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Zaterdag, 22 Januari 2011 | Bewerkt door Crethi Plethi

WikiLeaks: VS Zet Nederlandse Regering en Bedrijfsleven onder Grote Druk om Geen Zaken te Doen met Iran

De Nederlandse douane heeft vorig jaar 250 leveringen aan Iran geblokkeerd. In 2009 waren dat er maar 61. Daarnaast wordt in bijna veertig procent van de gevallen een exportvergunning geweigerd.

Uit de Amerikaanse diplomatieke ambtsberichten die de NOS via Wikeleaks heeft gekregen blijkt dat de Amerikanen de Nederlandse regering regelmatig onder druk zetten om maatregelen te nemen tegen Nederlandse bedrijven die mogelijk onderdelen leveren voor de kernindustrie of wapenindustrie.

Document 1: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over leveranties aan Iran. Er staan verder geen details in over wie en wat.

Document 2: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over de export van onderdelen voor onbemande vliegtuigen naar Iran.

Document 3: Bericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over export van vliegtuigonderdelen naar Iran.

Document 4: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over export naar Iran door Inter Connection Technologies en Aviation Services.

Document 5: Bericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over export van vliegtuigonderdelen naar Iran.

Document 6: Ambstbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over export tritium naar Iran.

Document 7: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over levering onderdelen aan Iran door Nederlandse bedrijven.

Document 8: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag gaat over beperkingen voor Iraanse studenten en over export naar Iran.

Document 9: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over de reactie van Philips op suggestie dat het handelt met Iraanse defensie industrie. Niet zo, zegt de vice president, Philips houdt zich juist meer dan gevraagd aan de regels van de VS.

Document 10: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken over de beschuldiging tegen AMT Netherlands van handel met Iran, via tussenpersoon zouden onderdelen voor onbemande vliegtuigen in Iran terecht zijn gekomen.

Document 11: Ambtsbericht van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over AMT Netherlands. AMT zou onderdelen hebben geleverd aan Iran, gesprek met vertegenwoordig ministerie van economische zaken. Ministerie zal zaak opnemen.

Document 12: Cable van de Amerikaanse ambassade in Den Haag over blokkeren levering rotorbladen aan Iran. Sulzer Eldim uit Limburg had 40 miljoen euro. Nederland wil dat andere landen wel leveren.

Lees het gerelateerde artikel hier.

Lees ook “WikiLeaks: VS Zet Nederlandse Banken onder Grote Druk om Geen Zaken te Doen met Iran”.

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 1

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 002555

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/PRA, ISN/ECNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2015
TAGS: MARR, NL, PREL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: UAV SALES TO IRAN
REF: A. STATE 172807
B. STATE 164496

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer;
reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (C) Polmiloff delivered ref A points to Ceta Noland
(Senior Policy Advisor, Nuclear Affairs and Non-Proliferation
Division, MFA) September 20. Noland appreciated the new
information, and stated she would pass it on to the Dutch
intelligence service and the Financial and Economic
Investigation Agency, Ministry of Economic Affairs. Noland
explained that the Dutch intelligence services typically pass
information on such cases directly to their U.S. intelligence
counterparts. She added that Dutch intelligence was actively
working the case; given Washington’s keen interest, she said
she would try to pass us any update she receives.

2. (C) Noland could not/not confirm whether the shipment (ref
A) had been sent to Iran, although she suspected it had, or
she would have heard about a seizure at Schiphol Airport.
She noted that she would follow up with the Financial and
Economic Investigation Agency for a definite answer.

3. (C) Noland further explained that the Dutch intelligence
service is somewhat limited in investigations of companies.
For example, company cooperation is voluntary should the
Dutch intelligence agency request additional information
during an investigation. The Dutch government is considering
an audit of the company involved (ref B) by the Financial and
Economic Investigation Agency in which company cooperation
would become obligatory.

BLAKEMAN

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 2

06STATE159373

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 002139

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MTR, EUR/UBI, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016
TAGS: PARM, MTCRE, PREL, ETTC, IR, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: RESPONSE TO IRANIAN UAV DEMARCHE
REF: STATE 159373

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (S) Polmiloff discussed reftel points with MFA Senior
Advisor for Nuclear Affairs and Non-proliferation Ceta Noland
on September 28. Noland claimed the points did not present
any new information — the Dutch intelligence service AIVD
has been in close contact with U.S. intelligence agencies
regarding the case, and is therefore on top of the
situation. She added that the Dutch MFA is pushing the Dutch
Ministry of Economic Affairs to issue a catch all in
connection to Aviation Services International’s apparent
attempts to circumvent Dutch and EU export control
restrictions.

