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Mon, May 09, 2011 | WikiLeaks: Part 1 and Part 2

WikiLeaks: Yemen – Who Are The Houthis?

Part 1: What are they fighting for?

Given the Houthis’ opacity and the government’s exaggerated claims about their goals, it is difficult to know what exactly they are fighting for. The ROYG accuses the Houthis of wanting to restore clerical rule in Yemen, which they deny, insisting instead that they want basic citizenship rights and religious freedoms. Although some Yemeni analysts believe the Houthis’ goals may be broader, possibly including political control of Sa’ada governorate, most informed observers do not believe that the Houthis desire to re-establish the imamate or expand their control beyond Sa’ada. In November 2009, the Houthis presented President Saleh with a list of conditions for guaranteeing a final resolution to the conflict. These include reconstruction and compensation for war-time damage and looting, genuine economic development and delivery of basic services, and an end to cultural and political discrimination against Zaydis, who form the majority of Sa’ada governorate’s population. The Houthis, feeling that Zaydi Shi’ism is under threat from the growing influence of Sunni Salafism, also reportedly seek to establish their own madrasas (religious schools) and a university for Zaydi jurisprudence in order to preserve their unique identity, religious beliefs, and practices. Understanding the Houthis’ objectives can help shape a political solution to this complex conflict, though additional factors, such as tribal vendettas, will also need to be taken into account in order to bring the fighting to an end.

Part 2: How are they fighting?

Little is clear about the Houthi leadership, aside from the fact that Abdulmalik al-Houthi is the rebel group’s current leader. Houthi field commanders do not seem to agree on key ideological and religious principles. The Houthis’ numbers range from the hundreds to the thousands, though it is difficult to determine how many of these adhere to Houthi ideology and how many are tribesmen who have joined the Houthis’ fight for other reasons. Numerous organizations have documented the Houthis’ use of child soldiers, as well as violations of international humanitarian law such as looting, forced evacuations, and executions. Contrary to ROYG claims that Iran is arming the Houthis, most analysts report that the Houthis obtain their weapons from the Yemeni black market and even from the ROYG military itself.

Source: WikiLeaks

Part 1: Who are the Houthis? What are they fighting for?

Reference ID: 09SANAA2185
Created: 2009-12-09 13:16
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Origin: Embassy Sanaa

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S E C R E T SANAA 002185

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: WHO ARE THE HOUTHIS, PART ONE: WHAT ARE THEY FIGHTING FOR?

REF: A. SANAA 2117
¶B. SANAA 1939

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Given the Houthis’ opacity and the government’s exaggerated claims about their goals, it is difficult to know what exactly they are fighting for. The ROYG accuses the Houthis of wanting to restore clerical rule in Yemen, which they deny, insisting instead that they want basic citizenship rights and religious freedoms. Although some Yemeni analysts believe the Houthis’ goals may be broader, possibly including political control of Sa’ada governorate, most informed observers do not believe that the Houthis desire to re-establish the imamate or expand their control beyond Sa’ada. In November 2009, the Houthis presented President Saleh with a list of conditions for guaranteeing a final resolution to the conflict. These include reconstruction and compensation for war-time damage and looting, genuine economic development and delivery of basic services, and an end to cultural and political discrimination against Zaydis, who form the majority of Sa’ada governorate’s population. The Houthis, feeling that Zaydi Shi’ism is under threat from the growing influence of Sunni Salafism, also reportedly seek to establish their own madrasas (religious schools) and a university for Zaydi jurisprudence in order to preserve their unique identity, religious beliefs, and practices. Understanding the Houthis’ objectives can help shape a political solution to this complex conflict, though additional factors, such as tribal vendettas, will also need to be taken into account in order to bring the fighting to an end. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) The information in this cable is compiled from PolOff interviews with sources who have first-hand contact with the Houthis, including journalists, relief workers, ROYG officials, and Houthi mediator and Haq party chief Hassan Zaid. (Note: It is Post’s policy not to communicate directly with the Houthis due to ROYG sensitivity. End Note.)

