overturned
that decision and maintained support for the F-136. However,
if the second engine does not survive the budget process,
significant U.S. effort will be required to keep the Dutch as
a partner in the program. Opponents of the JSF, including
the Labor Party (in the three-party governing coalition),
would likely argue the U.S. had changed the terms of the
Qwould likely argue the U.S. had changed the terms of the
agreement upon which Dutch participation was based and we are
unreliable. Prospects for winning continued Dutch support of
the JSF are dim without continuation of the F-136 program
(the two engine option). Furthermore, we are engaged in an
delicate effort to keep the Dutch in Afghanistan after 2010.
The Labor Party has the pivotal role on this issue as well.
When we are asking the Dutch Cabinet and Parliament to make a
difficult decision to stay with us as partners in
Afghanistan, being perceived as an unreliable partner on JSF
could prove to be a large hurdle to overcome. END COMMENT.

LEVIN