2. (S) Noland noted, however, that a catch all issuance
will be difficult, given the fact that Dutch companies are
not required under Dutch law to apply for an export license
for specific unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components. She
said the Dutch delegation will present on this topic at the
MTCR plenary intelligence exchange in Copenhagen. Noland
welcomed additional U.S. information and cooperation on this
case, and noted that Dutch intelligence agencies will pass
any new developments to their U.S. counterparts.

ARNALL

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 3

110736

2007-06-04

07THEHAGUE1050

Embassy The Hague

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

07THEHAGUE984
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001050

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR ISN/RA, EUR/UBI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, IR, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/NSG: IRAN EXPORT DENIAL INFORMATION
REF: THE HAGUE 984

1. (SBU) Per reftel, the GONL provided the following
information regarding the one export denial to Iran currently
in force in the Netherlands. The GONL provided this
information in preparation for the open-ended seminar in
national capacities to discuss implementation of UNSCRs 1737
and 1747 during the week of June 4, 2007 in Vienna.

2. (SBU) Begin text:

Destination: Islamic Republic of Iran
End-User Name: Parto Turbine Blade Engine and MFG. CO.
End-User Address: Fardis, 3167643597 Karaj
Cosignee Name: Parto Turbine Blade Engine and MFG. CO.
Cosignee Address Country: Islamic Republic of Iran
Cosignee Address Information: Fardis, 3167643597 Karaj
Item Description: Double chamber vacuum induction melting
furnace
Item End Use: Casting of Ni-Base alloys with stationary gas
turbine production
Item Category EU: 2B226
Item Category NSG: N-1B4
End text.

3. (SBU) The Dutch will not have experts from The Hague
attend the meeting. GONL officials reiterated that the above
information should only be released to the IAEA Technical
Secretariat and the UNSCR Iran Sanctions Committee.

SIPDIS

GALLAGHER

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 4

142853

2008-02-25

08THEHAGUE174

Embassy The Hague

SECRET

08STATE15228

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000174

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MTR, EUR/WE, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: PARM, MTCRE, PREL, ETTC, IR, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: POSSIBLE EFFORTS BY DUTCH FIRM INCO
TECH TO ASSIST IRANIAN UAV DEVELOPMENT
REF: STATE 15228

Classified By: CDA Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (S) Polmiloff discussed reftel points with MFA Senior
Advisor for Nonproliferation and Nuclear Affairs Ceta Noland
on February 25. Noland appreciated the points, and claimed
to be aware of Inter Connection Technologies (InCo Tech).
She needed to confirm, but thought the GONL might have
already issued a MTCR catch-all against InCo Tech. At any
rate, Noland said she would pass on the points to the
relevant Dutch intelligence authorities; any response will
most likely be handled through those channels, she added.

2. (S) Noland commented in passing on Aviation Services
International (ASI), noting that ASI Director Robert
Kraaipoel appears to be maintaining relations with Iran as he
was recently seen at a reception at the Iranian Embassy in
The Hague. That said, Noland understood that ASI has ceased
its attempts to export material to Iran. She asked for an
update on the U.S. case against ASI; polmiloff replied that
he had no updates on the case, which was being handled
through the Department of Justice.

Schofer

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 5

144565

2008-03-06

08THEHAGUE225

Embassy The Hague

SECRET

08STATE15228

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000225

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MTR, EUR/WE, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018
TAGS: PARM, MRCRE, PREL, ETTC, IR, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAN: NO OBJECTIONS TO DUTCH FIRM INCO
TECH EXPORT
REF: A. STATE 15228
B. THE HAGUE 174

Classified By: CDA Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (S) Per reftels, MFA Senior Advisor for Nonproliferation
and Nuclear Affairs Ceta Noland told polmiloff March 6 that
the Dutch firm Inter Connection Technologies (InCo Tech) had
contacted the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs on December
17, 2007, regarding the planned export of connectors to Iran.
Noland said the GONL determined at that time that the
connectors in question did not pose a WMD risk; she suggested
the connectors were quite ordinary and run-of-the-mill. As
such, she said no objections were raised against this planned
export.