WHAT DO THEY WANT?
——————

¶3. (S/NF) Given the opacity of the Houthi rebels in the northern governorate of Sa’ada, as well as the government’s misleading claims about the group’s goals, it is difficult to answer the question, “What are the Houthis fighting for?” They are rhetorically anti-American, painting the slogan “Death to America” on buildings and boulders throughout Sa’ada governorate, but they have not targeted U.S. citizens or interests. The Houthis are also anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic, and their threats against the Jewish community in Sa’ada (one of only two remaining Jewish communities in Yemen) caused the Jews to relocate to Sana’a in 2007.

EVOLVING OBJECTIVES
——————-

¶4. (SBU) The Houthis’ objectives have evolved since the first Sa’ada war began in June 2004, when the Houthis were a small group of fighters defending a member of their family, MP Hussein al-Houthi, from arrest. (Note: Hussein al-Houthi was reportedly one of 21 brothers, including current leaders Abdul-Malik and Yahya. End Note.) For almost three months Houthi and his supporters, who at that time claimed allegiance to the state, fought off government troops from his stronghold in the Marran Mountains, until he was killed on September 10, 2004. In the years since, as the Houthis have gained supporters and territories, the group’s objectives have expanded while becoming even murkier. According to the International Crisis Group, there is no evidence of a coherent ideology or political program: “Some groups fighting the government, though referred to as Houthis, appear motivated by multiple, mostly non-ideological factors having little in common with the leadership’s proclaimed grievances.” These factors include disenfranchisement with the ROYG and the need to avenge the killings of family members or tribesmen unless blood money is paid.

ROYG ACCUSATIONS ABOUT HOUTHI GOALS
———————————–

¶5. (S/NF) The ROYG accuses the Houthis of wanting to restore the clerical rule of the imamate overthrown in 1962 and impose draconian religious beliefs and practices on communities where they are in power. Foreign Minister Abu-Bakr al-Qirbi said in an interview published in London-based Al-Sharq al-Awsat on September 12 that the Houthis “consider the current presidential system illegal and not in accordance with their creed.” Colonel Akram al-Qassmi of the National Security Bureau (NSB) told PolOffs on November 18 that re-establishing the imamate is not the Houthis’ main priority now, but it is part of their ideology. Instead, they are currently focusing on “standing up and strengthening” a Shi’a-dominated region along the Saudi-Yemeni border. “With this deck of cards, the Houthis can abuse the Saudi and Yemeni governments,” he said, much like Hizballah in Lebanon. The ROYG )- along with many Arab governments in the region )- seeks to portray the Houthis as part of a regional, Iran-led Shi’ite conspiracy to expand influence and power at the expense of Sunni populations.

¶6. (S/NF) The Houthis deny such goals, however, and as a result, many of the Houthis’ pronouncements are more about what they do not stand for than what they do. The Houthis proclaimed on their website, “The authority’s accusations about the imamate are just a media war… We are not asking for positions, we are asking for rights and justice. The essence of the crisis is political.” In a letter delivered to President Saleh on November 22, Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam attempted to correct the record, saying, “We hope that you do not (believe) the propaganda presented to you that we want to restore the imamate or that we have anything against the republican system.” He goes on to explain, “We do not want from you more than the right of equal citizenship.” In the letter, Abdulsalam attributed the misunderstanding and marginalization of the Houthis to “the persistence of the official media to deal with us as if we are from another planet.”