2. (S) Noland doubted but could not confirm if the shipment
of connectors had already been exported to Iran. She said it
typically takes several months after an export approval for
the export to occur. Dutch customs officials can check
whether an export has taken place, but Noland explained that
due to an e-system output delay, there is typically a
three-month delay between the date of the export and the
export’s appearance in the Dutch customs’ database. Thus,
she noted that even if the export had occurred immediately
following the export approval, it would not yet be listed in
the database. Noland welcomed any additional information
from Washington regarding the specifications of the
connectors, and how they might pose a WMD risk — if the
shipment has not gone forward, then the GONL might be able to
reexamine the case.

Schofer

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 6

148419

2008-04-03

08THEHAGUE313

Embassy The Hague

SECRET

08STATE26650|08THEHAGUE271

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000313

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN, T, EUR/PRA, EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2028
TAGS: PARM, PREL, IR, NL
SUBJECT: NIAG 6004: DUTCH UPDATE ON TRITIUM GAS SHIPMENT
REF: A. STATE 26650
B. THE HAGUE 271

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (S) Summary: The GONL confirmed an attempted shipment of
tritium gas to Iran by a Dutch firm in December 2007.
According to MFA Senior Advisor for Nuclear Affairs and
Nonproliferation Ceta Noland, the Dutch are continuing to
investigate the incident and may pursue criminal charges
against the Dutch company. She said the Dutch have reported
the incident to the IAEA. Noland discussed these issues with
polmiloff on April 2. End summary.

2. (S) Per reftels, Noland compared notes on the halted
shipment of tritium gas at Schiphol International Airport in
December 2007. She said a Dutch firm had attempted to make
the shipment on behalf of its German parent company Campro
Scientific. The Dutch firm claimed the tritium gas was
intended — in conjunction with leucine proteins — to treat
blood disease at an Iranian children’s hospital. Noland said
that such radioactive treatment is extremely experimental
in Europe, and Dutch authorities greatly doubted that Iranian
medical science had advanced to the point where such
treatment could be used on children. Given the radioactive
nature of the gas and end destination in Iran, the GONL
insisted the firm apply for an export license, which the firm
has yet to do.

3. (S) Noland said that while the shipment was halted, Dutch
authorities did not seize the tritium gas. She said the
Dutch suspect the tritium gas is still in the Netherlands, as
returning it to Germany would require a special license to
transport such a controlled item. Noland said the Dutch
continue to investigate the incident, including the
possibility of filing criminal charges against the Dutch
firm.

4. (S) Noland noted that cooperation with German authorities
has been excellent, and said that Campro Scientific had
attempted to make a similar shipment a year earlier from
Germany. She noted that both the German parent firm and
Dutch subsidiary have Iranian leadership, and said that
according to German authorities, the German director had been
arrested, while an Iranian diplomat associated with the
firm’s activities had been expelled from Germany.

5. (S) Noland said the Dutch have reported the incident to
the IAEA so that it will be included in the illicit
trafficking database. She said the Dutch were interested in
making a NSG presentation on the incident, but have been
asked by Germany to postpone such a presentation due to the
on-going investigations in both Germany and the Netherlands.

Gallagher

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 7

148455

2008-04-03

08THEHAGUE317

Embassy The Hague

SECRET//NOFORN

05STATE145292

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000317

SIPDIS

NOFORN

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MTR, EUR/WE, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PARM, MTCRE, PREL, ETTC, IR, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON DUTCH FIRM’S
EFFORTS TO ASSIST IRANIAN UAV DEVELOPMENT
REF: A. 05 STATE 145292

B. 05 STATE 164496
C. 05 THE HAGUE 2478
D. 05 STATE 172807
E. 05 THE HAGUE 2555
F. 05 THE HAGUE 3283
G. 05 STATE 229063
H. 05 THE HAGUE 3397
I. 06 STATE 159373
J. 06 THE HAGUE 2139
K. 07 THE HAGUE 0037
L. STATE 15228
M. THE HAGUE 0174
N. THE HAGUE 0225
O. STATE 31941

Classified By: CDA Michael Gallagher, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (S) Polmiloff discussed reftel O with MFA Senior Advisor
for Nuclear Affairs and Nonproliferation Ceta Noland on April
2, stressing the past involvement of Aviation Services
International (ASI) with the Ghoods Aviation Center (reftels
A-K), and ASI’s referral to Inter Connection Technologies
(InCo Tech) to ship connectors used in aviation applications
to Iran (reftels L-N). Noland appreciated the additional
points, but noted that the assessment by Dutch authorities
indicated the connectors were not/not high-density military
grade.

2. (S) Noland said Dutch customs authorities had pulled the
connectors out of the crates, and that Dutch authorities had
determined the connectors could not be used for UAV purposes.
She added that the GONL has placed red flags on any
shipment associated with ASI, InCo Tech, or Iran’s Ghoods
Aviation Center — if there is an even remote chance that a
shipment could be used for UAV purposes, then the Dutch will
issue a catch-all, Noland explained. But in this instance,
she added, the Dutch were reasonably confident that the
connectors could not be used for UAV purposes.

3. (S) While she has not yet received a confirmation, Noland
strongly suspected that the shipment had gone forward. She
said she would pass these additional points to the relevant
Dutch intelligence authorities, but suggested we share our
information indicating the connectors are high-density
military grade with the Dutch through the appropriate
intelligence channels.

Comment
——-

4. (S) Embassy country team agrees that release of any
information regarding the high-density military grade
connectors through the appropriate intelligence channels
would be useful in making our case with the Dutch. End
comment.

Gallagher

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 8

159819

2008-06-26

08THEHAGUE553

Embassy The Hague

CONFIDENTIAL

08SECSTATE6453|08THEHAGUE355

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000553

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018
TAGS: PREL, KNNP,MNUC, PARM, IR, NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAN: SUPORT FOR ROBUST RESPONSE
REF: A. SECSTATE 6453
B. THE HAGUE 355

Classified By: Politicl Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons 1.5(b,d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: On June 24, poloff reviewed develpments in
Iran policy with Dutch MFA officials Lek ten Hagen, Iran
desk officer, Huib Mijnarends,Senior Policy Officer in the
Terrorism and New Treats Unit, and Ceta Noland, Senior
Advisor for uclear Affairs and Nonproliferation. The Dutch
continue to support a robust stance toward Iran athome, the
EU, the IAEA, and the UN. The Dutch wecomed the June 20
briefing for the EU by NEA/IR cting director Dibble. END
SUMMARY.

2. (C) Ntherlands: Noland stated that FM Verhagen had
aproved a new visa policy for Iranian students to prvent
access to nuclear weapons technology — the olicy will be
publicized within 10 days. The aproved regulations include
list of secured faciliies off limits to masters-level
students from Irn, plus an extensive list of prohibited
areas ofstudy for masters-level students from Iran. (Note
This policy goes beyond the earlier draft regultion that was
reported in reftel B. End Note.)

3. (C) EU / IAEA / UN: Mijnarends stated that theDutch want
the EU needs to start the debate on fll implementation of
UNSC resolution 1803, and tht the Dutch support a robust
implementation. oland indicated that on the IAEA, the Dutch
are isappointed the Board of Governors did not respondto
the latest IAEA report. The Dutch hope for aresolution at
the next Board meeting in September Regarding the UN,
Mijnarends said that the Duth support a UNSC debate on
Iran’s response to the P5 1 package after the 30-day
deadline proposed by Dibble during his June 20 briefing.
More generally, Noland cited continuing efforts by Iran to
access weapons technology as well as the long period of
international effort to engage Iran. Mijnarends suggested
that 30 days should be the maximum time allowed for Iran to
respond. Ten Hagen expected Iran to respond in a typical
fashion with efforts to delay and divide the allied response.
FM Verhagen would like to see a swift and positive
response.

Gallagher

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 9

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000087

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG, EPET, ETTC, ETRD, PREL, NL, IR
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAN: PHILIPS NOT ACTIVE IN IRAN’S ENERGY
SECTOR
Ref: (A) 08 STATE 125579, (B) THE HAGUE 2, (C)
GRAY-NEPHEW-COULTER-GROEN EMAILS 02/02/09

1. (U) This cable contains proprietary company information. Please
protect accordingly.

2. (SBU) Summary: In response to questions regarding its possible
licensing of LNG technology to Iran, Royal Philips Electronics
emphasized that it has no activities whatsoever in the LNG field,
especially not in Iran. Philips does export some lighting, consumer
electronics, and medical equipment to Iran, but always in accordance
with international export control laws. End summary.

3. (SBU) Econoff met January 28 with Mr. Guy Kerpen, Director of
Government Relations, and Mr. Wolter Boerman, Vice President of
Corporate Export Controls and Supply Chain Security, at Royal
Philips Electronics. Per Ref A request, Econoff sought information
about Philips’ possible provision to Iran of licensing for LNG
projects. The Philips representatives said the company had no
activities whatsoever in LNG or energy production in general, let
alone with Iran. Boerman said he had reviewed Philips’ historical
records to confirm the company had never been involved in
researching, developing, producing, or marketing any type of LNG
technology. He also contacted Philips’ office in Dubai to confirm
that it had never discussed conducting LNG-related activities with
Iran.