BASIC CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS OR BROADER AMBITIONS?
——————————————— –

¶7. (S/NF) Houthi mediator Hassan Zaid, a Zaydi Hashemite from a prominent Sana’a family and chair of the Haqq party, the legitimate political arm of the Zaydi movement, told PolOff on November 21 that the Houthis are fighting in self-defense and will stop as soon as the ROYG ceases to attack them. He explained that the Houthis’ political goal is to “benefit from the protection of the Constitution and the laws,” including equal citizenship and freedom of expression and religion. Mohammed al-Qadhi, correspondent for Dubai-based The National, however, told PolOff that the Houthis’ goals may be broader than securing certain religious and political freedoms. The Houthis’ fight is “no longer about self-defense,” he said. “They may have their own political ambitions now.” He believes that their fight is partially motivated by outrage at the open secret that President Saleh is grooming his son Ahmed Ali for the presidency. According to Qadhi, Saleh “keeps singing a song that offends them,” referring to how the ROYG prides itself on having “toppled the hereditary rule of the imamate” but is “doing the same thing (hereditary rule) under the umbrella of the republic.”

¶8. (C) Nabil al-Soufi of NewsYemen, who twice traveled secretly to Sa’ada governorate, told PolOff on November 18, “The Houthis have a political agenda, but the war they are waging lacks clear objectives.” He explained that the Houthis were dragged into the sixth war and have to keep fighting to defend themselves. He believes their objective is to control Sa’ada governorate, not to spread Zaydi religious beliefs or to re-establish the imamate, although they use religious rhetoric to advance their political objectives. U.S. academic Greg Johnsen, who has studied Yemeni politics for many years, has written, “Despite the religious rhetoric on all sides, the Houthis are primarily a group driven by the local politics of Sa’ada.” Chief among their complaints is the ROYG’s “deliberate neglect” of the governorate and the traditional political elite’s place within it. The conflict also is believed to have originated as an inter-Zaydi battle of the social classes, as the Hashemite elite within the Zaydi sect felt excluded from their rightful place in government by Zaydis from lower social classes, such as Saleh.

HOUTHIS’ SPECIFIC DEMANDS
————————-

¶9. (S/NF) The Houthis have presented President Saleh with a list of their conditions for “guaranteeing a final resolution” to the conflict (ref a). In addition to releasing prisoners (including 18 members of the Houthi family who are in prison in Sana’a, according to Zaid), compensating civilians for looted property, and reconstructing war-damaged infrastructure, the Houthis demand the “normalization” and “demilitarization” of life in Sa,ada” through the following steps: 1) the army’s withdrawal from villages and farms in order to demilitarize public and private properties in Sa,ada; 2) genuine economic development and delivery of basic services; 3) end cultural and political discrimination against the Zaydi population; and 4) allow civil servants to return to their jobs and give them back-pay for the time they were separated from their posts. According to NDI Deputy Director Murad Zafir, the Houthis are also seeking to establish a university for Zaydi jurisprudence, as various universities for Sunni jurisprudence already exist in Yemen.

WAR WITH RELIGIOUS ROOTS OR RELIGIOUS WAR?
——————————————

¶10. (SBU) One of the deepest root causes of the conflict in Sa’ada is religious. Over the past 20 years, Zaydis -) who have historically made up the majority of the governorate’s population )- have felt increasingly threatened by the radical Sunni Salafism exported from Saudi Arabia (ref b). “Sa’ada is so Shi’a that even the stone is Shi’a,” Abdulkader al-Hillal, former head of the Sa’ada Mediation Committee, told the Ambassador, quoting a Yemeni poet. However, Sa’ada’s unique Zaydi identity has been challenged by the establishment of Salafi schools and mosques in the governorate, and local residents founded a Zaydi revivalist group called the Believing Youth to teach young people about their Zaydi religion and history. A branch of the Believing Youth later produced the more extreme Houthi ideology and organization. NDI’s Zafir told PolOff on November 21 that the Houthis are fighting to preserve their unique identity, religious beliefs and practices by seeking to establish their own schools and university.