4. (SBU) Unlike Royal Dutch Shell, which does maintain investments
in Iran’s energy sector (ref B), Philips manufactures lighting,
healthcare products, and consumer electronics. Its only business
with Iran, according to Kerpen and Boerman, is the sale of products
such as coffee makers, electric razors, lamps, and light bulbs.
Philips also sells some medical equipment to Iran; these are the
only products for which Philips routinely applies for U.S. licenses.
Boerman explained that over 55 percent of Philips’ assets are based
in the United States, and the company therefore takes compliance
with U.S. export regulations regarding Iran very seriously.
Although the U.S. government requires exporters to acquire a license
if more than 10 percent of the medical equipment’s content is
produced in the United States, Philips acquires a license for any of
its products with more than 2 percent of U.S. content – just to be
safe.

5. (SBU) Kerpen and Boerman expressed dismay at the U.S.
government’s suggestion that Philips had any involvement in Iran’s
energy sector and asked where we had obtained such information.
They stressed Philips’ interest in correcting any misinformation in
the national measures campaign of the E4+1 governments (ref A).
Philips takes its international reputation extremely seriously and
carefully follows all UN, EU, U.S., and other international
obligations related to doing business in restricted countries. The
company recognizes the public relations damage that accusations of
improper dealings can cause; hence its dismay at the USG’s
questions.

6. (SBU) Per Department guidance (ref C), Econoff explained that
during the course of discussions with our E4+1 partners, one of them
had advised that Philips might be involved in licensing LNG
technology to Iran. Econoff assured Philips that the USG would
relay its response to our partners in order to correct the error.

GALLAGHER

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 10

S E C R E T STATE 020624

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2034
TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, ETTC, MTCRE, NL, IR
SUBJECT: DUTCH FIRM SELLING UAV ENGINES TO IRANIAN DEALER
(S)

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM FOR REASONS
1.4 (B), (D), AND (H).

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see
paragraph 4.

2. (S) Background. The United States has information
indicating that in October 2008, Iranian businessman
Hamid Reihani established himself as a dealer for the
Dutch gas turbine engine manufacturer AMT Netherlands.
We also understand that in November 2008, AMT
Netherlands shipped Titan unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
engines and Pegasus engines to Reihani – possibly via a
Reihani associate in the United Arab Emirates.
Shipping documents may have identified the engines as
model aircraft parts. Although we do not have any
information on the identity of the end-user, Reihani
has previous associations with individuals affiliated
with the Iranian UAV entity Qods Aviation (or
Aeronautics) Industries, an entity designated under
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747 for its
association with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps.

3. (S) We want to urge Dutch officials to investigate
this information and take all appropriate measures to
ensure that AMT Netherlands is not acting as a supplier
to Iranian entities of proliferation concern.

4. (S) Action request: Request Embassy The Hague
approach host government officials to deliver talking
points/non-paper in paragraph 5 and report response.
Talking points may also be provided as a non-paper.

5. (S) Begin talking points/non-paper:

(SECRET//REL NETHERLANDS)

— We would like to alert you to a matter of
proliferation concern and request your assistance in
investigating this activity.
— The U.S. has information indicating that in early
October 2008, the Iranian businessman Hamid Reihani of
Parilla Company Ltd. became a dealer for the Dutch gas
turbine engine manufacturer AMT Netherlands.
— We also understand that at that time, an associate
of AMT Netherlands provided Reihani with price quotes
for a number of items, including Titan unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) engines, as well as Pegasus and Olympus
engines.
— Our information further indicates that AMT
Netherlands shipped Pegasus and Titan engines to
Reihani during November 2008 – possibly via a Reihani
associate in the United Arab Emirates – and that the
engines may have been identified on shipping documents
as model aircraft parts.
— Although the end-users for these engines were not
identified, we are concerned that Reihani could act as
a supplier to Iranian UAV entities, as Reihani has
previous associations with individuals either
affiliated or involved with Qods Aviation (or
Aeronautics) Industries.
— Qods Aeronautics Industries is an entity designated
under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747
for its association with the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps.
— We therefore hope you will investigate this activity
and use all available measures to ensure that AMT
Netherlands is not acting as a supplier to entities of
proliferation concern.
— We look forward to continued cooperation on
nonproliferation issues and to hearing of any actions
your government takes in response to this information.

6. (U) Please contact ISN/MTR’s John Paul Herrmann
with any questions or follow-up issues related to this
case XXXXXXXXXXXX and
slug reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR.

7. (U) A word version of this document will be posted
at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.

CLINTON

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 11

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000180

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2034

TAGS: PARM, PREL, MNUC, ETTC, MTCRE, NL, IR
SUBJECT: (S) NETHERLANDS/IRAN: EXPORT CONTROL AUTHORITY TO
APPLY LICENSE REQUIREMENT ON DUTCH FIRM SELLING UAV ENGINES
TO IRANIAN DEALER
REF: STATE 20624

Classified By: Head of Economic Unit Shawn Gray, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (S) EmbOff met March 10 with Kees Jan Steenhoek, Senior
Policy Advisor, Ministry of Economic Affairs, to discuss
reftel points. Steenhoek is responsible for the GONL’s
export control process. He appreciated the information as he
said the GONL had not been aware of AMT Netherlands’ exports
to Iran. Steenhoek said the GONL would most likely use a
catch-all procedure under the Missile Technology Control
Regime that will require AMT Netherlands to obtain a license
for all exports of UAV engines to Iran. Steenhoek said he
did not suspect AMT Netherlands was aware of the possible
connection between its customer (Parilla Company) and Iran’s
UAV program, in which case he predicted the company would
likely back away from this commercial relationship.
Steenhoek said he would also share reftel points with the
Dutch Intelligence and Security Services (AIVD) as well as
generic lookout information with the Dutch Customs
Administration.

GALLAGHER

Bron: WikiLeaks/NOS

Document 12

09THEHAGUE444

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 000444

NOFORN

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2019
TAGS: ETTC, PARM, PREL, ENRG, NL, IR
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: DUTCH CONCERNS ABOUT ROTOR BLADE
EXPORTS TO IRAN

Classified By: ACTING POLECON COUNSELOR SHAWN GRAY FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
and (D)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Dutch export control authority has
denied an export license for power plant turbine blades
destined for Iran. Dutch officials have formally asked other
European countries with companies that produce similar parts
to block their export to Iran. The Dutch have asked us
informally to ensure U.S. firms, such as General Electric
(GE), refrain from supplying these turbine blades to Iran.
END SUMMARY.

2.(S/NF) Dutch export control officials at the Ministries of
Economic Affairs (MEA) and Foreign Affairs (MFA) asked to
meet with EconOff June 30. MEA,s Kees Jan Steenhoek
described his office,s decision to block Sulzer Eldim BV,s
(Dutch subsidiary of Swiss parent company Sulzer Metco)
application to export gas-fired electricity turbine
replacement rotor blades to Iran. PolMilOff,s subsequent
July 9 meeting with MFA,s export control policy official
Josephine Frantzen provided further detail.

3. (S/NF) Until 2009, Dutch customs authorities routinely
stopped Sulzer Eldim,s Iran-bound shipments, then released
them when satisfied the rotor blades were destined for
civilian-use electricity production. However, after
discovering in January 2009 the UK had blocked a GBP 45
million shipment of similar parts, MEA used a &catch-all8
provision requiring Sulzer Eldim to obtain an export license
for the blades, on the grounds the electricity could be
diverted to military or nuclear programs. Sulzer Eldim
subsequently applied for an export license on a EUR 40
million order. The Dutch recently denied the application and
posted this information on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
Secure Information System as NI-NL-09001.

4. (S/NF) The consignee in Iran is a conglomerate that
supplies the civilian power sector there, but also has ties
to the military. The Dutch review of the case led them to
believe the electricity produced by the turbines &might not
be used for civilian purposes.8 One of Sulzer Eldim,s
directors is an Iranian national. MEA estimates blocking the
firm,s exports to Iran could cause it to lose half its
revenue. Sulzer Eldim has already laid off some of its
400-person staff, a controversial decision in the
economically struggling southern province of Limburg where
the company is located.

5. (S/NF) The Dutch government has demarched other European
capitals — including Paris, Berlin, and Rome — where rotor
blade manufacturers are located. According to Frantzen, the
Italian government had a &positive reaction,8 but the
others have not responded. The Dutch do not intend to
demarche Washington at this time. However, GE is capable of
supplying the blades, and the Dutch hope the USG will not
allow GE to export these products to Iran. The Dutch want
other countries to be equally vigilant in denying export
licenses for these parts so as to maintain cohesion within
the NSG and not disadvantage Dutch business interests. The
Dutch are particularly concerned German company Siemens will
continue to export the blades to Iran.

GALLAGHER