COMMENT
——-

¶11. (C) Contrary to the ROYG’s claims, the Houthis do not appear to be fighting to restore clerical rule. It is more likely that they are, as they claim, seeking greater local autonomy and respect for their religious beliefs and practices. Understanding the Houthis’ objectives can help shape a political solution to this complex conflict. Yet even if such a settlement takes the Houthi leadership’s grievances into account, the fighting will not end unless steps are taken to address the additional factors )- such as tribal vendettas — that have motivated other individuals and tribes to join the Houthis’ struggle despite not sharing their ideology. END COMMENT.

SECHE

Source: WikiLeaks

Part 2: Who are the Houthis? How are they fighting?

Reference ID: 09SANAA2186
Created: 2009-12-09 13:29
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Origin: Embassy Sanaa

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DE RUEHYN #2186/01 3431329
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RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0122
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1718
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T SANAA 002186

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: WHO ARE THE HOUTHIS, PART TWO: HOW ARE THEY FIGHTING?

REF: A. SANAA 2155
¶B. SANAA 2185

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Little is clear about the Houthi leadership, aside from the fact that Abdulmalik al-Houthi is the rebel group’s current leader. Houthi field commanders do not seem to agree on key ideological and religious principles. The Houthis’ numbers range from the hundreds to the thousands, though it is difficult to determine how many of these adhere to Houthi ideology and how many are tribesmen who have joined the Houthis’ fight for other reasons. Numerous organizations have documented the Houthis’ use of child soldiers, as well as violations of international humanitarian law such as looting, forced evacuations, and executions. Contrary to ROYG claims that Iran is arming the Houthis, most analysts report that the Houthis obtain their weapons from the Yemeni black market and even from the ROYG military itself. END SUMMARY.

LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION
—————————

¶2. (C) Abdulmalik al-Houthi, brother of Houthi movement founder Hussein al-Houthi, is the current leader of the Houthi rebellion in the northern Yemeni governorate of Sa’ada. AP correspondent Ahmed al-Haj told PolOff on October 27 that Abdulmalik al-Houthi is a “political-military leader rather than a religious one, more of a politician than an ideologue.” Christoph Wilcke, a researcher for Human Rights Watch (HRW) who visited Hajja governorate on a fact-finding mission, told PolOffs on October 26 that Houthi foot-soldiers usually do not fight in the areas where they are from, and as a result may not know the name of the local commander, but do identify their top leader as Abdulmalik al-Houthi. Beyond that, according to Wilcke, “it’s not clear where the leadership sits or how it’s structured.” According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), there is no evidence that the rebels possess a centralized command-and-control structure, coherent ideology, or political program.

¶3. (C) While AP’s Haj believes the Houthis are a well-organized group, to some observers the Houthis are a rag-tag, decentralized guerrilla army. The number of fighters is estimated to be between several hundred and several thousand, though it is difficult to know how many adhere to Houthi ideology and how many are tribal fighters who joined the cause out of anti-government sentiments. There are substantial differences in ideology, strategy, and tactics among field commanders in different parts of Sa’ada. World Food Program (WFP) Representative Gian Carlo Cirri, who speaks with Houthis to negotiate passage of food aid, told PolOff on November 4 that “there is no such thing as a united Houthi command. The field commanders have a great deal of authority. They don’t agree on key ideological and religious principles.”

¶4. (C) One example of differences among Houthi field commanders is their attitudes toward international relief agencies. Cirri noted that Houthi field commanders “do not perceive UN and WFP assistance in the same way.” For instance, the field commander in Saqayn, west of Sa’ada City, allowed relief agencies to access the area in order to distribute aid to IDPs, while the commander in the Dhahian area between Sa’ada City and Baqim is adamantly “opposed to internationals.” (Note: As of early November, WFP had lost all contact with the Houthis because their main contact )- Abu Ali, the Saqayn field commander — had died. Ali was reportedly very close to Abdulmalik al-Houthi and was number three in the Houthi organization. End Note.) The main Houthi leadership, however, does seem inclined to accept a UN or foreign role in mediation. According to UNHCR Representative Claire Bourgeois, after the October visit of UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes, the Houthis said they would agree to a humanitarian corridor if it were enforced by the UN. Houthi mediator Hassan Zaid told PolOff on December 2 that the Houthis would welcome the participation of foreign governments or multilateral organizations in negotiating a settlement to the conflict (ref a).

SYMPATHIZERS AND SUPPORTERS
—————————

¶5. (C) AP’s Haj said that many Sa’ada residents support the Houthis because of ROYG injustices, abuses by local sheikhs, and the brutality of the war. During two visits to Sa’ada in the fall of 2009, however, NewsYemen’s Soufi found little support for either the Houthis or the ROYG, as the residents blame both parties for the suffering caused by the war. He said that some residents take a pragmatic approach, hedging their bets by supporting the ROYG during the day and the Houthis at night. He was struck by how isolated the people in Sa’ada are. They refer to Sana’a as “Yemen,” saying “I have never been to Yemen” when referring to the capital, according to Soufi.

¶6. (S/NF) Colonel Akram al-Qassmi of the National Security Bureau (NSB) estimates that there are thousands of men fighting for the Houthis, but not all of them share the Houthi ideology. They “jumped on the wave” to fight for their tribe, or against the government, or against a powerful sheikh. According to WFP’s Cirri, the tribes who support the Houthis have “no real loyalty” to them; they switch sides based on “direct, immediate private interests.” He believes the conflict is extremely localized: families and tribes decide to support the Houthis based on specific grievances )- including the lack of payment of blood money — that they have against the government or more powerful tribal leaders. NewsYemen’s Soufi thinks that many of the rank-and-file are thugs who are taking advantage of the conflict to gain power and resources.

HOUTHI GOVERNANCE
—————–

¶7. (C) Many analysts report that the Houthis establish their own system of governance in the areas they control. According to Mohammed Azzan, presidential advisor for Sa’ada affairs, the Houthis are trying to create a “state within a state.” Mohammed al-Qadhi, correspondent for Dubai-based The National, reported that in Haydan district, the Houthis have established courts and prisons. Soufi reported that the Houthis in Harf Sufyan have established Islamic courts, impose their own laws on local residents, demand protection money, and dispense rough justice by ordering executions. AP’s Haj argues that the Houthis are winning hearts and minds by providing security in areas long neglected by the ROYG. According to Haj, the Houthis limit the arbitrary and abusive power of influential sheikhs. According to Abdulmajid al-Fahd, Executive Director of the Civic Democratic Foundation, Houthis help resolve conflicts between tribes and reduce the number of revenge killings in areas they control. (Comment: While claims that Houthis are establishing a parallel state seem far-fetched, it is likely that the Houthis are attempting to arbitrate local disputes. End Comment.)

HOUTHI ABUSES: CHILD SOLDIERS AND ALLEGATIONS OF “SHIELDING”
——————————————— —

¶8. (C) Numerous organizations, including Save the Children, UNICEF, and Islamic Relief, have documented the Houthis’ use of child soldiers. HRW’s Wilcke reported that Houthis use boys as young as 13 as guards; older teenagers are used as fighters. According to UNHCR interviews with IDPs, “Their reasons for leaving their places of origin include … forced enrollment of children as young as 14 in guerrilla forces,” as well as forced taxes, destruction of properties, and heavy weapon shelling by both sides. Judith Evans, a Times of London reporter who visited the Mazraq IDP camp (Hajja governorate), told PolOff on October 12 that she heard many accounts of atrocities against civilians by the Houthis. She said, “The refugees we spoke to were terrified of the government bombing raids, but it seems the Houthis take things a step further and deliberately target civilians, including children, for instance, shooting them in their houses as an act of revenge for siding with the government.” Saba, the government news agency, reported on December 6 that the Houthis killed an 11-year-old boy in retaliation for his father’s refusal to join them.

¶9. (C) While the ROYG repeatedly accuses the Houthis of using civilians as human shields, Wilcke noted that “shielding” has a very specific definition in international human rights law, requiring intent to expose civilians to danger in order to fend off a military advance. HRW does not have enough evidence to conclude that the Houthis are intentionally using civilians as human shields, he said, though Wilcke admitted there may be cases they have not been able to document. However, HRW has documented a number of other Houthi violations of international humanitarian law, such as looting and forced evacuation (in which civilians are told to fight with the Houthis or flee). He said HRW also documented assassinations, which, depending on the circumstances, could be regular crimes or rise to the level of war crimes.

¶10. (C) With respect to humanitarian aid, WFP’s Cirri said that the Houthis have never stopped any WFP food convoys; they once stopped an ADRA convoy in Al Jawf but allowed it to pass. Rather, it is often tribes demanding aid or government concessions who hold aid convoys hostage. In addition, one joint WFP-UNHCR convoy was stopped for three weeks by the government.

TACTICS AND STRATEGY
———————

¶11. (S) According to journalist Qadhi, the Houthis have gained experience from each round of fighting, as shown by their use of more sophisticated tactics. HRW’s Wilcke said that the Houthis now dig trenches around towns so that the artillery shells, which explode upwards, do not hit them. The British DATT believes that the Houthis’ advances in tactics and strategy indicate that they have received outside training, though he did not say by whom. Early in the sixth war, he said, the Houthis focused on collecting and capturing weapons and resources. He told PolOff on November 21 that unlike previous rounds of fighting, in the sixth war there have been some set piece battles, including an attempted takeover of the Republican Palace in Sa’ada City involving hundreds of Houthi fighters. Such large battles are unusual, however. Murad Zafir, Deputy Director of the National Democratic Institute, said that Houthi fighters generally attack in groups of three to five people, including one sniper. That way they minimize their own losses while driving up the costs of the army, which is using big bombs on small groups of fighters. Col. Mansour al-Azi, a senior military intelligence officer, told PolOff on November 24 that the Houthis fight with religious fervor, yelling “God is Great” when running into battle, unafraid of dying because they believe that if they do, they will go directly to paradise.

WEAPONS SUPPLY
————–

¶12. (S/NF) Contrary to ROYG claims that Iran is arming the Houthis, most local political analysts report that the Houthis obtain their weapons from the Yemeni black market and even from the ROYG military itself. According to a British diplomat, there are numerous credible reports that ROYG military commanders were selling weapons to the Houthis in the run-up to the Sixth War. An ICG report on the Sa’ada conflict from May 2009 quoted NSB director Ali Mohammed al-Ansi saying, “Iranians are not arming the Houthis. The weapons they use are Yemeni. Most actually come from fighters who fought against the socialists during the 1994 war and then sold them.” Mohammed Azzan, presidential advisor for Sa’ada affairs, told PolOff on August 16 that the Houthis easily obtain weapons inside Yemen, either from battlefield captures or by buying them from corrupt military commanders and soldiers. Azzan said that the military “covers up its failure” by saying the weapons come from Iran. According to Jamal Abdullah al-Shami of the Democracy School, there is little external oversight of the military’s large and increasing budget, so it is easy for members of the military to illegally sell weapons.

¶13. (S/NF) ROYG officials assert that the Houthis’ possession and use of Katyusha rockets is evidence of support from Iran and Hizballah, arguing that these rockets are not available in Yemeni arms markets nor ROYG stockpiles. (Comment: Given Yemen’s robust arms markets, especially in Sa’ada, it is possible that Katyushas are available on the black market even if they are not in ROYG stockpiles. According to sensitive reporting, there is at least one instance of Somali extremists purchasing Katyusha rockets in Yemen in 2007. End Comment.) However, according to sensitive reporting, it may have been the ROYG military who aided the Houthis in obtaining a shipment of 200 Katyusha rockets in late November 2009.

SECHE